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Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, public discourse in German society has been repeatedly 
riven by debates prompted by three leading figures of the literary scene: Günter Grass, 
Martin Walser, and Christa Wolf. The tremendously emotional controversies regarding 
Wolf’s purported cowardice as a GDR-writer, Walser’s alleged anti-Semitism, and 
Grass’s membership in the Waffen-SS served to confirm the significance of these writers, 
which, I argue, stems not only from their literary merits, but also from their status as 
former members of the Hitler Youth. Building upon Sigrid Weigel’s claim that 
generations in post-war Germany act as symbols of the country’s relationship to the Nazi 
past, my dissertation elucidates the process by which Grass, Walser, and Wolf were 
adopted—and adopted themselves—as proxies for a “better Germany.” The biographies 
of these three writers, I argue, came to represent the overarching political goal of both 
post-war German states: the successful transition from an intimate association with the 
Nazi regime – in the authors’ case, their associations with the Hitler Youth – to a full 
embrace of democratic values. The conflation of the writers’ biographies with national 
identity explains their authority and popularity in both German societies. It also explains 
why the process of detachment from these writers as political figures began after 1990 as 




 With the waning of the Hitler Youth generation’s dominance in the public sphere, 
a re-evaluation of the writers’ political and literary work, set against the backdrop of their 
generational identity, is long overdue. In four chapters, this dissertation examines key 
moments in the careers of Grass, Walser, and Wolf. I emphasize the striking similarities 
between the generational discourse of the two West-German writers and the East-German 
writer, while pointing out where their shared generational background led to distinct 
political agendas. I show that the literary output, self-understanding, and public reception 
of arguably the three most significant writers in the post-war Germanies cannot be 
understood without a consideration of this mutual historical-biographical legacy. My 
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Vielleicht wird unser Beitrag zur Literatur darin bestehen müssen, daß wir den 
Mut finden, unseren eigenen Lebensstoff schonungslos und wahrheitsgetreu zu 
erzählen. 
—Christa Wolf, Gegenwart und Zukunft, 1970 
 
Chapter One:  
Gruppe 47 and the two “First Generations” of Post-War 
German Authors  
 
1. The Hitler Youth generation and the Privilege of Late Birth 
Introduction  
During his visit to Israel in 1984, the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl repeatedly 
emphasized that he came as a representative of a new Germany. While Kohl at no point 
denied the particular historical responsibility that derived from Germany’s role in the 
Holocaust and World War II, he did not miss any opportunity to mention that he was the 
first chancellor to embody a “post-war” generation of Germans, no longer biographically 
attached to the war. By stressing that the generation of the perpetrators was vanishing and 
that sixty percent of Germany’s population was born after the war, Kohl seemed to 
suggest that Germany’s relations with Israel could enter a new stage in which the 
dialogue could be more “normal,” less biased, less burdened by the past. Although the 
Chancellor himself was born in 1930, he made sure to include himself in the collective of 
Germans who, in his view, no longer shared the guilt of the Nazi era. 
 Kohl’s speech before the Knesset began with the words: “Ich rede vor Ihnen als 





Geburt und das Glück eines besonderen Elternhauses gehabt hat.”1 His use of the 
expression “die Gnade der späten Geburt,” which quickly became a catchphrase, 
provoked much disapproval. It was considered highly inappropriate for the chancellor of 
Germany to begin a speech to the Israeli Parliament with the assurance that he was not 
personally culpable for the crimes of Hitler’s Germany. The phrase only highlighted the 
problematic notion that underlay Kohl’s visit throughout, namely that historical 
responsibility and guilt could be rejected on the basis of age. Among the harshest critics 
was the journalist Günter Gaus, who had used the phrase “grace of late birth” a year 
before Kohl in order to underline that if his generation had been widely spared having to 
make difficult decisions during the years between 1933 and 1945, it was only due to their 
young age and thus by total coincidence and not as a result of their own merit.2 In a book 
published in 1986, Gaus again clarified that the exculpatory undertones that the 
expression carried in the context of Kohl’s speech were contrary to the meaning he 
originally intended:  
Helmut Kohl […] hatte in Israel seinen Geburtsjahrgang und alle jüngeren mit 
dem entwendeten Wort freisprechen wollen von deutscher Schuld: die 
Geburtsurkunde als Persilschein, biologische Fakten, wenn’s denn dem Ansehen 
dient, als Sieger über historische Identität. Ich dagegen habe den Begriff stets auf 
Kohls und meine Halbgeneration, die Altersgruppe um das Jahr 1930, bezogen, 
um deutlich zu machen, wie zerbrechlich die Barriere immer ist, die uns damals, 
gnädig, vom Dienst an der Rampe in Auschwitz bewahrt hat. […] Ich wollte 
unsere Nähe zur Schuld, das Unverdiente, nichts Beweisende unsere 
Schuldlosigkeit ins Bewußtsein heben […].3 
                                                
1 Cited in: Monika Köpke, “Helmut Kohl trifft in Israel ein und spricht von der ‘Gnade der späten Geburt’. 
Kalenderblatt, Vor 20 Jahren,” Deutschlandradio 24 January 2004, 
http://www.dradio.de/dlr/sendungen/kalender/227514/. 
2 In his book Die Welt der Westdeutschen, Gaus claims that he had used the phrase before Kohl, namely in 
1983 in a speech at the Münchner Kammerspiele, in the context of a lecture series called Reden über das 
eigene Land – Deutschland. See Günter Gaus, Die Welt der Westdeutschen: Kritische Betrachtungen 
(Cologne: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1986). 





Whether or not the Chancellor intended to exempt an entire generation from historical 
guilt, as Gaus suggests, Kohl certainly used the phrase “die Gnade der späten Geburt“ to 
underscore that his birth year prevented him from carrying any personal guilt; he spoke, 
as he said, as someone who could no longer be entangled in guilt. Gaus, on the other 
hand, had meant to stress the randomness and contingency of the year of birth—the idea 
that only a few years separated his generation from the collective of the perpetrators. In 
an article from 2001, he wrote: “Wer wollte die Hand dafür ins Feuer legen, wie sie [his 
generation] sich verhalten hätten, wären sie zehn Jahre früher geboren?”4  
 The metaphor of late birth leads directly into the center of the discourse 
surrounding Kohl’s and Gaus’ generation, the so-called “Hitler Youth generation”. The 
fact that Gaus characterizes his generation as innocent (“unsere Schuldlosigkeit”) while 
at the same time emphasizing its proximity to guilt (“unsere Nähe zur Schuld”) is 
paradigmatic of this discourse, which can be described as a continuous struggle to define 
and assess this generation’s relationship towards Germany’s National-Socialist past. 
The Hitler Youth generation and its place in post-war history 
Kohl and Gaus belong to the Hitler Youth generation, comprised of the cohorts born in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s. What distinguishes this generation from those before and 
after it is that their entire socialization took place in Nazi-Germany: they were children 
during the rise and rule of National Socialism and adolescents during its defeat.  
 When the war ended in 1945, this age group had no other experiences other than 
those under the National-Socialist regime. From the age of ten, when membership in one 
of the Nazi youth organizations became mandatory, they had been systematically 
                                                
4 Günter Gaus, “Wer den Mund zu voll nimmt. Die 45er und die 68er verbindet nur eins: Beide 





indoctrinated into fascist ideology and prepared for their role as Hitler’s “Garanten der 
Zukunft.”5 Deeply effected by the Nazi education during their adolescence, they often 
became the fiercest believers in the Führer and the idea of Germany’s final victory, even 
in the last years of the war when the downfall of the Third Reich was readily apparent to 
many Germans. For the Hitler Youth, then, the experience of both the end of the war and 
the end of the fascist regime in 1945 thus meant the total collapse of the world as they 
had known it. Accordingly, the central question in the discourse about German youth in 
the immediate post-war years was whether this generation would be able to leave their 
Nazi socialization behind, to “learn” democracy and to participate in the rebuilding of a 
democratic Germany. 
 In the first sociological study of the Hitler Youth generation, Die skeptische 
Generation (1957), Helmut Schelsky had argued that while this generation transitioned 
from fascism to democracy with ease, their Nazi socialization and the traumatic 
experience of 1945 had led to their withdrawal from the political into the private sphere.6 
Schelsky portrayed this generation as skeptical of all ideologies, unwilling to engage with 
societal and political issues and as interested mostly in consumption, professional success 
and family life.7 But this early assessment of the Hitler Youth generation did not hold 
true for its intellectuals. Many of the “young Nazis” in fact turned out to be the country’s 
leading intellectuals in the post-war era. Recent studies in the field of intellectual and 
cultural history have emphasized the significant role that intellectuals of the Hitler Youth 
                                                
5 During the Nazi regime, the Hitler Youth was commonly referred to as “Garant der Zukunft”. See for 
example Arno Klönne, Jugend im Dritten Reich: Die Hitler-Jugend und ihre Gegner: Dokumente und 
Analysen (Düsseldorf: Diederichs, 1982).  
6 Helmut Schelsky, Die skeptische Generation: Eine Soziologie der deutschen Jugend (Dusseldorf and 
Cologne: Diederich, 1957). 





generation have played in the Federal Republic. Jan-Werner Müller’s book Another 
Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity, for example, a study of 
intellectuals in the Federal Republic and their approaches to German nationhood and 
unification after 1945 as well as after 1989, focuses strongly on the “skeptical 
generation.” “Arguably,” he writes, “a generation, on which politics had intruded so 
forcefully so early, could not be truly ‘apolitical’ ever again.”8 Members of this 
generation, Müller argues, “participated in almost every major debate touching on the 
political self-understanding of West Germany, and especially questions of ‘national 
identity’.”9 In his book German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (2007), the historian Dirk 
Moses has correspondingly underscored the influence of this generation on the academic 
discourse. His thesis is that the “historians, philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, 
and educationalists” of this generation, “many of whom made decisive interventions in 
the public sphere, served as ministers and political advisers, and liberalized German 
intellectual life,”10 have themselves been driven by political emotions that result from 
their personal experience of the Nazi past. From the beginning of the 1960s they became 
the dominant forces in the cultural and political discourse on both sides of the Berlin 
Wall, in spite of their early indoctrination into Nazism, or, rather, because of it. As Moses 
points out, it was “[p]aradoxically, […] the true believers […] who made the cleanest 
break with the regime after 1945 because the collapse of their world demanded 
systematic, critical reflections on their prior commitments.”11 
                                                
8 Jan-Werner Müller, Another Country: German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 
9 Müller, Another Country  8-9. 
10 A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007). 
11 A. Dirk Moses, “The Forty-Fivers: A Generation Between Fascism and Democracy,” German Politics 





 Aleida Assmann has similarly highlighted the academic contributions of Hitler 
Youth intellectuals. Against the common opinion that the intellectual renewal of West-
Germany resulted from the generation of 1968, she argues that it was mostly the forty-
fiver generation that instigated what she calls a general overhaul of various academic 
disciplines at the end of the fifties: “Sie machten ein Ende mit der Restauration der 50er 
Jahre und den damit verbundenen muffig gewordenen Sprach- und Denktraditionen, sie 
begründeten neue Diskurse und ermöglichten damit einen international anschlussfähigen 
geistigen Neubeginn.”12 The list of prominent academics of the Hitler Youth generation 
who made a significant contribution to their respective disciplines includes the 
sociologists Niklas Luhmann (1927), Jürgen Habermas (1929) and Ralf Dahrendorf 
(1929), the literary scholar Wolfgang Iser (1926), the psychoanalyst Helm Stierlin 
(1926), the historians Martin Broszat (1926) and Joachim Fest (1926), the cultural 
historian Hermann Glaser (1928), the philosopher Hermann Lübbe, and the political 
scientist Kurt Sontheimer (1928). Other influential members of this generation, who 
became famous outside the academic context and even internationally, include the 
politicians Helmut Kohl (1930) and Hans-Dietrich Genscher (1927) as well as Pope 
Benedict XVI (1927).13 
 But it is particularly the writers of this generation who became highly influential 
figures in the public sphere. Authors such as Günter Grass (1927), Martin Walser (1927), 
Siegfried Lenz (1926), and Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1929) in the West, and Christa 
Wolf (1929), Uwe Johnson (1933), and Heiner Müller (1927) in the East, all gained 
reputations not only as writers but also as commentators on political and cultural issues 
                                                
12Aleida Assmann, Geschichte im Gedächtnis: Von der individuellen Erfahrung zur öffentlichen 
Inszenierung (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2007). 





that went far beyond the field of literature. Soon after they entered the cultural scene 
between the mid-fifties and early sixties, they became well respected and cherished in 
their role as “the prime advocates of a critical engagement with Germany’s National 
Socialist past, criticizing, in particular, the political continuities in the post-war period.”14 
The Hitler Youth generation’s critical perspective as well as their drive to explore new 
forms of literature had been missing from Germany’s cultural scene during the era of 
restoration in the fifties. A zero hour never existed in Germany’s literary scene. “Das war 
eine absurde Hoffnung,” Heinrich Vormweg writes about the idea that literature could 
simply bracket twelve years of Nazi-rule and move forward into the direction of 
innovation, renewal, and a critical dealing with the past. “Es war nur die Stunde 
äußersten physischen und ideologischen Elends, die Stunde der Unfähigkeit zu 
kritischem Denken, die Stunde der Anfälligkeit für die geringsten Tröstungen. Es konnte 
sich in ihr weder eine neue Gesellschaft noch eine neue Literatur konstituieren.”15 With 
this new generation of writers, seemingly exculpated from the historical guilt because 
they had experienced the war as children and adolescents, there seemed to be the chance 
for both: a new society and a new literature; or rather, two new societies and two new 
literatures seemed to emerge, as East and West continued to grow apart during these 
years. In the East, the emergence of a new generation of writers (Christa Wolf, Uwe 
Johnson, Heiner Müller) did not make as much noise as in the West. Older writers such 
as Anna Seghers, Bertolt Brecht, Arnold Zweig, and Johannes R. Becher, who had been 
forced into exile during the Third Reich due to their communist beliefs or Jewish origins, 
                                                
14 Anne Fuchs, Phantoms of War in Contemporary German Literature, Films and Discourse: The Politics 
of Memory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
15 Heinrich Vormweg: “Deutsche Literatur 1945-1960: Keine Stunde Null,” in Deutsche 
Gegenwartsliteratur. Ausgangspositionen und aktuelle Entwicklungen, ed. Manfred Durzak, (Stuttgart: 





had reassumed important positions in literature upon their return. Their moral authority 
was not in question. In the West, however, the popular writers of the era of restoration in 
the late forties and fifties were writers of the “inner emigration,” like Hans Carossa, Ernst 
Wiechert, Werner Bergengruen, Ricarda Huch, or Reinhold Schneider. They had spent 
the Nazi years in Germany without publicly declaring their opposition against the Nazis, 
and for the most part they continued to refrain from any societal involvement after the 
war. Continuities marked their literature as well. Their aesthetic development stalled 
during the Nazi years, but even after the war, writers of the late forties and fifties did not 
produce innovative literature, pick up modernist impulses from abroad, or break with 
aesthetic traditions. Klaus Scherpe describes the immediate postwar literary scene in the 
following way: “Wer unverdrossen Sonette schreibt, den Helden des Bildungsromans 
ohne Ironie wiederaufleben läßt oder den poetischen Realismus des 19. Jahrhunderts zum 
Hort eines wahreren Lebens erklärt, ignoriert die ebenso innovative wie destruktive 
Moderne.“16 In other words, post-war writers of the forties and fifties ignored the 
modernist avantgarde that had already been present in Germany before World War II. 
With regard to a critical reflection of the Nazi years, the deficit was even greater. The 
great societal task of Vergangenheitsbewältigung still lay ahead.  
 Thus, it has become commonplace to consider the year 1959 as the year of 
innovation when German literature finally caught up with the rest of the world, as writers 
began to address the difficult past and the difficult presence, and found new stylistic 
forms to write about both. Three 1959 publications marked the beginning of this new 
literary era, Günter Grass’s Die Blechtrommel, Uwe Johnson’s Mutmaßungen über 
                                                
16 Klaus R.Scherpe, introduction to Die rekonstruierte Moderne. Studien zur deutschen Literatur nach 1945 





Jakob—two members of the Hitler Youth generation, Johnson from the East, Grass from 
the West—as well as the novel Billiard um halb zehn by the slightly older author 
Heinrich Böll. The writer Hans-Erich Nossack described the symbolic meaning of “Die 
Blechtrommel” in his diary: “Es kommt nicht darauf an, ob es mir gefällt oder nicht: 
eines scheint mir festzustehen, daß es das erste Buch der Generation nach 1945 ist, das 
internationalen und überzeitlichen Rang hat.”17 Other pivotal works by writers of the 
Hitler Youth generation followed, for instance the novels Halbzeit (1960) by Martin 
Walser, Deutschstunde (1968) by Siegfried Lenz, Der geteilte Himmel and Nachdenken 
über Christa T. by Christa Wolf, and the play Der Stellvertreter (1963) by Rolf 
Hochhuth. The Hitler Youth generation began to dominate the cultural scene, and more 
so, they became increasingly influential in moral-political matters.  
The Hitler Youth generation today  
In his 2005 essay “Warum die Alten an der Macht bleiben”, the literary critic Fritz J. 
Raddatz described it as “sensationell” and perhaps even “einmalig in der deutschen 
Kulturgeschichte” that those writers, now nearing their eighties, still dominate the public 
sphere:  
Die Alten bestimmen den öffentlichen Diskurs. Entgegen aller Prognosen – 
immer noch. Ob es um direkte Einrede zur Politik geht, ob um historische 
Zusammenhänge oder philosophisch-theoretische Auseinandersetzungen – es sind 
allemal Schriftstellerinnen, Autoren, Theoretiker der älteren Generation […], die 
‚den Ton angeben’. Christa Wolf oder Günter Grass, Martin Walser, Walter 
Kempowski, Jürgen Habermas, Rolf Hochhuth oder Hans Magnus Enzensberger: 
Deren Wort zählt, sei es ein Essay, ein Interview, ein Buch, auch nur ein 
Artikel.18 
 
                                                
17 Hans-Erich Nossack, Die Tagebücher 1943-1977, ed. Gabriele Söhling, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp 
1997), Volume 1, 393.  
18Fritz J. Raddatz, “Warum die Alten an der Macht bleiben,” Cicero – Magazin für politische Kultur, Sept 





While I argue that the moral authority that Raddatz attributes to the intellectuals of this 
generation in this article had already begun to wane by 2005, I share his view that they 
maintained the prominent position they had assumed in the sixties for an astonishingly 
long time. Why is it that this generation was able to hold so much sway over the public 
sphere? My thesis is simple: they came to represent the overarching political goal of both 
post-war German states—the successful transition from an intimate association with the 
Nazi regime to a full embrace of new values. These writers had achieved what the 
country needed to achieve. They had been corrupted by Nazi ideology as children and 
adolescents but had then left this affiliation behind. They put all their energy into 
rebuilding the new German states advocating new values. As they embodied national 
identity, they were able to maintain their prominent role in society, both self-assigned and 
assigned to them by society, for decades. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, a 
number of heated literary debates surrounding the works of Christa Wolf, Günter Grass 
and Martin Walser—the first three on Raddatz’ list—had seriously damaged their 
reputation and turned these former role models into controversial figures. 
 Christa Wolf was the first to become the subject of fiery discussions with her 
novel Was bleibt (1979/1989), in which she depicts a writer being observed by the Stasi. 
In an article on this book, published in 1990 in Die Zeit, Ulrich Greiner accused Wolf of 
presenting herself as a victim of the repressive GDR regime, despite the fact that she had 
supported the regime and had decided to stay in the GDR when other intellectuals had 
long since emigrated. The article triggered the so-called “Deutsch-Deutscher 
Literaturstreit,” lasting over a year. The book review turned into a controversial exchange 





intellectuals in totalitarian regimes that had occupied the cultural scene already after 
1945.19 Wolf was attacked again when Stasi records found in 1993 showed that she had 
worked as an informant (Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter) during the years 1959-61.20 The 
overarching reproach made against the writer in both debates was that she had not lived 
up to the promise of her public image as a critical force courageously standing up against 
the East-German regime. The Stasi files were seen as a last proof of Wolf’s biographical 
and personal failure. Christa Wolf seemed to be a politically corrupted writer after all.   
 While Christa Wolf was criticized for her lack of distance towards the East-
German state, Günter Grass and Martin Walser have raised other suspicions with their 
recent interventions in the memory discourse. Walser stirred a highly emotional debate 
with his provocative acceptance speech for the Frankfurt Book Fair’s Friedenspreis des 
Deutschen Buchhandels in 1998, in which he denounced the inflationary use of the 
Holocaust in public discourse. He spoke of Auschwitz as a “Moralkeule” and 
“Einschüchterungsmittel” and pleaded that the memory of the Nazi era not be prescribed 
by a normative public discourse but instead be considered a private matter.21 The attacks 
on Walser multiplied after the publication of his 2002 novel Tod eines Kritikers,22 which 
included an allegedly anti-Semitic caricature of the Jewish literary critic Marcel Reich-
Ranicki.23 The Nobel laureate Grass, on the other hand, was accused of portraying 
                                                
19 For documentation and analysis of the debate, see Karl Deiritz and Hannes Krauss, Der Deutsch-
deutsche Literaturstreit, oder “Freunde, es spricht sich schlecht mit gebundener Zunge”: Analysen und 
Materialien (Hamburg: Luchterhand, 1991), and Thomas Anz, “Es geht nicht um Christa Wolf”: Der 
Literaturstreit im vereinten Deutschland (Munich: Edition Spangenberg, 1991). 
20 For a discussion of Wolf’s Stasi past, see Peter Graves, “The treachery of St. Joan: Christa Wolf and the 
Stasi,” in Christa Wolf in Perspective, ed. Ian Wallace (Amsterdam; Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1994). 
21 For Walser’s speech and an extensive documentation of the debate surrounding it see Frank 
Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte: Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1999). 
22 Martin Walser, Tod eines Kritikers, (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2002). 
23 See for example Dieter Borchmeyer, Der Ernstfall: Martin Walsers Tod eines Kritikers (Hamburg: 





Germans as innocent victims of World War II. In his 2002 novel Im Krebsgang,24 he 
explored the sufferings inflicted on East Prussian Germans who fled or were driven from 
their homeland in 1945.25 In 2006, Grass caused a major debate when in an interview 
preceding the publication of his memoir Beim Häuten der Zwiebel he admitted to having 
joined the Waffen SS as a seventeen-year-old during the last months of the war—a 
biographical detail that he had hidden throughout his career and had finally decided to 
reveal in his new book.26 
 The revelation took Grass biographers, literary scholars and the German public 
completely by surprise. Why had Grass, who had always criticized the country’s 
superficial reckoning with the Nazi past, taken so long to speak about his own 
entanglement? And why was it not discovered earlier? Suddenly, the biographies of other 
members of the Hitler Youth generation were under siege as well: membership cards for 
the Nazi-party were found for writers Martin Walser and Siegfried Lenz, for the popular 
political comedian Dieter Hildebrandt and for Martin Broszat, historian and longtime 
director of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte. An article in the journal Cicero, which brought 
up Jürgen Habermas’ affiliation with the Hitlerjugend, led to a front page with the title 
“Vergesst Habermas!”27    
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 The events of the summer of 2006 underline the enormous significance of 
intellectuals of the Hitler Youth generation for public discourse. The Grass affair also 
revealed a phenomenon that had already become visible during the Christa Wolf debate 
sixteen years earlier. While the writers themselves had reflected upon their biographies in 
their literary and non-literary work, the media discourse about these authors mostly chose 
not to pick up on this self-reflexion. This is understandable in the case of Walser, because 
it requires some interpretative work to understand that Walser’s discourse on Germany is 
closely tied to his generational identity. But whereas Grass had kept his SS membership a 
secret, he had never concealed that he was a fierce admirer of the Führer during his 
adolescent years. In fact, like many other intellectuals of the Hitler Youth generation, he 
had repeatedly expressed the idea that his work was to a large part motivated by his 
experiences during the Nazi era—in explicitly generational terms. Similarly, Christa 
Wolf had never hidden that her (and her generation’s) relationship to the GDR proved to 
be continually conflicted due to her upbringing in Hitler-Germany. Thus, in the case of 
Grass and Wolf, the public obliviousness to their Hitler Youth past is striking. Wolf’s and 
Walser’s positive roles as representatives of society had come under serious scrutiny 
during the nineties. But only in 2006, when this generation’s biggest “hero” was kicked, 
or kicked himself, off the pedestal with his Waffen SS confession, did the media bring 
the generational subject to the forefront and put an end to the Hitler Youth generation’s 
dominance. It was as though over the course of the summer of 2006 a whole nation 
became aware of the fact that this generation, “die lange Zeit das Über-Ich der 
Gesellschaft in Form von moralischer Instanz und Meinungsbildung verkörpert hatte,“28 
had grown up under Hitler’s swastika. 
                                                





A new vantage point  
Aleida Assmann has pointed out that the Grass debate might serve as a vantage point for 
a re-examination of the generational identity of the Hitler Youth. She said: “Ein Spalt hat 
sich geöffnet zwischen Lebensleistung und Biographie, der einen neuen Blick auf die 
Generationsidentität der 45er freigibt.”29 In my dissertation, I want to adopt this vantage 
point in order to examine the aesthetics and politics of arguably the most prominent 
writers of this generation. I argue that the works of Günter Grass, Martin Walser and 
Christa Wolf reveal traces of a distinct generational identity, which separate them from 
other generations of writers and shed light on their canonical work from an angle that has 
thus far been mostly overlooked. After the post-reunification debates have stressed yet 
again the enormous significance of Grass, Walser, and Wolf—paradoxically at the very 
moment their authority began to wane—a re-evaluation of these writers’ political and 
literary work, set against the backdrop of their generational identity, is long overdue.  
 Only few scholars have taken on this task so far. To my knowledge, there are two 
scholarly pieces, a book chapter by Anne Fuchs and an article by Stuart Parkes, which do 
not only draw a direct connection between the works of these three writers but also take 
their common generational affiliation into consideration. Anne Fuchs includes a chapter 
on “Hitler Youth biographies” in her book Phantoms of War.30 She examines the 
“management of the process of autobiographical recall”31 in Grass’ Beim Häuten der 
Zwiebel compared to another Hitler Youth autobiography that appeared in 2006, the book 
Ich nicht. Erinnerungen an eine Kindheit und Jugend by the conservative historian 
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Joachim Fest.32 Fuchs also mentions Wolf and Walser in her essay on Grass and Fest (as 
well as the less well-known writer Ludwig Harig) and points to the differences in their 
treatment of the subject of guilt. However, since she primarily focuses on Grass and Fest, 
the other autobiographies are mentioned only in passing. Due to her concentration on 
autobiographical texts, Fuchs’s chapter also misses a comparison of Grass, Walser, and 
Wolf from the perspective of the post-unification debates as well as a consideration of 
their earlier works.33  
 Stuart Parkes, by comparison, does address the debates and points out many 
characteristics that writers of the Hitler Youth generation have in common. His article, 
“Günter Grass and his contemporaries in East and West,” published in 2009 in The 
Cambridge Companion to Günter Grass,34 presents an innovative piece of scholarship, 
because it draws connections between the GDR authors of this generation (Christa Wolf, 
Heiner Müller, Hermann Kant, etc.) and the West-German authors (Günter Grass, Martin 
Walser, Hans-Magnus Enzensberger, Siegfried Lenz, etc.), taking into consideration the 
different political discourses. Parkes states:   
A quick glance at the works of Grass and his contemporaries reveals a number of 
common themes related to the times they have experienced. These include 
childhood and adolescence under National Socialist rule, German identity, 
particularly in the aftermath of National Socialism, the division of the country and 
the nature of the societies created in the new postwar Germany.35  
 
He then touches upon some of these issues and compares and contrasts the authors’s 
different stances, for example Grass’s, Walser’s and Wolf’s views on Germany’s 
reunification—Walser being decidedly in favor and Grass and Wolf against it. However, 
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with regard to this and other topic such as the authors’ autobiographical dealings with 
their childhood during the Nazi period, strangely the particularity of the Hitler Youth 
generation does not become clear. Parkes highlights the common themes Grass and his 
contemporaries share. He references the debates mentioned above. But whereas he points 
out that there are similarities between the writers’ literary work and their role as public 
intellectuals, he does not spell out exactly how they are connected with the shared 
generational identity. Rather, he assesses the overall intellectual achievement of Grass 
and other writers of the Hitler Youth generation and comes to the rather broad conclusion 
that the history of post-war German literature would look differently without them. How 
their achievements are related to their generational discourse and their experience of the 
Nazi period as adolescents remains blurry.  
 In fact, Parkes seems hesitant to present the generational approach as the 
“correct” analytic lens when at the beginning of the article he says that “[d]espite the 
popularity of this generation-based view of society, it is still necessary to consider if date 
of birth remains a more significant factor in the biographies of the people in question 
than, for example, gender, social class, or, given the postwar division of Germany, 
citizenship of two ideologically opposed states.”36 This is an important point. That gender 
and ideological differences distinguish the authors and need to be considered in any 
comparative analysis goes without saying. Nevertheless, the premise for this dissertation 
is that the generational perspective presents the most crucial category in a re-evaluation 
of Grass’s, Walser’s, and Wolf’s contribution to post-war German culture. The fact that 
Wolf has often been considered only as a GDR writer, or alternatively as a feminist 
writer, has veiled that, as Parkes points out, she addresses themes strikingly similar to 
                                                





Grass and Walser based on the generational background the three writers share. 
Questions of gender and “citizenship” in the Federal Republic or GDR must be 
considered. However, in the case of the trio of writers in question I argue that they should 
be considered as factors that have led to different figurations of a similar generational 
discourse.  
Haunted by a Nazi Childhood—Generational Reflections in essays by Günter Grass, 
Martin Walser and Christa Wolf 
While Parkes considers the category of “generation” important  to understanding  the 
Grass generation, he does not mention in his article that many writers themselves have 
thought about the relevance of this category. To show that such a discourse on the Hitler 
Youth generation exists—explicitly and implicitly—in the work and reception of Grass, 
Walser, and Wolf, that one can find a self-reflective discourse on their generational 
identity in some of their key texts, will be the overarching goal in the following three 
chapters. Just a quick glance at the authors’ essayistic work, mainly from the sixties and 
seventies, suffices to demonstrate that all three seem to have experienced strong feelings 
of being haunted by their childhood and adolescent experience of Hitler-Germany.  
 Günter Grass has raised the subject of “generation” in his essayistic work with 
striking regularity. He has used it in three different contexts: in texts about the Holocaust, 
in his campaign speeches for the Social Democratic Party in the sixties, and with regard 
to aesthetic questions. Long before Gaus and Kohl, Grass expressed the idea of the 
“Gnade der späten Geburt.” Grass’s version of it, however, lacks any notion of relief. 
Instead, it unveils a tortured notion that it was mere contingency that prevented him from 
being entangled in the Nazi’s crimes against humanity. In a speech in Danzig, he spoke 





autobiography that allowed him to convey to his own children that he was young enough 
not to carry any direct responsibility for Nazi crimes. He said, however, the sense of 
having just barely escaped great guilt because of his birth date caused him nightmares:  
Relativ leicht fiel es, meine Biografie, die eines Hitlerjungen, der bei Kriegsende 
siebzehn Jahre alt war und mit letztem Aufgebot noch Soldat wurde, deutlich zu 
machen: Ich war zu jung, um schuldig zu werden. Doch schon die Frage: Wenn 
du aber älter gewesen wärest? ließ keine eindeutige Antwort zu. Ich konnte für 
mich nicht garantieren. […] Es war mir nicht möglich, mich, wäre ich nur 
lächerliche fünf oder sieben Jahre älter gewesen, von der Teilnahme an dem 
großen Verbrechen auszuschließen, zumal mich (mit wachsender zeitlicher 
Distanz immer häufiger) Angstträume belasteten, in denen ich mich versagend, 
schuldig erlebte. Die Grenzen zwischen tatsächlicher und möglicher Tat 
verwischten sich. Das fragwürdige Glück, dem ‚richtigen Jahrgang’ anzugehören, 
äußerte sich in Stottersätzen, die hinter den Fragen der Kinder mein Tagebuch 
füllten. 37  
 
What if he had been born five or seven or ten years earlier? In which ways would he have 
been implicated in the genocide of the Jews if he had been only slightly older? The 
question of contingency becomes even more urgent now that Grass’s membership in the 
Waffen SS is known. It is not surprising that for Grass the year of birth is intrinsically 
tied to the question of guilt. If he had been older and had joined the Waffen SS earlier, a 
direct participation in the Holocaust would not only have been possible, but even likely, 
as he could have easily been drafted into the so-called Totenkopfverbände, the 
subdivision of the Waffen SS responsible for administering the concentration camps. 
Grass formulates for his entire cohort: if his generation appeared untainted with regard to 
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the Nazi crimes, they did not earn it. The Hitler Youth generation was “ohne Verdienst 
unbelastet, womöglich nur zufällig ohne Schuld.”38 
 Wolf is haunted by the past in a different way. Her generational reflections mirror 
the author’s struggle with the taboos of the GDR’s memory discourse. In a speech given 
to the GDR writers’ congress in 1973, she describes her feeling that her generation has 
shaken off the fascist legacy all too fast that was implanted in them via their education. 
She writes: “wir haben die Problematik zu früh für ‘erledigt’ gehalten.” 39 But now in the 
seventies, Wolf claims, their Nazi adolescence creeps up on them:   
Für meine Generation, die am Ende des Krieges verhältnismäßig jung war, 
fünfzehn bis sechzehn Jahre alt, aber nicht jung genug, um noch ohne Bewußtsein 
zu sein […] kommen Kindheit und Jugend noch einmal mit voller Wucht zurück. 
Es ist, als käme die Vergangenheit in Wellen über uns. 40   
 
In her speech, Wolf expresses her opinion that some patterns of behavior learned during 
the Nazi period persist in the GDR, for example an unconditional belief in authority. She 
argues that since the problem of her generation’s Nazi education cannot be simply cast 
off, denied, or delegated to West-Germany—as, she alludes,  has been common 
practice—it must be critically addressed, if only for the sake of future generations:  
Es ist nicht so einfach, eine Kindheit abzuschütteln, die einen zum Beispiel einen 
tiefen Autoritätsglauben eingefressen hat. Es ist nicht so einfach, eine Kindheit 
abzuwerfen, die nicht von Wissen, sondern von bedingungsloser Gläubigkeit 
geprägt war und von einer Reihe anderer Faktoren, die hier wahrscheinlich jeder 
kennt. Jeder wird wissen, wovon ich spreche. Aber merkwürdigerweise wissen es 
unsere Kinder nicht. Warum nicht? Weil wir es ihnen nicht sagen können. Wir 
haben es auch bis jetzt nicht geschrieben. Warum, ist klar: weil es unerhört 
schwer ist. Weil man da auf eine solche Fülle innerer Tabus–auch äußerer Tabus– 
stößt, wie ich es zum Beispiel, die ich mir des Problems all die Zeit über scharf 
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bewußt gewesen bin, es nicht für möglich gehalten hätte.41 
 
In the clearest terms, Wolf admits to the inner resistance of confronting the remnants of 
her (and her generation’s) Nazi education here. This passage also elucidates the particular 
political framework of the Hitler Youth generation’s discourse in the GDR, which I will 
address in later chapters: In addition to the personal taboos, there were political taboos 
that prevented this generation from admitting to these continuities of fascism in the East-
German state. The anti-fascist myth upon which the GDR was founded turned the idea 
that the Nazi past lived on in an entire generation of GDR citizens into a taboo.  
 Walser explicitly speaks about being haunted by his Nazi adolescence only in the 
essay “Händedruck mit Gespenstern” from 1979. Here he admits to having persistent 
conflicted feelings about having been influenced by his upbringing during the Nazi era, 
knowing that he should have left them behind long ago. This is expressed in form of an 
image, in which demons of the past lurk behind every door and window and come to 
haunt him:  
Er hat die Teufel vor seinen Fenstern und Türen und Schlüssellöchern und 
Türritzen doch immer gesehen, hat sie immer bekämpft, abgewehrt. Aber er hat 
nie erwähnt, daß sie ihn belagern, bedrohen. Er hat getan, als sei er schon fein 
heraus! Als enthalte er nicht selber noch alle Übel, die er bekämpft. Er wollte ein 
Posten des Fortschritts sein, der Annäherung an Humanität. Er lebte im 
gespannten Zustand. Zwischen niederziehenden Atavismen und dem 
zeitgenössischen Bedürfnis, das schlimme Erb- und Traditionszeug loszuwerden. 
Jetzt, müde und kapitulierend, wäre er im Handumdrehen besetzt von jener 
Barbarei der Vergangenheit? Der Handschlag mit Gespenstern fände statt? Jetzt 
sagt er sich schon – und nennt das, um sich zu verführen, ein Geständnis –, er sei 
nie frei gewesen von den Vergangenheitsbelastungen; er habe nur weiterkommen 
wollen, aber er sei eben nicht weiter gekommen; das sei doch nicht seine 
Schuld.42 
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Walser describes this fight with his inner demons in the context of trying to define his 
stance towards Germany. What exactly he implies with this imagery and what it means 
that he presents his generational identity as more important for defining his politics than 
the political labels such as left and right, I will examine in detail in the next chapter. For 
now, it suffices to show that Walser clearly relates his contradictory political emotions to 
his generational identity:  
Ich würde gern beweisen, wenigstens behaupten, daß mein gestörtes Verhältnis 
zur Realität etwas damit zu tun habe, daß ich Deutscher bin und 1927 geboren 
worden bin. Ich glaube nicht, daß man als Deutscher meines Jahrgangs ein 
ungestörtes Verhältnis zur Realität haben kann. 43 
 
By necessity, he claims in this passage, the German cohort of 1927 connects with reality 
in a highly conflicted way. It is haunted by the past.  
 Christa Wolf once said about the socialist writers of her generation: “Vielleicht 
wird unser Beitrag zur Literatur darin bestehen müssen, daß wir den Mut finden, unseren 
eigenen Lebensstoff schonungslos und wahrheitsgetreu zu erzählen.“44 I believe that the 
“Lebensstoff”—witnessing the transition from the Nazi regime to the post-war states as 
young adults—has influenced all three writers, Grass and Walser as well. Wulf 
Kansteiner claimed that, as a result, the Hitler Youth Generation “will always remain the 
age cohort—situated between the generation of the Nazi perpetrators and bystanders and 
the postwar generations—that has made the most conflicted, self-reflexive, and 
idiosyncratic contribution to the task of Vergangenheitsbewältigung.”45 I will describe 
what exactly this contribution looks like in order to assess their great significance for 
post-war literature and culture from a generational perspective. First, I will examine first 
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how their generational background has shaped their political-societal role, second how 
they look back onto their childhood, and third how their societal responsibility was 
affected after Germany’s reunification, both in their own perception and in the eyes of the 
public. In the following three chapters, I will thus examine key moments in the careers of 
Grass, Walser, and Wolf, stressing both their shared generational background but also the 
three writers’ distinct political agendas.   
 In the remaining parts of this introductory chapter, I lay some conceptional and 
theoretical groundwork before moving on to the analysis of the authors’ texts in the 
following three chapters. I will first explain my use of “generation” as a concept and of 
the term “Hitler Youth Generation.” I will then present Sigrid Weigel’s pivotal 
reflections on the implications of the generational discourse in post-war Germany, where, 
not only in the case of the Hitler Youth, questions of origin and birth date were for the 
longest time linked to either the association or disassociation with historical guilt. The 
last part of this chapter will be to critique Weigel’s generational approach to the post-war 
literary scene. She convincingly points out that the memory discourse of non-Jewish 
writers of the post-war era is influenced by their own generational-biographical legacy.  I, 
however, will demonstrate that she does not differentiate enough between the Hitler 
Youth generation and their older colleagues, former Wehrmacht soldiers. Weigel, like 
other scholars, considers the entire group of writers affiliated with Gruppe 47 as the “first 
generation” of West-German writers after the war, and she assigns to all of them a type of 
dominant Vergangenheitsbewältigung that entailed the exclusion of Jewish intellectuals. I 
argue that the similarities in the generational discourse between West-German writers 





precisely because of such an approach. I attempt to show the flaws in Weigel’s 
argumentation in order to introduce my own thesis about the autonomy of the Hitler 
Youth generation, which, I argue, needs to be seen independently from “Gruppe 47.”  
 
2. “Generation” and “Hitler Youth Generation”—Conceptual, 
Terminological, and Historical Considerations   
Karl Mannheim’s Das Problem der Generationen  
The term “generation” was introduced as a socio-historical category by the sociologist 
Karl Mannheim in his pivotal 1928 article “Das Problem der Generationen.”46 In 
Mannheim’s essay, which is to this day considered a groundbreaking theoretical work on 
the topic of “generation”, Mannheim established the term as an analytic category for 
sociological studies in opposition to the evolutionary theories of generation that were 
popular in the 1920s. While these theories understood the concept of “generation” in its 
diachronic or genealogical sense, for instance as it is used in the formula “from 
generation to generation,” Mannheim primarily considered its synchronic meaning: 
“generation” as a concept to describe collectives that are bound together by age and 
common experiences. The “generation”, he argues, is a socio-historical phenomenon 
similar to that of the “class”: we cannot choose to abandon the “generation,”, to which we 
belong, as we cannot choose to abandon our “class.” Born at a certain time and in a 
certain environment, we are embedded in what Mannheim calls “Generationslagerung”. 
This “Generationslagerung”, the fact that we belong to a certain age group, however, 
does not necessarily relate us to other members of this group. What establishes a 
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connection between us, or in Mannheim’s words, what creates the 
“Generationszusammenhang”, is that we participate in the same historical events and life 
conditions.47 The youth in the city, for instance, and the youth in the country, while being 
part of the same “Generationslagerung”, do not necessarily belong to the same 
“Generationszusammenhang”, since they might live under entirely different conditions. 
 Mannheim further specifies that a “Generationszusammenhang” can contain 
different subgroups, the so-called “Generationseinheiten”. A “Generationseinheit“ 
comprises those who are not only born around the same time and have collectively 
experienced the same life circumstances and historical events, but who in addition react 
to these preconditions in a similar way, for example by having similar views on politics 
and society.48 As Bude has pointed out, the hermeneutical “work” in dealing with a 
generation consists in revealing the relationship between “Generationszusammenhang” 
and “Generationseinheit”: 
Mit dieser Differenzierung hat Mannheim m.E. die zentrale Schwierigkeit für das 
Verständnis einer Generationengestalt aufgeworfen. Denn es dürfte in der Regel 
so sein, daß innerhalb des Kontextes einer Generation verschiedene 
Bezugsgruppen koexistieren, die unterschiedliche Lehren aus dem gezogen haben, 
was ihnen widerfahren ist oder was sie hervorgerufen haben. Die Arbeit des 
Interpreten besteht nun darin, unterhalb der Ebene sich widersprechender oder gar 
sich bekämpfender Auffassungen von verschiedenen Gruppierungen die Schicht 
des ihnen gleichwohl gemeinsamen Lebensgefühls freizulegen. Aus den diversen 
Selbstdeutungen einer Generation gilt es, die sic einigenden Deutungsbedürfnisse 
herauszulesen. Das meint Mannheim mit dem gemeinsamen 
Generationszusammenhang, der die verschiedenen Generationseinheiten 
zusammenfügt.49  
 
As such, it might be useful to keep Mannheim’s distinction in mind when dealing with 
the trio of writers in the center of this study. Walser, Wolf and Grass certainly belong to 
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the same “Generationszusammenhang”: They were born only a couple of years apart, 
they grew up in the socio-historical climate of the Third Reich, and they most likely 
experienced the breakdown of Nazi-Germany in 1945 as a formative event in their lives. 
But as I will show in the course of this study, their reactions to this generational 
experience vary significantly depending on different ideological stances in the post-war 
era, so that in Mannheim’s understanding they would not be part of the same 
“Generationseinheit”. In fact, it is precisely their different responses in East and West to 
the same socio-historical events that make an examination of their work with regard to 
the generational question so compelling. 
 The analytic tools that Mannheim has provided with his 1928 essay thus turn out 
to be surprisingly applicable to an investigation of the Hitler Youth generation. In today’s 
discourse on generations, however, Mannheim’s unwieldy distinction between 
“Generationslagerung”, “Generationszusammenhang” and “Generationseinheit” is no 
longer in use. Mostly, the term “generation” is implicitly understood as what he termed 
the “Generationszusammenhang”. Weigel summarizes this commonplace definition of 
generation succinctly when she writes “[D]ie Generation [ist] verstanden als 
jahrgangsverwandte Kohorte, deren Biographie in einer bestimmten Phase durch den 
gemeinsamen Bezugspunkt eines einschneidenden historischen Ereignisses geprägt 
wurde, das zumeist einen katastrophischen Charakter besitzt”.50  
 In the case of the Hitler Youth generation, one can more precisely speak of a 
“political generation” as defined by Helmut Fogt, who has developed a theory of 
“political generations” for the 20th century. For him, a political generation comprises 
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diejenigen Mitglieder einer Altersgruppe oder Kohorte, die—mit bestimmten 
Schlüsselereignissen konfrontiert—zu einer gleichgesinnten bewußten 
Auseinandersetzung mit den Leitideen und Werten der politischen Ordnung 
gelangten, in der sie aufwuchsen. Diese Auseinandersetzung pflegt in einer 
politisch formativen Lebensphase der politischen ‘Normalbiografie’ der 
Generationszugehörigen stattzufinden und diese zu einer langfristigen und 
stabilen Neuorientierung ihrer politischen Grundhaltungen zu bewegen. Politische 
Generationen weisen einen Grundbestand gemeinsamer Einstellungen, 
Verhaltensdispositionen und Handlungspotentiale auf, von Normen und Werten, 
die politisch von Relevanz und Einfluß sind.51 
 
While Fogt discerns eleven political generations in the 20th century, Ulrich Herbert has 
demonstrated convincingly that the Hitler Youth generation is one of only three 
generations which was not only described as such but whose members also considered 
themselves as a distinct generation.52 Furthermore, their generational identity was not—as 
opposed to other generations—based on transitory phenomena such as a shared linguistic 
idiom or shared preferences in music or fashion. Their particular generational experiences 
presented a “zentrale politische Prägung, die sich auf das ganze Leben auswirkt.”53 In my 
analysis of the works by writers of the Hitler Youth generation, I will use the term 
“generation” in this sense.54 
 Both Mannheim and Fogt emphasize that historical events only become formative 
generational experiences when they are experienced in youth. Mannheim argues that, 
depending on whether historical events are experienced at a young age or later in life, 
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“Erfahrung” can become “Generationenerlebnis”. As he writes, “es ist ganz entscheidend 
für ein und dieselbe “Erfahrung” und deren Relevanz und Formierung, ob sie von einem 
Individuum erlebt wird, das sie als einen entscheidenden Jugendeindruck, oder von einem 
anderen, das sie als “Späterlebnis” verarbeitet.”55 In other words, experiences in our 
childhood and youth are formative for our world view and shape our identity more than 
experiences later in life.56 
Flakhelfer, 45er, skeptische Generation?  
This idea forms the common basis for any treatment of the Hitler Youth generation. In 
the historical and sociological research on this generation, the cohorts born in the 
twenties and thirties have been given many names, each describing slightly different age 
groups and emphasizing different aspects in their biographical experience. But whether it 
is called “Flakhelfer-Generation,”57 “skeptische Generation,”58 “betrogene Generation,”59 
“45er Generation,”60 or “Hitlerjugend-Generation,”61 all of these studies agree that 
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childhood and youth experiences have shaped the biographies of members of this 
generation. The common understanding is that the socialization under Hitler and the 
adolescent experience of the end of the war present the conditions that make this 
generation a generation.  
 Recent studies in cultural and intellectual history seem to have settled on the term 
“45er” or “Forty-fivers”, foregrounding the significance of the year 1945.62 These studies 
argue that the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 forms a point of intellectual re-orientation 
for this generation. Assmann writes for example:  
Die 45er Generation (Schelskys ‘skeptische Generation’, auch Flakhelfer-
Generation genannt), umfasst die Jahrgänge von ca. 1926-1929, die in der 
Weimarer Republik geboren und im Nationalsozialismus als Kinder und 
Jugendliche in der Hitler-Jugend, in Napola-Schulen und als Flakhelfer 
sozialisiert worden sind. Sie wurden, wie das Beispiel Grass zeigt, bis zuletzt 
zurückgestellt und kamen erst in den letzten Kriegsjahren und -monaten zum 
Einsatz. Nach Rolf Schörken, selbst ehemaliger Flakhelfer bestimmt die 
Niederlage des Krieges ihre Generationenerfahrung. Das Kriegsende bot dieser 
Generation allerdings auch die Chance eines radikalen Neubeginns; sofern sie 
physisch und psychisch überlebt hatten, war ihnen vergönnt, ihr Leben 1945 noch 
einmal zu beginnen und sich eine neue Identität aufzubauen.63  
 
There are some advantages to the term “Forty-Fivers”, most importantly that it is the 
most neutral of all denominations, but also that it facilitates the comparison with the so-
called “Sixty-Eighters”. From my perspective, however, the great emphasis on 1945 in 
the characterization of this generation might be slightly misleading. While the “Sixty-
Eighters” actively participated in the events of 1968 and made this year their generational 
“moment,” members of the Hitler Youth generation experienced the historical caesura of 
1945 mainly as passive recipients. This year may have certainly presented a turning point 
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in their biographies, but it was not a generational event, or, in other words, a moment in 
which generational identity was created or affirmed by means of a collective appearance 
as a generation in the public discourse. It is in fact questionable whether intellectuals of 
the Hitler Youth generation ever had a generational event like the Sixty-Eighters. From 
the moment that intellectuals of the Hitler Youth generation began to think about their 
upbringing in the Nazi-era in the 1960s—many years after the end of the war in 1945—
their generational discourse was characterized by a struggle with this past. Unlike the 
Sixty-Eighters, they did not enter the stage with a self-confident and loudly pronounced 
“we”. Their self-conscious generational identity must rather be reconstructed by a careful 
reading of their texts. For my examination of Walser, Grass, and Wolf, the term “Hitler 
Youth generation” is thus a more appropriate designation as it foregrounds the scarring 
biographical experience of having grown up as Hitler’s Youth. 
 “Hitler Youth” is understood in a broader sense here, refering to both Nazi youth 
institutions, the Hitlerjugend for boys and the Bund Deutscher Mädel for girls. The Hitler 
Youth generation,  by my definition, includes all those who were in either one of these 
organizations at the end of the war, not just the male cohorts. This comprises the age 
group born between 1927 and 1931, those who were between fourteen and eighteen in 
1945. On the one hand, this age group was too young to fully participate in the war, but 
its members, on the other, were no longer children in 1945 and experienced the end of the 
war as teenagers. What distinguishes the Hitler Youth generation from other generations 
is that its members were exposed to National-Socialist ideologies throughout their 
childhood and adolescence. The Nazi machinery took hold of them already at the age of 





males between ten and fourteen) or the Jungmädelbund (for females of the same age). At 
the age of fourteen, they transitioned to the Hitlerjugend (for males between fourteen and 
eighteen) and the Bund Deutscher Mädel (for females of the same age).64 
 The sociologist Arno Klönne underlines the great influence of these youth 
organizations in his book Jugend im Dritten Reich, calling the Hitler Youth “[f]ür etliche 
Millionen Jungen und Mädchen zwischen 1933 und 1945 [. . .] neben Familie und Schule 
die entscheidende Sozialisations-Instanz.“65 As Klönne emphasizes, the educational 
purpose of these organizations was not simply to entertain the German youth but to 
systematically indoctrinate them into the National-Socialist belief system: 
[F]ür den nationalsozialistischen Staat galt diese Jugendorganisation als ‚Garant 
der Zukunft’, das heißt der Herrschaftserhaltung. Der Dienst in der Hitler-Jugend 
sollte die nachwachsende Generation möglichst restlos an die Leitbilder des NS-
Systems binden und jene Verhaltensweisen eintrainieren, deren es für den 
faschistischen Alltag bedurfte.66  
 
Besides this early indoctrination, the Hitler Youth generation differs from the previous 
generation mostly with regard to their experiences in the war. In comparison to older age 
groups, members of the Hitler Youth generation either did not at all participate in the war 
or did so only for a short time. While women born in and before 1926 were often 
employed to support the war industry in various secretarial positions, younger women 
born after 1926 were generally not recruited for the Kriegshilfsdienst anymore. For men, 
the situation was more complex. Unlike the age groups born in and before 1926, 
members of the Hitler Youth generation were generally not drafted into the Wehrmacht. 
However, the men born in 1927 and 1928—thus including Grass and Walser—were 
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enlisted as so-called Flakhelfer to staff the anti-aircraft defense in the last years of the 
war. Those born in 1929 were not drafted into the antiaircraft units but called up for other 
“minor” duties at the Heimatfront. Members of the Hitler Youth generation born between 
1927 and 1929 thus did come in close contact with the military and the war as Flakhelfer, 
serving in the Kriegshilfsdienst, or in the case of the cohort of 1927, occasionally even in 
the Wehrmacht or, as in the case of Günter Grass, the SS. On the whole, they experienced 
the greater part of the war “at home” and did not share the same experiences as those who 
fought at the Eastern or Western fronts in World War II from 1939 on.67 
Generational misconceptions in post-war German literature  
In the realm of literature, these different experiences of the Nazi years, I argue, constitute 
two separate generations of post-war German writers with distinct memory discourses 
and political agendas. Yet, in the scholarship on memory and post-war German literature 
the particular discourse of writers of the Hitler Youth generation remains widely 
unexplored. The little scholarly literature one can find on the topic of memory, literature 
and generations focuses only on the West-German authors and almost always links Grass 
and Walser with the memory politics of Gruppe 47. Without differenciation authors 
belonging to cohorts as far apart as 1914 and 1927 are often described as part of the “first 
generation of post-war writers.” This scholarship, of which I will present a number of 
examples in this chapter, overlooks Grass, Walser’s and Wolf’s self-understanding as 
writers of this generation. The idea to belong to the Hitler Youth generation, who 
experienced the war and the rupture of 1945 in a particular way, namely as adolescents, 
shaped these writers’ work, and at least in the case of Grass and Wolf we can find 
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numerous texts, in which this is made explicit. As a literary scholar, I am thus interested 
in the question of the generation not exclusively as a descriptive category in the sense 
Mannheim and other sociologists employ it. Rather, I ask in which ways the three authors 
themselves use the concept of generation, or better: how they struggle with their 
generational identity. It is their self-reflexivity and the public display of their struggle to 
be part of the Hitler Youth generation has never been sufficiently examined, although 
these are precisely the features, visible both in the three authors’ literary as well as in 
their political works, that distinguish them from other post-war writers. The generational 
discourse of writers of the Hitler Youth generation remains hidden if they are understood 
as “first generation of post-war writers” along with older writers of Gruppe 47, for whom 
generational identity was either of little significance or to be avoided because it would 
have revealed uncanny connections to the Nazi period.  
 Sigrid Weigel’s scholarship on the symbolic nature of generations in the specific 
historical context of post-war Germany presents an important framework for my 
dissertation. The following part will deal both with some of her conceptual claims but 
will also identify Weigel’s critique of the Hitler Youth generation as an example of the 
merging of two generations that I try to “undo.” The insufficient acknowledgment of 
writers of the Hitler Youth generation serves as the starting point for my generational 









3. Dominance and Marginalization in the “First Generation” of Post-
War German Authors—A Correction  
 
Generations and the post-1945 German memory discourse  
In her 2006 book Genea-Logik, the cultural historian and literary scholar Sigrid Weigel 
points out that the concept of generation contains two dimensions: the first being 
synchronic, when “generation” is used to describe the affiliation to a certain age group 
and defines a common collective identity for this group, and the second diachronic or 
genealogical, when it denotes the succession of, or the relationship between, generations. 
Thus combining Mannheimian and pre-Mannheimian approaches to the concept of 
“generation,” Weigel points out: “Insofern verbirgt sich im Begriff der Generation immer 
schon ein komplexes Zusammenspiel zwischen Herkunft und Gedächtnis.“68 By 
considering ourselves as part of a specific generation, we describe our position in a 
certain historical context and delineate our origin. 
 Therefore, the generational discourse in Germany after 1945 has always 
inherently been a discourse about memory politics, Weigel argues. After World War II 
and the Holocaust, generational affiliations defined the relationship to the Nazi past. 
During the second half of the twentieth century, the further a generation could distance 
itself from the guilt of the past, the more political and moral power it could attain: 
[The discourse on generations] ist einer jener Schauplätze, auf denen die 
Verhandlungen über die politische Macht und die moralische Definitionsmacht 
ausgetragen werden. Das Selbstverständnis, Vertreter oder Angehöriger einer 
bestimmten Generation zu sein, ersetzt und überlagert nämlich durchweg das 
Paradigma von Opfern und (Mit-)Tätern. Insofern stellt sich der 
Generationendiskurs nicht selten als ein verdeckter nationaler Diskurs dar, in dem 
sich Schuldabwehr und Reinheitsbegehren artikulieren. [...] Die Generation 
                                                





funktioniert als Medium der Gedächtnispolitik.69 
 
In a pivotal article, “Generation’ as a Symbolic Form,” published in English in 2002, 
Weigel had already addressed the close ties between generational discourse and memory 
politics.70 In this essay, she analyzes the concept of “generation” “as a cultural pattern for 
constructing history” and sheds light on the implicit distortions of the generational 
discourse in post-1945 Germany. Both on the side of the Jewish survivors and on that of 
the German perpetrators, the events of World War II defined a break in the historical 
continuum, from which a new genealogy emerged. We are counting the first, the second, 
and the third generation, with the first generation representing the perpetrators and 
victims, the second their children, and the third their grandchildren. On the side of the 
perpetrators, Weigel argues, “the fact that the part of a first generation’s discourse is not 
occupied is easily explained: in this case the position of the historical actors coalesced 
with that of the perpetrators of incomparable crimes.”71 
 The counting of generations in Germany thus started with the second generation, 
the generation of 1968. She argues that the silence of the first generation and their refusal 
of guilt triggered the generational conflict of 1968, in which the second generation 
revolted against their parents. In her view, the most striking aspect in the Sixty-Eighters’ 
generational discourse is their self-understanding in opposition to the collective of 
perpetrators: the Sixty-Eighters, she argues, defined themselves in opposition to their 
guilty fathers. Their desire not to belong to the “perpetrator” side of history can be seen 
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particularly clearly in the literary genre of so-called “Väterliteratur”, autobiographical 
texts written by members of the generation of 1968 that are crammed with accusations 
against perpetrator-fathers (Täter-Väter).72 This discourse, she writes, “had the precarious 
effect that the children described themselves as victims, and thus assumed the role of the 
historical victims, who to a large extent had been forgotten in the discourse.”73 For 
Weigel this repression of the Jewish perspective presents the main distortion of the 
second generation’s discourse. 
Sigrid Weigel on the Hitler Youth Generation as “concealed first generation”    
Weigel convincingly demonstrates that in the conflict between the Sixty-Eighters and 
their fathers—staged as a debate between the accusers and the accused, between the 
innocent and the guilty, between the victims and the perpetrators—the Hitler Youth 
generation remained widely absent. While they distanced themselves from the generation 
of perpetrators and expressed their general support with the generation of 1968, their own 
biographical ties with the Nazi-past made it impossible for them to side with the Sixty-
Eighters in their accusations against the first generation. Weigel argues that it is due to 
their absence in the generational battle of 1968 that the Hitler Youth generation is 
typically not represented in the genealogy of post-war generations, i.e. it is omitted in the 
counting of the first, the second generation (the Sixty-Eighters) and the third generation 
(their children). Nevertheless, she writes, the Hitler Youth generation has attained a 
significantly powerful position in the post-war era: “it established itself after the war as 
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the first authority in questions of politics, truth and morality” and can thus be called “the 
concealed first generation.”74 
 She argues that the “concealed first generation” assumed this authoritative 
position by turning their biographical ties to Nazi Germany to their advantage. Unlike the 
Sixty-Eighters, born after the war, members of the “concealed first generation” could not 
easily distance themselves from the Nazi period. They had experienced it first-hand as 
children and adolescents. But by creating a self-image presenting them as innocent 
witnesses of the years 1933-1945, she claims, intellectuals of this generation could 
function in their role as moral authorities in post-war German society despite being, at 
least biographically, implicated in this Nazi regime. Weigel argues that this image gave 
them control over the memory discourse, and that in having “authentic” access to the 
Nazi era without being considered the perpetrators, the “concealed first generation” put 
forth their “hegemonic claim for the image of history,”75 which, as she attempts to show, 
has led to the exclusion of other forms of memory, specifically Jewish ones. 
Distortions—A critical assessment of Weigel’s argument  
 To support her thesis that the discourse of the “concealed first generation” 
inherently contains a hegemonic claim to the memory of Nazism, Weigel mainly presents 
two examples, one from the field of historiography and the other from the field of literary 
criticism. It is worth considering briefly the texts from which she draws her argument 
about the Hitler Youth generations’s memorial hegemony—an exchange of letters in the 
case of the first example, and an essay on post-war poetry in the case of the second 
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example. In my view, both examples are less clear-cut than they than they are made to 
seem in Weigel’s presentation.  
 The first example is a text taken from a historiographical debate between 
historians Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer in 1988 in the wake of the 
Historikerstreit. Broszat, born in 1926, belongs to the Hitler Youth generation, while 
Friedländer, born in Prague in 1932 to a family of German-speaking Jews, survived the 
Holocaust by posing as a gentile, while his parents were gassed in Auschwitz. The 
catalyst for this exchange was Broszat’s 1986 article “Plädoyer für eine Historisierung 
des National-Sozialismus” published in Merkur, in which, as the title suggests, he had 
insisted on the need to consider the Nazi era from a sober historical distance. Friedländer 
published a critical response to Broszat in 1987, in which he spoke about the dangers of 
Broszat’s plea for historicization. Broszat, in turn, felt the need to clarify his position, and 
the two historians entered a dialogue in the form of an open exchange of letters, which 
was published in the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte in 1988.76 
 Weigel takes issue with a passage from the opening letter of this exchange, in 
which Broszat further elucidates his concept of historicization in order to defend it 
against Friedländer’s reproaches. Friedländer considered it dangerous to approach 
National-Socialism with a merely neutral and scientific lens without the possibility of 
moral judgments; the crimes seemed too atrocious to apply a perspective from which 
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everything could be understood by means of reasoning because the next logical step 
would then be to excuse them. Broszat tried to clarify that this was not what he had 
intended to say.77 Naturally, he stated, a scholarly approach to the Nazi era did not need 
to exclude the possibility of critique, and of course, the history of National Socialism was 
neither a solely German affair, nor was the scholarly approach the only approach to 
history. Scholars would have to realize that they were dealing with the memory of a time 
period “besetzt von den schmerzlichen Empfindungen vieler vor allem auch jüdischer 
Menschen, die auf einer mythischen Form dieses Erinnerns beharren.”78 Broszat suggests 
that historiography ought to make room for this type of memory. Historians ought to be 
sensitive to the pain of the Nazi’s victims who saw “history” from a different, personal 
angle:  
Deutsche Historiker und Geschichtsstudenten, das möchte ich meinem Plädoyer 
expressis verbis hinzufügen, müssen verstehen, daß es von Opfern der NS-
Verfolgung und ihren Hinterbliebenen sogar als eine Einbuße ihres Anrechts auf 
ihre Form der Erinnerung empfunden werden kann, wenn eine nur noch 
wissenschaftlich operierende Zeitgeschichtsforschung mit akademischer Arroganz 
das Frage- und Begriffsmonopol in bezug auf die NS-Zeit beansprucht. Der 
Respekt vor den Opfern der Naziverbrechen gebietet, dieser mythischen 
Erinnerung Raum zu lassen.79 
 
Weigel points to the juxtaposition of “rational” German historical scholarship and Jewish 
“mythical” memory that Broszat allegedly evokes here, playing on century-old (as she 
suggests anti-Semitic) stereotypes. She is bothered especially by the next sentence, in 
which Broszat speaks explicitly of the “Nebeneinander von wissenschaftlicher Einsicht 
und mythischer Erinnerung” expressing his hopes that this coalition might generate a 
tension fruitful and productive for the investigation of the Nazi era.  
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  I agree with Weigel that in this formulation, which also becomes a point of 
discussion in the subsequent exchange with Friedländer, it sounds as though Broszat 
distinguishes the Jewish from the German approach when speaking about the mythical 
versus the scientific-scholarly perspective of this time. In one of the following letters, 
however, Broszat assures Friedländer that this was not the distinction he had meant to set 
up. He said he wanted to express “daß es neben der wissenschaftlich-akademischen 
Rekonstruktion der NS-Zeit (durch deutsche und nicht-deutsche Historiker) einen 
legitimen Anspruch auch anderer, etwa mythischer Formen der Geschichtserinnerung 
durch die Opfer gibt, und ‘kein Vorrecht der einen oder anderen Seite’.80   
 Thus, while Broszat’s choice of words is certainly vague and perhaps even a little 
careless, Weigel incorrectly represents his overall argument when she claims that Broszat 
“excluded this form of memory (Weigel means the Jewish memory) from the historical 
model.”81 For Broszat’s point is precisely to criticize the “nur noch wissenschaftlich 
operierende Zeitgeschichtsforschung [, die] mit akademischer Arroganz das Frage- und 
Begriffsmonopol in bezug auf die NS-Zeit beansprucht.“82 He argued for the integration 
of the victims’ memory, not for its exclusion.  
 In her essay, Weigel further suggests that Broszat’s alleged disqualification of 
memories of Nazi victims corresponds to a particularly high estimation of the memory of 
German war participants, especially of his own generation, the Hitler Youth generation. 
To back up this claim she quotes a passage in which Broszat reflects on the particularities 
of the Hitler Youth generation. He does this in response to Friedländer, who had warned 
about the danger of overestimating the possibilities of an objective scholarly-scientific 
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treatment of the Nazi period. Both Jewish and German historians, Friedländer had 
argued, could not ignore their personal ties to this period, which could well be seen in the 
fact that some of the most reactionary German historians involved in the 
Historikerstreit—the highly emotional debate that had just caused great turmoil in the 
field of historiography—were members of the Hitler Youth generation. The following 
quote from Broszat’s response includes the passage that is cited in Weigel:  
Ganz persönlich gesprochen: Hätte ich nicht dieser HJ-Generation angehört und 
ihre spezifischen Erfahrungen gemacht, wäre es für mich nach 1945 
wahrscheinlich nicht ein solches Bedürfnis gewesen, mich so kritisch und, wie 
wir damals empfanden, zugleich mit “heiliger Nüchternheit” mit der NS-
Vergangenheit auseinanderzusetzen. Als Angehöriger dieser Generation hatte 
man das Glück, in politisches Handeln und in Verantwortung noch nicht oder nur 
marginal hineingezogen zu werden, aber man war alt genug, um emotional und 
geistig hochgradig betroffen zu werden von der moral- und gefühlsverwirrenden 
Suggestivität, zu der das NS-Regime, zumal im Bereich der Jugenderziehung […] 
Zwar betroffen, aber kaum belastet, war die HJ-Generation freier als ältere 
Jahrgänge und motivierter als jüngere, sich dem Lernprozeß dieser Jahre voll 
hinzugeben. Aus der persönlichen Kenntnis vieler Altersgenossen weiß ich, und 
aus den Lebensläufen vieler anderen bestätigt sich meines Erachtens, daß sich die 
Mehrheit dieser HJ-Generation nach 1945 die einst von den Nazis denunzierten 
Werte mit Verve zu eigen machte. Aus dieser Generation sind besonders viele 
engagierte Demokraten hervorgegangen, und sie ist in der politisch-kulturellen 
Prominenz der Bundesrepublik überproportional vertreten.83 
 
Weigel claims that Broszat presents the Hitler Youth generation “as the only one that can 
provide the possibility of an objective record of history.”84 It could be argued, however, 
that this passage is descriptive rather than normative: it does not favor the memory of 
members of the Hitler Youth generation to the memory of Jewish victims, as Weigel 
claims. The strongest reproach one could make against Broszat on the basis of this 
passage is that he overemphasizes his generation’s as well as his own anti-Nazi 
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credentials, which, however, is a point with which several scholars, myself included, 
would agree.  
 I devote such detail in my analysis of Weigel’s treatment of Broszat because 
Weigel sees a pattern in his argumentation that she considers typical for the discourse of 
the Hitler Youth generation: “[T]he privileged position of the Hitler youth as witness”, 
she writes, “functions through the paradoxical construct of knowledge without guilt.”85 
This idea that the Hitler Youth generation has apologetically created the status of the 
innocent witness of the Nazi era to seek dominance over the memory discourse has 
influenced the scholarship on writers of this generation. Therefore, I consider it important 
to demonstrate the distortions in Weigel’s essay. As the passage quoted above shows, 
Broszat does regard his generation as privileged when he speaks of a learning process to 
which his generation committed more freely than the older and the younger generations: 
“[D]ie HJ-Generation [war] freier als ältere Jahrgänge und motivierter als jüngere, sich 
dem Lernprozeß dieser Jahre voll hinzugeben.”86 He does not, however, privilege his 
generation’s view of the past to that of the Jewish victims, as Weigel suggests—at least, 
this is not evident from the text.  
 The second example Weigel presents in order to reveal the Hitler Youth’s claim 
to discursive power is taken from the realm of literature. Analyzing Peter Rühmkorf’s 
1962 essay “Das lyrische Bild der Nachkriegsdeutschen,”87 she argues that Rühmkorf, 
born in 1929 and himself a member of the Hitler Youth generation, disqualifies Paul 
Celan’s poetry while propagating the style of writers of his own generation, specifically 
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that of Günter Grass (born in 1927) and Hans-Magnus Enzensberger (born in 1929) as the 
ideal for modern poetry. The problem with Weigel’s argument is  that again she proceeds 
in a very selective way. By focusing only on a few phrases of Rühmkorf’s essay, she 
leaves her readers with the impression that he directly juxtaposes Celan’s poetry with that 
of Grass and Enzensberger, clearly favoring the latter. The essay, however, provides an 
overview of Germany’s poetic movements since 1945—an overview suggesting that only 
at the beginning of the sixties poets had found a truly innovative style.  
 In his guided tour through contemporary German poetry, Rühmkorf presents 
Celan as only one in a series of writers whose poetry do not meet his number one 
criterium: stylistic innovation. Poetry written between 1945 and 1947 merely produced 
“die perfekte Mittelmäßigkeit.” Instead of marking “Wandlung oder Neubeginn,” poets 
sought “Halt am Herkömmlichen”.88 Similarly, the so-called “Naturlyrik” of the years 
1948-1950 led poets “in die ästhetische Provinz [...], wo sie am Ende alle die gleichen 
Blumen für sich in Anspruch nahmen.”89 For example, Gottfried Benn’s Statische 
Gedichte (1948), while fresh and original, only gave rise to a wave of poor imitations. 
Rühmkorf sums up: “Eine schöpferische Revision des deutsches Expressionismus und 
eine Besinnung auf die eigenen modernen Traditionen, die an allem Anfang hätten stehen 
sollen, ließen weiter auf sich warten.”90 
 Against the backdrop of these early post-war movements, Rühmkorf initially 
portrays Celan in a positive light, namely as one of three poets who entered the literary 
scene in 1952 with new forms of writings. These “neue Jahrgänge”—apart from Celan, 
Rühmkorf mentions Walter Höllerer, Ingeborg Bachmann and Paul Riegel—shared not 
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only “eine neue dichterische Intensität,” but also “ein seltsam verqueres, gespanntes und 
dennoch leidenschaftliches Verhältnis zu Welt und Wirklichkeit.”91 In the poetry of these 
young writers, Rühmkorf states, one could finally see the long-awaited “Wandel im 
Ausdruckswillen“ and a critical stance towards reality.92  
 What bothers Rühmkorf primarily about Celan’s poetry is, “daß Celan […] mit 
vorgegebenen Symbolen arbeitet, Symbolen, die seit Mallarmé eingeführt, seit Benn und 
Trakl kommun sind und die durch allzu häufigen Gebrauch schon lange an 
Ausdruckskraft verloren haben. […] so gesellt sich denn dem kühlen Entzücken an 
manchem einsfarbenen Bilde und der kunstvollen Tonlosigkeit der Sprachmelodie immer 
wieder der Ärger über den altbekannten Chiffrenreigen.”93 Celan, then, does not provide 
the radically new impulses Rühmkorf is looking for. In fact, he does not find them in 
post-war poetry as a whole up until the year 1955/57 when Grass and Enzensberger 
published their first volumes of poetry. The vocabulary of these two poets, Rühmkorf 
argues, was finally no longer taken “aus der poetischen Requisitenkammer“ but from 
every-day language, “dem täglichen, dem Umgangs- und Gebrauchsfundus.”94 Rühmkorf 
connects this stylistic change with a different life attitude resulting from the generational 
experience of these authors. The following quotation is also cited in Weigel:  
Sie [the new metaphorical language] ist mit allen möglichen anderen 
Artikulationsveränderungen aufs innigste verzahnt und ist wie diese auf ein 
gründlich verändertes Lebensgefühl zurückzuführen. Ich spreche vom 
Lebensgefühl jener Jahrgänge, für die Faschismus, Krieg und Diktatur gerade 
noch bewußtseinsprägend geworden waren, bei denen der Neubeginn dann just 
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mit einer altersbedingten Umbruchsituation zusammengefallen war, und die den 
Aufstieg aus dem Nichts zu nichts als Gütervermehrung bei schwindendem 
Idealismus und erwachender Kritizität erlebt hatten. Eine Generation, im 
Überschlag, die ohne Fehl, aber nicht ohne Erfahrung war, die ohne Signale war, 
aber dennoch nicht resignieren wollte, die die Welt in ihren naturalen und 
sozialen Gegebenheiten akzeptierte: als Reibungswiderstand.95 
 
Thus, while there were several new poetic movements since 1945, Rühmkorf does not 
acknowledge either the poetry of the early post-war years (1945-47), or the “Naturlyrik” 
of the subsequent two years (1948-1950), or the poetry of Celan and other young authors 
between 1952 and 1954 as truly novel forms of poetic writing. Only with the poetry of 
Grass and Enzensberger does he see a significant change in style and expression—a 
change, which, as he argues, is based on the particular experiences of this generation. 
 From today’s perspective this assessment of, and emphasis on Grass and 
Enzensberger’s poetry seems peculiar. Bachmann and Celan are usually considered by far 
the more innovative and influential writers of post-war poetry. I also agree with Weigel’s 
critique that Rühmkorf, like other critics of Celan in the fifties and sixties, widely ignore 
“the fact that Celan’s poetry is based on the experiences of a Jew who escaped from the 
NS death program.”96 She is right to point out that Rühmkorf does not acknowledge 
either the biographical or the historical-philosophical aspects of Celan’s poetry, i.e. its 
direct relation to the Shoah. Indeed, Rühmkorf does not seem to notice the poetological 
basis of Celan’s poetry: “[t]he significance of language as a memorial for murdered, 
graveless parents and, more generally, the significance of poetry for the genealogy of 
memories.”97 But in 1962 Celan was not the famous iconic figure that he is today, and 
Rühmkorf’s ignorant treatment of his Jewish background reflects a widespread tendency 
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not to speak openly about the Jewish victims’ fate. In other words, Weigel does not 
historicize Rühmkorf’s essay but takes the current state of the memory discourse for 
granted. From the perspective of 1962, one could even read Rühmkorf’s failure to 
mention Celan’s Jewish identity as an attempt to avoid labeling him as “a Jew.” Celan 
naturally appears as a writer of German poetry in his catalogue of poets.    
 Therefore, as questionable as it is from an aesthetic standpoint that Rühmkorf 
praises Enzensberger and Grass based on their biographical background while ignoring 
Celan’s and dismissing his poetry as not innovative enough, I cannot see the link between 
the two evalutations, as Weigel does. One cannot derive from this essay the conclusion 
that “[w]ithin the notion of “generation” in postwar literature there is the hidden, the 
implicit national (German), gender-specific (masculine) matrix of this norm.”98 Even 
though Rühmkorf stresses the merit of writers of his own generation for advancing poetry 
he critiques about thirty poets and does not specifically exclude the Jewish or the female 
perspective.  
 Broszat’s designation of the memory of Holocaust survivors as “mythic” remains 
equivocal, and Rühmkorf’s interpretation of Celan can be considered mistaken. But it 
should be clear that the two cases on which Weigel bases her critique of the “concealed 
first generation” are not nearly as clear-cut as they appear to be in her presentation. 
Broszat does not exclude Jewish memory from the historical discourse but promotes a 
form of historical research that allows for the incorporation of other “non-academic” 
memories of the Holocaust. Rühmkorf, likewise, does not criticize Celan based on his 
Jewishness but on aesthetic criteria. That both of them underline that the particular role of 
their generation in their respective fields does not yet establish a hierarchical order 
                                                





necessarily tied to mechanisms of exclusion. In fact, their claims about the Hitler Youth 
generation are worth considering. I would agree with Broszat’s claim that this 
generation’s relationship to the Nazi past was more critical and more intense than that of 
older generations of Germans. And Rühmkorf’s assumption that generational experiences 
of writers of the Hitler Youth generation have left an impact on the post-1945 history of 
literature will serve as the starting point of my second chapter, in which I examine a 
number of early prose texts by Grass, Walser, and Wolf.  
The discourse of the “young generation” in the early post-war years 
Weigel focuses exclusively on non-literary texts in her essay, which is all the more 
surprising given her focus on post-war German literature. That her criticism of the 
“concealed first generation” is directed particularly against the literary realm becomes 
clear again in the next and last step of her argument, when she looks at the generational 
discourses prevalent in the beginnings of Gruppe 47.  
 After suggesting that the “concealed first generation” was able to dominate the 
memory discourse by portraying itself as privileged due to its innocent experience of the 
Nazi years, Weigel goes on to argue that this paradigm emerged in the early post-war 
years, in the discourse of the so-called “junge Generation”.99 Focusing on the journal Der 
Ruf: Unabhängige Blätter für die junge Generation, Weigel convincingly illustrates that 
there is a distinct political agenda behind this particular generational discourse. She 
shows that the editors of Der Ruf take great pains to portray the “young generation” as 
both free from guilt and rich in experience. As she further demonstrates, by 
systematically cutting this generation’s ties to Nazi-Germany, the “young generation” 
                                                





and their representatives attempt to emphasize their qualification to take over elite 
positions in culture and politics of the post-war German state. 
 In her critique, Weigel focuses mainly on two programmatic essays, both 
published in the first issue of Der Ruf in 1946 and both written by one of Der Ruf’s 
editors, Alfred Andersch. She stresses three aspects in the presentation of the “young 
generation.” First, she shows that the program of the “young generation” is connected 
with a radical denial of a genealogical origin.100 Cutting all of its relations to the Nazi 
past, Andersch imagines the “young generation” as originating from a type of immaculate 
birth in the midst of destruction. Weigel quotes from Andersch’s article “Das junge 
Europa formt sein Gesicht”: “Der auf die äußerste Spitze getriebenen Vernichtung 
entsprang, wie einst dem Haupt des Jupiter die Athene, ein neuer, jugendfrischer, 
jungfräulich-athenischer Geist.”101 This image of the “young Germany” born out of 
catastrophe, Weigel argues, has neither origin nor history and, as a result, carries no 
responsibility for the past. 
 The second passage she highlights from Das junge Europa reveals Andersch’s 
humanistic vision of a Europe unified by its youthful generations. He argues that what 
connects young Germans with other young Europeans is their existential experience of 
the war:  
Uns scheint, trotz aller Verbrechen einer Minderheit, der Brückenschlag zwischen 
den alliierten Soldaten, den Männern des europäischen Widerstands und den 
deutschen Frontsoldaten, zwischen den politischen KZ-Häftlingen und den 
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ehemaligen ‚Hitlerjungen’ (sie sind es schon längst nicht mehr!) durchaus 
möglich.102 
 
Weigel stresses that Andersch not only assigns the responsibility for the Nazi crimes to “a 
minority.” In his imagination of a “Brückenschlag,” she argues, “only the Jewish 
survivors are excluded.”103 Indeed, whether Andersch represses Jewish victims or 
considers reconciliation impossible at this point, he explicitly mentions resistance 
fighters, Allied soldiers, and political inmates of concentrations camps without so much 
as a reference to the Holocaust.  
 Third, Weigel demonstrates how unambiguously Andersch sets up a divide 
between guilt and innocence along the lines of ‘young’ and ‘old’. She quotes from his 
essay “Notwendige Aussage über Nürnberg,” an article about the Nuremberg trials:  
Die erstaunlichen Waffentaten junger Deutscher in diesem Kriege und die ‚Taten’ 
etwas älterer Deutscher, die gegenseitig in Nürnberg verhandelt werden, stehen in 
keinem Zusammenhang. Die Kämpfer von Stalingrad, El Alamein und Cassino, 
denen auch von ihren Gegnern jede Achtung entgegengebracht wurde, sind 
unschuldig an den Verbrechen von Dachau und Buchenwald.104 
 
According to Andersch’s logic, members of the “young generation” were soldiers. Thus, 
they had nothing to do with the Holocaust. Quite the opposite, their “Waffentaten” were 
so astonishing that even their adversaries could not help but admire them. As Weigel 
writes, this passage illustrates particularly well “how a heroic soldier collective tries to 
escape from historical responsibility for Nazism.”105 
 I do not take issue with Weigel’s brief examination of Andersch’s articles, which 
is both compelling and persuasive. Not only Der Ruf but various other publications 
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between 1945 and 1947 focused intensely on the notion of youth in general and the 
“young generation” in particular. As Stephen Brockmann points out in his book German 
Literary Culture and the Zero Hour: “Given the apparent moral bankruptcy of several 
generations of German leaders culminating in the cultural, political, military and 
economic disaster of the Third Reich, it was only natural that the end of the Second 
World War saw a widespread interest in the search for a younger generation untainted by 
association with Nazi crimes.”106 This interest is visible for instance in the various 
journals that catered specifically to the “young generation” such as Start: Illustriertes 
Blatt der jungen Generation (1946-1949), Benjamin: Zeitschrift für junge Menschen 
(1947-1948), Ende und Anfang: Zeitung der jungen Generation (1946-1949), Ja: 
Zeitschrift der jungen Generation (1946-1948), Wir: Ein Blatt der Jugend (1946-1948), 
and Die Zukunft: Unabhängige Zeitschrift junger Menschen (1946-1948).107  
 Ohad Parnes has called attention to the fact that discussions of the so-called 
“Schuldfrage” are prevalent in many of these publications. Expanding Weigel’s 
argument, he writes that in response to the debate about German guilt, the spokesmen of 
the young generation established the “Topos der unschuldigen Erfahrung.”108 Their 
involvement in the war is reframed both as tragic and as enriching experience: they were 
‘dragged’ into the war despite their young age, but at the same time this experience 
qualified them to be the future elite. Thus, Parnes writes with regard to Andersch’s 
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Nuremberg article in which the latter speaks of the astounding “Waffentaten” of the 
young generation: 
Die Anerkennung militärischer Leistungen sogar durch ‘den Feind’ als Beleg 
soldatischer Unschuld anzuführen ist eine Strategie, die zum entstehenden 
Mythologem der ‘sauberen Wehrmacht’ entscheidend beitragen wird. Diese 
Strategie nutzt Andersch hier für die Legitimation seines Anspruchs, Teil der 
neuen kulturellen Elite [...] zu sein. Denn die Kriegserfahrung lässt sich nicht nur 
biografisch nicht abstreifen, im Gegenteil: Sie gilt gerade als jener 
Erfahrungshorizont, der es allererst erlaubt, an den künftigen Machtpositionen im 
kulturellen Feld zu partizipieren.109 
 
Parnes characterizes the discourse of the “young generation” quite accurately when he 
writes: “Kind und Stalingradkämpfer, d.h. unschuldig und erfahrungsgesättigt zu sein, 
das soll diese Generation auszeichnen, die sich damit von den ‚Schuldigen’ sowie von 
den ‚Unerfahrenen’ abgrenzt.”110 In the center of this discourse is the young, exonerated 
and virtuous Wehrmacht soldier. 
 My criticism of this last part of Weigel’s essay is not directed at her analysis of 
Andersch’s self-exonerating presentation of the “young generation”. Rather, I am 
concerned with her thesis that this discourse in the years 1945-1947 marks the beginning 
of an apologetic discourse that would be perpetuated by the Hitler Youth generation 
throughout the post-war era.  
 
4. The Two “First Generations” of Post-War German Literature: 
Different Generations—Different Discourses  
 
It is no coincidence that Weigel’s argument focuses on Alfred Andersch and Der Ruf. 
This journal is considered the intellectual forum from which Gruppe 47 emerged, that is 
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the very origin of the group of intellectuals who were highly influential in West 
Germany’s cultural sphere during the next decades. The group formed spontaneously in 
1947. Alfred Andersch and Hans-Werner Richter had to step down as the editors of Der 
Ruf because the Allied forces in the West considered their writing too far on the Left. 
When Andersch and Richter attempted to develop a new publication (Der Skorpion), 
meeting of the future editorial staff of this new magazine turned into a reading of literary 
texts—and Gruppe 47 was born.111 In Genea-Logik, Weigel accordingly refers to Der Ruf 
as “die Gründungsurkunde der deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur und Gruppe 47,”112 a 
phrase which suggests that the apologetic tendencies in Andersch’s articles were carried 
over into post-war literature as a whole. 
 That she sees continuities between the exculpatory discourse of the “young 
generation” and the discourse of the Hitler Youth generation particularly in the literary 
realm,becomes clear when, after speaking about Broszat and Rühmkorf, she mentions the 
names of Martin Walser and Günter Grass. About Walser, she writes: “He owes his 
literary upbringing to a group that at once shifted the responsibility of history onto 
‘somewhat older Germans’ and defended themselves as the ‘young Germany’.”113  
 To claim such continuity is problematic: first of all, it is misleading to write that 
Walser’s and Grass’ generation, in establishing their self-image as innocent witnesses, 
“received support from the discourse of a group of intellectuals about half a generation 
older that established itself as spokesmen of the youth.”114 The young generation, which 
Andersch attempts to exonerate in Der Ruf, is not identical with the Hitler Youth 
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generation. In Das junge Europa, he defines the young generation as “diese junge 
deutsche Generation, die Männer und Frauen zwischen 18 und 35 Jahren, getrennt von 
den Älteren durch ihre Nicht-Verantwortlichkeit, von den Jüngeren durch das Front- und 
Gefangenschaftserlebnis, durch das eingesetzte Leben also.”115 The generation to which 
Andersch refers is thus undoubtedly characterized by its military experiences. As Ohad 
Parned has also pointed out, Andersch considers the young generation “als männlich-
soldatische”.116 When Andersch speaks of their “Waffentaten” and their “Front- und 
Gefangenschaftserlebnis”, these are experiences, which members of the Hitler Youth 
generation, even those in the anti-air-raid units, did not share with older age groups. 
 That the editors of Der Ruf did not regard the Hitler Youth as part of the young 
generation becomes clear also from another passage, found in a rarely studied document 
called Redaktionelle Prinzipien des Ruf. In this document the editors delineate the 
political program of the journal and define the ‘young Germany’ as  
die Jahrgänge, die entweder nur noch die Depressionsjahre der Weimarer 
Republik kennengelernt haben oder aber vollständig von Nationalsozialismus und 
Krieg (Front- und Gefangenschaftserlebnis) geistig geprägt wurden. Es sind die 
Jahrgänge, welche die stärksten Blutopfer gebracht haben, die durch die 
geschichtliche Entwicklung aus den beruflichen und familiären Zusammenhängen 
am schärfsten herausgerissen wurden, die den Neubau ihrer geistigen und 
wirtschaftlichen Existenz leisten müssen, ohne in der Lage gewesen zu sein, sich 
das Rüstzeug anzueignen, wie es das Leben in einer friedlichen Welt bedingt. So 
grenzen diese Jahrgänge sich scharf gegen die Gruppe der Älteren, die in der 
Weimarer Republik großgeworden sind, und der eigentlichen Jugend ab, die heute 
unter veränderten Bedingungen ihr Leben beginnen kann.117 
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This passage clarifies once more that the Hitler Youth generation is seen as separate from 
the “young generation.” Unlike the “young generation,” members of the Hitler Youth 
generation neither experienced the depression in the twenties, nor did the war interrupt 
their professional lives, nor did the majority of them die in World War II—they do not 
belong, in other words, to the group of men who Andersch and Richter call “die 
Jahrgänge, welche die stärksten Blutopfer gebracht haben.” Clearly, the two of them 
speak of the generation of Wehrmacht soldiers. One could claim with Ohad Parnes that 
this marks the beginning of the discourse about the honorable Wehrmacht, which was 
prevalent in West Germany until the nineties.118 Weigel’s suggestion, however, that 
Andersch and Richter’s apologetic presentation of the young generation gave way to the 
discourse of the “concealed first generation” or Hitler Youth generation is historically 
imprecise, because it conflates differences both in terms of birth dates and in terms of war 
experiences resulting from the affiliation to different age groups.   
 In the last quotation, the editors of Der Ruf themselves strangely distinguish the 
“young generation” from the “die eigentliche Jugend”.119 This description sheds light on 
another aspect of the cultural-political program in the journal that speaks against a 
blurring of the “young” and the “concealed first generation.” As Weigel and others have 
observed, Andersch and Richter, while belonging to the group of Wehrmacht soldiers, 
were not quite young anymore when they founded Der Ruf in 1946. They certainly did 
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not belong to the actual youth. The adjective “young” was thus used in a fairly flexible 
way.120  
 In her essay, Weigel acknowledges this fact by writing that the Hitler Youth 
generation’s apologetic discourse was initiated by “a group of intellectuals about half a 
generation older that established itself as spokesmen of the youth.”121 In Genea-Logik, 
she addresses the age difference between the editors of Der Ruf and the “young 
generation” (which, as we have seen, she falsely identifies with the Hitler Youth 
generation in the following quote):  
Sprechen die Herausgeber der Unabhängige(n] Blätter für die junge Generation 
im Namen einer Generation, die im historischen Sinne als HJ- oder Flakhelfer-
Generation bezeichnet werden muß […] so ist allerdings eine eklatante 
Diskrepanz zwischen ihrem Sprechort als Stellvertreter einer jungen, 
‘schuldlosen’ Generation und den Jahrgängen der federführenden Herausgeber zu 
verzeichnen. Denn Hans-Werner Richter (Jg. 1908, d.h. bei Kriegsbeginn bereits 
31 und 1946 bereits 38 Jahre zählend) und Alfred Andersch (Jg. 1914, bei 
Kriegsbeginn also bereits 25 und 1946 immerhin 32 Jahre alt) gehörten selbst zu 
der nicht mehr ganz so jungen Generation.122 
 
Thus, when Andersch and Richter turn themselves into the representatives of the young 
Germany despite this age gap, and when they declare in their program that “Der Ruf ist 
keine Publikation ‘für’ die junge Generation, geschrieben von der älteren, sondern ein 
Blatt ‘der’ jungen Generation für sich selbst,”123 we are no longer dealing with a 
generation’s self-understanding but with the appropriation of a generational discourse. It 
was very much in Andersch’s and Richter’s interest to form part of the group of younger 
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Germans they themselves had described as innocent, heroic and predestined to lead the 
future German state. 
 In a radio feature from 1974 called Was war und wie entstand die Gruppe 47, 
Richter implicitly admits to this appropriation. Recapitulating the beginnings of Der Ruf, 
he unmistakably formulates that he and Andersch wrote in the name of the “young 
generation”: 
Aber gehöre ich noch zur jungen Generation? Ich bin achtunddreißig Jahre alt, 
Andersch immerhin auch schon dreiunddreißig, unsere Jugend liegt unter den 
Jahren des Dritten Reiches und des Krieges begraben. Doch wir fangen ganz von 
vorn an. Jetzt, meinen wir, sind wir die junge Generation. So beginnen wir 
unbekümmert für jene zu schreiben, die jünger sind als wir, eine Generation, die 
dezimiert und verschlagen von den Schlachtfeldern des zweiten Weltkrieges 
zurückgekehrt ist. Diese Generation ist unsere Hoffnung.124  
 
In this statement, Richter confirms yet again that differences in age and biographical 
experiences did not play an important role in Der Ruf’s notion of youth. Weigel criticizes 
this elision strongly. Only by brushing away these differences, she argues, youth could be 
so easily identified with innocence. In the discourse of the “young generation,” she writes 
werden alle Differenzen der historischen Herkunft und die gegensätzlichsten Orte 
in der jüngstvergangenen Katastrophe offensiv aus dem Weg geräumt. Zur 
Formierung einer alle Differenzen einebnenden Einheit wird eine andere 
Opposition absolut gesetzt: der Gegensatz zwischen junger und älterer 
Generation. Insofern ist die Junge Generation der Deckname für eine entlang der 
Demarkationslinie von Schuld geteilte Erinnerung, mit der ein heroisches 
soldatisches Kollektiv sich aus der historischen Verantwortung des Nazismus 
herauszulösen anschickt.125  
 
But does Weigel herself not brush away the differences in age and biographical 
experience in her claim that Andersch, Richter, Walser, and Grass share in the same 
generational discourse? Does she herself not neglect the different historical positions of 
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the former Wehrmacht soldiers and the Hitler Youth by claiming that in both cases youth 
is utilized to defy guilt and guarantee innocence? To agree with her argument that the 
apologetic discourse of the “young generation” is programmatic of the way in which the 
Hitler Youth generation presented itself, we would have to grant Andersch and Richter 
the role of the spokesmen for the youth. We would have to tacitly accept a conflation 
between them and the generations of younger Germans—a conflation that they 
themselves had set up to their own benefit. Ultimately, we would have to reproduce the 
distortion prevalent in this particular generational discourse. 
 At the beginning of her article Weigel states that she is not concerned with the 
concept of generation in a socio-historical sense, but rather with discursive strategies 
within the generational discourse in Germany after 1945.126 However, in order to 
examine the ways in which the concept of generation is used as a “cultural pattern to 
construct history,”127—that is, as a type of narrative in the post-war discourse on 
memory—we have to acknowledge each generation’s particular relationship to the Nazi 
past. In order to unveil the distortions in this discourse, we have to first deal with each 
generation “im historischen Sinne,” 128 in Weigel’s words. For an examination of the 
literary sphere, at which Weigel directs most of her criticism, this requires distinguishing 
between writers who experienced the years 1939-1945 as Wehrmacht soldiers in combat, 
and writers who spent most of these years in Nazi Youth organizations. 
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writings about the effect of milieu. Instead I will analyze the concept and narrative of ‘generation’ as a 
symbolic form, that is, as a cultural pattern for constructing history.” Weigel, “Generation as a Symbolic 
Form,” 265.  
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 If Broszat as a member of the Hitler Youth generation speaks of “das Glück in 
politisches Handeln und in Verantwortung noch nicht oder nur marginal hineingezogen 
zu werden,”129 this cannot be considered an exonerative depiction of his generation, 
because it is largely based on historical facts. While biographically attached to the Nazi 
era and for the most part “Mitläufer” of the Nazi regime, the Hitler Youth generation 
does not carry the same set of moral and legal responsibilities that the perpetrator 
generation of Germans does. “Youth” was in their case not a metaphor used to defy guilt, 
but in fact the reason why they were not politically involved in the majority of Nazi 
crimes. Aleida Assman concludes succinctly: “Als ‘Täter’ kommen diese jungen 
Menschen, auch wenn sie sich wie Grass freiwillig und mit Enthusiasmus auf die Ziele 
des Nationalsozialismus verpflichteten, nicht in Frage.”130 
 Their different level of legal responsibility did not prevent writers of the Hitler 
Youth generation from reflecting on their adolescent belief in the Nazi ideology and the 
responsibility as writers and public intellectuals resulting from this experience. In fact, it 
is precisely the idiosyncratic debate on guilt and innocence and a continuous struggle to 
come to terms with an upbringing in Nazi Germany that distinguishes this generation of 
writers from their older and younger colleagues. Their work is shaped by an astute 
awareness of belonging to the generation that experienced the “Gnade der späten 
Geburt.” This should have become evident merely from the few passages quoted from the 
three writers’ essays above. From these passages, in which all three writers display strong 
feelings of being haunted by their childhood under Hitler, one can suspect that the writers 
of the Hitler Youth generation are not primarily concerned with exoneration, as is 
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undoubtedly the case with Andersch and Richter. Instead of glossing over their ties to 
their Nazi past and of denying their origin, they make their particular relationship to the 
Nazi past an important subject of their writing. This is not always done entirely without 
apologetic tendencies or, as I will show, questionable conclusions, but it is nevertheless 
done in a decidedly more self-reflective mode than that of Andersch and Richter.  
Hitler Youth Generation & Gruppe 47 
I have dedicated a good portion of this chapter to Weigel’s critique of the concealed first 
generation and their alleged spokesmen because I consider her conflation of two different 
discourses—that of the Hitler Youth generation with that of the war generation—
symptomatic of a broader trend in scholarship on post-war German literature. Günter 
Grass, Martin Walser, and other writers of the Hitler Youth generation are often seen in 
conjunction with Andersch, Richter and other writers of Gruppe 47 such as Heinrich 
Böll, especially in the field of memory studies. The group’s bonds are considered so 
strong that the affiliation to Gruppe 47 is frequently superimposed on generational 
affiliations, sometimes even replacing them entirely. Paradigmatically, Amir Eshel thus 
refers to the key figures of Gruppe 47—“Alfred Andersch, Heinrich Böll, Siegfried Lenz, 
Günter Grass, Martin Walser und andere”—as “‘erste Generation’ deutscher 
Nachkriegsliteratur”.131 
 This amalgamation of (mostly West German) writers who began their literary 
careers in the 1940s, '50s, and '60s, has long been standard in the study of so-called 
Gegenwartsliteratur. Notwithstanding the fact that Gruppe 47 writers belonged to 
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different generations, they seemed to be unified in their role as critical forces behind the 
great societal project of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, continually writing about Nazi 
Germany and its aftermath in the post-war era. From this perspective, it was possible to 
consider their dominant role in the literary sphere in a positive light, as seen for example 
in Jochen Vogt’s book ‘Erinnerung ist unsere Aufgabe’: Über Literatur, Moral und 
Politik 1945-1990. He writes:  
Die deutschsprachige und speziell die westdeutsche Nachkriegsliteratur hat von 
ihren Anfängen bis in die achtziger Jahre hinein den Nationalsozialismus in all 
seinen Dimensionen, von Weltkrieg und Holocaust bis zum alltäglichen und 
familiären Faschismus, sowie sein Nachleben in der westdeutschen Restauration, 
zu ihrem wichtigsten Thema gemacht. Sie leistet damit Erinnerungs- und 
Trauerarbeit stellvertretend für eine Gesellschaft, die solche Arbeit in ihrer 
Mehrheit und ihren repräsentativen Institutionen abgewehrt hat. Unter dem 
Begriff Nachkriegsliteratur fasse ich, wie Böll schon 1963, in erster Linie 
diejenigen Autorinnen und Autoren, die nach 1945 zu schreiben beginnen, die 
sich in den fünfziger Jahren als ‚nonkonformistisch’ definieren, zunächst noch im 
Schatten der sogenannten Inneren Emigration stehen, dann aber – im lockeren 
Zusammenschluß als Gruppe 47 – das literarische Leben der Bundesrepublik 
zunehmend dominieren.132 
 
It is precisely this positive assessment of post-1945 writers as promoters of an earnest 
working through of the past that has recently been challenged by scholars who, at the 
meeting point of literary, cultural and memory studies, have begun to critically seek out 
the “blind spots” in the project of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. This critical scholarship 
works with the same broad conception of post-1945 writers as the previous more 
traditional scholarship did. Writers of the Hitler Youth generation are seen as part of the 
collective of writers who were “members” of Gruppe 47, with the difference that their 
dominance in the literary sphere, particularly in post-war memory discourse, is now 
strongly criticized. Similarly to Weigel, several studies thus argue that the authoritative 
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role of Hitler Youth/Gruppe 47 in the memory discourse has worked to exclude other 
forms of memory, such as that of women or of Jewish writers as well as of the following 
generations who did not witness the Nazi period themselves. 
 In her study Genea-Logik, Weigel claims that, in Germany after 1945, “[d]as 
Selbstverständnis, Vertreter oder Angehöriger einer bestimmten Generation zu sein, 
ersetzt und überlagert [...] durchweg das Paradigma von Opfern und (Mit-)Tätern.“133 As 
I have already suggested—and as I will clarify in the literary analyses in the following 
chapters—the self-understanding of writers of the Hitler Youth generation is much more 
complicated and, as a result, does not fit into this paradigm. However, in the discourse 
about this generation there seems to be an undercurrent operating strongly along the 
divide between perpetrators and victims. In research that sheds light on mechanisms of 
marginalization and repression in the post-war German memory discourse—undeniably a 
highly important endeavor—Hitler Youth writers, seen in alliance with older writers of 
Gruppe 47, often become the usual suspects, while younger writers seem to be exempt 
from all reproaches. The argumentation then quickly becomes imprecise, the tone 
moralizing, and above all, the writers are considered in isolation from their literature.  
 The most extreme example of such heavy-handed categorization is Klaus 
Briegleb’s Missachtung und Tabu. Eine Streitschrift über die Frage: ‘Wie antisemitisch 
war die Gruppe 47?’.134 In this book, Briegleb, who happens to also be Sigrid Weigel’s 
husband and, born in 1932, is part of the Hitler Youth generation himself, attempts to 
draw a connection between the latest debates caused by writers of this generation and the 
memory discourse of the early post-war years, arguing that there is a thread of anti-
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Semitism and marginalization of Jewish memory leading from the beginnings of Gruppe 
47 to the recent debates surrounding Martin Walser and Günter Grass. Referring mostly 
to the debates surrounding Walser’s Friedenspreis speech (1998), his novel Tod eines 
Kritikers (2001), and Grass’ novella Im Krebsgang (2001), Briegleb argues that the anti-
Semitism and German nationalism allegedly expressed by Walser and Grass only 
followed Gruppe 47’s true ideological lines: “Sie [Grass and Walser] erbrachten dabei 
den lebenden Beweis, daß die Vergangenheit dieses westdeutschen literarischen 
Vorzeige-Ensembles in Gestalt seiner verdrängten ‘reindeutschen’ Prämissen 
wiederzukehren im Begriffe war.”135 He claims that while the group had succeeded in 
maintaining their positive image for a long time—“Antifaschismus, Opposition gegen 
den Adenauerstaat, Vergangenheitsbewältigung sind die Schlagworte”136—anti-Semitism 
and nationalism had always been prevalent in Gruppe 47. This is visible in the discourse 
in Der Ruf: “Feststeht, daß die Wiege der Gruppe 47 das Grab schon war. Es trägt den 
Namen ‘Der Ruf. Unabhängige Blätter für die junge Generation.’”137 The discourse 
formulated by Andersch and Richter immediately after the war, Briegleb argues, 
persisted during the years of Gruppe 47’s existence between the years 1947-1967, and 
ultimately was unleashed in the debates surrounding Walser and Grass.138 The authors 
most frequently mentioned in his book—Andersch, Richter, Walser and Grass—are 
coarsely categorized as “deutsche Schriftsteller ‘1947er Herkunft.’”139  
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 In his 2005 article “Im Schatten der ‘gebrannten Kinder,’” Stephan Braese, who 
was Briegleb’s doctoral student at the University of Hamburg, attacks the writers of the 
Hitler Youth generation from a different angle than does Briegleb’s polemical and 
willfully controversial book.140 Braese expands on Weigel’s argument about the 
“concealed first generation,” claiming that post-war literature has for the longest time 
been overshadowed by the influence of a group of canonical German authors, still evident 
“in den herausragenden literarischen events noch von 1998 oder 2001 – Martin Walsers 
Frankfurter Friedenspreisrede, Günter Grass’ Im Krebsgang sowie Walsers Tod eines 
Kritikers.”141 He first identifies these authors as members of the “HJ-Generation”142 or 
“Luftwaffenhelfer-Generation,”143 recapitulating Weigel’s thesis that they successfully 
legitimized their hegemonic position in post-war memory discourse by means of their 
“authentic” experience of the war. In the remainder of his article, however, he speaks 
about the “first generation” of German authors. This latter term is used in reference to 
different writers of Gruppe 47. For example, he speaks about “die Werke von Heinrich 
Böll, Günter Grass, Alfred Andersch, Siegfried Lenz”144, and identifies “Böll, Grass and 
Walser”145 (and at another place “Andersch, Richter, Grass und die anderen”146) as the 
first generation of post-war writers. 
 With regard to these authors, Braese establishes three specific points of criticism. 
First, he claims that the hegemonic position of the so-called first generation has silenced 
writers of the second generation. When the Hitler Youth generation entered the literary 
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scene in the late 1950s and 60s, Braese claims, they modernized and re-energized the 
group of older writers, so that the phalanx of first-generation writers was able to interrupt 
the alternation of generations and to overpower the second generation, which no longer 
shared the personal experience of the Nazi era.147 As he writes: “Wer später geboren war, 
authentische Erinnerungen an die Jahre des Dritten Reiches nicht mehr teilte, dem kam 
hier [in der Gruppe 47) allenfalls eingeschränktes Rederecht […] zu.”148 Even as late as 
the 1990s, younger writers—W. G. Sebald serves as Braese’s primary example—
struggled to make their voices heard: 
Noch wer in den 90er Jahren als Schriftsteller deutscher Sprache zu 
Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust schrieb, der schrieb notwendig an - nicht nur 
gegen das kaum erschütterliche Prestige der einschlägigen, teilweise ikonisierten 
Werke von Böll, Grass und Walser; nicht nur gegen die unverringerte Aktivität 
der noch Verbliebenen der ersten Generation in Literaturbetrieb und -politik; 
sondern vor allem gegen das Gewicht der Tatsache, dass die generationelle 
Ablösung der HJ-Generation noch zu ihren Lebzeiten zu einer kulturellen 
Erfahrung nie geworden war. Es ist dieses Datum, von dem deutschsprachiges 
Schreiben über Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust auch nach 1989 notwendig 
seinen Ausgang nimmt.149  
 
The first generation’s dominant position in the literary discourse about Nazi Germany 
and the Holocaust is in Braese’s eyes particularly precarious, because those writers had 
taken on the project of Vergangenheitsbewältigung for the wrong reasons in the first 
place. 
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 Braese’s second point of criticism is that their motivation to deal with this 
problematic part of German history was not rooted in moral awareness but in a utilitarian 
understanding that this was the only condition under which literature could make its way 
back to the ranks of world literature: 
[D]er westdeutsche Kulturbetrieb der Nachkriegsjahrzehnte [rezipierte] die 
poetische Reflexion der Massenverbrechen nicht als Gebot der Geschichte […], 
sondern als im Grunde akzidentielle, ‘moralische’ Zulassungsbedingung der 
Siegermächte zur Weltliteratur.150   
 
For the first generation, working through the past was an obligation, a sheer 
“Pflichtübung,”151 as Braese calls it. 
 The third reproach against this generation of post-war writers relates to the 
previous ones. Braese argues that not only did these writers only reluctantly deal with the 
history of National Socialism, but they also found a way to avoid dealing with the Jewish 
victims of Nazism in their literature. Since the first generation was so influential, they 
were able to constitute a memory discourse at their discretion—one that, as he argues, 
focused exclusively on the historical role of the German perpetrator. In their critical 
investigation of Nazi Germany, writers of the first generation were thus able to avoid 
reflection on the role of the victim. Braese speaks of the “heimliche Programmatik […], 
über die Täter zu reden zu dem Zweck, nicht über die Opfer reden zu müssen.”152 Under 
the pretext of a self-critical examination, claims Braese, the Jewish perspective was 
excluded.  
 Both Briegleb and Braese paint their pictures with fairly broad strokes when they 
juxtapose the so-called “first generation” of German writers with the Jewish victims of 
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the Holocaust.  In this context, Thomas Anz in his review of Briegleb’s book has as 
spoken of a “Hermeneutik des Verdachtes und der Unterstellung”153 that often replaces a 
thorough literary analysis. This type of questionable hermeneutics can be found, though 
to a lesser extent, in Braese’s essay. It is noteworthy that both authors have published 
similarly critical works on the memory politics of the West German Literaturbetrieb, in 
which the analysis is more thorough and the argumentation more convincing. This is the 
case in Briegleb’s 1999 essay “‘Neuanfang’ in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsliteratur” on 
the nationalist rhetoric prevalent in Gruppe 47 between the years 1947 and 1951, and also 
in Braese’s voluminous study Die andere Erinnerung- Jüdische Autoren in der 
westdeutschen Nachkriegsliteratur from 2001. In this latter book, Braese considers the 
reception of works by Grete Weil, Edgar Hilsenrath, and Wolfgang Hildesheimer and 
demonstrates in an impressive way that Jewish writers were repeatedly excluded from 
literary discourse in post-war Germany through feelings of “Erinnerungsdifferenz” and 
“Erinnerungskonkurrenz” predominant on the German side.154 
 Interestingly, Grass and Walser are either marginally or not at all mentioned in 
these two works.155 Instead, Briegleb and Braese find traces of oppression in works by 
Richter, Andersch, Böll, and—in Braese’s study—in the writing of a number of literary 
critics. It seems that both Briegleb and Braese have begun to engage a generational 
discourse only after the recent literary debates surrounding writers of the Hitler Youth, 
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especially Grass and Walser. Only in a “Nachbemerkung,” added to a later edition of his 
book Die andere Erinnerung, Braese identifies the Walser-Bubis debate as the most 
recent example of a memory “competition.” Only there, he uses generational terminology 
speaking of “Deutsche und Juden der ersten Generation” and the “Generation der 
Täter”.156 While writers of the second generation seem to be exempt from the 
accusations, while they sometimes even rank among the repressed victims, one can sense 
a deep mistrust towards writers of the so-called “first generation” in these words, towards 
those writers with personal ties to the Nazi period.  
  
As a result of the amalgamation of generations and a biased approach to the post-war 
literary sphere, the generational discourse of writers of the Hitler Youth generation—and 
with it, a very specific memory discourse—has become lost. In the following three 
chapters, I will attempt to make it visible again. I will show that the literary output, self-
understanding, and public reception of Günter Grass, Martin Walser, and Christa Wolf, 
arguably the three most significant writers in the post-war Germanies, cannot be 
understood without a consideration of their mutual historical-biographical legacy. While I 
claim that the collective experience of the years 1933-1945 has shaped the aesthetic and 
political thinking of all three writers in strikingly similar ways, I am interested also in the 
different manifestations of the generational discourse in their literature and in the distinct 
agendas that emerged from it with regard to their views on Germany.  
 In his book “German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past,” Dirk Moses suggests to 
avoid the categories of “left” and “right” in descriptions of the politics of this generation. 
Instead, he argues, we can find “German Germans” and “non-German Germans” on both 
                                                





the Left and the Right: those who positively identitied with national culture and insisted 
that “[t]he group self has not been polluted by the Nazi deeds, nor ought it be 
stigmatized,”157 and those who claimed the opposite. He considers Walser a “German 
German” leftist of his generation, who “thought that the nation was redeemable.” 158 If we 
apply Moses’s categorization to Grass, we would have to describe him as a “non-German 
German.” Grass has revealed tendencies to see the German nation as forever stigmatized 
by the Nazi years, especially in his stance on the GDR. He presupposed that after 
Auschwitz Germany carried a burden that could never to be redeemed and was 
symbolically represented in the country’s division. Walser—the archetypical “German-
German,” and Grass—the “non-German German” par excellence?   
 Moses’s categories were designed to describe the positive and negative 
nationalism of West German thinkers of this generation; they do not seem to be suitable 
to characterize Christa Wolf’s belief in a socialist Germany. Nevertheless, Moses’s focus 
on the different reactions that can be found in this generation vis-à-vis the stigma of the 
Nazi past proves to be helpful in the case of Grass, Walser, and Wolf. The three writers’ 
political stances toward Germany can be understood as “redemptive projects,” resulting 
from a shared generational experience. As Moses highlights, Walser wanted to salvage 
the German “Volk” and overcome its stigma. Grass continually evoked the stigma by 
speaking about Germany’s historical guilt and the responsibility derived from it. Wolf’s 
redemptive project was socialism itself, an anti-fascist state representing the “better 
Germany.” 
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From Weigel’s depiction one could assume that the discourse of the Hitler Youth 
generation was an oppressive West German discourse of male writers of Gruppe 47.  
By highlighting the urgency with which the three writers follow their respective projects 
of redemptions, each in their own way, their generational discourse will become visible 
as something else entirely: a self-reflexive struggle for identiy—their own identity and 
that of the nation, the two being closely intertwined. This is what connects the three 





Vor allen anderen Blumen gefällt mir die hellgraue, das ganze Jahr über  
blühende Skepsis. 





Taking the Stage—Generational Thinking in the 
Early Political and Literary Work of Grass, Wolf, and Walser  
(1963-1979)  
 
Introduction   
 
On December 1, 2011, Christa Wolf died at the age of 82. Shortly thereafter, Günter 
Grass delivered a eulogy at a memorial gathering at the Berlin Academy of Arts, which 
began with the assertion that he and the East German writer belonged to the same 
generation:  
Christa Wolf gehörte einer Generation an, zu der auch ich mich zähle. Die Zeit 
des Nationalsozialismus und die späte, zu späte Erkenntnis aller im Verlauf von 
nur zwölf Jahren von Deutschen begangenen Verbrechen haben uns geprägt. 
Schreiben verlangt seitdem, aus Spuren zu lesen. Dem entspricht eines ihrer 
Bücher unter dem Titel „Kindheitsmuster“, denn ideologische Wechselbäder 
bestimmten nach der braunen Diktatur die Doktrinen des Stalinismus ihrer jungen 
Jahre. 
 Gläubig eingeschlagene Irrwege, aufkommender Zweifel und Widerstand 
gegen verordnete Zwänge, mehr noch, die Einsicht in eigene Teilhabe innerhalb 
eines die sozialistische Utopie nivellierenden Systems, sind bezeichnend für ihren 
im Verlauf von fünf Jahrzehnten bewiesenen literarischen Rang: vom „Geteilten 
Himmel“ bis zur letzten Reise, die uns in die „Stadt der Engel“ führt, Buch nach 
Buch; Bücher, die geblieben sind.159  
 
                                                







This is an astute summary of Wolf’s career, and it is no coincidence that it is presented 
within a generational framework. From the atuhor’s breakthrough novel Nachdenken 
über Christa T. to her last one Stadt der Engel, her books reveal the strong influence that 
the childhood and adolescence during the Nazi era had on her writing. The embrace of 
the socialist utopia, Wolf’s errors in following this path such as her short-term 
collaboration with the GDR’s secret police, her doubts and her resistance, and ultimately 
her late recognition that the “GDR project” had failed—Grass is right in pointing out that 
for Wolf writing meant “Spuren lesen”: following the traces of a Nazi childhood in her 
later political life.   
 What is most interesting about this eulogy is the almost self-evident way in which 
Grass creates a bond between himself and Wolf based on a shared generational identity. 
From today’s perspective, it is indeed not difficult to see the similarities between Grass 
and Wolf. When they first took the stage as young writers in the fifties and sixties, they 
then appeared as a new generation bringing fresh air to the stuffy German literary scene 
by approaching the still recent Nazi past in a different way. Grass and Wolf in 
particular—he in the West and she in the East—were both willing to approach Hitler 
Germany not only from a very personal angle but also in a self-critical and self-reflective 
manner, talking openly about their generation’s particular experience of this time. Their 
biographies became public, and while the rest of the country was busy looking forward, 
these two authors looked back and relentlessly revisited their Nazi childhood and their 
belief in the Führer’s Tausendjähriges Reich. Grass lacked the accusatory tone of the 
sixty-eighters, who were born after the war and held their parents responsible for it, as 





writers of the inner emigration entangled with the regime in one way or other. Wolf 
differed in her approach to the GDR because her biographical experiences were much 
unlike the communists of the first hour, whose socialist ideas emerged before World War  
II and who had to endure Nazi persecution. There was a searching mode in their 
literature, a certain caution, and a tone of self-doubt that had never been there before. 
This attitude that they themselves related to their upbringing influenced not only their 
literature but also their politics. The continuity with which both writers publicly related 
their own biographies lend them moral credibility and eventually turned them into moral 
guide-posts in the East and in the West.   
 This narrative about Grass, Walser and Wolf as a collective can emerge only from 
a certain distance to the first decades of Germany’s post-war intellectual history, more 
precisely from a post-reunification perspective. In the sixties and seventies, Grass and 
Wolf could not have denied being part of the same generation, and it seems to be that the 
generational theme constantly accompanied their work. But their generational thinking 
went in very different directions and developed almost in opposition to each other. Thus, 
while my dissertation as a whole seeks to show the benefits of a synthesis of Grass, 
Walser and Wolf as representing one and the same generation of writers, this chapter will 
focus on how their generational discourses diverge. More precisely, I will show that each 
writer approaches his or her generational background at a time when the division between 
East and West Germany still existed in an idiosyncratic way.  
 In my first chapter, I argued that the generational discourse of writers of the Hitler 
Youth generation has often been overlooked, both by those scholars who categorically 





“Vergangenheitsbewältigung” and by those highly critical of that generation. In this 
chapter, I address this failure to acknowledge this distinct generational discourse, in order 
to highlight the ways in which such an acknowledgement is central to an understanding 
of the works of these writers. In three sections, each focusing on one of the three authors, 
I hope to underscore the significance of this generational discourse for each writer’s 
work. Emphasizing their different attitudes toward Nazi upbringing in this early phase of 
their careers will be crucial for my reading of the development of these three writers after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 In the first part on Günter Grass, I begin with a consideration of W. G. Sebald’s 
critique of the autobiographically inspired work Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke 
(1979), which identifies in the text the same apologetic tendencies found in the works of 
older German writers. I take issue with this critique, arguing that he misreads large parts 
of the text, since he seems so unfamiliar with two themes Grass develops in his early 
work based explicitly on his generational experiences—ideological skepticism and guilt. 
In a brief reading of Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke and a longer reading of 
Hundejahre I will demonstrate how Grass relates these themes to a Hitler Youth 
discourse. In the second part on Christa Wolf, I will show that for the East-German 
writer, the generational subject was perhaps even more important, even though she was 
forced to address it in more careful terms than her West German colleague. While Wolf’s 
most pivotal work on her generation is without a doubt the novel Kindheitsmuster (1979), 
which I discuss in the next chapter, here I contend that the critical turn in Wolf’s early 
work, usually linked with her novel Nachdenken über Christa T. (1968) was prompted by 





mid-sixties, Wolf develops a more critical stance towards the German Democratic 
Republic, a stance based on a form of generational discourse, which paradoxically, as I 
will show, leads to her continuing support of the socialist utopia.  
 At first glance, Martin Walser’s early work seems to lack the generational theme 
entirely, and there is little material to be found that would show a continual thinking 
about his generational origins with the same urgency visible in Grass and Wolf. 
However, as I argue in my third section, this lack is itself meaningful. If we see Walser 
against the foil of these two writers, it becomes obvious that he seems to have avoided 
publicly speaking and writing about his Hitler Youth past. I relate this avoidance to 
Walser’s detachment from the left-liberal discourse that first emerges at the end of the 
seventies, which he later so heavily critiques. The most crucial text in this context is the 
1979 essay “Händedruck mit Gespenstern”, where he explains that because of his 
increasingly nationalist political stance he cannot be seen as a leftist intellectual any 
longer. The essay also reveals Walser’s struggle to form a political opinion on the right 
while being haunted by his Hitler Youth past, and thus offers a way to understand his 
refusal to explicitly include his biography in his writing and politics, asserting that this 
kind of generational discourse of the Hitler Youth generation is already occupied and 










1. Ten Years Make a Difference— 
Generations in Aus dem Tagebuch einer Schnecke (1972) and 
Hundejahre (1963) by Günter Grass  
 
Wunschfiguren  
In his essay “Konstruktionen der Trauer,” W. G. Sebald compares the theme of mourning 
in two texts by post-war German writers, Günter Grass’s diary text Tagebuch einer 
Schnecke and Wolfgang Hildesheimer’s novel Tynset.160 Mary Cosgrove criticizes 
Sebald’s biased approach in pitting the two writers against each other favoring the 
Jewish-German writer Hildesheimer, with whom he seems to identify more strongly. The 
comparison becomes a kind of “melancholy competition,” as Cosgrove calls it,161 over 
which is the more authentic discourse of mourning, specifically of mourning over the 
Jewish victims of the Holocaust. She points out that Sebald, under the guise of analyzing 
the texts based on literary criteria, operates as though there were a normative standard for 
authentic mourning while ignoring the authors’ different registers and their ethnic and 
generational affiliations. The essay, Cosgrove writes, “seems to suggest that Grass is 
faking it, that his melancholy ode plays in a flat key and that his focus on matters German 
compromises him in his search for a commemorative discourse on the Jews.” 162 Sebald 
does not acknowledge that Grass and Hildesheimer come from opposite historical 
perspectives, the former from the collective of perpetrators, the latter from the collective 
of victims.  
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 Cosgrove interprets Sebald’s strong favoritism of Hildesheimer in relation to his 
affiliation with the generation of 1968, arguing that it reveals “the idealizing perspective 
of the West German intellectual of the student generation.”163 This post-war generation, 
she claims, identifies strongly with the Jewish victims of history and grew up in 
opposition to all those Germans biographically connected to the Nazi era. For her, Sebald 
carries this generational bias over into his writings on post-war German literature:  
Sebald’s critical attitude towards postwar Germany is well known; here, as in his 
vehement essay on Alfred Andersch, it is once again the postwar German writer 
[Cosgrove speaks of Günter Grass here], who was old enough to have played an 
active role in the Nazi war effort, who functions as the target for a scathing attack. 
The conflict between the German postwar first and second generations comes to 
the fore in Sebald’s treatment of Grass, for the problem of the legacy of guilt and 
responsibility is precisely what makes it impossible for even the ‘Nachgeborene’ 
to conceive of self in terms not shaped by this past.164 
 
Sebald’s commitment to the memory of the Jewish victims and his skepticism toward 
both Andersch and Grass—she counts both writers among the first generation of post-war 
Germans—can thus be explained, she thinks, by Sebald’s affiliation to the sixty-eighters.  
 Cosgrove’s reading of the bias underlying Sebald’s essay seems convincing, but 
her tacit acceptance of his definition of the first generation of post-war authors leads to a 
degree of imprecision when it comes to identfying where exactly Sebald’s argument goes 
wrong. I would argue that Sebald is not simply expressing the bias of a second-generation 
German writer against a first-generation one, but rather the bias of a second-generation 
writer who falsely assumes that his target—Günter Grass—follows the same patterns as 
all the other first-generation writers. Sebald misreads the Tagebuch, I argue, because he 
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does not take Grass’s generational discourse into consideration. Like Weigel, Briegleb, 
and Braese, he attacks a group of German writers with a moral argument based on their 
biographies. But he also problematically merges the first generation of post-war writers 
with the Hitler Youth generation—as it is often the case in the scholarship on memory 
and post-war literature—arguing that in the Tagebuch, Grass simply continues the 
repression and apologetic distortions of 1950s literature.  
 Sebald’s argument hinges on his reading of the character of Hermann Ott, also 
called Zweifel, as yet another apologetic representation of the “good German.” At the 
beginning of his essay, he claims that in the early post-war period “die Mehrzahl der 
repräsentativen Autoren der neuen Republik (wie etwa Richter, Andersch und Böll)”165 
were busy creating the myth of the good German, writing stories involving, for example, 
a German soldier, whose humanity stands out among the inhumane crime surrounding 
him. This literature, instead of addressing the conflicts Jewish survivors had to fight 
during these years, kept depicting “good Germans” who, as Sebald sarcastically puts it, 
endured the Nazi rule in “passivem Widerstand.”166 This supposed “resistance” was often 
expressed by way of a love story between a German (soldier) and a Polish or Jewish 
girl—German men interested in “the other.” Literature by writers such as Andersch, 
Richter, and Böll, he summarizes, was populated by “schlecht schraffierte[…] 
Wunschfiguren der Unschuld.”167 The same phenomenon of creating the good and 
innocent German retrospectively, he claims, can be seen in Grass’s Tagebuch in the 
fictional character of the school teacher Hermann Ott. 
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 What does Grass tell us about this character? In 1924, Ott returns to Danzig from 
studying philosophy and biology in Berlin in order to take a vacation job in a Jewish 
emigrants’ camp. This is where he is first called “Zweifel” or “Dr. Zweifel,” “weil der 
Student Hermann Ott mit dem Wort Zweifel so gebräuchlich umgeht, als hantiere er mit 
Messer und Gabel.”168 He keeps this nickname, highlighting his categorical questioning 
of the things around him, when he begins to work as a teacher at the local high school. 
His ability to doubt makes him immune to National Socialism when the movement 
reaches the city. He proves to be a clear-sighted and critical observer of the rising anti-
Semitism and the beginning persecutions of the Jewish people of Danzig. When a Jewish 
acquaintance, the editor of a Zionist newspaper, has to flee the city, for example, Zweifel 
lends him his bicycle, while also revealing his understanding of this incident as societally 
symptomatic: “Ich bezweifle,” he says “daß es bei dieser vereinzelten Flucht bleiben 
wird.”169 Zweifel also speaks up in front of the whole school when a seventeen-year old 
Jewish boy commits suicide after being harassed by his classmates about being 
circumcised. When the bullies are expelled, Zweifel comments: “Ich bezweifle, daß der 
Verweis von Schülern irgend etwas bewirkt, solange es einige Lehrkräfte für richtig 
halten, verallgemeinernde Aussagen – wie etwa: ‘Die Juden sind unser Unglück’ – zum 
Aufsatzthema zu erheben.”170 Some time after this incident, the school administration 
suggests that he leave and he begins to work at a Jewish private school. When restrictions 
against Jews become ever more unbearable and life in Danzig a dangerous enterprise, 
Zweifel encourages students and their families to emigrate. Violence is all around, and 
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shortly after 1939, Zweifel himself has to flee the Gestapo. He pays a farmer outside of 
Danzig for hiding him in the basement where he survives the war.  
 The fictional story about the exceptional teacher Dr. Zweifel represents only one 
of the book’s many narrative threads. The diary, published in 1972, first and foremost 
centers around Grass’s diary notes from his 1969 campaign for the candidate of the 
Social Democratic Party Willy Brandt. Interwoven with these notes from the campaign 
trail are other important narratives such as the writer’s conversations with his children, 
his encounter with someone who commits suicide shortly after talking to Grass, his 
essayistic reflections about the engraving “Melencolia I” by the Renaissance master 
Albrecht Dürer, and a historical account of the expulsion of the Jewish people of 
Danzig/Gdansk.171 The fact that most of these other narrative threads are non-fictional is 
central to Sebald’s critique, as he considers the inclusion of the Zweifel story among all 
the documentary pieces to be a strategy to create the illusion that this “good German” 
actually existed: 
Im Gegensatz zu den dokumentarischen Passagen über den Auszug der Juden und 
über den Wahlkampf, zu den Berichten aus dem Familienleben des Schreibers 
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und zu den essayistischen Exkursen ist sie, obschon alles sonst auf sie Bezug hat, 
bloß erfunden. Das wird freilich durch den wiederholten Hinweis, es handle sich 
hier in etwa um die Erlebnisse des Marcel Reich-Ranicki, zunächst vertuscht. 
Hermann Ott alias Zweifel, von Berufs wegen Studienassessor und Skeptiker, 
der—seit den jüdischen Kindern Danzigs die staatlichen Schulen verschlossen 
sind—auf der Rosenbaumschen Privatschule unterrichtet und noch bei jüdischen 
Händlern seinen Salat einkauft, als ihm die Marktfrauen dafür schon ‚Pfui Deibel’ 
zurufen, dieser Hermann Ott ist eine retrospektive Wunschfigur des Autors [...].  
Die Implikation ist hier wie bei allem, was wir über Hermann Ott erfahren, daß es 
den besseren Deutschen tatsächlich gegeben hat, eine These, die durch die 
Verbindung der Fiktion mit dem dokumentarischen Material den Anspruch eines 
hohen Grads von Wahrscheinlichkeit sich erborgt.172  
 
It is this last part of Sebald’s argument that is unconvincing. The simple fact that Grass 
combines the Zweifel story with documentary material does not necessarily detract from 
its fictional nature.173 His reading of Zweifel as an expression of wishful thinking about 
the past needs to be taken seriously, without the necessarily considering it a paradigmatic 
heroic tale of the “good German”. Rather, I argue that Grass very consciously presents 
Zweifel as a “retrospektive Wunschfigur”—however without the intention of 
apologetically glossing over Nazi history. 
 Sebald reads the character of Zweifel as one of many stories representing “die 
guten und unschuldigen Deutschen, die in unserer Nachkriegsliteratur ihr stilles 
Heldenleben führen.”174 He implies that Grass sells the book as a text about mourning—
mourning the loss of the Danzig Jews—but that he fails with this intention because the 
story of Zweifel overpowers the story of the Danzig Jews. Sebald goes even further by 
suggesting that Grass repeats the historical marginalization of the Jews in his text: “Die 
Kunstfigur des Zweifel genannten Schullehrers, die Grass für die Entwicklung seiner 
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Schneckenmelancholie ermöglicht, wirkt […] wie ein der programmatischen Intention 
der Trauer entgegenstehendes Alibi über das die realen Aspekte der Geschichte der 
Danziger Juden […] nochmals zu kurz kommen.”175 But Sebald’s marginalization 
argument only works if one assumes that Grass’s overall intention was to mourn the lost 
lives of the Danzig Jews. Even without providing a close analysis of the Grass’s text, one 
can assume that this was likely not his primary focus. Rather, in the Tagebuch, Grass 
reveals that the motivation for his anti-ideological politics, his support of Willy Brandt, 
and his work in the German provinces during the campaign trail lies in his Hitler Youth 
past. The story about the teacher Zweifel, then, does not appear as an apologetic attempt 
to insert the figure of the good German into Nazi history, but as a story about the lost 
chances in Grass’s own biography. 
 In a speech given at the end of the nineties in the context of a debate about the 
reform of the German high school system, Grass says that he wishes he had experienced a 
teacher like Dr. Zweifel:  
Ich habe ihn nicht oder nur andeutungsweise erlebt. Dabei hätte ich Hermann Ott, 
genannt Zweifel, gerne zum Lehrer gehabt. Ersatzweise ist er mir aus 
Bruchstücken und Wünschen entstanden. Jemand, dem Erkenntnis nur aus 
langwieriger Erfahrung und geduldigem Anschauen erwuchs. Jemand, der mich in 
Zeiten dumpfer Gläubigkeit gelehrt hätte, aus Prinzip zu zweifeln.  
 
He then speaks about one teacher who taught his students to doubt at least to some extent:  
Oder gab es Lehrer, die in meinen Hitlerjugendjahren den Mut hatten, Zweifel 
anzumelden, und sei es auch nur in Nebensätzen? Ich erinnere mich an einen von 
allen Schülern gefürchteten, trocken konservativen Studienrat, der uns Geschichte 
einpaukte, indem er dozierend auf und ab schritt, dabei die Wirrnisse des 
Dreißigjährigen Krieges um weitere Verknotungen bereicherte, wobei er mit 
Wendungen wie “Wir haben allen Grund, zu bezweifeln ...” oder “Abermals 
besteht Anlaß für Zweifel” nicht sparte, um plötzlich mit dem Satz: “Das deutsche 
Volk ist eine Hammelherde bis ins Oberkommando der Wehrmacht hinauf” in die 
Gegenwart kurz vor oder nach Stalingrad zu springen und uns in unserem 
                                                





Halbschlaf aufzustören. Später, als er von einem Tag auf den anderen 
verschwunden war – und alle ahnten, wohin – hieß es, kurz vor ihrem 
Kriegsabitur hätten ihn Obersekundaner denunziert. 
 Es wird wohl so sein, daß dieser Studienrat, auf den ich nicht hören wollte, 
mich dennoch zwei Jahrzehnte später angestiftet hat, den Lehrer Hermann Ott, 
genannt Dr. Zweifel, ins literarische Spiel zu bringen. Mehr noch: Ihm ist zu 
verdanken, daß ich, wo und wann immer Glauben zum Marktangebot gehörte, das 
“Prinzip Zweifel” allen anderen Prinzipien, auch dem “Prinzip Hoffnung”, 
übergeordnet habe.176  
 
This vague memory of a teacher, who, Grass admits, might have been “aus Bruchstücken 
und Wünschen entstanden” served as inspiration for the literary figure of Dr. Zweifel. 
But as in the diary it becomes clear that Grass’s emphasis does not lie on Zweifel, the 
model German or Zweifel, the philosemite. Rather, he presents this character as the 
teacher he himself never had or the teacher to whom he did not listen. At some point in 
the diary, the autobiographical figure of Grass says to his children, “Erst jetzt, Kinder, 
kann Zweifel aufkommen, überwiegen, bestehen bleiben, die Stimmung trüben, 
Hoffnung ansäuern, sich mutig und lustig betragen, unter Verbot stehen, kann endlich 
von Hermann Ott die Rede sein.”177 This statement must be read biographically. It is only 
now, in 1972, that Grass can invent a character who embodies this type of critical 
thinking with which he himself only became familiar a long time after the end of the war. 
With the figure of Zweifel, he projects back into the past the ability he wishes he had 
possessed already during between 1933 and 1945. 
 That Grass relates his aversion to ideologies and utopias and his preference for the 
“Prinzip Zweifel” to his biographical experiences is already clear in a 1965 campaign 
speech for Willy Brandt entitled “Ich klage an.” In this speech, he describes his 
experiences as a Hitlerjunge and a witness to the Nazi era as the origins of his ideological 
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skepticism and support of the SPD. He states that in the early post-war years when many 
intellectuals were drawn to communism, he was drawn to a pragmatic social democracy 
precisely because the socialist utopia awoke uncomfortable memories of his Hitler Youth 
past:  
Noch hatte ich die Morgenfeiern der Hitlerjugend im Ohr, diese allsonntäglichen 
Vereidigungen auf die Fahne, aufs Blut und auf den Boden natürlich, und schon 
lockten die Kommunisten mit ähnlich verstaubten Requisiten aus den 
Rumpelkammern ihrer Ideologie. Als gebranntes Kind hielt ich mich vorsorglich 
an meine wortkargen Sozialdemokraten, die weder vom Tausendjährigen Reich 
noch von der Weltrevolution faselten.178 
 
Later in the speech, he expands on this idea, claiming that doubt and skepticism are 
characteristic features of his entire generation: “In gefärbten Uniformstücken standen wir 
frühreif zwischen Trümmern. Wir waren skeptisch und fortan bereit, jedes Wort zu 
prüfen und nicht mehr blindlings zu glauben. Jede Ideologie prallte an uns ab.”179 It was 
only chance that prevented them from being part of the “guilty generation” of Germans 
and gave them the opportunity to become the “skeptical generation.” But the majority of 
his generation, Grass claims, did not take advantage of this historical opportunity, and 
was instead corrupted by the materialism of the economic miracle years, withdrawing 
from political life, a withdrawal he harshly criticizes. “Ich klage an” continues with a 
strong rebuke of his generation’s devolution from “healthy” skepticism to political 
fatigue and consumerism:  
Meine Generation klage ich an. Sie konnte unter Hitler nicht schuldig werden. 
Wir waren zu jung. Wir hatten den richtigen Jahrgang. Doch der Jahrgang ist kein 
Verdienst. Vor zwanzig Jahren waren wir 14, 16 oder auch 20 Jahre alt. In 
gefärbten Uniformstücken standen wir frühreif zwischen Trümmern. Wir waren 
skeptisch und fortan bereit, jedes Wort zu prüfen und nicht mehr blindlings zu 
glauben. Jede Ideologie prallte an uns ab. Es kam darauf an, sich den Frieden und 
seine Möglichkeiten nicht aus der Hand nehmen zu lassen. Aber wir haben uns 
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korrumpieren lassen. Wir haben es geduldet, daß dieser Frieden in geistlosem 
Wohlstand erstickt wurde, während unsere Landleute, die wir schamlos Brüder 
und Schwestern nennen, die Zeche bezahlen mußten. Dieser Wohlstand riecht 
nach Bestechung! Jeder Zweifel an der Richtigkeit dieser Politik wurde mit dem 
Hinweis auf den vollen Eisschrank beschwichtigt. Schaut Euch an, Ihr 
dreißigjährigen Familienväter: abgesichert, angepaßt und mürrisch vor 
Fernsehschirme gepflanzt. So billig hat meine Generation sich einkaufen lassen! 
Die Väter wurden schuldig unter Zwang; jedes Schuldkonto jedoch, das heute 
eröffnet wird, türmt sich freiwillig.180 
 
This description of the Hitler Youth generation as skeptical, apolitical and materialistic 
clearly echoes Schelsky’s 1957 book Die skeptische Generation, but Grass gives this 
rather descriptive study a normative twist by demanding political engagement. Being 
skeptical of ideologies, Grass argues, should not result in an apolitical stance. Instead of 
being interested just in filling up the refrigerator, the men of his generation, the 
“dreißigjährigen Familienväter,” ought to be preoccupied with Germany’s recent division 
by the Berlin Wall, an important topic on Brandt’s political agenda. 
 Later in his career, Grass applied this idea of ideological skepticism more 
specifically to the realm of literature. In retrospect he describes the idea of skepticism as 
the driving force for writers of his generation. In “Schreiben nach Auschwitz,“ his 1990 
Frankfurt lecture on poetics, he speaks about his generation’s crucial role for post-war 
German literature, highlighting precisely the categories of doubt and skepticism: “Es galt 
den absoluten Größen, dem ideologischen Weiß und Schwarz abzuschwören, dem 
Glauben Platzverweis zu erteilen und nur noch auf Zweifel zu setzen, der alles und selbst 
den Regenbogen graustichig werden ließ.”181 In his 1999 Nobel Prize lecture, Grass 
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expresses this idea again, recycling the color imagery and some of the phrasing of  the 
earlier speech:  
Uns, den gebrannten Kindern, kam es darauf an, den absoluten Größen, dem 
ideologischen Weiß oder Schwarz abzuschwören. Zweifel und Skepsis standen 
Pate; die Vielzahl der Grauwerte reichten sie uns als Geschenk. Nur so konnte das 
Schreiben nach Auschwitz – ob Gedicht oder Prosa – fortgesetzt werden.182 
 
Grass thus claims that writers of the skeptical generation—those who had learned their 
lesson about ideologies after blindly following the Nazis as children and adolescents—
helped to clear the German language of National Socialist ballast and thus established 
one of the preconditions for the continuation of German literature after Auschwitz.  
The generational context becomes even clearer in his Nobel Prize speech. For writers of 
his generation, he argues, it was always crucial “daß wir zwar nicht als Täter, doch im 
Lager der Täter zur Auschwitz-Generation gehörten, daß also unserer Biographie, 
inmitten der üblichen Daten, das Datum der Wannsee-Konferenz eingeschrieben war; 
aber auch soviel war uns gewiß, daß das Adorno-Gebot—wenn überhaupt—nur 
schreibend zu widerlegen war.”183  
This particular understanding of the authorial self as being part of the perpetrator 
collective without actually having been perpetrators generated a memory discourse that, 
as I argued in the previous chapter, must be distinguished from the Wehrmacht 
generation and the literary generation of the Gruppe 47 founders Alfred Andersch and 
Hans-Werner Richter. Grass makes this distinction very explicit in an early text, the 1963 
novel Hundejahre. In the following section, I will show that at first glance, Grass assigns 
fairly simple historical roles to these two generations. He appears to depict the older 
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generation as perpetrators and his own generation as witnesses. I argue, however, that 
Grass simultaneously questions these historical roles and that he precisely does not evoke 
the idea of the “innocent witness” for which Sigrid Weigel critiques writers of the Hitler 
Youth generation.  
Innocent witnesses?  
One of the main subjects of Grass’s second novel Hundejahre (1963) is the difference 
between the Wehrmacht and Hitler Youth generations. Published four years after Grass’ 
breakthrough with Die Blechtrommel, this novel tells the story of the friendship between 
Walter Matern and his friend Eddi Amsel, both born in 1917, and thus representative of 
the cohort Grass describes in his 1979 essay “Kein Schlusswort.” The text traces the lives 
of these two protagonists from the mid-twenties until the early sixties. They are sixteen 
when Hitler comes to power, twenty-two when the war begins, and twenty-eight when it 
ends. Thus, unlike the Hitler Youth generation, they experience Hitler’s rule not as 
children but as adolescents, and the war as adults. Matern and Amsel also occupy the 
positions of perpetrator and victim: Amsel’s father is Jewish (his fate unknown after the 
war) and Matern sympathizes with the Nazis and becomes the prototypical German 
unreflectively following the promises of the new ideology.  
 Matern and Amsel grow up in a village near Danzig. When Matern spontaneously 
protects the chubby Amsel—the outsider who is bullied by the other children because of 
his peculiar artistic ambitions (he feverishly builds scarecrows)—one day at school, the 
nine-year-old boys become best friends. They begin to spend all their time together and 
share everything, including a language only the two of them are able to understand. But 





increasingly drawn toward the fascist ideology, enters the SA, and their friendship ends 
abruptly when Amsel is assaulted by a group of SA men who knock all his teeth out and 
leave him bleeding in the snow. Matern, in his uniform and with a mask covering his 
face, is barely recognizable, but Amsel nevertheless identifies his friend among the 
attackers. Shattered by the violence of the attack and by his friend’s betrayal, he leaves 
the village forever. Under various false names and pursuing different professions, Amsel 
survives the war and eventually becomes a successful businessman and owner of a mine 
in central Germany.   
 The complicated narrative structure of Hundejahre was one of the most criticized 
features of the book after its publication. Grass structures the work through a type of 
“Herausgeberfiktion”: as the plot unfolds, Amsel—or rather Brauxel, as he calls himself 
in 1961—becomes visible as the planner, commissioner, and editor of the novel. 
Amsel/Brauxel hires an “Autorenkollektiv” in order to trace the years of his friendship 
with Matern and their lives apart after the betrayal. This collective consists of 
Amsel/Brauxel himself, the young writer Harry Liebenau, and finally Walter Matern 
(who does not recognize his old friend Amsel). Brauxel’s novel, identical with the text 
presented to the reader as Hundejahre, is thus divided into three parts, which follow 
Amsel’s and Matern’s biographies in chronological order:   In “Frühschichten”, the first 
part of the novel, Amsel/Brauxel takes on the task of depicting the years before the rise of 
National Socialism.  The second part, told by Liebenau, is called “Liebesbriefe” and 
describes the years during the National Socialist reign. Finally, Walter Matern is 






 In his 1967 review of the novel, Marcel Reich-Ranicki argues that the use of the 
three different narrators is superficial and mechanical, because the viewpoint never 
changes; it remains that of Grass: “Es bleibt […] offen, wozu Grass überhaupt drei 
verschiedene Ich-Erzähler gebraucht hat,” he writes, adding that “Stil, Blickwinkel und 
Betrachtungsweise der drei Chronisten unterscheiden sich voneinander überhaupt nicht 
oder bloß unerheblich, die Erzählerstafette ergibt nichts.” 184 Ranicki is correct in his 
assessment that the voices of the narrators do not differ significantly from each other, and 
that Grass’ idiosyncratic voice prevails throughout the novel. However, the three writers 
of the “Autorenkollektiv” do write from exceedingly different historical vantage points.  
Grass juxtaposes a German and a Jewish perspective in the first and the third part of the 
novel, but more importantly, Hundejahre also contains a juxtaposition of two 
generational perpsectives: the first generation represented by Amsel and Matern (born in 
1917), and the Hitler Youth generation, Grass’ own, represented by Harry Liebenau (born 
in 1927), the narrator of the second book.  
 Albrecht Goetze has argued that the three narrators represent three different 
relationships to the Nazi past: while Amsel embodies the victim and Matern the 
perpetrator, Liebenau’s role is that of the witness.185 A passage at the end of 
“Frühschichten” supports this reading, revealing that Amsel/Brauxel appoints Liebenau 
precisely to serve this function. Although the young man comes with impeccable 
references as a writer, he is hired only after a long examination:  
Wie war es, als der junge Harry Liebenau zu uns kam und sich um die 
Autorschaft des zweiten Buches bewarb? Brauxel examinierte ihn. [...]  
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Brauchsel fragte ihn zuerst über Danzig aus: ‚Wie, junger Freund, hießen 
die Verbindungsgassen zwischen der Hopfengasse und der neuen Mottlau?’ Harry 
Liebenau schnurrte sie herunter: ‚Kiebitzgasse, Stützengasse, Mausegasse, 
Brandgasse, Adebargasse, Münchengasse, Judengasse, Milchkannengasse, 
Schleifengasse, Turmgasse und Leitergasse.’  
‚Wie, junger Mann’, wollte Brauksel wissen, ‚wollen Sie uns erklären, wie 
die Portechaisengasse zu ihrem hübschen Namen gekommen ist?’ [...] ‚Wer war, 
junger Freund - Sie werden sich kaum erinnern -, der letzte Vorsitzende der 
Zentrumspartei in Danzig?’ [...] Mir fielen noch eine Menge kniffliger Fragen ein. 
Den Verlauf des Strießbaches, die Namen aller Langfuhrer Schokoladenfabriken, 
die Höhe des Erbsberges im Jäschkentaler Wald wollte ich wissen und bekam 
zufriedenstellende Antworten. Als Harry Liebenau auf die Frage: Welche 
bekannten Schauspieler begannen ihre Karriere im Danziger Stadttheater? sofort 
die frühverstorbene Renate Müller und den Filmliebling Hans Söhnker nannte, 
gab ich in meinem Lehnstuhl zu erkennen, daß die Prüfung beendet und 
bestanden sei.186  
 
It becomes clear that Amsel/Brauxel is not only seeking a good writer but someone with 
an intimate knowledge of Danzig and its past and present history, entrusting him with the 
job only after checking if Liebenau knows a great number of geographical and historical 
facts about the city. The young writer, then, becomes the mediator of the events during 
the Nazi years because of his apparent ability to objectively record history.  
One could argue that by casting Liebenau—a member of the Hitler Youth 
generation—in the role of the historical witness, Grass reinforces the stereotype that his 
generation has a particularly authentic access to Nazi history, which Weigel would argue 
almost always entails an attempt at exculpation. This is a delicate issue if we consider the 
fact that the historical witness in the novel, the character Harry Liebenau, is quite clearly 
an alter ego of Grass, a young writer who was born in 1927 in Langfuhr, a suburb of 
Danzig.187 In his memoir, Grass describes the description of Harry Liebenau in 
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Hundejahre as “mein erster Versuch, die Wirrnis im Kopf eines jungen Soldaten, dessen 
zu geräumiger Stahlhelm ständig rutschte, zu sortieren und auf blankweißes Papier zu 
bringen.”188 A superficial reading of the autobiographical parallels would then suggest 
that Grass is doing exactly what Weigel argues he would do: evoking his own innocence 
based on his young age. My own reading suggests, by contrast, that by including another 
figure, Harry’s teenage friend Tulla Prokriefke, Grass precisely complicates the Hitler 
Youth generation’s role of the innocent witness.  
Even a quick glance at the second part reveals how much space Tulla takes up in 
Harry’s descriptions. Hired as a witness to give a report of the relationship between 
Amsel and Matern during the Nazi years, Liebenau is not doing a particularly good job. 
Most of his writing is dedicated to his cousin Tulla. Consequently, the second part of 
Hundejahre, supposedly a witness report, is called “Liebesbriefe.” Paragraphs are 
introduced with salutations such as “Liebe Tulla,”189 “Liebe Cousine,”190 “Liebe Cousine 
Tulla,”191, or phrases that evoke a conversation with Tulla, such as “O Tulla,”192 “Und 
du, Tulla,”193 “Hör zu, Tulla,”194 or “Du und ich.”195 Harry himself addresses this 
problematic balance: “Meine Cousine Tulla, von der ich schreibe, an die ich schreibe, 
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obgleich ich, wenn es nach Brauxel ginge, immer nur über Eddi Amsel schreiben 
müßte.”196.  
Reich-Ranicki dismissed the peculiar structure of the second part as a 
compositional failure. Neither here nor in the rest of the novel, he argued, did Grass 
succeed in having a clear and consistent narrative.197 But his narrative becomes more 
consistent if we read the Tulla character as an embodiment of the Hitler Youth’s guilt. By 
literally addressing Tulla, Harry metaphorically addresses his own and his generation’s 
guilt. He realizes at the beginning that there is no true dialogue since Tulla of course 
never responds:  
Liebe Cousine Tulla,  
man rät mir, Dich und Deinen Rufnamen an den Anfang zu setzen, Dich, da Du 
überall Stoff warst, bist und sein wirst, formlos anzusprechen, als beginne ein 
Brief. Dabei erzähle ich mir, nur und unheilbar mir; oder erzähle ich etwa Dir, 
daß ich mir erzähle?198   
 
Both Tulla and Harry are guilty witnesses: 
Tulla und ich waren dabei”199  
Tulla und ich sahen”200 
Tulla und ich wußten”201  
 
On the one hand, Harry and Tulla merely enter puberty when the war begins, busy eating 
ice cream and discovering their sexuality, but Tulla on the other hand, Tulla is shown as 
an someone who has internalized the Nazi ideologies: an expert in discrimination and 
persecution. Harry characterizes his cousin as “immer schuldig oder mitschuldig.”202 He 
recalls, for example, how the young girl expels Eddi Amsel from her family’s property by 
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loudly and repeatedly calling him “Itzich”, an antisemitic expression for Jew,203 knowing 
that this denunciation could cause him harm. Tulla is also responsible for the arrest of 
their non-conformist teacher Brunies, who is brought to the concentration camp Stutthof. 
Harry, meanwhile, remains in the role of the observer but he becomes complicit through 
his admiration for Tulla.  
 Grass compares Wehrmacht and Hitler Youth generation with regard to violence 
and oppression most clearly in the relationship between Tulla and Jenny. Jenny, a girl 
slightly younger than Tulla and Harry, was found and adopted by teacher Brunies after 
being left by her “Gypsy” parents. With her Roma heritage, she represents a group 
persecuted by the Nazis, in the same way the “half-Jewish” Amsel does. Like Amsel, 
Jenny becomes the victim of Nazi persecution, even if Grass initially shows it to be a 
“childish” type of persecution, for example when Tulla spits in Jenny’s stroller and 
makes her eat jellyfish. However, that Grass does not represent these acts simply as 
innocent teasing among children, becomes clear in the scene of the great betrayal. In a 
masterfully narrated episode, Grass parallels the guilt of both generations when he shows 
how Matern and his SA friends assault Amsel at the same time as Tulla torments Jenny in 
a nearby park. This scene does not juxtapose an innocent with a guilty generation but 
rather the persecuted, Jenny and Amsel, and the persecutors, Tulla and Matern. As such, 
Grass highlights both generations’ inhumane behavior.  
 Harry’s role is that of the intelligent observer. He reports what happens at the two 
locations: while Tulla forces the overweight Jenny to dance in the snow until she falls 
and cannot get up anymore, Matern pounds his friend until he lies on the ground 
unconscious. Neither Tulla nor Matern stop the violence when their victim is on the 
                                                





ground, and both Amsel and Jenny are rolled up in a carpet of snow at the end. They are 
being turned into snowmen:  
Jenny wollte nicht mehr. Nach dem zweiten und dritten Sturz kroch sie uns 
wimmernd, ein Schneeball, entgegen. Aber Tulla war noch nicht satt. [...] Und 
wenn Jenny hochwollte, stieß Tulla sie zurück. [...] Tulla lachte meckernd mit 
Echo über die Lichtung und winkte uns heran. Wir blieben unter den Buchen, 
während Jenny im Schnee gerollt wurde. Ganz still war sie und wurde immer 
dicker. […]  
  Tulla hatte mit Jenny leichtes Spiel;  
aber Eddi Amsel […] muß mit der Faust geantwortet werden, solange er Fragen 
stellt. Alle Fäuste, die ihm antworten, bleiben stumm, bis auf eine. [...] Mehrmals 
rammt sie, von oben nach unten, den rotsprudelnden Mund. Womöglich will er 
immer noch die Frage Bistdues? formen, aber er fördert nur kleine wohlgeformte 
Perlzähne: warmes Blut im kalten Schnee, Kindertrommeln, Polen, Kirschen mit 
Schlagsahne: Blut im Schnee. Jetzt rollen sie ihn, wie Tulla das Mädchen Jenny 
rollte.  
  Aber Tulla war mit ihrem Schneemann zuerst fertig.  
Mit flachen Händen klopfte sie ihn rundum fest, stellte ihn aufrecht, gab ihm eine 
mit raschen Griffen geformte Nase, fand, um sich blickend, Jennys 
Wollmützchen, spannte die Mütze über den kürbisrunden Kopf des 
Schneemannes, kratzte mit Schuhspitzen im Schnee, bis sie auf Laub, taube 
Bucheckern und dürre Äste stieß, spießte dem Schneemann links rechts zwei 
Äste, pflanzte dem Schneemann Bucheckernaugen und ging dann hinter sich: Sie 
nahm von ihrem Werk Abstand.  
  Tulla hätte Vergleiche anstellen können,  
denn hinterm Erbsberg, in Amsels Garten steht auch ein Schneemann. [...] Der 
Schneemann in Amsels Garten hat keine Nase. Niemand hat ihm aus Bucheckern 
Augen gesetzt. Kein Wollmützchen spannt über seinen Kopf. Nicht kann er mit 
Reisigarmen grüßen winken verzweifeln. Dafür hat er einen roten immer größer 
werdenden Mund.“204   
 
With this central passage of the second part of Hundejahre, Grass implies that acts of 
violence—whether physical or not—have taken place in both generations. Moreover, 
through the imagery of snow as a kind of whitewashing, he emphasizes that both 
generations have covered up their wrongdoings. Tulla could have compared her own 
snowman to the other snowman (“Tulla hätte Vergleiche anstellen können”), but she 
quickly turns away from her “work” (“Sie nahm von ihrem Werk Abstand.”).  
                                                





 As a writer, Grass does the opposite: he compares the role of his generation, 
normally considered too young to be entangled in the Nazi crimes, to that of the 
perpetrator generation, dismissing the idea that childhood guarantees innocence. This 
becomes most explicit in a passage that needs to be quoted in its entirety, for it is not only 
central to the generational theme of the novel but also to Grass’s poetics in general205:  
Es war einmal ein Mädchen, das hieß Tulla und hatte eine reine Kinderstirn. Aber 
nichts ist rein. Auch der Schnee ist nicht rein. Keine Jungfrau ist rein. Selbst das 
Schwein ist nicht rein. Der Teufel nie ganz rein. Kein Tönchen steigt rein. Jede 
Geige weiß es. Jeder Stern klirrt es. Jedes Messer schält es: Auch die Kartoffel ist 
nicht rein: Sie hat Augen, die müssen gestochen werden. 
 Aber das Salz? Salz ist rein! Nichts, auch das Salz ist nicht rein. Nur auf 
Tüten steht: Salz ist rein. Lagert doch ab. Was lagert mit? Wird doch gewaschen. 
Nichts wäscht sich rein. Doch die Grundstoffe: rein? Sind steril, doch nicht rein. 
Die Idee, die bleibt rein? Selbst anfangs nicht rein. Jesus Christus nicht rein. Marx 
Engels nicht rein. Die Asche nicht rein und die Hostie nicht rein. Kein Gedanke 
hält rein. Auch die Kunst blüht nicht rein. Und die Sonne hat Flecken. Alle 
Genien menstruieren. Auf dem Schmerz schwimmt Gelächter. Tief im Brüllen 
hockt Schweigen. In den Ecken lehnen Zirkel. Doch der Kreis, der ist rein!206 
 Kein Kreis schließt sich rein. Denn wenn der Kreis rein ist, dann ist auch 
der Schnee rein, ist die Jungfrau, sind die Schweine, Jesus Christus, Marx und 
Engels, leichte Asche, alle Schmeren, das Gelächter, links das Brüllen, rechts das 
Schweigen, die Gedanken makellose, die Oblaten nicht mehr Bluter un die 
Genien ohne Ausfluß, alle Ecken reine Ecken, gläubig Zirkel schlügen Kreise: 
rein und menschlich, schweinisch, salzig, teuflisch, christlich und marxistisch, 
lachend, brüllend, wiederkäuend, schweigend, heilig, rund rein eckig. Und die 
Knochen, weiße Berge, die geschichtet wurden neulich, wüchsen reinlich ohne 
Krähen: Pyramidenherrlichkeit. Doch die Krähen, die nicht rein sind, knarrten 
ungeölt schon gestern: Nichts ist rein, kein Kreis, kein Knochen. Und die Berge, 
hergestellte, um die Reinlichkeit zu türmen, werden schmelzen kochen sieden, 
damit Seife, rein und billig; doch selbst Seife wäscht nicht rein.207 
 
                                                
205 As can be seen from the fact that Grass refers to it in his Frankfurt poetics lecture, where he identifies 
this passage as one strongly influenced by Paul Celan: “Ich verdanke Paul Celan viel: Anregung, 
Widerspruch, den Begriff von Einsamkeit, aber auch die Erkenntnis, daß Auschwitz kein Ende hat. Seine 
Hilfe kam nie direkt, sondern verschenkte sich in Nebensätzen, etwa auf Spaziergängen in Parkanlagen. 
Mehr als auf die ‘Blechtrommel’ hat sich Paul Celans Zuspruch und Dreinreden auf den Roman 
‘Hundejahre’ ausgewirkt, etwa zu Beginn des Schlußmärchens vor Ende des zweiten Teils, sobald sich 
neben der Flakbatterie Kaiserhafen ine Knochenberg türmt, den das bei Danzig gelegene 
Konzentrationslager Stutthof speist.” Grass, “Schreiben nach Auschwitz,” 212-213)  
206 Grass, Hundejahre 388. 





This passage highlights why Grass became an icon of the process of “Vergangenheits-
bewältigung” in post-war Germany in the sixties, and it shows the poetic fervor that the 
author once possessed. The omnipresent guilt, he insists, affects everything. As a result, 
nothing is pure—no political utopia, no religion, no art. Children are not innocent. Nature 
is not innocent. The base materials of things—the “Grundstoffe”—are not innocent. 
Whitewashing cannot hide the guilt: “Nichts wäscht sich rein.” Not even the perfectly 
pure geometric circle is pure. If it were, one could begin to believe in the idea of 
innocence again, and Grass shows the bitter consequences: “gläubig Zirkel schlügen 
Kreise: rein und menschlich, schweinisch, salzig, teuflisch, christlich und marxistisch, 
lachend, brüllend, wiederkäuend, schweigend, heilig, rund rein eckig. Und die Knochen, 
weiße Berge, die geschichtet wurden neulich, wüchsen reinlich ohne Krähen: 
Pyramidenherrlichkeit.” 
The whitewashing of the past would thus continue in a country built upon 
mountains of bones, but “doch selbst Seife wäscht nicht rein”. If Grass combines the soap 
and bones here, he not only evokes the idea of whitewashing but also the so-called 
“Danzig Soap Case,” an urban legend—spread during and after the war that Grass likely 
took as an authentic, gruel fact about the Holocaust—about an institution near Danzig 
that allegedly made soap out of the Jews killed in the Stutthof concentration camp.208 
Whether Grass believed in the soap legend in the sixties or only imagined Tulla’s and 
Harry’s adolescent fascination with it (or whether he remembers his own), he distinctly 
links it with the idea of childhood innocence. A few pages later, he writes:  
Nichts ist rein. Und so war auch der Berg seitlich der Batterie Kaiserhafen bei 
aller Weiße nicht rein, sondern ein Knochenberg, dessen Bestandteile nach 
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fabrikmäßiger Präparation immer noch bewachsen waren mit Rückständen; denn 
die Krähen konnten nicht aufhören, auf ihnen zu wohnen, unruhig schwarz. So 
kam es, daß ein Geruch […] in jeder, auch in Harrys Mundhöhle einen 
Geschmack verbreitete, der selbst nach übermäßigem Genuß saurer Drops nichts 
von seiner schweren Süße verlor.  
 Niemand sprach von dem Knochenberg. Aber alle sahen rochen 
schmeckten ihn. Wer Baracken verließ, deren Türen sich nach Süden hin öffneten, 
hatte den Berg als Kegel im Auge. Wer, wie Harry, als K6 erhöht dem Geschütz 
daneben saß […] wurde immer wieder, als hielten Kommandogerät und 
Knochenberg Zwiesprache, vor ein Bild geschwenkt, das einen weißlichen Berg 
mit qualmender Fabrik […] darstellte.209  
 
Grass thus presents both Harry and Tulla, the representatives of his generation, without 
“reine Kinderstirn.”210 Even if they did not know about the crimes committed in their 
vicinity, they were aware of them. They saw them and tasted them, as Grass expresses it, 
and they became complicit the moment they tuned in to the widespread silence during the 
post-war era. 
The second part of the novel ends with what can be read as a summarizing 
statement about the Hitler Youth generation after the war:  
 Neu beginnen wollen alle mit dem Leben, mit dem Sparen, mit dem 
 Briefeschreiben, auf Kirchenstühlen, vor Klavieren, in Karteikästen und 
 Eigenheimen.  
 Vergessen wollen alle die Knochenberge und Massengräber, die 
Fahnenhalter und Parteibücher, die Schulden und die Schuld.211 
 
To be sure, Grass portrays his generation as witnesses of the crimes, not as perpetrators, 
but it should have become clear that he does not portray them as innocent witnesses but 
precisely challenges this type of apologetic approach to the past by never losing sight of 
their implication.  
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Not in the position to judge  
One of the most compelling passages about the Hitler Youth generation in Hundejahre 
reveals Grass’ stance on their authority in judging the complicity of others: the 
phantasmagorical episode about the “Wunderbrillen” in the third part of the novel. In 
1955, “im Jahr fünffünf, als alle im Friedensjahr vierfünf geborenen Kinder zehn Jahre 
alt werden,”212 the  so-called “Wunderbrillen” appear all over Germany, targeted to 
German youth between the ages of seven and twenty-one, but with no clear provenance. 
The cheap object becomes such a best seller that the concerned governments of several 
Bundesländer launch investigations, and discover that a factory near Hildesheim—“Firma 
Brauxel & Co”—produced the glasses; in other words, that Eddi Amsel is behind the 
mass product. But nothing dangerous can be found in the material, and while it remains 
unclear why the glasses have become so popular despite the fact that they do not correct 
people’s vision, they are ultimately considered harmless toys.  
 Yet, the glasses do correct the vision of Germany’s youth. University students call 
them “Erkenntnisbrillen,” “Vatererkennungsbrillen” and “Muttererkennungsbrillen” or 
“Familienentlarver:”213    
Die Wunderbrille zeigt jugendlichen Brillenträgern die Vergangenheit der Eltern 
in wechselnden Bildern, oft genug und bei einiger Geduld in chronologischer 
Folge. Episoden, die aus diesen oder jenen Gründen den heranwachsenden 
Kindern verschwiegen wurden, werden greifbar deutlich. […] [es] wiederholen 
sich im doppelten Rund der Vatererkennungsbrillen Gewalttaten, verübt geduldet 
veranlaßt vor elf zwölf dreizehn Jahren: Mord, oft hundertfacher. Beihilfe zum. 
Zigarettenrauchen und Zusehen, während. Bewährte dekorierte umjubelte Mörder. 
Mordmotive werden zu Leitmotiven. Mit Mördern an einem Tisch, im gleichen 
Boot, Bett und Kasino. Trinksprüche. Einsatzbefehle. Aktenvermerke. Stempel 
anhauchen. Manchmal sind es nur Unterschriften und Papierkörbe. Viele Wege 
führen zum. Worte und Schweigen können. Jeder Vater hat wenigstens einen zu 
verbergen. Viele bleiben so gut wie ungeschehen, verschüttet verhängt 
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eingemietet, bis im elften Nachkriegsjahr die Wunderbrillen auf den Markt 
kommen und Täter zur Schau stellen.214  
 
When Walter Matern, the representative of the perpetrator generation, buys wonder 
glasses for his daughter Walli on the Düsseldorf Christmas market, she drops her 
gingerbread, screams and runs away after putting them on and seeing the truth about her 
father’s war experiences, which the reader never learns about.  
 This episode addresses, and to some extent predicts, the conflict between the 
generation that would later be called the “generation of 1968” and their parents, the 
perpetrator generation. In the novel, the recognition of parents’ crimes has almost no 
consequences: “[E]s kommt nicht zum Aufstand der Kinder gegen die Eltern. 
Familiensinn, Selbsterhaltungstrieb, nüchterne Spekulation wie blinde Liebe zu den 
Bloßgestellten verhindern eine Revolution, die unserem Jahrhundert einige Schlagzeilen 
geliefert hätte.”215 This presents a snapshot of 1955, when the generational conflict had 
only begun to manifest itself. In 1963, the idea of a generational revolt might not have 
appeared completely unrealistic anymore, but it is doubtful that Grass would have 
predicted that the children of the perpetrators would initiate a significant change of 
German society only a few years later.  
 At first glance, the Hitler Youth generation does not seem to be included in this 
episode. However, one has to carefully consider the numerical indicators offered in this 
passage. He describes the miracle glasses as being “für die Jugend vom siebenten bis zum 
einundzwanzigsten Lebensjahr bestimmt,”216 and clarifies that they reveal things only 
about those Germans who are over thirty. About his own generation he says: “Nur wer im 
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Jahre fünffünf noch nicht dreißig Jahre zählt oder älter als einundzwanzig ist, bleibt 
indifferent und kann weder entlarven noch von jüngeren Geschwistern entlarvt 
werden”217 The most interesting aspect in this episode is that the cohorts between 1925 
and 1934—which of course include Grass’s own cohort of 1927—are excluded from the 
conflict between the perpetrators and their children. Grass’s generation can neither be 
accused for their deeds during the Nazi period, nor can they themselves accuse the 
perpetrator generation. 
 One possible reading of this passage is that it mocks Helmut Schelsky’s theory 
about the skeptical generation, who Grass refers to by another term here: “die 
Indifferenten.” Following the passage quoted above, he comments on the divisions 
between the different generations, and in particular on the role of the skeptical 
generation: “Sollen mit solch pauschalen Rechenkunststückchen Generationsprobleme 
gelöst werden? Sind die Indifferenten, neun vollständige Jahrgänge, abgeschrieben und 
unfähig primärer Erkenntnis?”218 Grass could be seen to criticize Schelsky for presuming 
(and being unconcerned with the fact) that the skeptical generation will not play any 
decisive role in memory politics when he writes: “Der Skeptische mag bei seinem 
Kopfwiegen bleiben; denn welche Gründe auch mitspielten als beschlossen wurde, 
Wunderbrillen zu produzieren und zu vertreiben, der Erfolg dieses Saisonschlagers ist 
eindeutig und veränderte die westdeutsche Gesellschaftsstruktur wesentlich, gleichgütlig, 
ob dieser Struktur- oder Konsumentenwandel, wie Schelsky sagt, beabsichtigt wurde oder 
nicht.”219 However, whether his critique is directed at Schelsky, at his own “indifferent” 
generation, or at both, Grass portrays his own generation as the “generation in between,” 
                                                







as the generation which can be found neither on the side of the perpetrators nor on the 
side of their children.220  
 Grass is keenly aware of his generation’s ambiguous historical position, but 
unlike Schelsky he is concerned about its apolitical behavior and is not shy in his public 
accusations of its members, as I showed in my analysis of the Brandt speech “Ich klage 
an.” But it is, in fact, difficult to find texts in which Grass accuses the perpetrator 
generation without at the same time speaking about his generation’s guilt, or its proximity 
to it. Grass always vacillates between his insight that as a former Hitlerjunge he is not in 
the position to judge other (older) Germans for their incorrect behavior during the Nazi 
period and a strongly felt responsibility as a public intellectual to do precisely that.  
No conclusion  
 Grass’s ambiguity vis-à-vis the perpetrator generation, moreover vis-à-vis the 
writers of this generation, is manifest in the 1979 essay “Kein Schlußwort,” published in 
Die Zeit.221 This essay appeared during a debate about writers of a slightly older 
generation who withdrew from political writing during the Third Reich in order to avoid 
conflict with the Nazi regime. Grass explains that it is not his place to judge these writers, 
because as someone whose writing career only began in the fifties, he himself had not 
been “tested.” An adolescent during the Third Reich, he did not have to take a stance as 
an intellectual, or declare his opposition to the Nazi regime. He is aware, however, that 
he was spared moral probation merely because of his late birth, and to illustrate that it 
was contigency and not merit that saved him from being seriously entangled with 
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German guilt, he imagines how his biography could have taken a different turn if he had 
been born only ten years earlier: 
Ich, Jahrgang, siebzehn. 1933 wäre ich 16 und nicht sechs Jahre alt, bei 
Kriegsbeginn 22 und nicht zwölf alt gewesen. Da sogleich wehrpflichtig, hätte 
ich, wie die meisten dieses Jahrgangs, kaum den Krieg überlebt. Doch abgesehen 
von dieser Wahrscheinlichkeit, spricht nichts (oder nur Gewünschtes) gegen 
meine zielstrebige Entwicklung zum überzeugten Nationalsozialisten. […] Mit 
meiner Mitgift, dem rigorosen Schreibtalent, wäre mir zu den Ereignissen der 
Bewegung (Machtergreifung, Erntedankfest, Führers Geburtstag usw.) und später 
zum Kriegsverlauf Gereimtes und Hymnisches eingefallen, zumal die Poetik der 
Hitlerjugend (siehe Anacker, Schirach, Baumann, Menzel) spätexpressionistische 
Wortballungen und gestische Metaphern erlaubte. Oder es hätte mich, dank der 
Anstöße feinsinniger Lehrer, naturbeflissene Innerlichkeit lammfromm gemacht 
und auf Carossas oder, noch stiller, auf Wilhelm Lehmanns Spuren geleitet. […]  
Wahrscheinlich wäre mir ab Stalingrad—jetzt sechsundzwanzig Jahre alt—ein 
Licht aufgegangen. Verwickelt möglicherweise in Partisanenerschießungen, 
Vergeltungsschläge, als Augenzeuge unübersehbarer Judendeportationen hätte ich 
meiner spätexpressionistischen Reimkunst oder meiner verinnerlichten 
Beschwörung der Schachtelhalme neue Töne, ortlose Trauer, verzweifelte 
Wortwahl, Dunkles Vieldeutiges beigemengt. Und in dieser Stillage, die 
vierundvierzig noch einen Verleger gefunden hätte, hätte ich (soldatisches 
Überleben vorausgesetzt) zwanglos die Kapitulation, die angebliche Stunde Null 
überbrücken und mich der neuen, kargen, kalorienarmen, der pazifistischen bis 
antifaschistischen Inhalte annehmen können; wie es geschehen ist laut tausend 
und mehr Biographien.222    
 
His response is clear: ten years would have made a significant difference in his 
development as a writer. Grass suspects that like many other writers, he would have 
written affirmatively about the Nazi movement from the moment of their rise to power in 
1933. If he had not supported Nazi ideology, he would have avoided any form of political 
expression writing poetry about nature. From 1939 on, he would have fought in Hitler’s 
army. Perhaps, Grass speculates, he would have lost his initial fascination with Nazi 
ideology at the front, Stalingrad being an ultimate reason to doubt Hitler. On the Eastern 
front, he may have become involved in war crimes, and marked by these experiences, his 
writing would have turned darker towards the end of the war. Unlike for the actual 
                                                





Günter Grass, Germany’s defeat in 1945 would not have represented an earth-shattering 
event for him. During the first postwar years, the other Grass would have readily 
welcomed new ideologies such as pacifism and anti-fascism and would have instantly 
incorporated them into his writing, as it happened “laut tausend und mehr 
Biographien.”223 
 Should there still have been any doubt, his thought experiment expresses with 
great clarity the aesthetic distance Grass feels toward writers who were merely ten years 
older than him as a writer of the Hitler Youth generation. He implies that it makes a big 
difference whether a writer experienced the war as a soldier in Hitler’s Wehrmacht—he 
mentions, among others, the names of Heinrich Böll (born in 1917) and Alfred Andersch 
(born in 1914)—or whether they made their first attempts at writing being in the Hitler 
Youth like him and began their career long after the war.224 But in addition to clarifying 
on a basic level that Grass sees his writing and that of other post-war German writers as 
strongly dependent on generational experiences, it also reveals the mode of self-doubt 
and self-reflection with which Grass approaches his own biography. “Ich will nicht 
urteilen,” he writes. “Ein fragwürdiger Glücksfall, mein Jahrgang 1927, verbietet mir 
letzte, den Stab brechende Worte.”225 Not being able to guarantee his own behavior had it 
not been for his later birth date, he avoids making a concluding statement about the 
alleged Nazi past of writers of the inner emigration, thus making good on the essay’s 
title, “Kein Schlusswort.”  
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 Grass’s criticism comes across nevertheless. When he speaks of the older writers’ 
transition from fascism to anti-fascism, from life as soldier to life as pacifist, one can 
sense the critical undertone, the fact that Grass considers this transition all-too-smooth. 
Even if he says “Ich will nicht urteilen,” he does so regardless through his ironic tone and 
his suggestion that these older writers took an easy road. However, by including himself 
in the criticism, by assuring his readers that he would have probably done the same, 
ensures that no one could accuse him of sitting on a moral high horse. It is precisely this 
mixture of muted accusation with references to his own not-entirely-uncomplicated 
biography, I would argue, that was the reason for the moral authority that writers like 
Grass enjoyed in post-war German society. The honesty with which he admits to the 
contigencies of his personal innocence must have evoked admiration, as much as it must 
have seemed appealing because it meant that guilt could also be seen as contigent on the 
one’s year of birth. 
 However, the essay reads differently from today’s perspective. Singling out 
Wolfgang Weyrauch (born 1904) as the only writer who has openly talked about his Nazi 
past is especially problematic.226 He writes: “Ein einziger, soweit mir bekannt, Wolfgang 
Weyrauch, hat die Offenheit gewagt, sich zu solch einer Biographie zu bekennen. Ich 
datiere mich, die schlimmeren Varianten auslassend, um zehn Jahre zurück und hole es 
hiermit versuchsweise nach.”227 Grass thus presents himself as someone who follows 
Weyrauch’s example. Although he talks about his Hitler Youth past openly, this 
celebration of Weyrauch’s and his own honesty seems hypocritical considering that Grass 
                                                
226 Wolfgang Weyrauch became famous for coining the term “Kahlschlagsliteratur” in his programmatic 
anthology Tausend Gramm, with which he sought to induce a radical new beginning for German literature.   





admissions about his SS membership only about thirty years later in 2006. His self-doubt 
was certainly justified, one must conclude, but it certainly wasn’t completely honest. 
 
2. Re-thinking a Generation’s Embrace of Socialism— 
Christa Wolf’s Nachdenken über Christa T. (1968)  
 
Both Günter Grass and Christa Wolf have touched upon the question of contingency in 
their reflections on their biographies. While Grass thought about the random nature of his 
birth year 1927 that distanced him from the perpetrator generation, Christa Wolf 
wondered about contingency in geographical terms. In her 2010 novel Stadt der Engel, 
she raises the question what her life would have looked like if she and her family had 
managed to cross the river Elbe on their flight from the Red Army in 1945? What if they 
had left what became the Soviet Occupation Zone, and later the GDR? Would she have 
become a different person in the West, innocent of the political corruption of which she 
was accused after 1989? “WÄRE ICH UNTER DEN ANDEREN, DEN RICHTIGEN 
VERHÄLTNISSEN EIN ANDERER MENSCH GEWORDEN? KLÜGER, BESSER, 
OHNE SCHULD?”228 Instead of speculating about answers to these questions, she 
interrupts herself in this thought, declaring that she still does not regret to have “landed” 
on the Eastern side: “WARUM KANN ICH IMMER NOCH NICHT WÜNSCHEN, 
MEIN LEBEN ZU TAUSCHEN GEGEN JENES LEICHTERE, BESSERE?”229  Twenty 
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the autobiographical novel that deals with her 
Stasi corruption, shortly before her death, despite all the difficulties she faced as an 
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author criticizing the regime, it seems that Wolf’s strong avowal to socialism remains 
unbroken. 
 Wolf’s strong identification with the idea of a socialist German state cannot be 
understood without considering the roots of her anti-fascism, which lie in her Hitler 
Youth past—a connection that has often been made for writers of her generation. In 1990, 
for example, Frank Schirrmacher shed light onto the GDR’s literary scene from a 
generational angle. Wolf’s generation, he claimed, became enthusiastic supporters of the 
GDR regime out of bad conscience, and their authoritarian upbringing under Hitler made 
them forever blind for the state’s repression.230 Have these East-German writers not 
learned anything from growing up in a dictatorship? Could they not have known better? 
“Angesichts ihrer (Wolf’s) Biographie,” Schirrmacher notes, “stellt sich ein zweites Mal 
in der Geschichte dieses Jahrhunderts die Frage, wie blind Denken und Tat, Literatur und 
Welt füreinander sein könnten.”231 
 Wolfgang Emmerich lacks this moralizing and overly simplistic approach to East-
German writers of the Hitler Youth generation in his survey of GDR literature, published 
in Metzler’s Deutsche Literaturgeschichte. Nevertheless, culpability and responsibility 
are categories in his survey. In his presentation, Wolf’s generation went into ideological 
overdrive when they adopted socialism and anti-fascism, the founding myths of both 
GDR and GDR literature, which were carried in a more credible way “von den Autoren 
der ersten, älteren Generation [...], die wie Johannes R. Becher, Anna Seghers, Arnold 
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Zweig oder Bertolt Brecht im Exil gewesen waren.“232 Emmerich sees this generation as 
the stabilizing force of the dictatorial regime of the GDR:  
Der Antifaschismus wurde nun aber auch zur – geborgten – weltanschaulichen 
Basis für die literarische Arbeit der zweiten, jüngeren Autorengeneration, deren 
Angehörige das NS-Regime und den Krieg als Hitlerjungen und BDM-Mädel, 
SA-Leute und Soldaten selbst erlebt hatten, in der Regel als naiv Begeisterte oder 
als Mitläufer. Die Autoren, zumeist erst in den 20er Jahren geboren, ersetzten 
jetzt einen Glauben, ein ‘totales’ Weltbild, durch einen neuen Glauben, die neue, 
totalisierende Weltanschauung des Marxismus. Der aus dem schlechten 
politischen Gewissen geborene Antifaschismus wurde zur ideologischen 
Klammer, die Autoren wie Erwin Strittmatter, Franz Fühmann, Erich Loest, 
Hermann Kant, Christa Wolf, Heiner Müller, Erik Neutsch oder Dieter Noll 
untereinander und mit den Älteren (den beglaubigten) Antifaschisten verband.233 
 
He describes the anti-fascist consensus among this younger generation of GDR writers as 
“verhängnisvoll,” because it resulted in the paradoxical situation 
dass eine Vielzahl gutwilliger und begabter junger Autoren das System des 
‚realen Sozialismus’ geradezu bedingungslos unterstützte (und eine 
dementsprechende Literatur schrieb), eben weil sie das Trauma der Nazi-Diktatur 
ohne Rest abschütteln und mit dem menschenfeindlichen System von vordem 
brechen wollte. Dass der vermeintliche Bruch vor allem Kontinuitäten 
beförderte—autoritäre, gesellschaftliche und politische Strukturen und damit 
Untertanenmentalität, geheimdienstliche Observation und Terror, Militarismus, 
Fremdbestimmung in vielen Bereichen—, sahen die Autoren erst spät, manche zu 
spät (und manche verweigern sich dieser Einsicht bis heute). Aus diesem tief 
sitzenden Widerspruch zwischen ehrlich geglaubtem, emphatischem 
Antifaschismus und einer—näheren oder ferneren—Komplizenschaft mit dem 
Repressionssystem des ‚realen Sozialismus’ muss die DDR-Literatur [...] 
verstanden werden.234   
 
I agree that any consideration of GDR intellectuals of Wolf’s generation has to 
underscore that their anti-fascism led to a state with oppressive tendencies. But I would 
object to Emmerich’notion that their support of the socialist utopia was unconditional. 
The generational approach to writers like Wolf reveals that their upbringing not only 
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resulted in a misguided anti-fascism and enthusiastic support of the GDR but 
simultaneously, or perhaps contradictorily, also in a heightened awareness for signs of 
dictatorial repression. In the case of Wolf, one can very clearly trace how her 
generational background presented the driving force for both her affirmation and her 
critique of the regime. The “never again”-imperative resulted in her identification with 
the GDR while at the same time motivating her continuous thinking about its errors.  
 It is true that Wolf’s political protest always remained vague and mostly limited 
to the poetic realm, and in my fourth chapter, I will consider the heated dispute that 
evolved around this very question in 1990. Critics and supporters of the author fought 
about the question whether Wolf’s allegiance to the GDR should be evaluated as a 
failure, a questio that became even more urgent when it was revealed that Wolf worked 
as inoffizielle Mitarbeiterin for the Stasi from 1959 to 1962. In this chapter, however, I 
would like to put these complicated moral questions aside, and instead want to consider 
Wolf and other GDR writers of her generation in their double-edged function as “at once 
the creators of a new audience and a variant of the official voice,”235 in the words of 
David Bathrick, who emphasizes that these writers could only become “spokespeople and 
representatives for a struggle to enlarge and enhance the freedoms of speech,”236 when 
they were allowed to participate in the socialist public sphere by those in power in the 
first place. He focuses on the complicity of East German writers to the GDR, and their 
simultaneous distance to it: 
The fact that some of them had been censored, hunted, questioned, and ridiculed 
does not belie the fact that they were also—and sometimes even simultaneously—
privileged, nurtured, courted, and coddled. In a very fundamental, if complicated, 
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way, those writers who continued to publish and speak within the official socialist 
public sphere ended up functioning, perhaps oxymoronically, as reform-dedicated 
Staatsdichter. […] [I]t was precisely their function on both sides of the power 
divide, as official and nonofficial voices within the whole that defined a particular 
kind of intellectual in the GDR.237 
 
This notion of GDR writers as “reform-dedicated Staatsdichter” should precede every 
treatment of Wolf’s literature, as this is precisely how the writer saw herself. Equally 
important is Bathrick’s rejection of a moralizing evaluation of GDR literature and his 
plea for a historical perspective:  
One can, of course, fault them for this at the level of personal intentions and 
behaviors: for not speaking out on this or that issue, for losing a sense of the 
society at large, for failing to grasp the real issues of power and freedom, for 
chasing a utopian dream. But one can also understand them historically. Here we 
have a generation of intellectuals who were socialized within the highly 
dichotomized cold war culture and who found in the mutilated forms of a Stalinist 
antifascism what they saw as the only chance to start something new in a postwar 
Germany.238 
 
He correctly points out the influential Cold War socialization of writers of the Hitler 
Youth generation, who were encouraged to see the West as “sozialistischer 
Klassenfeind.” I would add that it is not only their socialization within the Cold War 
culture after 1945 but also their indoctrination into Nazi culture before this date that 
shaped the politics of this generation of writers. In what follows, I will highlight both 
these influences in Wolf’s essays and her work, in order to clarify how Wolf differs from 
a West German writer like Grass as a representative of her generation in the East.  
Moments of Doubt  
There is a consensus in Wolf criticism that Nachdenken über Christa T. (1968) is her first 
mature work, the work in which she showed that she had freed herself from the aesthetic 
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and political prescriptions of the SED. Her first published work, Moskauer Novelle 
(1961), a love story between a woman from East Berlin and a Russian translator, was 
rejected by Wolf herself as a formulaic piece of writing, almost a treatise, that tried to 
comply with the doctrine of socialist realism.239 Her first novel, Der geteilte Himmel 
(1963), a highly successful publication, represented Wolf’s attempt to follow the cultural 
program of the Bitterfelder Weg, the attempt to break the rigidity of socialist realism by 
bringing literature closer to the socialist worker. The novel tells the story of the young 
factory worker Rita, who falls in love with a man who leaves the GDR and tries to 
convince Rita to come with him. The socialist heroine, however, sacrifices her love for 
her country. 
 Nachdenken über Christa T., by comparison, displays a new tone. The novel 
reveals a more modern, more poetic, and more complex aesthetic quality, further away 
from the prescriptions of socialist realism than any of the texts published in East 
Germany at the time. Politically,too, the novel shows a great distance to the naïve 
enthusiasm for socialism displayed in the earlier two texts.240 It is hard to pinpoint what 
caused Wolf’s increased critical awareness, but the Eleventh Plenum of the SED’s 
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Central Committee in 1965 seems to have been a crucial experience in that regard.241 In 
2009, Wolf wrote about the Plenum in an article in Die Zeit: “Es hat in meinem Leben 
eine einschneidende Rolle gespielt.”242 It was the first time she experienced censorship 
first hand, right in front of her eyes: “Es gibt eine einfache Rechnung,” Erich Honecker 
had said at the Plenum, 
Wollen wir Arbeitsproduktivität und damit den Lebensstandard weiter erhöhen, 
woran doch alle Bürger der DDR interessiert sind, dann kann man nicht 
nihilistische, ausweglose und moralzersetzende Philosophien in Literatur, Film, 
Theater, Fernsehen und in Zeitschriften verbreiten. Skeptizismus und steigender 
Lebensstandard beim umfassenden Aufbau des Sozialismus schließen einander 
aus.243 
  
The SED, putting greater emphasis on economic growth, was on the hunt for books and 
films that stood in the way of this goal, and thus any cultural product that spread 
insecurity and skepticism in the Party’s eyes was to be forbidden. When it was decided 
that a Werner Bräunig novel would not be published for being “anti-sozialistisch,” Wolf 
decided to speak up: “Das kann ich mit meinem Gewissen nicht vereinbaren.”244 Her 
protest was in vain, but the event had a strong impact on her. As Angela Drescher points 
out in her book with documentary material about Nachdenken über Christa T.:  “Was 
Christa Wolf auf diesem Plenum erlebte und wogegen sie vergeblich Einspruch zu 
erheben suchte, wurde zur traumatischen Erfahrung für sie. Unmittelbar unter dem 
Eindruck des Plenums begann sie, ‘Nachdenken über Christa T.’ zu schreiben.”245  
The importance of the generational concept in Wolf’s political thinking   
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This critical turn in Wolf’s literature is paralleled in the statements she made about her 
generation in her essays. In order to understand to what extent Nachdenken über Christa 
T. is the result of Wolf’s systematic re-evaluation of her generation’s path, I will focus on 
the generational reflections in her essays and speeches before presenting my reading of 
the novel. Wolf recognizes symbolic potential of her generation for literary 
representations early on: from Hitler Youth to citizens of the GDR, from believing in the 
“wrong” ideology to helping to establish the supposedly human and democratic nature of 
the socialist society—this was the path of socialist heroes and heroines, exactly as the 
doctrines of socialist realism demanded. Convinced of the invincibility of the socialist 
German regime, she thought writers of this generation could make a significant 
contribution. Already in 1961, the year of the construction of the Berlin Wall, she wrote 
in “Probleme junger Autoren,” one of her earliest essays, “daß es nicht irgendeine, 
sondern die Forderung an einen deutschen Schriftsteller unserer Zeit ist, 
Nationalbewußtsein schaffen zu helfen.”246 In a 1962 interview with the GDR magazine 
Forum, she suggests that literature should trace the miracle that happened “in der nach 
1945 jungen Generation” and should document “Daß unter diesen Bedingungen, in 
diesem Deutschland, nach dem Faschismus, allen Widersprüchen direkt ausgesetzt, 
Menschen herangewachsen sind, die heute als Sozialisten Betriebe leiten, Lehrer sind, 
Ingeniere – das halte ich für ein eigentliches ‘deutsches’ Wunder.”247 This optimistic 
depiction of her generation—the embodiment of the GDR’s success—reflects a proud 
belief in their accomplishments, which interestingly generates a moral superiority 
towards writers of the Hitler Youth generation in West during the early sixties.  
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 We are familiar with this type of thinking from West-German writers, who during 
the post-reunification period emphasized that the Hitler Youth generation in the East 
chose the “easy way out” by switching from Nazi ideology to Marxist theory with great 
ease. As Grass said in 1990: “in der DDR wurde das Braunhemd ausgezogen und das 
Blauhemd angezogen,”248 referring to the uniforms of the Hitlerjugend and the GDR’s 
youth organization Freie Deutsche Jugend. Wolf, on the other hand, depicted West 
German writers as those who made things easy for themselves. From her perspective, 
writers in the West simply avoided what the task the East tackled so bravely: to overcome 
Germany’s shame and guilt after World War II in order to identify with the country 
again. In an essay from 1965 called “Einiges über meine Arbeit als Schriftsteller” she 
speaks about the difficulties her generation had to face in the first years after the war:  
Nicht vergessen kann ich, wie man uns, die wir bei Kriegsbeginn zehn Jahre alt 
waren, falsche Trauer, falsche Liebe, falschen Haß einimpfen wollte; wie das fast 
gelang; welche Anstrengung wir brauchten, uns aus dieser Verstrickung wieder 
herauszureißen, wieviel Hilfe wir nötig hatten, von wie vielen Menschen, wieviel 
Nachdenken, wieviel ernsthafte Arbeit, wieviel heiße Debatten. In den nächsten 
Jahren erlebten wir, wieviel leichter ein ‚Nein’ sich ausspricht als ein neues ‚Ja’ 
[...]; wieviel leichter, sich seines Volkes zu schämen, nachdem man die ganze 
Wahrheit wußte, als es wieder neu lieben zu lernen. 249 
 
This skewed perception that the foundation of the GDR in 1949 accomplished the 
endeavor of working through the Nazi past simply reiterated the state’s official memory 
politics. But her generation was greatly validated by believing themselves to be part of a 
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great political undertaking. In “Notwendiges Streitgespräch,” a speech she gave at an 
international colloquium in Berlin in 1964, she played off the East German courage to 
cope with “real” political challenges against the pessimistic West German atmosphere of 
resignation. In a sharp and ironic voice, rare for the author, she ridicules leftist West 
German authors and journalists of her generation in their desire to find political allies 
among the authors in the East:  
[I]ch weiß, daß Grass und […] Enzensberger, die ich schätze, und vielleicht auch 
die Redakteure der ‚Zeit’, sich gern mit mir und meinen Kollegen gern auf einen 
Stein der Berliner Mauer setzen und das Schicksal Deutschlands beweinen 
würden. Eines Deutschlands, dem nach ihrer Meinung nun einmal nicht zu helfen 
ist. Gern würden sie uns auf diesem Stein unter Tränen an ihr Herz drücken. Und 
dabei würden sogar unsere ‚kleinen literarischen Schwächen’ mit untergehen, die 
sie sonst angeblich so hindern, mit uns über Literatur zu sprechen. Wir würden 
uns als einheitlich empfindende Bürger einer Welt und eines Jahrhunderts fühlen, 
die als Ganzes im Schatten der Bombe stehen. 250  
 
Wolf decidedly distances herself from these attempts. In spite of belonging to the same 
generation and however far to the left Grass, Enzensberger, and journalists of Die Zeit 
might be, she says, Western and Eastern factions of this generation are not “einheitlich 
empfindende Bürger einer Welt und eines Jahrhunderts.” What separates them from each 
other is simply the belief that a realization of communist state is possible, or in Wolf’s 
words, “daß wir die Welt, oder um bescheidener zu sein, dieses unser Land und die 
Leute, die hier leben, für veränderbar halten: in dem Sinne, wie Brecht es getan hat.”251 
Her superiority reaches its peak in this speech—one might add, along with her political 
naïveté—when she wonders why West German writers glorify freedom of speech when 
they themselves do not make use of it by fighting for valuable political goals. “Oft wird 
                                                






uns von westdeutschen Autoren entgegengehalten, sie könnten schreiben, was sie 
wollten,” she says. “Die Gegenfrage liegt nahe: Was aber wollt ihr?”252  
 These passages show that in the first half of the sixties Christa Wolf remains 
entirely within the official Cold War rhetoric in her depiction of her generation. By the 
seventies, however, Wolf has lost this energized view of her generation as the pillar of 
socialism and anti-fascism. Her later generational reflections bear a much different, more 
sober, tone, which is closely related to her work on Kindheitsmuster, the autobiographical 
novel published in 1976, which I read as an “autobiography of a generation” in the next 
chapter. In the 1970 essay “Gegenwart und Zukunft,” she announces this future project, 
noting that she is working on a text in which she will try to tackle the conflicts and 
tensions that her generation has experienced and—note the present tense—still 
experiences: “Vor allem aber beschäftigt mich der große, sehr komplizierte Stoff, den 
meine Generation als Lebensgeschichte erlebt hat und erlebt, mit all seinen 
Widersprüchen, Spannungen und starken Konflikten.”253 
Three years later, Wolf went as far as explicitly questioning the idea of a smooth 
transition from fascism to anti-fascism she had previously described with such 
confidence. In a conversation with Hans Kaufmann she asserts that former Hitler Youth 
turned into socialist comrades only at the cost of deep inner conflicts:  
Was unsere Generation erlebt hat, wird nie wieder eine Generation erleben: in der 
einen Gesellschaft aufzuwachsen, erzogen, geprägt zu werden und in der anderen 
– in unserer – die Möglichkeit zu einer an die gesellschaftlichen Wurzeln 
gehenden Kritik und Selbstkritik zu haben, zum Denken, Verstehen, Handeln zu 
kommen, dabei in neue, gewiß nicht einfache Widersprüche und Konflikte gestellt 
zu sein, mehr: diese Widersprüche selbst mit herzustellen und an ihrer 
Überwindung mitzuarbeiten, und dabei doch Verhaltensmuster nicht verleugnen 
zu können, die Kindheit und Jugend bestimmten. Wenn das kein 
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widersprüchliches Kontinuum ist! Aber eben doch ein Kontinuum, denn es ist ein 
und derselbe Mensch, der das alles erfahren hat-  aber ist er es noch? Die Stunde 
Null jedenfalls, die ihn zu einem anderen machte, hat es nie gegeben…254  
 
Obviously, Wolf has arrived at a more realistic and less glorifying perspective of her 
generation here. There was never a moment, she admits, when the “new socialist man” 
entirely cast off his past. Their “Widersprüche” and “Konflikte,” she argues dialectically, 
must be represented in literature so that they can be recognized and ultimately overcome. 
 No longer, then, does she expect writers of her generation to depict their path to 
socialism as “deutsches Wunder.” Surprisingly, however, she holds on to the notion that 
her generation can serve as a paradigmatic example. She suggests that writers of her 
generation can make their contribution to “DDR-Nationalliteratur” by openly portraying 
their idiosyncratic doubts, conflicts, and questions: 
Die ältere Generation sozialistischer deutscher Schriftsteller hat klassische Werke 
vorzuweisen, die in unserer Generation fehlen. Vielleicht wird unser Beitrag zur 
Literatur darin bestehen müssen, daß wir den Mut finden, unseren eigenen 
Lebensstoff schonungslos und wahrheitsgetreu zu erzählen.255 
 
This “Lebensstoff” is most explicitly represented in Kindheitsmuster, in which Wolf 
focuses on the legacy of the Nazi past in East German society that lived on through this 
generation despite all efforts to declare it dead. But the author began to reflect more 
critically upon her generation’s path in the sixties, long before she began work on 
Kindheitsmuster. While Nachdenken über Christa T. (1968) was mostly read as 
“großangelegte Reflexion über das Thema Individuum und Gesellschaft,”256 I will show 
that Wolf writes, perhaps paradoxically, about individuality from a very concrete 
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historical-generational angle. The novel, I argue, represents a first critical retrospective 
on the Hitler Youth generation’s passage to socialism.  
The “Plot”  
Instead of providing a plot in the traditional sense, Nachdenken über Christa T contains a 
montage of memories and reflections embedded in a complex narrative structure. The 
primary theme, however, is apparent from the first few words: “Nachdenken, ihr nach—
denken,”257 to reflect on Christa T.’s life after her passing—this is the narrator’s goal 
after the death of her friend. Christa T., modeled after Wolf’s childhood friend Christa 
Tabbert, died from leukemia in 1963 at the age of 35.258 The narrator revisits Christa T.’s 
life with the help of letters and other writings that have been bequeathed to her. She 
remembers important moments in their friendship: how they met as teenagers when 
Christa T. and her family moved to the small town East of the Oder during the war, and 
how, after losing touch in 1945 when the families fled from the Russian Army, they 
resumed their friendship in the 1950s when they met again by chance during their studies 
in Leipzig. The reader learns bits and pieces about both women’s biographies, both born 
at the end of the twenties, and slowly understands the narrator’s admiration for her friend, 
an admiration than borders on fascination. Because Christa T. is different—the narrator 
describes her as an imaginative and autonomous woman, who was always on the search 
for new ways to explore who she was, and who she wanted to be. A strong individual 
who did not care about fitting in, she differed from the people surrounding her, the other 
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girls in the BDM as well as her fellow students later in the GDR. “Die Wahrheit war: Sie 
brauchte uns nicht. Sie kam und ging, mehr ließ sich über sie nicht sagen.”259  
 During the last years of her life, the narrator only remains in sporadic touch with 
Christa T., who to everyone’s surprise decided not to make use of her intellectual 
capacities: “Lehrerin, Aspirantin, Dozentin, Lektorin…Ach, sie traute ja diesen Namen 
nicht. […] Sie zuckte davor zurück, sich selbst einen Namen aufzudrücken, das 
Brandmal, mit welcher Herde in welchen Stall man zu gehen hat.”260 In the years before 
her death, she withdraws from society. She marries a veterinarian, moves to the 
countryside, and becomes a wife and a mother of three children. The narrator comments 
both on this conventional life and her friend’s death when she says: “Nichts könnte 
unpassender sein als Mitleid, Bedauern. Sie hat ja gelebt. Sie war ganz da.”261 However, 
the end of the novel is marked by a highly melancholic tone. Among her friend’s 
belongings the narrator finds some phrases that the deceased had scribbled down on a 
piece of paper, “Dieser lange, nicht enden wollende Weg zu sich selbst. Die 
Schwierigkeit, ‘ich’ zu sagen,”262 a sad but apt description of her life. 
 Today, Nachdenken über Christa T. reads like a powerful and poetic text on 
mourning—a psychological portrait of a woman who died too early. At the time of its 
publication, however, the novel was perceived as—and was intended to be—a highly 
political text. The book that documents the reception of Nachdenken über Christa T. and  
the turmoil that followed its publication, makes for compelling reading for those 
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interested in the absurdities of Cold War cultural politics.263 As soon as Wolf submitted 
the novel to the state-owned Mitteldeutscher Verlag, it was treated as a highly 
problematic manuscript. Two “experts” examined whether the text could be published, 
both of which praised the literary quality of the text but considered its politics 
problematic. One “expert” decidedly recommended against publication, fearing “die 
Gefahr einer ideologischen Desorientierung,”264 and Wolf received a visitor—“mein 
Zensor,” she calls him—who unsuccessfully tried to convince her to change the 
manuscript: the protagonist ought to find her way back to being a productive member of 
socialist society before her death.265 
 After much debate, the publishing house eventually asked the Kulturministerium 
for permission to print the novel in an unusually small edition, which was published only 
over a year later in 1968. The debates, of course, did not cease. Wolf was attacked again 
and again, while the limited number of Christa T. editions were passed on from reader to 
reader and the author received many letters from intellectuals and ordinary citizens 
expressing their support. A brief look at a speech given at the VI. Deutsche 
Schriftstellerkongreß in 1969 in Berlin gives an idea of the kind of criticism levelled 
against the book. Eberhard Röhner, professor of history and high-ranking SED official, 
argued that in the novel the “Selbstverwirklichung des Menschen” appeared “als 
Rückzug von den entscheidenden Problemen unserer Zeit.” He called Wolf’s treatment of 
individuality “unproduktiv” because he argued that “in unserer Zeit entwickeln sich 
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sozialistische Persönlichkeiten gerade im Kampf um die neue Gesellschaft“ and Christa 
T. had given up the fight.266 
  Wolf protested both against such a reading and against the reading given by the 
Western media, who read the novel as a radical critique of the GDR. In December 1969, 
she sent an official statement to the Deutscher Schriftstellerverband, in which she 
pledged allegiance to the GDR and explained some of the intentions of her work:  
Alles, was ich bisher geschrieben habe, nicht zuletzt dieses Buch, entstand aus 
Parteinahme für die sozialistische Gesellschaft, in der ich lebe. Es käme mir nicht 
in den Sinn, die Verantwortung, die meine Leser mir hier übertragen, gegen die 
Unverbindlichkeit einzutauschen, die man im Westen so häufig mit Freiheit 
verwechselt.267 
 
Her novel, she argued, treated the “Vorgang des Zu-sich-selbst-Kommens von Subjekt 
und Gesellschaft,” adding that “Dieser Prozeß, vorstellbar nur in der gemeinsamen Arbeit 
vieler einzelner, ist, was ich Glück nenne.”268 The statement ends with an assertion:  
Nachdenken […] führt keineswegs zur Selbstaufgabe, sondern zur besseren 
Bekanntschaft mit uns selbst, zur größeren Schärfe des Urteils. Wer könnte im 
Ernst annehmen, daß dieses Urteil ausgerechnet zugunsten jener notorischen 
Antikommunisten und ihrer plumpen Anbiederungsversuche ausfallen soll?269  
 
This statement was not only meant to appease political officials,270 but also reflects 
Wolf’s very particular understanding of liberty: individuality—obviously one of the 
novel’s most important subjects—is thought of as individuality within the boundaries of a 
socialist society. Nachdenken über Christa T. thus portrays the “Zu-sich-selbst-Kommen” 
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of individual and society, while also functioning as a work of introspection that Wolf 
undertakes on behalf of her generation. 
Ich und Wir  
Several scholars have acknowledged that Nachdenken über Christa T. addresses 
generational questions. Sonja Hilzinger, for example, points out that the biography of 
Christa T. is representative of Wolf’s generation and that the text depicts the encounter 
between the generation who grew up during the Third Reich and the younger generation 
socialized in the GDR.271 Therese Hörnigk, likewise, summarizes in one sentence: “Auf 
[…] Reflexions- wie Handlungsebene, werden Denkstrukturen und Handlungsweisen 
erörtert und debattiert, Grundstrukturen der Generation der um 1930 Geborenen 
durchgearbeitet, die sich—während des Nationalsozialismus aufgewachsen—
übergangslos nach der Befreiung vom Faschismus am Aufbau der neuen Gesellschaft 
beteiligten.”272 Wolfram and Helmtrud Mauser refer to the generational importance in 
their monograph on Nachdenken über Christa T. in the chapter “’ich’-sagen – ‘wir’-
sagen,” stating that Christa T.’s difficulties are “nicht nur ein individuelles, zufällig-
persönliches, sondern ein generationsspezifisches Problem.”273 
None of these scholars, however, go beyond simply identifying the generational 
nature of the work. The only Feuilleton critic who at the time fully grasped the historical-
generational dimension of the text was Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who reviewed the novel 
for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in 1969:  
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Es ist die Geschichte ihrer Generation, die Christa Wolf hier erzählt, die 
Geschichte jener, die kurz nach 1945, damals kaum achtzehn oder zwanzig Jahre 
alt, begeistert und emphatisch die Morgenröte einer neuen Zeit grüßten und die 
sich wenig später inmitten des grauen und trüben Alltags von Leipzig und 
Ostberlin sahen. Sie glaubten, den Sturm der Revolution entfesselt zu haben, doch 
was kam, war nur der Mief der DDR. 
 So betrachtet sind beide—ebenso Christa T. wie ihre berichtende und 
analysierende Freundin—in hohem Maße typische und exemplarische Gestalten, 
sensibler freilich und intelligenter als die meisten Generationsgenossen.274  
 
I fully agree with his reading: clearly, the retrospective on Christa T.’s life is presented as 
a retrospective on the generation from the beginning. While Reich-Ranicki does not 
provide much textual evidence to back up his claim there are indeed several significant 
passages that provide evidence for Wolf’s systematic generational focus.  
 In the exposition before the first chapter, the narrator writes: “Und bloß nicht 
vorgeben, wir täten es ihretwegen. Ein für allemal: Sie braucht uns nicht. Halten wir uns 
also fest, es ist unseretwegen, denn es scheint, wir brauchen sie.”275 The imperative form 
of “festhalten” in this sentence means both “let’s brace ourselves” as well as “let’s record 
our lives”. Wolf emphasizes that “we” need to look back and write down what became of 
our generation. In fact, she even describes the moment at which the narrator realizes the 
need for this generational retrospective, the moment when the two women meet again in 
the 1950s during their studies in Leipzig. Walking to the train station together after a 
lecture they notice how similar their biographies have been since they parted ways in 
1945:  
So fragten wir uns unsere Erlebnisse ab, als ließen sich Schlüsse daraus ziehen. 
Dabei merkten wir: Wir gebrauchten und mieden die gleichen Wörter. In der 
gleichen Versammlung hatten wir eben noch gesessen, die gleichen Schriften 
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mußten wir beide gelesen haben. Viele Wege gab es damals nicht für uns, keine 
große Auswahl an Gedanken, Hoffnungen und Zweifeln.276 
 
They both recognize that there was a pattern in their lives: both were introduced to 
Marxist theories (“die gleichen Schriften”) and eventually began to repress their fascist 
upbringing (“mieden die gleichen Wörter”), as they entered the new society.  
 The narrator decides that it is time to revisit this shared past, bothered by the lack 
of a critical-analytical perspective on the past ten or fifteen years of their life. They need 
to walk the path a second time, to use Wolf’s metaphor:  
[D]en Weg vom Kaufhaus zum Bahnhof müssen wir noch einmal gehen, uns 
andere Worte sagen, den Mut endlich finden, aus unseren halben Sätzen ganze 
machen, die Unschärfe aus unserer Rede tilgen, schade um die Zeit. Anders 
ansehen sollen wir uns auch und anderes sehen.277 
 
While this passage is easy to miss, it is crucial in clarifying that the meditation on Christa 
T.’s life is embedded within a larger project that seeks to evaluate the path of an entire 
generation—“es ist unseretwegen,” as the narrator says. Nachdenken über Christa T. is a 
portrayal of the Hitler Youth generation in the socialist German state, the generation that 
regarded itself as morally superior to their colleagues in the West. The quote above 
continues:  
Unschärfe? Das Wort mag befremden. Hat es doch den Jahren, von denen zu 
reden gewesen wäre, an Schärfe nicht gefehlt. Den Schnitt machen zwischen 
‘uns’ und ‘den anderen’, in voller Schärfe, endgültig: das war die Rettung. Und 
insgeheim wissen: Viel hat nicht gefehlt, und kein Schnitt hätte ‚das andere’ von 
uns getrennt, weil wir selbst anders gewesen wären. Wie aber trennt man sich von 
sich selbst? Darüber sprachen wir nicht.278  
 
The narrator admits to the artificiality of their previous image of themselves. They 
sharply distinguished themselves from “den anderen” in the West by cutting themselves 
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off from the Nazi past—“das andere”. But the narrator recognizes that by being so 
decidedly “anti-fascist” they also separated themselves from a part of their own lives. 
“Anders ansehen sollen wir uns,”279 she says now. Together with Christa T., she wants to 
revisit the years after the war in order to rethink rash choices and youthful errors. This 
broader perspective explains why about half of the book is written in the first person 
plural, with the other half being the narrator’s reflections on Christa T. in the third 
person. At some point in the novel, the narrator writes: “an die Stelle des Ich kann—
diesen Ausweg läßt die Sprache—fast immer das Wir treten, niemals mit mehr Recht als 
für jene Zeit.”280 Thus, Christa T.’s identity struggles seem to be closely intertwined with 
the collective identity of the generational “wir.”  
A generation’s path from fascism to anti-fascism 
How then does the narrator look back on the history of this generation? What critical 
perspective does she gain? Unlike Kindheitsmuster, which focuses on childhood and 
adolescence, Nachdenken über Christa T. illuminates the years after the war, beginning 
in 1945 with memories of the symbolic destruction of Nazi ideologies: “Sie verbrannte 
ihre alten Tagebücher, da gingen Schwüre in Rauch auf und die Begeisterungen deren 
man sich nun schämte, die Sprüche und Lieder.”281 Soon thereafter, new ideologies are 
offered, providing much-needed direction:  
die neuen Namen auf den Buchdeckeln: Gorki, Makarenko, die neuen 
Broschüren, die, so wichtig wie die tägliche Nahrung, jedem in die Hand gegeben 
werden, der seine Hände nicht zumacht. [...] Ja, so wird es sein. Dies ist der Weg 
zu uns selber. So wäre diese Sehnsucht nicht lächerlich und abwegig, so wäre sie 
brauchbar und nützlich.282  
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“Dies ist der Weg zu uns selber”—precisely the belief that the narrator now questions. 
She comments on her generation’s early fascination with Marxist theory: “Wieviel wird 
da zu verwerfen sein!”283 On the way to the Leipzig train station, she suspects that her 
friend feels a similar distance to this earlier enthusiasm, but they avoid talking about it: 
“Kein Wort davon auf unserem ersten Weg. Zwei, drei Titel im Höchstfall, nüchterne 
philosophische und ökonomische Begriffe.”284 Through the many unspoken words and 
allusions, the reader can sense why the narrator feels the need to “walk this path again” 
and illuminate the story of her generation through Christa T.’s representative biography.  
 These passages in the third chapter, which already suggest a critical perspective 
on the Hitler Youth generation’s rash involvement with the socialist ideal, are 
complemented by a number of even more explicit passages in the sixth chapter, which 
contains the passage quoted by every single critic in the East and West after the book was 
published, Christa T.’s statement that “mir graut vor der neuen Welt der Phantasielosen. 
Der Tatsachenmenschen. Der Hopp-Hopp-Menschen, so hat sie sie genannt.”285 This 
sentence was as unacceptable to GDR functionaries as it was praiseworthy to West 
German critics because it captured so well the manner in which the excitement about new 
socialist ideas turned into resignation over the reality of totalitarian bureaucracy. Another 
passage, frequently quoted alongside the previous one, expresses the disillusionment even 
more clearly:  
Der Mechanismus, nach dem sich das alles bewegte—aber bewegte es sich 
denn?—die Zahnräder, Schnüre und Stangen waren ins Dunkel getaucht, man 
erfreue sich an der absoluten Perfektion und Zweckmäßigkeit des Apparats, den 
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reibungslos in Gang zu halten kein Opfer zu groß schien—selbst nicht das: sich 
auslöschen, Schräubchen sein.286   
 
No one knew exactly how the GDR functioned; its hidden machinery was “ins Dunkel 
getaucht.” Things seemed efficient and perfect on the surface, but Wolf suggests that one 
of the sacrifices as a result of this efficiency was the diminished value of the individual. 
Throughout her life Christa T. had tried to be more than a piece that kept the machinery 
going, but she had always felt the threat of being “ausgelöscht” by the state apparatus.  
 While most critics read these two text passages exclusively alongside Christa T.’s 
quest for individuality, they overlook that Wolf placed them in a chapter that consists 
largely of passages written from the generational perspective. By seeking out these 
passages in the first person plural and rearranging them slightly, thus reversing Wolf’s 
montage technique, we receive the clearest, most critical depiction Wolf provides of her 
generation in the novel. Take this key passage, which reveals the author’s critical view of 
her generation’s naïve switch from one ideology to the next:  
Sie [Christa T.] hat an unseren Gesprächen teilgenommen, jenen herrlichen 
ausschweifenden nächtlichen Gesprächen über die Beschaffenheit des Paradieses, 
an dessen Schwelle wir, meistens hungrig und Holzschuhe an den Füßen, mit 
großer Gewißheit standen. Die Idee der Vollkommenheit hatte uns erfaßt, aus 
unseren Büchern und Broschüren war sie in uns eingedrungen, und von den 
Podien der Versammlungen kam die Ungeduld dazu: Wahrlich, ich sage dir, heute 
noch wirst du mit mir im Paradiese sein! Oh, wir hatten das Vorgefühl davon, es 
war unleugbar und unersetzbar, wir vergewisserten uns seiner, indem wir stritten. 
[...] Wer aber, wer würde würdig sein es zu bewohnen? Die Allerreinsten nur, das 
schien doch festzustehen.287  
 
This hyperbolic depiction of their almost religious belief in the socialist utopia, which 
seemed like paradise, discloses how much distance Wolf feels to these early post-war 
years two decades later.  
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 Why did it take so long until this generation developed a self-reflective and self-
critical perspective? Wolf offers a plausible psychological explanation:  
Wir nämlich waren vollauf damit beschäftigt, uns unantastbar zu machen, wenn 
einer noch nachfühlen kann, was das heißt. Nicht nur nichts Fremdes in uns 
aufnehmen—und was alles erklärten wir für fremd!—, auch im eigenen Innern 
nichts Fremdes aufkommen lassen, und wenn es schon aufkam—ein Zweifel, ein 
Verdacht, Beobachtungen, Fragen—, dann doch nichts davon anmerken zu lassen. 
Weniger aus Angst, obwohl viele auch ängstlich waren, als aus Unsicherheit.288  
  
It was not only fear that prevented them from shedding any doubts about the new 
political system but also deep insecurity. Because it was unthinkable that this system, 
which had provided a safe ideological haven after the collapse of the Nazi regime, could 
also be corrupt, they created a protective shield that repelled doubts, questions, or 
suspicions:  
So entstand um uns herum, oder auch in uns, was dasselbe war, ein hermetischer 
Raum, der seine Gesetze aus sich selber zog, dessen Sterne und Sonnen scheinbar 
mühelos um eine Mitte kreisten, die keinen Gesetzen und keiner Veränderung und 
am wenigsten dem Zweifel unterworfen war.289  
 
With astonishing insight, Nachdenken über Christa T. thus revisits the development of 
Wolf’s generation during the first twenty years after the war and discovers 
disillusionment and discontent with the GDR but also the need to hold on to a belief 
system that provides stability.  
 At the beginning of the novel, the narrator already states that this retrospective 
will allow them to see their lives from a new viewpoint: “Die Jahre, die wieder 
aufsteigen, sind dieselben Jahre nicht mehr.” But she continues: “Licht und Schatten 
fallen noch einmal auf unser Gesicht, das aber gefaßt bleibt.”290 Wolf does not intend to 
unnerve or upset, and it is interesting that she uses the plural form “unser Gesicht” in this 
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sentence. The strong generational identity continues to exist, only that it is now based on 
the memory of what used to glue them together, the emphatic embrace of socialism 
during the early post-war years: “[Wir] lächeln heute, wenn wir uns gegenseitig daran 
erinnern. Werden noch einmal, für Minuten, einander ähnlich, wie wir es damals durch 
diesen Glauben jahrelang waren. Können uns heute noch an einem Wort, einer Losung 
erkennen. Blinzeln uns zu.“291 Instead of the future, it is now the memory of the past—of 
how silly we were…—that creates the bond between the members of this generation.  
 The idea of the socialist society itself, however, is never questioned. Instead, Wolf 
wants her generation—in her essay “Lesen und Schreiben,” she refers to “die auffällig 
verzögerte Reife meiner Generation”292— to grow up and develop a more critical 
political attitude, apparently hoping that a new, more mature perspective will lead to 
these problems being tackled. Defending herself against the criticisms of GDR officials, 
Wolf quoted a sentence from her novel that in her view clearly showed she was still 
committed to the socialist idea.293 She referred to the last sentence of this passage:  
Denn die neue Welt, die wir unantastbar machen wollten, und sei es dadurch, daß 
wir uns irgendeinen Ziegelstein in ihr Fundament einmauerten—sie gab es 
wirklich. Es gibt sie, und nicht nur in unseren Köpfen, und damals fing sie für uns 
an. Was aber immer mit ihr geschah oder geschehen wird, es ist und bleibt unsere 
Sache. Unter den Tauschangelegenheiten ist keines, nach dem auch nur den Kopf 
zu drehen sich lohnen würde...294 
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 “Es gibt sie”—with the present tense she stresses that the idea of this new society still 
exists. Christa T.’s death might be an allegory about the loss of individuality in the GDR, 
but to claim, as several critics have done, that she suffers and ultimately dies because of 
the GDR, would signify a pessimistic attitude that Wolf certainly did not mean to 
express. 295 
Shortly before her death, Christa T. makes a statement that points in the other 
direction. She has found a new project in designing and building a house, and although 
financial troubles and health problems present serious obstacles,  
war [sie] gar nicht zu erschüttern. Sie wußte ganz gut, daß dieses rohe, 
winddurchpfiffene Haus weiter von seiner Vollendung entfernt war als das 
Traumhaus an jenem glücklichen Abend auf den Skizzen im Strandhotel, das 
weiß und schön auf dem Papier dagelegen hatte. Aber sie hatte auch erfahren, daß 
das wirkliche Material sich stärker widersetzt als Papier und daß man die Dinge, 
solange sie im Werden sind, unerschütterlich vorwärtstreiben muß. Wir sahen, 
daß sie längst nicht mehr auf ihren Skizzen bestand, sondern auf diesen rohen 
Steinen.296  
 
Christa T. realizes that it will take time for the house to resemble her sketches. Things 
looked easier on paper as they turned out to be in reality. She is ready to make 
concessions and be content with the rough stones instead of insisting that the house 
becomes identical with her sketches. It is not her death but this project—representing 
Christa T.’s maturity and patience, her more realistic approach to the original drafts—that 
serves as an allegory for the GDR. This passage must be read together with a statement 
made twenty pages later, “Man kann sich nämlich entschließen, in gewissen Bereichen, 
das eine für wahr zu halten, das andere nicht. So wie man sich irgendwann entschlossen 
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hat, an die Gutartigkeit des Menschen zu glauben, nützlichkeitshalber, als 
Arbeitshypothese.”297 As I will show in my fourth chapter, Wolf stands by this statement 
until her death. Reich-Ranicki has pointed out: “[D]iesem Roman also fehlt auch nur die 
Spur von der fröhlich-optimistischen Perspektive, die die Kulturfunktionäre ihren 
Schriftstellern abzuverlangen versuchen.”298 But nevertheless, it is ultimately an 
optimistic perspective. 
Conclusion  
Klaus Sauer writes aptly of a “Prozeß der Selbstrevision” with regard to the critical turn 
during this early phase in Wolf’s career in the sixties,299 claiming that in Nachdenken 
über Christa T. we see for the first time the self-reflexive attitude that becomes the 
trademark of Wolf’s literature. Sauer writes about this astonishing development:  
[E]s war keineswegs von Anfang an ausgemacht, daß Christa Wolf über die 
Fähigkeit verfügen würde, sich selbst und ihre Arbeit in Frage zu stellen. Als sie 
zu schreiben begann, lag ihr jedenfalls nichts ferner als der Gedanke an eine 
Literatur, die nicht zuletzt eine Schule des Zweifels ist—des Zweifels an den allzu 
vielen öffentlich gehandelten Gewißheiten300 
 
In a similar vein, Georgina Paul writes that from the late sixties, Wolf “began to 
consciously apply the technique of paradigmatic self-analysis through fictionalisation.”301 
Paul argues that on a profoundly personal level, by including autobiographical elements 
in her novels, Wolf began to ask critical questions about life in the GDR. However, both 
the term “self-reflexive writing” as well as Georgina Paul’s phrase “poetics of self-
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analysis,”302 hide the fact that, strictly speaking, it is not the “self” that is in the center of 
Wolf’s writing. I would instead argue that Wolf’s truly self-reflective writing only begins 
in 1990, after the socialist society of the GDR finally falls apart. In Nachdenken über 
Christa T., any reflection about the “self” is embedded within the author’s paradigmatic 
writing about her generation. It is no coincidence that—as with Tulla and Harry in Grass’ 
Hundejahre—there are two protagonists in Wolf’s novel, who are “nicht immer und nicht 
so sicher als zwei autonome epische Figuren erkennbar sind,“ as Reich-Ranicki has 
pointed out.303 With the addition of the narrator as a second, equally important 
protagonist besides Christa T., Wolf demonstrates on a structural level what she 
expresses semantically by the constant use of the “wir.” The individual subject in 
Nachdenken über Christa T. represents her generation, which, in turn, represents the 
larger GDR society.  
 While my generational reading of Nachdenken über Christa T., a novel that 
represents her first piece of literature that reveals aesthetic and political independence, 
does not unveil a dramatically new perspective, I hope to have added a new layer of 
understanding by stressing how the novel’s emphasis on individuality goes hand in hand 
with an adherence to collective generational thinking. In his eulogy for Wolf, Grass 
spoke about the self-doubt with which she faced her own biography in her literary work: 
“jener Mut zum Selbstzweifel, den Christa Wolf lebenslang, ich meine, im Übermaß 
bewiesen hat.”304 However, the individual voice in Wolf’s literature would only become 
stronger over time. 
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3. Walser versus Zeitgeist—The essay “Händedruck mit Gespenstern” 
(1979) from today’s perspective  
 
As we have seen, both Günter Grass and Christa Wolf readily accepted, or even aspired 
to, a public role as representatives of the Hitler Youth generation in the cultural-political 
spheres of their respective countries. Grass in the West and Wolf in the East—both used 
their Hitler Youth past in their role as advocates of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 
continually addressing their biographies and their generational background from the 
beginning of their careers. They talked openly their upbringing in Nazi-Germany, 
reflected on their generational identity, and depicted their generation’s particular situation 
during and after the war in their literature. The case of Martin Walser is strikingly 
different. Whereas Grass and Wolf were already writing autobiographically inspired 
works about their childhood and youth in the fifties and sixties, Walser conspicuously 
avoided this subject until 1998 when he published his childhood autobiography Ein 
springender Brunnen. And even then, I will show in my next chapter, the text only 
underscored Walser’s refusal to represent his “Nazi childhood” in an exemplary political 
way, as Wolf and Grass had done. In short: While both Grass and Wolf chose to inhabit 
their roles as generational representatives, it can be argued that Walser was placed in that 
role unwillingly, made a spokesperson as a result of his assumed biographical 
experiences, but not as a result of any desire on his own part. 
 Therefore, one looks for explicit generational-biographical references in Walser’s 
early work in vain. Both his first and his second novel, Ehen in Philippsburg (1957) and  
Halbzeit (1959), portray West Germany during the economic miracle of the fifties. One 
could potentially connect these texts with Schelsky’s Die skeptische Generation, given 





himself does not highlight the generational context at all. In fact, in an interview in 1980, 
he revealed that the motivation for the work on Halbzeit was actually a reaction against 
the feeling of being confined to a very specific national identity and biography, and that 
he wrote the novel “[a]us Wut sozusagen”, after returning to Germany from a trip to 
America:  
Ich war ja doch schon 31 Jahre alt—und hatte gar keine Lust mehr nach 
Deutschland zurückzugehen. […] Die Energie dazu [to write the novel in a very 
short amount of time] kam aus diesem Erlebnis des Gefangenseins auf einem 
Kontinent, in einem Land, einer Familie, einer Sprache, dieses Abgegrenzt- und 
Abgekapselt- und Abgepacktsein einer Biographie, aus der Ahnung, du bist der 
und der, und der hat wieder da und da unter der und der Adresse mit seinem 
Paß einzufinden. Das schien mir unerträglich.305 
 
This anger seems to have accompanied him ever since. After the publication of Ein 
springender Brunnen  in 1998, a critic observed that while other writers of his generation 
had incorporated their biographies into their works decades earlier, Walser instead wrote 
a collection of novellas reminiscent of Kafka,306 and seemingly avoided connecting 
National Socialist history with his own biography, which did not seem to be on his 
agenda at the time. Walser reacted with fury to the notion that this might have been the 
result of repression, as was suggested in the television show Das literarische Quartett in 
which Ein springender Brunnen was discussed. In an interview with Rudolf Augstein, the 
editor of Der Spiegel, Walser said:  
Schon in Ehen in Philippsburg, also 1957, sei keiner in der HJ gewesen, keiner im 
BDM; ja, schon 1955 sei die deutsche Vergangenheit im Flugzeug über dem Haus 
ausgeklammert worden ... Dass das 1955 kafkaeske Parabeln waren, in denen die 
Hitlerjugend schlecht platzierbar gewesen wäre, gilt nichts. Ästhetik gilt nichts, 
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nur die politische Korrektheitsforderung gilt, und das erlebe ich als ungeheure 
Bevormundung.307  
 
As a result of statements like this, I argue that the generational context has always in fact 
been present in Walser’s work, but through its absence—and I will demonstrate that the 
author made a conscious choice not to be perceived as a representative of the Hitler 
Youth generation. While this avoidance of the past could be described in psychological 
terms, as the repression of trauma, I wish instead to focus on the political rather than the 
personal and psychological implications. It is Walser himself who uses the term “political 
emotions” in his essay “Händedruck mit Gespenstern,” which is particularly apt given his 
tendency to display highly emotional reactions precisely when he wants argue in sober, 
political terms. In considering these emotional reactions, then, I am not so much laying 
Walser on the couch, as it were, but instead considering them as part of an expression of 
political identity.  
 I consider three texts in this last section of the chapter. First, in my discussion of 
the essay “Über die Neueste Stimmung im Westen” (1970), I will show that Walser 
began his career fully subscribing to the leftist discourse so often “attached” to his 
generation. Then, I fast forward to a recent essay called “Über Erfahrungen mit dem 
Zeitgeist” (2008), in which he provides a retrospective of his public career, representing 
himself as an individualist who has always been misunderstood because his views 
contradicted the dominant political culture. Finally, I turn to the essay “Händedruck mit 
Gespenstern” (1979), which I consider a key text in understanding Walser’s rejection of 
the role as a representative of the Hitler Youth generation in the public sphere. In this 
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essay, Walser rejects this role of spokeperson because it would not allow him to speak 
both about his Hitler Youth past and his increasingly strong nationalist feelings, given the 
domination (or even occupation) of the generational Hitler Youth identity by left-liberal 
discourse. 
“Über die Neueste Stimmung im Westen” (1970)  
Over the past fifteen years, Walser has repeatedly claimed that the German literary scene 
had lost its autonomy as a result of being increasingly infiltrated by (left-liberal) political 
demands, not least demands concerning the memory of the Holocaust. In the Spiegel 
interview quoted above, for example, he complains about an omnipresent “politische 
Korrektheitsforderung.” In this light, the claims he makes in the essay “Über die Neueste 
Stimmung im Westen” from 1970 are quite astonishing. Here, Walser aligns himself 
entirely with those writers on the Left who understood their literature as a critical force in 
society and a tool to communicate political opinions, attacking the “neueste Stimmung”: 
the post-modern movement that had spilled over into West Germany’s literary scene from 
America, and promoted by figures such as the postmodernist critic Leslie A. Fiedler. He 
juxtaposes a group of younger intellectuals—in particular Rolf Dieter Brinkmann (born 
in 1940) and Peter Handke (born in 1942)—with a group of politically engaged authors 
of his own generation. These younger authors, he writes, deal with language  
[s]o weit als möglich weg von einer Ausdruckspraxis, die die Welt noch mit Hilfe 
kritischer Abbilder korrigieren wollte, oder die, selbst wenn die Schreiber das 
nicht beabsichtigt hatten, ganz von selbst brauchbar schien als ein Mittel zur 
Ausbildung eines kritischen und dadurch zur Veränderung drängenden 
Bewußtseins vom gesellschaftlichen Zustand.308  
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Walser coins the term “Desengagement” for this mode of experimental writing that uses 
language in its materiality and no longer as critical tool: “Das Desengagement führte zur 
Weigerung, mit Sprache Meinung herzustellen, und entwickelte eine artistische Methode 
der Reduktion des Ausdrucks auf Sprachfertigteile, auf Montage und Collage und 
Bloßlegung von Sprachstrukturen. Diese Bewegung reicht am sichtbarsten von 
Heißenbüttel bis Handke.”309  
Walser clearly distances himself from this literature of “Desengagement,” arguing 
that by fostering interiority and individuality in anti-democratic ways, this movement 
indirectly left room for fascist structures to re-emerge:  
[W]o dieser Prozeß hin will: zu einer Gesellschaft, in der jeder seine eigene 
Befreiung auf dem Weg nach innen sucht, mit Hilfe von Drogen, mit Hilfe einer 
Literatur, die sich auf Mythen und verfälschte Trivialitäten kapriziert, oder auch 
mit Hilfe einer Literatur, die als Droge die chemische Droge begleitet. Befreiung 
des Menschen von der Gesellschaft […] In ihr [in this liberated society] stirbt mit 
jedem Ausflug ins Innere eine demokratische Möglichkeit ab und die Möglichkeit 
zum Gegenteil—und das heißt Faschismus—nimmt zu.“310  
 
With statements like this one, Walser positions himself in an ongoing debate about 
aesthetics and politics in German literature that began at the end of the sixties.311 These 
quotations demonstrate that Walser argues against a position that he would later assume 
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himself, albeit with some modification, arguing against both aesthetic autonomy and the 
liberation of literature from politics, of which he would later became a strong defender. 
At this point in time, he sees himself as a “gesellschaftskritischer Schriftsteller” and even 
sides with Grass: 
Die Produzenten der Neuesten Stimmung können natürlich sagen: ihr 
sogenannten gesellschaftskritischen Schriftsteller habt nichts geändert, nicht 
einmal euch selbst. [...] Sie verzichten also auf diese bei uns immer noch 
gehandelte Rechtfertigung des Schriftstellers, der auf großem Parkett andauernd 
sein gesellschaftskritisches Ritual aufführt. […] Ich dagegen muß Grass einfach 
immer wieder bewundern, wenn er auf seine SPD-Tour geht; bewundern nicht 
wegen des Bekenntnisses zum SPD-Inhalt, sondern wegen seiner Fähigkeit, eine 
praktische Konsequenz zu ziehen; für die Virtuosen der Tour nach innen ist Grass 
wahrscheinlich gerade durch seine Praxis völlig korrumpiert; diese geradezu 
rücksichtslose Verbindlichkeit eines Schriftstellers ist ihnen ein schmieriger 
Greuel.312  
 
While he clarifies that he does not necessarily agree with the specific political program 
Grass promotes, he also clearly identifies with Grass’s concrete political activism rather 
than with the aesthetic “Tour nach innen” advocated by the younger generation of 
authors.  
 Later in his career, Walser completely abandoned his allegiance to the idea of a 
German littérature engagée. As mentioned earlier, in the controversial Friedenspreis 
speech, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede” (1998), the basic argument on 
which he bases his memory “intervention” appears to be the opposite of what he argues 
in 1970. For him, as he has argued more recently, German literature was “polluted” by 
the left-wing political understanding of literature, fostered both by authors like Grass, 
who clung to the notion of an engaged literature, as well as the media, which for a long 
time guaranteed authorial publicity. As a result, Walser complains, the aesthetic sphere 
has lost its autonomy. It is within this framework that he looks back onto his early career 
                                                





in the 2008 essay “Über Erfahrungen mit dem Zeitgeist,”313 in which he represents 
himself as a victim of this development.  
“Über Erfahrungen mit dem Zeitgeist” (2008) 
Walser’s zeitgeist essay is cloaked as a broad reflection on how the reigning discourses 
influences all intellectuals—“[W]as der Sauerstoff für unsere Lunge,” Walser writes “ist 
der Zeitgeist für das Bewusstsein und für das Selbstbewusstsein.”314 His highly subjective 
investment in this zeitgeist analysis, however, become visible when he continues: 
“Gewöhnlich nehmen wir von der Luft auch erst Notiz, wenn sie schlecht ist. So auch 
vom Zeitgeist. Wenn wir mit ihm nicht zurechtkommen, oder er mit uns, dann nehmen 
wir ihn wahr,”315 a comment that must be linked to the memory debates of 1998 and 
2002, when Walser was not—and did not want to be—in agreement with the zeitgeist. In 
fact, he ends the essay by quoting the philosopher Peter Sloterdijk who had noted “dass 
Walser auch hierin zu früh recht hatte”316—Walser had been correct in demanding a 
normalization of German memory discourse in his Friedenspreis speech but since he was 
ten years ahead of the zeitgeist, his critics did not realize his brilliant foresight.  
 It thus becomes clear that Walser writes out of a deep feeling of being 
misunderstood in this long essay, in which he continuously quotes long passages from his 
own work, presenting himself as an avantgarde political thinker and author, who was 
unjustifiably attacked by his critics because his ideas did not match those of the current 
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zeitgeist.317 The essay reveals strong undertones of victimization, and it becomes 
apparent that the term zeitgeist functions as a metaphor for the culturally dominant left-
liberal consensus, a consensus with which Walser had long struggled—not least, I argue, 
because it was the mainstream discourse of intellectuals of the Hitler Youth generation. 
As he writes, “[L]inksintellektuell? Ich habe mein Leben unter dieser Etikettierung 
verbringen müssen. Müssen?”318—clearly presenting himself as the victim of a left-
liberal zeitgeist. 
He goes on to launch a retrospective of moments during his career when he 
deviated from the expectations of being a leftist. At the beginning of the sixties, he 
polemically explains, the Frankfurt School, according to Walser the dominant school of 
thought at the time, evaluated German writers with the help of two adjectives: “Mehr als 
ein Entweder-oder war nicht drin: kritisch-aufklärerisch oder affirmativ.”319 Thus, when 
the first dissertation on his novel Halbzeit came to the conclusion that the novel was 
“affirmativ,” this verdict was tantamount to suggesting the author might be on the 
political right—a heavy-handed criticism. Paradoxically, he points out, he was “genau in 
dieser Zeit vom Zeitgeist […] zum Kommunisten, gestempelt”320 because of his 
vehement public protest against the Vietnam War. He quotes a lengthy passage he wrote 
in his diary in 1971, in which he expressed his disappointment with his editor Siegfried 
Unseld and the critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki, both of whom had criticized him for being 
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too far on the left. He describes Unseld as ungrateful for not taking his side after he had 
supported him when his own editors turned against him two years prior, and mentions 
Reich-Ranicki’s negative review of his novel Jenseits der Liebe, suggesting that Reich-
Ranicki rejected the novel aesthetically because he disagreed with the author’s politics.321 
Walser claims that “Da wird nicht mehr ein Buch besprochen, sondern eine Person. Aber 
beides, Buch und Person, wird gleichermaßen erledigt,”322 adding that he deals with 
Reich-Ranicki’s review for one reason, “weil sie wie keine andere den Zeitgeist 
demonstriert.”323 These passages about Unseld and Reich-Ranicki, constituting personal 
attacks against those who did not share his political positions, significantly weaken 
Walser’s cultural-political argument.  
 Walser feels especially justified in his self-portrayal as an outcast when it comes 
to his GDR politics. Jan-Werner Müller, who offers an excellent synopsis of Walser’s 
Germany politics in his book Another Country, agrees with the author insofar as he 
portrays the fall of the Berlin Wall as “the moment of Walser’s triumph.”324 Unlike many 
of his colleagues Walser had always been an advocate of unification, a position for which 
he was criticized by both the Left and Right. Müller writes that both political wings 
tended to attack him for the wrong reasons. The Right wanted to claim as one of 
its own a man who had consistently espoused ‘democratic socialism’. The Left, 
on the other hand, rather than fastening on these underlying issues and engaging 
with the questions which Walser persistently posed, seemed to brand him a 
‘nationalist’, even ‘revanchist’, simply for articulating national questions and the 
plight of the East Germans.325  
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Walser’s pro-unification stance, Müller shows, was always motivated by his defense of 
the idea of a German nation, which in Walser’s view could only exist through the reunion 
of the entire German “Volk.” 
The zeitgeist argument is most convincing in the part of the essay that deals with 
the difficulties Walser faced because his stance on reunification did not match the Left’s 
acceptance of a divided Germany and a socialist German state. Already in his early essay 
“Engagement als Pflichtfach für den Schriftsteller” (1967), Walser described the 
difficulties of passing the public test of having the “correct” political opinion as 
“engagierter Schriftsteller,” which is all about finding the right balance, he says 
ironically. “[I]n Passau muß man dich für einen Knecht Ulbrichts halten, aber Ulbricht 
darf sich über dich nicht freuen können. So hat sich der Engagierte einzupendeln 
zwischen Passau und Pankow.”326 He thus implies that, as a writer in the West German 
cultural scene of the sixties, he was expected to incorporate a very specific political 
position: one had to appear as a radical leftist in the traditionally right-wing Bavarian city 
of Passau while still not appearing to be a communist in Pankow, East Berlin.  
 But “Über Erfahrungen mit dem Zeitgeist” falls short of this display of intelligent 
wit and acute observation in suggesting that the Left might have been shortsighted in 
their view of the GDR. Abandoning his previous analytical lens, in 2008 Walser 
approaches the topic with bitterness and a sense of victimhood. Again, he personalizes 
the issue by mentioning how hurt he was by Jurek Becker, a writer and GDR dissident, 
who had publicly called Walser’s speech “nationalistisches Geschwafel,”327 and by 
condemning the leftist intelligentsia for turning their back on him when he accepted an 
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invitation to discuss his speech with the CSU in Bad Kreuth.328 It’s quite clear that in 
Walser’s usage, zeitgeist does not denote a neutral concept but specifically refers to the 
cultural left: his editor’s resistance to using the word “Heimat” in a book title because it 
was considered too right-wing, or the positive international reception of his novella Dorle 
und Wolf, in spite of its negative reception in Germany on account of, as he suggests, 
leftist disapproval of the pro-unification stance expressed in it.329 Walser also includes a 
number of stabs at Grass as the spokesperson of the Left, including a cheap remark on the 
public’s positive view of Grass’s political engagement in the sixties and seventies: “Das 
ist Zeitgeist pur.”330 He displays his disdain for his colleague when he sarcastically writes 
of Grass’ “moralische Intelligenz” with regard to GDR politics—obviously, he suggests, 
we know whose stance on the GDR was the more intelligent.331  
 These episodes are all meant to confirm Walser’s point that the dominant left-
liberal discourse was so influential that it did not allow for his own political opinions.  
This interesting and important argument is impeded and undermined by the author’s 
desire to vindicate his political positions throughout his career at all costs, and to rewrite 
his public life as a story of victimisation at the hands of the Left. 
“Händedruck mit Gespenstern” (1979) 
While Walser heavily criticizes the resistance of younger authors to serve as societal 
spokespeople in “Über die neueste Stimmung im Westen,” he follows their lead only nine 
years later. Towards the beginning of “Händedruck mit Gespenstern,” he explains that 
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“Wenn man als Mitarbeiter an der öffentlichen Meinung jahrelang eine gesellschaftliche 
Ausdrucksweise anstrebt [...], besteht die Gefahr, daß sich die Ausdrucksweise 
verselbständigt und mit dem, der sie praktiziert, immer weniger zu tun hat.”332 Walser 
implies he has long been part of a discourse from which he now feels completely 
alienated: “Seine Meinungen und er sind einander ein bißchen fremder geworden.”333 
Without wishing to retract what he had said during the past decade, “er muß doch 
zugeben, daß seine veröffentlichten Meinungen ihn nicht ganz enthalten,”334 and that he 
no longer identifies with the image he used to embody, of a left-wing writer.  
 In this essay, we can see the beginnings of Walser’s later claim of literature 
having been appropriated by the public sphere. He considers the enormous influence of 
writers in the public sphere highly problematic: “Nach Gott haben wir nichts Wichtigeres 
mehr gehabt als Öffentlichkeit.”335 He seems to speak of the danger of having to conform 
to one and the same opinion and “der Schaden, der entstünde, wenn unsere öffentliche 
Meinung ein von Mandarinen gemachtes und verwaltetes Routineding ist.”336 In a truly 
democratic and pluralist state, he argues, there must be room for friction and 
contradiction among its intellectuals—a type of contradiction that goes beyond two 
journalists writing opposing editorials. If “das Verschwiegene,” those political emotions, 
with which intellectuals struggle and which they usually keep to themselves, were to be 
addressed in the public sphere, and if the public opinion were no longer a “Produkt des 
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Lippengebets von bezahlten Gebetsspezialisten,”337 one could actually speak of 
democratic progress. 
 Currently, Walser continues, German intellectuals obey a left-liberal discourse 
that hinders such plurality. He writes in terms that evoke an oppressive intellectual 
culture that suppresses dissent: “Bei uns hat jeder, wenn mein Fall typisch ist, seinen 
eigenen Samisdat,”338 using the Russian term samizdat for literature that circulated in the 
underground cultural scene during the Soviet Union as a revolt against official 
restrictions on the freedom of expression.339 Walser suggests that he is not so much 
holding back his opinions but that there are public restrictions preventing him from 
expressing them —the restrictions of dominant leftist discourse. In order to achieve his 
pluralistic ideal he wants to repair the damage, as he says, “mit Geständnissen.”340 All 
along, he then confesses, he only saw himself as “’linker Intellektueller’” mainly through 
“[d]ie Reaktionen anderer.”341 He himself “ist nicht von solchen Etiketten ausgegangen, 
sondern von Erfahrungen, die bedingt sind durch Jahrgang und Herkunft.”342  
 The label “leftist” certainly does not fit the position he then presents, given that 
the second half of the essay concerns the German Volk, which in his opinion were duped 
in both world wars.343 About World War I, for example, he writes:  
[D]as deutsche Volk war an diesem Krieg kein bißchen schuldiger als das 
englische, russische, französische, italienische, österreichische. Die bürgerlich-
feudalen Cliquen der beteiligten Länder dürften noch am ehesten als Verursacher 
dieser ausschlaggebenden Katastrophe namhaft zu machen sein. Zu erleiden 
hatten die Folgen fast ausschließlich das deutsche Volk. Nicht die Gesellschaft. 
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Kein Kollektiv. Das Volk als deutsches Volk wurde gedemütigt und 
ausgeplündert. Von den bürgerlich-feudalen Cliquen der Siegermächte.344  
 
This very particular revisionist view of history mixes a Marxist critique of the 
bourgeoisie, “die bürgerlich-feudalen Cliquen,” with a discourse of victimhood centering 
around the idea of the German Volk that Walser knows is connected with the Right. The 
way Walser stresses this term—“[n]icht die Gesellschaft. Kein Kollektiv. Das Volk als 
deutsches Volk”—reveals that he is fully aware of its right-wing connotations. At the 
same time, this emphasis underscores Jan-Werner Müller’s reading of Walser as the self-
assigned representative of the German petty-bourgeoisie.345 With the term Volk, Walser 
also depicts the (innocent) “normal” Germans in juxtaposition to the (responsible) 
political and intellectual elite.346 
 “Wer sind wir?” Walser fantasizes: “Wenn wir Auschwitz bewältigen könnten, 
könnten wir uns wieder nationalen Aufgaben zuwenden.”347 World War II and the 
Holocaust, he argues, should not prevent Germany from overcoming its struggle to 
become a nation again.348 But in his eyes, this can only happen through a collective 
embrace of historical guilt by the entire German Volk, in other words: if the Federal 
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Republic and the GDR were to become one nation again. Towards the end of the essay 
we consequently find Walser’s clear-cut rejection of Germany’s division. He asks: 
“Warum akzeptieren wir eine Teilung wie ein Naturgesetz, obwohl wir einsehen können, 
daß sie aus ganz und gar zeitlichen Bedingungen entstand?“ Against the dominant public 
opinion, he announces: “Ich habe ein Bedürfnis nach geschichtlicher Überwindung des 
Zustands Bundesrepublik.”349 The Federal Republic needs to be “overcome” and the 
Germans need to become one Volk again.  
 There is much to be said about Walser’s politics, which—if one maintains the 
categorizations the writer insistently declares obsolete—represents the author’s 
nationalism in spite of occasional Marxist borrowings. More compelling in the context of 
this chapter, however, is the lengthy passage in which Walser confesses that his political 
thinking is heavily influenced by his biographical attachment to the Nazi period. It is a 
rare, if not singular, statement in his work where Walser clearly alludes to his political 
indoctrination in the Hitler Youth:  
Jahrgang und Herkunft disponieren ihn zum Demokraten mit 
Verwirklichungsanspruch, also zum Sozialisten. So muß er noch immer sein 
Fähnlein benennen. (Wie schonend, das nicht in der ersten Person sagen zu 
müssen.)350  
 
“Fähnlein” is not only a diminutive of the word “Fahne” (flag) but also, crucially, the 
name of a unit in the Jungvolk, the Hitler Youth for younger boys, comprised of cohorts 
belonging to the same age group. Underscored by the temporal adverb “noch immer,” 
Walser unmistakably creates a direct line from his Nazi upbringing to his 1979 discourse 
on Nation and Volk, in which he also stresses that he is a socialist. If we put together the 
different ideas Walser offers to us here —Hitler Youth, nationalism, and socialism—we 
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see that he identifies the contradictory political emotions that haunt him in 1979 as 
remnants of his youthful National Socialist beliefs.  
 Walser is disarmingly honest about his own ambiguity about these opinions: 
“manchmal schämt er sich seiner Entwicklung und versucht sie gänzlich zu unterdrücken; 
manchmal verteidigt er sie vehement gegen die besorgten oder beißenden Argumente des 
Freundes.”351 Hidden within the political critique of the dominant left-wing discourse we 
thus find passages, in which he reveals the overwhelming presence of a childhood 
trauma:  
Ich habe ein gestörtes Verhältnis zur Realität. Das muß ich zugeben. [...] Ich 
würde gern beweisen, wenigstens behaupten, daß mein gestörtes Verhältnis zur 
Realität etwas damit zu tun habe, daß ich Deutscher bin und 1927 geboren worden 
bin. Ich glaube nicht, daß man als Deutscher meines Jahrgangs ein ungestörtes 
Verhältnis zur Realität haben kann. Unsere nationale Realität selbst ist gestört. 
Und wenn ein so Ausschlaggebendes gestört ist, ist es möglich, daß man zu allem 
davon Abgeleitetem kein rechtes Vertrauen gewinnen kann. Was mir vor allem 
fehlt ist Vertrauen. 352 
 
The fact that Walser quotes this passage from his own diary and that the majority of these 
psychological passages are written in the third person indicates Walser’s troubled 
relationship to his own biography. He seems to be able to speak about his past only by 
removing himself from it, creating a linguistic distance in order to enable critical 
distantiation. 
 The subjunctive in the following passage serves a similar function. Walser uses 
the metaphor of being haunted by “Gedankengespenster”—presumably representing a 
form of nationalism further to the right than the one Walser openly speaks about in this 
essay. He imagines the great relief he would experience if he stopped wrestling with the 
ghosts of the past and fully allowed the feelings to come to the surface:  
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Endlich keine Kritik mehr der eigenen Neigung, sondern Zustimmung zur bisher 
ununterbrochen bekämpften Neigung. Zulassung des Widerspruchs, endlich! Ein 
plötzliches Einlassen jahrelang bekämpfter, immer auf Einlaß drängender 
Gedankengespenster und Meinungsmonster.  
 
But he knows that his true opinions would never be accepted in the public sphere, and 
that he would have to be secretive and more careful. This would, on the other hand, not 
be a great change, since he admits to always having hidden part of his true political 
emotions:  
Das hieße aber, verschwiegen sein. Er dürfe bald keinem mehr sagen, was er 
‘wirklich’ meint. Hat er das je getan? Er hat die Teufel vor seinen Fenstern und 
Türen und Schlüssellöchern und Türritzen doch immer gesehen, hat sie immer 
bekämpft, abgewehrt. Aber er hat nie erwähnt, daß sie ihn belagern, bedrohen. Er 
hat getan, als sei er schon fein heraus! Als enthalte er nicht selber noch alle Übel, 
die er bekämpft. Er wollte ein Posten des Fortschritts sein, der Annäherung an 
Humanität. Er lebte im gespannten Zustand. Zwischen niederziehenden 
Atavismen und dem zeitgenössischen Bedürfnis, das schlimme Erb- und 
Traditionszeug loszuwerden.353  
 
But what would it entail if he actually shook hands with the ghosts of the past? Again, he 
states, it would not make a difference, because he has never been free of the past:  
Jetzt, müde und kapitulierend, wäre er im Handumdrehen besetzt von jener 
Barbarei der Vergangenheit? Der Handschlag mit Gespenstern fände statt? Jetzt 
sagt er sich schon – und nennt das [...] ein Geständnis –, er sei nie frei gewesen 
von den Vergangenheitsbelastungen; er habe nur weiterkommen wollen, aber er 
sei eben nicht weiter gekommen; das sei doch nicht seine Schuld.354  
 
He comes to the conclusion that “Nicht alles, was er ausschloß, durfte schlechterdings 
ausgeschlossen werden.”355 Not every idea, he suggests, should be rejected offhand 
because it might in some way relate back to the Nazi era. 
 “Händedruck mit Gespenstern” thus reveals Walser’s struggle on two fronts, the 
public and the private one. With regard to the public sphere, he shows that he is aware 
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that for the dominant political culture which makes it unacceptable for him, a former 
Hitlerjunge, to formulate a political position that connects him with the Right. He does so 
anyway by carefully wrapping his German nationalism in a plea for plurality in a 
democratic society. More importantly, however, this essay reveals Walser’s personal, 
psychological struggle to fathom how he can take a stance without shaking hands with the 
ghosts of his past. The abovementioned rhetorical devices, which create distance between 
the writer and his right-wing politics, demonstrate that he is still deeply conflicted as to 
how to define his position in relation to the Nazi indoctrination of his youth. The essay 
leaves this problem unresolved, and Walser never really expresses his struggle with his 
past as explicitly again as he does here. 
 “Händedruck mit Gespenstern”, then, is crucial to understanding how the left-
wing Walser of the essay “Über die neueste Stimmung im Westen” could turn into the 
Walser of the zeitgeist essay, looking back on his career with bitterness and a sense of 
having been misunderstood. Furthermore, his position in the memory debates of 1998 and 
2002 becomes more transparent against the backdrop of this essay: here, he already 
expresses his awareness that he is on dangerous ground relating his Hitler Youth past to 
his nationalist views. After 1998, he makes it a point to continually demonstrate his 
refusal to be part of what he considers a leftist memory discourse, beginning with the 
publication of Ein springender Brunnen in that year, and culminating in major public 
controversies, as he turns his refusal into provocation in such texts as the Friedenspreis 
speech in 1998 and the novel Tod eines Kritikers. Partly as a result of these provocations, 





acknowledged the way he hoped it would be, and this failure leads directly to the 2008 




My synthesis of the ways in which Grass, Wolf and Walser approached their Hitler 
Youth biographies in their early literary and essayistic work serves a number of different 
purposes. To begin with, it confirms the overarching claim of my dissertation—that there 
is a distinct generational discourse in this generation of writers that needs to be taken into 
account in any literary or cultural history of post-war Germany. As Grass emphasized in 
his eulogy for Wolf, “die späte, zu späte Erkenntnis aller im Verlauf von nur zwölf 
Jahren von Deutschen begangenen Verbrechen haben uns geprägt. Schreiben verlangt 
seitdem, aus Spuren zu lesen.”356 All three writers made German politics their personal 
concern. Grass spelled out in greater detail how doubt and skepticism became the crucial 
concepts of his politics as a counter-reaction to a childhood in Hitler-Germany where a 
skeptical attitude was impermissible, but Wolf and Walser also valued a critical and 
skeptical approach in their engagement with societal issues. Through their experience of 
the Nazi era and the skeptical imperative that resulted from it, Grass and Wolf also 
distinguished themselves from the older generation of post-war writers.  
 But while my analysis illuminates the continuation of the writers’ childhood 
bonds in the post-war era, it also seeks to highlight the differences between their uses of 
the generational concept. Grass provided an early portrayal of the complicated historical 
position of the Hitler Youth generation in his 1963 novel Hundejahre. While he shows 
                                                





that they witnessed the Nazi era as children and as a result were less entangled in the 
Nazi crimes than the perpetrator generation, he emphasizes that guilt cannot be deferred 
to the older generation. The guilt of the Hitler Youth generation, he argues, may not have 
been juridical or on the grand scale of Nazi political oppression, but their childhood 
world was anything but innocent, as the mistreatment of the “Zigeunermädchen” Jenny 
Brunies at the hands of Tulla shows. This ambigous role places them between the 
perpetrators and the sixty-eighters. The “miracle glasses” that allow the sixty-eighters to 
see the crimes of their fathers do not work with the Hitler Youth generation, as they are 
not in the position to judge the guilt of their elders due to their own entanglements with 
this tainted time period. Based on this subtle depiction of his generation in Hundejahre, 
one could claim that Grass justly became the icon of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, but as I 
have pointed out before, the exclusion of the most tainted part of his own biography, his 
membership in the Waffen-SS, severely undermines his iconic status, a complexity I 
address in the next chapter, when I examine his ultimate admission of guilt in his 
autobiography Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, published some forty years later.   
 The picture Christa Wolf paints of her own generation in Christa T. focuses on 
the post-war rather than the Nazi era, with Wolf questioning their enthusiastic embrace of 
the political implementation of the socialist idea in the GDR. She wonders if her 
generation has ever had the chance to develop as critical individuals, having changed so 
swiftly from one ideology to the next. Christa T. becomes the figure for an individuality 
and a critical attitude that have no place in the society of the GDR. The reception history 
of the novel reveals the almost absurd resistance it encountered from GDR officials who 





The author’s courage, then, cannot be underestimated. But I have also shown how Wolf 
relates both her adherence to the ideals of the GDR, as well as her increasingly critical 
attitude towards it to her upbringing during the Third Reich. It is her generational 
perspective that enables her critique: the experience of fascism drove her to embrace the 
anti-fascist state, while continually raising the question of its anti-fascist character.  
 In the last part of the chapter, I have shown that while the generational theme is 
absent from Walser’s literary work in the early phase of his career, it is present in his 
critique of the left-liberal discourse from the seventies on. The essay “Händedruck mit 
Gespenstern” reveals that he has tried to relate his political emotions to his biography, but 
ultimately conludes he will never be able to openly relate his nostalgia for a German Volk 
to his Nazi indoctrination, because of the restrictions of a dominant left-wing discourse 
on the Hitler Youth generation. One has to be like Grass, speaking about the guilt and not 
the beauty of German nationalism. This early expression of Walser’s frustration that he 
cannot publicly reveal the links between his childhood and his political opinions is 
crucial to understanding the three texts of his I will discuss in the next chapters: the 
childhood memoir Ein springender Brunnen, the provocative Friedenspreis speech, and 
the novel Tod eines Kritikers. While all these texts address the memory of the Third 
Reich, they also display the author’s refusal to do what he thinks is expected of him as a 
member of the Hitler Youth generation in the left-wing memory culture, and represent the 





Wie […] begreiflich machen, daß an diesen Schwerpunkten vorbei, sogar ohne sie zu 
beachten, in kräftigen Farben die Kindheit weiterlief? 
 




Through the Eyes of a Child— 




The autobiographical novel Fatelessness by Hungarian Nobel Prize laureate and 
Holocaust survivor Imre Kertész (born in 1929) tells the story of the young Jewish boy 
Gyuri, who is deported by the Nazis from his home town of Budapest at the age of 
fifteen.357 The reader learns about his odyssey from Budapest to a work camp in Hungary 
to the concentration camps of Auschwitz and Buchenwald from the teenager’s point of 
view. This point-of-view-narration creates a distinct effect. While the (adult) reader 
follows the deportation of Gyuri and his family with the full historical knowledge of the 
Nazi genocide of the European Jews, the boy fails entirely to recognize the seriousness of 
the situation: The day of his father’s deportation to a Nazi work camp, he is thrilled to be 
released early from school, and when the moment of departure has come, he is bored stiff 
by the long farewell. Several months later, upon his arrival in Auschwitz in 1944, he feels 
relief at the sight of the German SS-officers. Hungry and exhausted from the chaotic 
journey in several trains that crossed the borders of many countries, he thinks: “If there 
are Germans here, there will be order.”  
                                                





 Fatelessness is just one of many representations of the Holocaust which employ 
the innocent perspective of the child victim as a rhetorical device, often in not entirely 
unproblematic ways.358 There are several other examples of novels using the child’s 
perspective to represent war, trauma, and violence.359 The innocently trusting perspective 
of children and the naïve world-views of adolescents can become powerful stylistic 
devices to highlight both the vulnerability of the innocent victims and the absurdity and 
senselessness of war and violence. However, this narrative device seems ethically and 
politically problematic in literary (and filmic) representations depicting World War II 
from the side of the German perpetrators because childlike innocence and ignorance were 
precisely the excuses the majority of Germans used after 1945 in order to reject historical 
responsibility. The trope of childhood innocence in representations of the Third Reich, it 
seems, would reproduce a stereotypical strategy of exculpation and reinforce a discourse 
of victimization.  
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This is precisely the reproach Sigrid Weigel made against authors of the Hitler 
Youth generation. Even at an old age, she claimed, they followed their “Begehren nach 
dem Blick eines unschuldigen Kindes.”360 Is Weigel right? Do the three writers exploit 
the limited and pre-political perspective of the child, as she claims, in order to establish 
themselves as innocent witnesses of the Third Reich—outside of the discourse of 
historical guilt?361  
This critique seems unjustified in the case of arguably the most famous child 
narrator of twentieth century literature, the character Oskar Matzerath in Günter Grass’s 
1959 novel Die Blechtrommel.362 Grass precisely subverts the idea of innocent narration: 
While Oskar appears to be a child to his environment, because by sheer willpower he has 
stopped growing on his third birthday, he possesses the critical faculties of an adult from 
the moment of his birth. With a sharp mind, he observes how people in his surrounding 
become increasingly drawn to Nazi ideologies, and instead of leaving him in the position 
of the neutral witness, Grass shows him to become complicit like everyone else.  
But how do Grass, Walser, and Wolf relate to the issue of childhood innocence 
and the Third Reich retrospectively in their autobiographical texts? How do the authors 
of the Hitler Youth generation deal with their childhood memory? When Martin Walser 
was awarded the “Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels,” Frank Schirrmacher 
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presented the author as part of a generation who struggled with their childhood memory, 
“weil die Erinnerung an ihre Kindheit sich fast niemals mit dem heutigen Wissen über 
das außerhalb der Spielzimmer stattfindende Verbrechen in Einklang bringen läßt.”363 
Amir Eshel, however, decidedly rejected Schirrmacher’s depiction of the Hitler Youth 
generation as children with blank slates sullied by the guilt inflicted on them by the 
Nazis. He saw in Schirrmacher’s speech “eine fragwürdige Stilisierung von Walser und 
seiner Generation zu Kindern im Spielzimmer” and called to mind this generation’s 
partial complicity, for example by volunteering for Hitler’s army.364 My own interest lies 
not in ascertaining the degree of complicity for Grass, Walser, and Wolf. I agree with 
Jaimey Fisher that adjudicating juvenile guilt with regard to the Nazi period is not only 
difficult but also rather unproductive.365  
Rather, I will focus on the literary representations and explore how the authors 
used the trope of childhood innocence retrospectively in their childhood autobiographies 
in order to illuminate how they engage with the respective memory discourse of their 
times. In my examinations of Walser’s Ein springender Brunnen (1998), Wolf’s 
Kindheitsmuster (1976), and Grass’s Beim Häuten der Zwiebel (2006), I will show that 
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all of these texts show a great awareness of the moral-political implications of this 
narrative device. They either use it, reject it, or question it. The authors’ stance vis-à-vis 
the respective memory discourse of their political system and time become clearly visible 
in their childhood biographies. Thus, while far from being unproblematic, none of the 
three texts operates outside of the historical discourse, as Weigel had claimed. 
I will follow a chronological order in my presentation of the three 
autobiographical texts, beginning with text that was published first, namely during the 
Cold War era in the GDR, Wolf’s Kindheitsmuster (1976), and ending with the two male 
writers’ autobiographies, written in the context of a post-reunification memory discourse. 
Wolf and Walser’s autobiographies stand on opposite sides with regard to the issue of 
childhood innocence. While Wolf radically questions this concept in Kindheitsmuster 
through a highly complex narrative constellation, Walser embraces it in Ein springender 
Brunnen (1998) by presenting his childhood entirely from the perspective of the naïve 
child. With regard to the question of childhood innocence, the stakes were arguably the 
highest for Günter Grass in Beim Häuten der Zwiebel (2006). After all, this text contained 
the author’s revelation of his Waffen-SS past. Unsurprisingly then, the author uses a child 
narrator only with great caution. All in all, I will demonstrate that despite the shared 
generational experience of a childhood under Hitler the three authors’ different personal 






1. Christa Wolf’s Kindheitsmuster (1976)— 
“Wie sind wir so geworden, wie wir heute sind?” 
 
Biography of a generation 
Kindheitsmuster was published in 1976. This publication date is striking not only 
considering that Wolf’s book about her childhood memories during the Nazi era was 
published about two decades before Walser’s Ein springender Brunnen (1998) and about 
three decades before Grass’s Beim Häuten der Zwiebel (2006). But also because Wolf 
worked on her childhood autobiography during the Cold War in the East-German state 
where connections with fascism were officially made only in form of glorious tales of 
anti-fascist rebellion rather than in self-critical biographical reflections as in 
Kindheitsmuster. While the early publication of Kindheitsmuster thus stands out as 
remarkable to us, Wolf herself addressed the psychological barriers that caused her to 
delay the work on this novel until the seventies. In a discussion following a reading of the 
book in 1983 she said:  
Ich selbst habe so lange Zeit gebraucht, um darüber schreiben zu können. Obwohl 
ich ein Kind war, obwohl ich über mich selbst nichts Entsetzliches mitzuteilen 
hatte, war dieser Schock nach 1945 gerade für unsere Generation so eingreifend 
und anhaltend, daß man einfach noch nicht darüber schreiben konnte—noch nicht 
in der Form, wo man sich selbst mit hinein nahm.366  
 
 Wolf does precisely this: “sich selbst mit hineinnehmen.” Kindheitsmuster includes the 
author’s most intimate, conflicted feelings facing her childhood in the Third Reich; it 
provides a psychological portrait of someone working through a trauma. But Wolf also 
follows a socio-political urge with this novel. Her speeches and interviews of the 
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seventies, in which she frequently speaks about her work on Kindheitsmuster, reveal that 
Wolf deals with her individual childhood memories always already in a representative 
way. Wolf, one could argue, writes this autobiography as an autobiography for her entire 
generation—those who have grown up under Hitler and became prototypes of the “new 
man” in East-German socialism. How can we ignore, Wolf often wondered in public, that 
we were deeply shaped by fascist ideologies in our childhood and adolescence, ideologies 
for which we now try to delegate responsibility to the West? The early indoctrination of 
her generation, she argues, “ist nicht vorbei, wenn man zwei Jahre später sagt: 
Donnerwetter, der Marx hat aber recht.”367 The childhood under fascism is still with 
them, she repeatedly stresses at the time. At a GDR writer’s congress in 1973, Wolf says:   
Es ist nicht so einfach, eine Kindheit abzuschütteln, die einem zum Beispiel einen 
tiefen Autoritätsglauben eingefressen hat. Es ist nicht so einfach, eine Kindheit 
abzuwerfen, die nicht von Wissen, sondern von bedingungsloser Gläubigkeit 
geprägt war.368 
 
And in a 1975 discussion about Kindheitsmuster, a work in progress at the time,  she said: 
Wie sind wir so geworden, wie wir sind? Das ist eigentlich eine Frage, der ich 
etwas näherzukommen versuche. […] Denn ich glaube, daß so manches, was 
unsere Generation heute tut oder nicht tut, noch mit der Kindheit zusammenhängt. 
Wenn die Kindheit wirklich eine wichtige Zeit im Leben eines Menschen ist, 
dann sollten wir nicht so tun, als ob wir, als wir sechzehn waren, als der 
Faschismus zu Ende war, nun ‚neue Menschen’ werden konnten. Und daß eine so 
verbrachte Kindheit ohne Folgen bleiben kann.369 
 
Wolf thus raises the overarching question of her autobiography in the plural: “Wie sind 
wir so geworden, wie wir sind?”370 Ultimately then, she approaches her individual 
childhood memories from a generational and thus a socio-political perspective. 
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Examining her own biography, she asks which patterns of thinking and behavior acquired 
during their childhood, i.e. which “Kindheitsmuster”, still shape her generation in the 
socialist society in the present. This sentence from the novel’s preface reveals the text’s 
representative function:  
Wer Ähnlichkeiten zwischen einem Charakter der Erzählung und sich selbst oder 
einem ihm bekannten Menschen zu erkennen glaubt, sei auf den merkwürdigen 
Mangel an Eigentümlichkeit hingewiesen, der dem Verhalten vieler Zeitgenossen 
anhaftet. 371  
        
Wolf expects readers of her generation to recognize patterns of behavior. The novel then 
seeks to address a widespread social phenomenon rather than merely presenting Wolf’s 
individual case. The preface continues with the comment that not the individuals are to 
blame if they recognize these childhood patterns in themselves. “Man müßte die 
Verhältnisse beschuldigen, weil sie Verhaltensweisen hervorbringen, die man 
wiedererkennt.”372 This sentence can be considered paradigmatic for Wolf’s position 
towards the GDR. By saying that the circumstances (“die Verhältnisse”) are to blame if 
members of her generation are reminded of their Nazi, it is unclear whether the word 
“Verhältnisse” refers to past or present. Her phrasing leaves open the possibility that the 
political conditions in the GDR might remind her generation of their upbringing in the 
fascist state. In 1976 the GDR denaturalized the dissident songwriter Wolf Biermann, an 
even that raised protest among many GDR intellectuals including Wolf but also revealed 
that the state would go rigorously against artists and writers critical towards the regime. 
Only carefully, Wolf alludes to continuities between the fascist and the socialist regimes 
by suggesting that present behavior shaped by the past might also remind one of present 
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“Verhältnisse” in the GDR. But the critical reader cannot have overlooked this comment 
prominently placed at the beginning of the novel.   
While containing many critical allusions such as the one in the preface, 
Kindheitsmuster never explicitly raises criticism against the GDR. Read as a text of 
political protest, it is easy to dismiss Kindheitsmuster as disappointing and the author as 
not radical enough in her opposition to the GDR. In his 1977 review of the novel in Der 
Spiegel, Wolf’s former teacher Hans Mayer criticized that the SED-member Wolf had 
practiced “freiwillige Selbstkontrolle”, for example by not questioning the GDR-myth 
about the Red Army as liberator and founder of socialist humanity. Mayer also sees a 
political bias in Wolf’s narrative level that deals with her own writing process (I will 
explain the three narrative levels of the novels later). While she focuses on recent 
political events such as the Vietnam War and the military coup d’etat against President 
Allende in Chile, events in which communists were the oppressed, Mayer criticizes that  
anti-socialist protests like the Prague Spring or the Hungarian Revolution are missing 
from her account.373 Overall, Mayer is disappointed about the vagueness of Wolf’s 
critical stance towards the GDR and the Cold War in general.  
 While Mayer is certainly correct in this evaluation, I would suggest to approach 
this novel from the same historical perspective with which I have approached her earlier 
novel Nachdenken über Christa T. in the previous chapter. As much as the West German 
literary scene wanted to see Wolf as a dissident writer, despite her increasing skepticism 
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towards the GDR she was always loyal to the idea of living in a socialist society. This 
novel confirms the paradoxical constellation in Wolf’s generational discourse that I have 
already emphasized in my analysis of Christa T.: She questions the anti-fascist myth 
upon which the GDR was built by way of showing the fascist remnants in her generation. 
The generation thus becomes representative of the fascist past. However, at the same 
time, her generation is representative of the socialist society. Wolf’s dealing with the 
fascist past does not serve the purpose of creating a generation of dissidents but of 
creating a better socialist society. We might not agree with the writer’s utopian belief. 
But in this chapter my goal is not first and foremost to critique the writer’s  politics but to 
examine the differences between her childhood autobiography from similar texts by the 
writers of the Hitler Youth generation in the West. With regard to this question, I argue 
that it is Wolf’s treatment of her individual biography as a case-study for the 
improvement of socialist society that distinguishes Kindheitsmuster from the other two 
text.   
The narrative structure: “Vergangenheit von heute aus gesehen” 
Wolf’s focus on present society becomes apparent in the narrative structure. Even though 
Kindheitsmuster deals with the author’s childhood during the Nazi era, past and present 
are always deeply intertwined on the narrative level. This is entirely different in Walser’s 
novel Ein springender Brunnen, in which the first eighteen years of the protagonist, 
Walser’s alter ego, appear “under glass, (like) an irretrievably lost continent from which 
no road […] leads to the present persona.”374 Walser creates the illusion that his past has 
been reproduced without hindsight. In his Munich speech the author had stated: 
                                                





“Vergangenheit von heute aus gesehen—kann es etwas Überflüssigeres geben?”375 In the 
narrative construction of his novel, he follows this idea.  
 Wolf, by comparison, stresses right at the beginning of her novel that past and 
present cannot be easily  separated from each other. “In die Erinnerung drängt sich die 
Gegenwart ein”, she writes on the second page of her novel, “und der heutige Tag ist 
schon der letzte Tag der Vergangenheit.”376 In an interview from 1973—Kindheitsmuster 
was still a work in progress—Wolf raised the question of how this intertwinement can be 
made manifest on the narrative level. In her book about her generation’s experience of 
the Nazi period, she says that she faces the methodological problem of finding a narrative 
technique to adequately express 
daß Gegenwart und Vergangenheit – wie sie es in uns Menschen ja andauernd tun 
– auch auf dem Papier sich nicht nur ‚treffen’, sondern aufeinander einwirken, in 
ihrer Begegnung miteinander gezeigt werden. Man muß also Schreibtechniken 
finden (und zu erkennen geben, daß und warum man sie sucht), die es 
fertigbringen, die fast unauflösbaren Verschränkungen, Verbindungen und 
Verfestigungen, die verschiedenste Elemente unserer Entwicklung miteinander 
eingegangen sind, doch noch einmal zu lösen, um Verhaltensweisen, auf die wir 
festgelegt zu sein scheinen, zu erklären und (womöglich) zu ändern. Es ist ein 
ziemlich anstrengendes Unterfangen.377  
 
Not only does she want to reveal the “fast unauflösbaren Verschränkungen, 
Verbindungen und Verfestigungen”378 with the past. She also wants to depict her very 
quest for these interrelations between past and present patterns of behavior.   
 The narrative technique employed in Kindheitsmuster does precisely this. To 
make sure “daß Gegenwart und Verhangenheit […] in ihrer Begegnung miteinander 
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gezeigt werden,”379 Wolf not only depicts her childhood years, but also turns the process 
of writing about her childhood memories into important themes of the novel. The novel’s 
highly self-reflexive and self-referential structure interlinks present and past events 
already on a narrative level, and depicts the remembered past as well as the remembering 
subject. 
 There are three time levels and three respective narratives in Kindheitsmuster. As 
Sandra Frieden has pointed out in her insightful essay on the book, “all three levels are to 
be understood as merely heuristically separable from one another”380, since they are 
interwoven from the beginning. Nevertheless, Frieden attempts to ‘untie’ the three 
narratives and to describe content and function for each of them:  
 In the first narrative, Wolf describes the first sixteen years in the life of her alter 
ego and narrator, Nelly Jordan, from 1929 until 1945. As Frieden writes, “the most 
historically removed plane presents the dailiness of Nazi-indoctrination in the life of a 
little girl, whose activities are more and more clearly recollected as the account proceeds 
forward through her experience.”381 In this narrative, the narrator speaks about her 
younger self in the third person as “Nelly” or “das Kind.”  
 The second narrative depicts the narrator’s 1971 trip to the (now) Polish town in 
which she grew up and describes her feelings during this first attempt at revisiting her 
childhood. The trip to Poland, Frieden writes, provides “a filter of hindsight through 
which former deeds and values must now pass.”382 She emphasizes that the second time 
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level focuses on a “moment-to-moment recording of memory, thought and response,”383 
that it presents “the experience and knowledge of the remembering adult”384 during her 
visit to the places of her childhood, but leaves an even deeper level of hindsight for the 
third narrative. For this second time level, the narrator does no longer use the third- but 
the second-person-perspective. Hence, she addresses herself as “du.”  
 The third time level—Wolf calls it “Gegenwartsebene”385— presents an account 
of the narrator’s writing process during the years 1972 to 1975. She narrator reflects upon 
her Nazi childhood and on her feelings and thoughts during the trip to Poland from yet 
another perspective of hindsight, with more distance and more sense for the ‘bigger 
picture’. Offering the highest level of reflection, this plane includes personal comments 
on the writing process as well as broader obversations about history and politics. On the 
third level, like on the second one, the narrator addresses herself as “du.” The first person 
singular—“ich”—appears only once on the very last page of the novel. 
 Wolf emphasized that she could not write about her childhood in the first person 
for both aesthetic and psychological reasons. In a public discussion about the book she 
said:  
Von Kindheitsmuster habe ich eine Reihe von Anfängen, die in der Ich-Form 
erzählt wurden, als einfache Erinnerung. Das habe ich dann aufgegeben. Einer der 
Gründe war, daß dieses Kind für mich in der Ich-Form nicht erzählbar war, weil 
ich es nicht war. Ich konnte mich nicht identifizieren. Das ist vielleicht 
bezeichnend überhaupt für Erwachsene in ihrem Verhältnis zu sich als Kind. Bei 
mir war es besonders bezeichnend, weil diese Kindheit in Deutschland dem 
Erwachsenen, der ich dann geworden war, wirklich vollkommen fremd war. 
Verdrängung und Nichtwissenwollen war natürlich auch dabei, aber ich wollte ja 
nun wissen. Trotzdem gelang es mir nicht, dieses Kind ‚ich’ zu nennen. Da war 
auch eine psychologische Barriere—es ist nicht nur ästhetisch zu erklären.386  
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While Wolf thus reflects her inability to identify with her younger self by using the third-
person-perspective in the childhood-story, she does not leave it at this  
“Gebetsmühlengeklapper in der gleichen Person,“387 but splits up the narrative voices 
even further. The purpose of this separation (“sie/Nelly” on the first, “du” on the second, 
and “du/ich” on the third  time level) is explained in the first several paragraphs of 
Kindheitsmuster. The narrator writes: “Ich, du, sie, in Gedanken ineinanderschwimmend, 
sollen im ausgesprochenen Satz einander entfremdet werden.”388 This destruction of 
identity on the level of language is intended to ensure that “[d]er Brustton, den die 
Sprache anzustreben scheint, verdorrt.”389 Wolf chooses a narrative technique that not 
only represents the rupture between her pre-war and post-war self, but also forces her to 
take a step back from her present self and to observe it from an analytical, reflective 
position.  
 From the beginning, it is thus clear that this childhood retrospective will refrain 
from grand declarations. “Zwischenbescheide geben, Behauptungen scheuen, 
Wahrnehmungen an die Stelle der Schwüre setzen,”390 these are the goals the narrator 
sets for herself. Already, we can see how much this careful approach differs from the 
certainty with which Grass proclaimed his feelings of shame and guilt, and from Walser’s 
almost stubborn insistence on his innocent childhood in Hitler’s Germany. Wolf 
approaches her childhood carefully, asking lots of questions and finding few answers.   
Getting to Know the Child 
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While in Grass’ Beim Häuten der Zwiebel the distance between the author and his 
younger self is expressed subtly and for the most part only on a stylistic level through a 
shift from the first- to the third-person-perspective, the narrator of Kindheitsmuster leaves 
no doubt that she feels entirely separated from the child she used to be. She says at the 
beginning of the novel:  
Nicht nur trennen dich von ihm die vierzig Jahre; nicht nur behindert dich die 
Unzuverlässigkeit deines Gedächtnisses, das nach dem Inselprinzip arbeitet und 
dessen Auftrag lautet: Vergessen! Verfälschen! Das Kind ist ja auch von dir 
verlassen worden. Zuerst von den anderen, gut. Dann aber auch von dem 
Erwachsenen, der aus ihm ausschlüpfte und es fertigbrachte, ihm nach und nach 
alles nachzutun, was Erwachsene Kindern anzutun pflegen: Er hat es hinter sich 
gelassen, beiseite geschoben, hat es vergessen, verdrängt, verleugnet, 
umgemodelt, verfälscht, verzärtelt und vernachlässigt, hat sich seiner geschämt 
und hat sich seiner gerühmt, hat es falsch geliebt und falsch gehaßt.391 
 
The narrator’s distance to her younger self, however, must not be misunderstood as an 
attempt to reject her Nazi childhood. Quite the opposite: after trying to forget her 
childhood, after neglecting, suppressing or remodelling it, she now decidedly says: “Jetzt, 
obwohl es unmöglich ist, will er [the adult] es [the child] kennenlernen.”392  
 Getting to know the child—for Wolf this means precisely not relying on those 
childhood memories that are easy to categorize and to reproduce but rather to work 
through the most difficult memories. That she considers this the task of a writer in 
general becomes clear from her poetological essay “Lesen und Schreiben,” written a 
couple of years before Kindheitsmuster in 1968. Everyone owns, she had claimed there, 
“eine Kollektion kolorierter Medaillons mit Unterschriften, teils putzig, teils grauslig”, 
“schön oder häßlich, gut oder böse.”393 Those memories, “beruhigend eindeutig,” “glatt,” 
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“stillgelegt” and “zurechtgeschliffen”394 are nothing more than polished and 
representable stories, freed from all contradictory feelings and reducible to one emotion, 
whether good or bad. In the essay, Wolf demands that the writer go beyond these neat 
little memory narratives, that she ought to push forward into “Zonen, die gemieden 
werden bei der Anfertigung der Medaillons,”395 and work through precisely those 
memories that are ambiguous and difficult to describe.  
 The following discussion of text passages from three different chapters of 
Kindheitsmuster will illustrate that Wolf does not present “Erinnerungsmedaillons” but 
sheds light on the most upsetting and unpleasant, the most embarrassing and the most 
confusing memories of her childhood. We will see that, compared to Walser and Grass, 
her childhood autobiography presents a much more self-critical and self-reflexive 
investigation of the past and why Wolf has called the writing process of Kindheitsmuster 
“fast ein therapeutischer Prozeß.”396 
Exercises in hating 
I begin with a number of passages from the sixth chapter, which deals with the time 
period roughly between 1936 and 1938 when Nelly is seven or eight. Wolf calls this 
chapter “Erinnerungslücken, ‘Friedenszeiten’, Einübung in Haß.” She depicts this period 
before the war, “peaceful” only in quotation marks, as a time of heavey indoctrination. 
The seven-year-old receives her first lesson in hating from her teacher Herr Warsinski: 
Ein deutsches Mädel muß hassen können, hat Herr Warsinski gesagt: Juden und 
Kommunisten und andere Volksfeinde. Jesus Christus, sagt Herr Warsinski, wäre 
heute ein Gefolgsmann des Führers und würde die Juden hassen. […]  
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Nelly haßt den starken Rudi. Einen Juden hat sie ihres Wissens noch nie gesehen, 
auch einen Kommunisten nicht. Den Haß gegen diese unbekannten 
Menschengruppen funktioniert nicht nach Wunsch – ein Defekt, den man 
verbergen muß.”397  
 
Nelly does not find it easy to hate Jews and communists because she cannot imagine 
what these „Volksfeinde“ look like. But in order to please her teacher, she obediently 
writes a short anti-Semitic poem that she proudly presents in front of the entire class.  
 Her ability to imagine “a Jew” becomes better after she eavesdrops on a 
conversation between her parents and their friend Leo Siegmann, a convinced National 
Socialist. Siegmann makes anti-Semitic remarks about a Jewish schoolmate—he uses the 
derogative term “Itzig”—whom, he says, everyone simply felt the urge to beat up. “Das 
war Instinkt, da kann einer sagen, was er will. Er roch einfach widerlich, oder was es 
war.”398 In Nelly’s imagination, the image of the Jew takes shape, with all the stereotypes 
she picks up from Siegmann’s descriptions:  
Dies war nun- natürlich ganz gegen Leo Siegmanns Absicht – der erste Jude, den 
Nelly näher kennenlernen sollte. [...]   
 Der Judenjunge. Nelly sah ihn deutlich. Er ist blaß, hat ein spitzes Gesicht, 
welliges dunkles Haar, ein paar Pickel.399  
 
Soon thereafter, Nelly encounters an exhibitionist while running an errand for her mother. 
Thinking that she has seen a man with a snake, she develops a distinct aversion to 
reptiles. But for the child, the narrator reluctantly admits, reptiles, the young Jewish boy 
from Siegmann’s story, and the man with the snake, become images that she associates 
with each other. They belong to the category of “unrein.” Nelly does not blink twice 
when others sing the anti-Semitic song “Judenköpfe rollen.” She joins in:  
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Jedenfalls mied sie das Unreine, auch in Gedanken, und stimmte laut, vielleicht 
überlaut, in ein Lied ein, das sie kannte wie jedermann; man mußte es nicht 
lernen, es lag in der Luft (‘Maikäfer flieg’ braucht auch kein deutsches Kind zu 
lernen oder ‘Ri-ra-rutsch, wir fahren in der Kutsch’ oder ‘Ein Jäger aus Kurpfalz, 
der reitet durch das Gänseschmalz’): ‘Judenköpfe rollen, Judenköpfe rollen, 
Judenköpfe rollen übern Bürgersteig, / Blut, Blut, Bluhuhut,/ Blut muß fließen 
knüppelhageldick, / wir pfeifen auf die Freiheit/ der Sowjetrepublik.’400 
 
The child became so immersed in the anti-Jewish sentiments surrounding her that when 
in 1936 or 1937, her aunt Trutchen visits and is devastated because people in her village 
spread a rumour about her being half-Jewish, Nelly is deeply upset:  
Sie ist außer sich, aber sie weint nicht. Feucht werden ihr die Augen erst, als die 
Mutter sie aufstöbert, die natürlich etwas gerochen hat, und wissen will, was los 
ist. 
 Da äußert Nelly den bemerkenswerten Satz: Ich will keine Jüdin sein!, und 
Charlotte [Nelly’s mother] richtet an eine nicht zu benennende Instanz die nicht 
weniger bemerkenswerte Frage: Woher um alles in der Welt weiß dieses Kind, 
was eine Jüdin ist? Auf diese Frage ist eine Antwort nicht zu ermitteln.401  
 
The narrator does not hide her repulsion vis-à-vis the anti-Semitism of the seven-year-old 
child. In paragraphs such as the following, she expresses her shame about this part of her 
childhood and the difficulties of facing it:  
(Heikel bis heute, der Verbindung nachzugehen, die sich damals zwischen dem 
namenlosen Judenjungen, den Nelly durch Leo Siegmann kannte, und der weißen 
Schlange hergestellt haben muß. Was hat der blasse picklige Junge mit Kröten, 
Spinnen, Eidechsen zu tun? Was diese wiederum mit der gläubigen fanatischen 
Stimmen, die in jener Sonnwendnacht vom brennenden Holzstoß her rief: ‘Rein 
wollen wir uns halten und unser Leben reifen lassen für Fahne, Führer und Volk! 
– Nichts, möchtest du sagen, nicht haben sie miteinander zu tun. So muß die 
richtige Antwort lauten, und was gäbest du darum, wenn sie auch noch wahr 
wäre.)402 
 
Her shameful memories of Nelly’s indoctrination as a child are briefly connected with 
her thoughts on the psychological reports she has just read on Adolf Eichmann, one of the 
major organizers of the Holocaust. The reports come to the conclusion that Eichmann 
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was “normal.”403 The word “normal” causes in her “eine feine, doch penetrante 
Übelkeit.”404 The ideas presented to her as a child as normal—“Judenköpfe rollen,” Jews 
are to fear and hate, Jews and snakes are impure and dirty—makes her feels nauseous.  
Kristallnacht 
In chapter seven, Wolf presents another difficult memory, Nelly’s experience of the 
“Kristallnacht”, the nation-wide pogrom against German Jews on November 9, 1938. 
This time, however, the narrator remembers how the child develops a feeling nobody has 
taught her:  At the sight of the burned-down synagogue the morning after the 
“Kristallnach” nine-year-old Nelly feels empathy and sadness: 
Nelly konnte nicht dagegen an: Das verkohlte Mauerwerk machte sie traurig. Sie 
wußte aber nicht, daß es Trauer war, was sie empfand, weil sie es nicht wissen 
sollte. Sie hatte längst angefangen, ihre wahren Gefühle vor sich selbst zu 
leugnen.  
 […] Die Juden sind anders als wir. Sie sind unheimlich. Vor den Juden 
muß man Angst haben, wenn man sie schon nicht hassen kann. Wenn die Juden 
jetzt stark wären, müßten sie uns alle umbringen.   
 Um ein Haar wäre Nelly eine unpassende Empfindung unterlaufen: 
Mitgefühl. Aber der gesunde deutsche Menschenverstand baute seine Barriere 
dagegen, als Angst.405    
 
How to deal with these conflicting feelings? Sadness or compassion were feelings that 
Nelly knew she should not feel towards the Jews. So, she represses them. Thus, by 1938, 
the narrator shows, Nelly had already learned that she was supposed to encounter the 
Jews only with hatred or fear. In parentheses, so as not to voice her pain all too loudly, 
the adult Nelly speaks about the consequences of this “education” to transform sympathy 
in fear and hatred:   
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(Vielleicht sollte wenigstens angedeutet werden, welche Schwierigkeiten ein 
Mensch in Sachen ‘Mitgefühl’ haben muß—auch, was das Mitgefühl mit sich 
selbst betrifft—, der als Kind gezwungen wurde, Mitgefühl mit Schwachen und 
Unterlegenen in Haß, in Angst umzumünzen, dies nur, um auf Spätfolgen früherer 
Geschehnisse hinzuweisen, die man zu Unrecht oft nur in der zwar zutreffenden, 
doch nicht erschöpfenden Rechnung zusammenfaßt: 177 brennende Synagogen 
im Jahre 1938 ergeben ungezählte Ruinenstädte im Jahre 1945.)406 
 
The physical ruins that remained after “Kristallnacht” and after the Allied bombings of 
Germany can be summarized in numbers and facts, the narrator writes. The psychological 
remnants of this time period, however, are harder to fathom. However, that they are still 
there, Wolf expresses by including an episode from the present, in which the narrator 
watches a television show, in which a psychologist states that there are certain patterns of 
behavior, “Grundmuster,” are established through experiences early on in one’s life. They 
form our moral education.  
The trial 
In chapter ten, Wolf depicts Nelly’s “career” in the Hitlerjugend during the first years of 
the war. While Nazi education takes effect she develops an increasingly twisted 
relationship to her own emotions. The center of this chapter describes “ein 
Strafgericht,”407 a trial against a girl in Jungmädelbund that Nelly witnesses probably 
around the age of twelve in 1941. The offense is minor: Gerda Link, a girl of Nelly’s age, 
stole money from a comrade and lied when her “Gruppenführerin” Christel confronted 
her. Since, in the eyes of the group leaders, Gerda besmirched the honor of the 
Hitlerjugend, she is publicly humiliated in front of all Jungmädel units in town.408 Nelly 
watches with discomfort how Christel, the most senior leader, punishes the girl:  
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[E]s wartet Gerda Link auf ihr Urteil, das von Christel, der Gruppenführerin, 
selbst verkündet werden wird. Als Christel nun einen Schritt vortritt und zu reden 
beginnt, läuft Nelly der Schweiß in Strömen den Rücken hinunter. […] Neben 
Christel ist Micky eine untergeordnete Gottheit. Christels Aufmerksamkeit auf 
sich zu ziehen ist das Höchste oder, falls es im Zorn geschieht, das Schlimmste, 
was einem widerfahren kann.  
 Aber Christel weiß ihren Zorn zu bändigen und zeigt Trauer und 
Enttäuschung, die viel schrecklicher sind. Sie dämpft ihre Stimme, sie erträgt den 
Schmerz fast nicht, den Gerda Link ihr, ihr ganz persönlich angetan hat; die 
Schmach, die sie auf jedes einzelne Glied ihrer Gemeinschaft gehäuft, die 
Schande, die sie über alle, besonders aber über ihre Führerin gebracht.409  
 
The overly serious tone of this passage mirrors the grave impression the event leaves on 
Nelly. “Deutsch sein heißt treu sein”, their leader Micky yells, before they all sing the 
song of the Hitlerjugend and Gerda is expelled from the group for three months. But 
Nelly cannot help but feel terrible for Gerda on her way home. Later that night, she 
develops a fever, which the narrator interprets as a psychosomatic reaction to the 
incident. When her mother asks what is wrong with her, she has difficulties describing 
the conflicted feelings that derive from her knowledge of what she is supposed to feel and 
what is actually feeling:  
Schrecken, Verzweiflung zu sagen wäre zu stark, und daß sie Angst hat, darf sie 
nicht wissen wollen. Nach ihrer eigenen Überzeugung hätte sie Abscheu gegen 
Gerda Link fühlen müssen, nicht dieses weichliche Mitleid, und Begeisterung 
über die Gradlinigkeit der Führerin anstatt eben Angst. Wie öfter schon handelte 
es sich um die Unmöglichkeit sich Klarheit zu verschaffen. Da kam das Fieber, 
sie konnte sich zu Bett legen.410  
However, the mix of fear, pity, and guilt that Nelly feels after Gerda’s trial, do not 
prevent her from accepting the offer to become “Führerinanwärterin,” on track to become 
a group leader like Micky and Christel.411  
Shortly thereafter, Nelly can proudly call herself a Jungmädelführerin. As such, 
she does a particularly excellent job teaching her unit “die deutschen Tugenden”. To her 
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mother’s surprise, the otherwise rather chaotic girl even holds up order and tidiness as 
important values. During a camping trip she tells on her friend Tella, who has left an old 
apple in her locker, and she enjoys the recognition she receives in return from the leader 
of the camp, who stresses that she, like all Jungmädelführerinnen, now belongs to the 
elite of the German nation.412 
The narrator struggles to explain why Nelly became part of the same system that 
already at the time she felt was deeply wrong. Why did Nelly become a group leader in 
the Hitler Youth after Gerda’s humiliation made her sick, even against the resistance of 
her mother? Ambition and the need for recognition must have motivated Nelly’s 
decision, the narrator speculates, but she is not fully satisfied with this explanation:  
Ehrgeiz, Geltungsbedürfnis wären erprobte Stichworte, klängen nach 
Aufrichtigkeit, und daß sie es nicht auf träfen, soll ja nicht behauptet werden. 
Doch treffen sie es eben nicht ganz. Und gerade der Rest, der nicht durch Ehrgeiz, 
nicht durch Geltungsbedürfnis gedeckt wird, interessiert.413  
 
Could compensation have been a reason for her eagerness to succeed in the Hitler Youth? 
A compensation for not fully embracing actions such as Gerda’s trial?     
Das dritte Stichwort wäre: Kompensation […]. Anerkennung und 
verhältnismäßige Sicherheit vor Angst und übermächtigem Schuldbewußtsein 
werden ihr garantiert, dafür liefert sie Unterwerfung und strenge Pflichterfüllung. 
Sie hat erlebt, daß sie den Zweifeln nicht gewachsen ist. Sie nimmt sich jede 
Möglichkeit zu zweifeln, vor allem an sich selbst. (‘Das Schwache muß 
weggehämmert werden.’ Adolf Hitler)414 
 
The subjunctive underscores the narrator’s recognition that she will not find definite 
answers. In spite of the ever-growing material she collects about her childhood—earlier 
diary entries, old newspapers, and notes from her library research—she sees “immer 
deutlicher die Unfähigkeit, das immer weiterwuchende Material […] zu bewältigen im 
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Sinn von ‘deuten.’”415 Like other episodes from her childhood and youth, the one about 
the Jungmädelbund will not have a result. The memories remain “zweifelhaft.”416  
My close reading of these passages shows how Wolf intertwines past memories 
and present reflections. What is most striking about these episodes is not only the 
depiction of the child’s slow immersion into the inhuman belief-system but also, and 
perhaps more importantly the depiction of the narrator’s shame and helplessness during 
the moments when she is haunted by her childhood in Nazi Germany. The text does not 
offer answers, solutions, or firm opinions but instead a highly complex narrative 
intertwinement of past and present, which leaves it up to the reader to draw historical and 
political connections.  
“Entblößung der Eingeweide” 
After presenting this selection of passages that exemplify Wolf’s approach to her 
childhood memories, I want to address the overarching question of this chapter: what role 
does the trope of childhood innocence play in Kindheitsmuster?  
It should be quite clear that Wolf is not interested in making a statement about 
guilt or innocence. Rather, she traces her moral education during the Nazi period and 
indoctrination into Nazi ideology in a drastically honest way, revealing many memories 
she would prefer to forget. In her soul searching, one could certainly find moments of  
self-accusation and self-exculpation not dissimilar to those in Ein springender Brunnen 
and Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, as I will show later in this chapter. However, as the 
narrator says at one point: “Selbstbezichtigungen und Entschuldigungsversuche halten 
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einander die Waage.”417 One does not get the impression that Wolf assesses the behavior 
of her younger self with the purpose of rehabilitating a childhood during the Nazi period 
as in Walser’s case, or a writer’s reputation as in Grass’s. As opposed to the two male 
authors, Wolf presents an adult who does not come to terms with her Nazi childhood and 
who describes the occupation with an education that taught her hatred and fear with the 
strong metaphor: “Entblößung der Eingeweide”418. She presents the narrator, her alter 
ego, who in the process of remembering and writing about these memories suffers from 
panic attacks and has to be hospitalized because of a physical and psychological 
breakdown, but who nevertheless decides: “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber 
muß man allmählich zu schweigen aufhören.”419 
 
If we evaluate this novel first and foremost as a personal text, Kindheitsmuster proves to 
be a highly intimate and honest text that gains its qualities from the depiction of a writer’s 
inconclusive search for answers about her childhood. This childhood story would come to 
an end, the narrator states at one point, if identity could firmly be reclaimed, if “zweite 
und dritte Person wieder in der ersten zusammenträfen, mehr noch: zusammenfielen. Wo 
nicht mehr ‘du’ und ‘sie’—wo unverhohlen ‘ich’ gesagt werden müßte.”420 At least, on a 
grammatical level, she does reach this identity. The first-person perspective is used for 
the first time on the very last page of the book at the moment the narrator (and Wolf) 
finishes her writing project. But this new “I” stands yet again amidst a group of 
questions:  
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Das Kind, das in mir verkrochen war—ist es hervorgekommen? Oder hat es sich, 
aufgescheucht, ein tieferes, unzugänglicheres Versteck gesucht? […] 
 Und die Vergangenheit, die noch Sprachregelungen verfügen, die erste 
Person in eine zweite und dritte spalten konnte—ist ihre Vormacht gebrochen? 
Werden die Stimmen sich beruhigen?421  
 
To sum up, the narrators raises only one question at the end: Has the past been mastered? 
Significantly, Wolf leaves the answer open. The narrator’s response is: “Ich weiß es 
nicht.”422 What remains is the impression of melancholy and pain toward a childhood that 
has left its imprint forever.  
 
2. In defense of a childhood?  
Martin Walser’s Ein springender Brunnen (1998) 
 
Childhood images 
In his speech “Über Deutschland reden. Ein Bericht,” Martin Walser most clearly 
articulates the contrast between the innocence of his childlike perceptions of the Nazi era 
and the historical guilt connected with this time period. In this speech, given in Munich in 
1988, he raises the question of whether he could represent the years between 1933 and 
1945 in the way he experienced them as a child and adolescent, or whether he was 
morally and politically obliged to reflect his childhood in Nazi Germany in the context of 
the Holocaust and to reconstruct it with the full knowledge of hindsight.423 The speech 
begins:   
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Ist man fähig oder gar verpflichtet, Kindheitsbilder nachträglich zu bewerten, oder 
darf man sich diesem allerreichsten Andrang für immer überlassen? Ich habe das 
Gefühl, ich könne mit meiner Erinnerung nicht nach Belieben umgehen. Es ist 
mir, zum  Beispiel, nicht möglich, meine Erinnerung mit Hilfe eines 
inzwischen erworbenen Wissens zu belehren. Die Erinnerung reicht zurück in 
eine Zeit, von der ich inzwischen weiß, daß sie furchtbar gewesen ist. Jedes 
Parteigesicht, jede Militärerscheinung, jede  Lehrperson und alle Gesichter aus 
der Nähe zeigen, daß sie aus jener Zeit stammen. Aber das Furchtbare selber 
zeigen sie nicht. Ein Sechs- bis Achtzehnjähriger, der Auschwitz nicht bemerkt 
hat. Kindheit und Jugend entfalten ihren unendlichen Hunger und Durst, und 
wenn Uniformen, Befehlshabergesichter und dergleichen angeboten werden, dann 
wird eben das alles verschlungen.424  
 
The images that make up his childhood, Walser argues, do not show any atrocities. 
Between 1933 and 1945, he never heard of Auschwitz; he was a “Sechs- bis 
Achtzehnjähriger, der Auschwitz nicht bemerkt hat” and who naively absorbed his 
National Socialist surroundings. The realization that his childhood and adolescence 
coincided with the most atrocious crimes against humanity, Walser argues, did not 
change the widely positive memory of his childhood. The images his memory provides, 
he says, are free from the Holocaust and he cannot retrospectively “add” anything to 
them, “[k]einen Kommentar, keine Aufklärung, keine Bewertung. Die Bilder sind jeder 
Unterrichtung unzugänglich. [...] Das erworbene Wissen über die mordende Diktatur ist 
eins, meine Erinnerung ist ein anderes.”425 In order to write about his childhood in 
connection with the Holocaust, he would have to transform himself, he says, into an anti-
fascist child:  
Ich müßte mich, um davon erzählen können, in ein antifaschistisches Kind 
verwandeln. Ich müßte also reden, wie man heute über diese Zeit redet. Also 
bliebe nichts übrig als ein heute Redender. Einer mehr, der über damals redet, als 
sei er damals schon der Heutige gewesen.426  
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To view the past from such a present perspective, however, is in Walser eyes “[e]in 
peinliches Vorgehen.“427  
 Considering these statements, it is hardly surprising that in his autobiographical 
novel Ein springender Brunnen, Walser presents the years between 1933 and 1945 
entirely from the point of view of the “Sechs- bis Achtzehnjähriger, der Auschwitz nicht 
bemerkt hat”.428 His protagonist is the young Johann, his alter ego, who—like the 
author—grows up in the small village of Wasserburg on Lake Constance, whose father, 
like Walser’s father, dies when the boy is about ten, and whose mother, like Walser’s 
mother, is the owner of the local pub and meeting place of the village.429 The novel is 
divided into three parts, each of which is set at a different time in Johann’s life; he is 
about five in the first part, about ten in the second  and eighteen in the last. Each part is 
introduced by a theoretical passage, set apart from Johann's autobiographical account, in 
which an impersonal narrator reflects on the relationship between past and present in 
fairly abstract terms. So Walser does not, in fact, present the memory images of his 
childhood without commentary or explanation. But the three prologues, all entitled 
“Vergangenheit als Gegenwart,” stand apart from the main narrative, seemingly unrelated 
to Johann's story. This is, I suspect, why many critics just ignored them or mentioned 
them only marginally in their readings of the novel. However, only in the context of the 
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prologues on the one hand and Walser’s Munich and his so-called Friedenspreis speech 
on the other hand, his use of the idea of childhood innocence becomes visible not as an 
exculpatory rejection of national-historical responsibility but as a conscious refusal to 
have his childhood be “exploited” for a political discourse, with which he disagrees.  
Coming of age in Wasserburg—A Synopsis 
The first part of the book, called Der Eintritt der Mutter in die Partei, focuses on the 
months leading up to the Nazis’ rise to power in January 1933 when Johann is five or six. 
At the end of the Weimar Republic and the height of Germany’s economic crisis, 
Johann’s family, along with many others in the village, struggles to make a living. His 
father, unable to work due to an ailment resulting from his fighting in World War I, does 
not help the situation with his unrealistic dreams of making it big by breeding silk worms 
or angora sheep. While the father is skeptical of the National Socialists, Johann’s mother, 
albeit not interested in politics, recognizes that the ever-growing support for this new 
political movement in the village presents great opportunities for her business. She joins 
the Nazi party in order to gain the favor of the local SA, who she hopes will hold their 
weekly meetings in her pub, the so-called Restauration. The family’s financial problems, 
the muted political tensions between Nazi supporters and opponents, the mother’s 
decision to become a member of the NSDAP as one of the first in the village—all this is 
conveyed to the reader only through bits and pieces the five-year old Johann picks up of 
the adult conversations surrounding him. 
 The information about the historical and political context is woven into Johann’s 
stream of consciousness that leads us through the abundance of his childlike thoughts and 





of the Restauration, about the local hair-dresser, raspberry candy and his brother’s 
annoying piano playing, but above all about his father. While the text suggests very 
clearly that the highly sensitive but weak and ailing man is a hopeless dreamer and only 
burdens the family with his quirky ideas of breeding angora sheep, Johann speaks about 
his father with the utmost admiration, not least because of the father’s magical invention 
of the “Wörterbaum”: Whenever Johann manages to spell a word that is particularly 
difficult or exotic, the father praises him saying “Johann, ich staune!” and hangs the 
newly mastered word into a self-made “tree of words” that assembles his sons’ greatest 
accomplishments, words like “Jugendstil,” “Popocatepetl,” or “Theosophie.” 
 In the second part of the novel, Johann, age ten, is a member of the Jungvolk. 
There are two episodes telling how Johann witnesses political and racial repression. The 
first one takes place in the Jungvolk when Wolfgang Landsmann, a boy of Johann’s age, 
is excluded from the group. His bicycle is taken away from him and he is publicly 
humiliated because he is “half-Jewish.”. The second episode depicting Nazi repression 
describes how a group of the village’s SA brutally beats up a circus clown who, in a 
political cabaret during a circus show in Wasserburg, had made fun of Hitler. While 
Johann barely registers the violence against the clown, he develops a great sensibility for, 
and aversion to, Nazi language at the time. When he listens to his best friend’s father, the 
highest ranking Nazi in the village, his Nazi jargon appears uncouth compared to the 
poetic language of his own father, who had recently passed away. During this time 
period, Johann is most preoccupied with his awakening sexuality, which conflicts with 





 In the third part of the novel, which carries the title “Ernte”, the eighteen-year-old 
Johann is waiting for his conscription order for the Gebirgsjäger, the mountain troops of 
the German Wehrmacht, for which he had volunteered earlier. The young man’s thoughts 
and feelings show him as a sensitive, musical and slightly vain young man, who is still 
very much attached to his home. But he is eager to fight in the war like his older brother 
to prove that he is not a coward. He is increasingly interested in literature: he wins the 
first prize for a play in a regional drama competition, and constantly writes love poems 
for his girlfriend Magda. Shortly before Johann is conscripted, he and his family are 
informed of the brother’s death in combat. After the defeat at the end of the War, Johann 
is taken prisoner by the Americans in Bavaria. But only a few weeks later, he is released 
and returns home. He is surprised to learn that there were, in fact, Jewish people in his 
village who lived in constant fear of being deported, but he remains indifferent to the 
news. He meets Lena, the daughter of the new tenant of his mother’s pub and is 
completely smitten. We see the interactions between Johann and Lena growing from first 
trepidatious encounters to nightly visits in each other's room. This new relationship gives 
Johann a first taste of the freedom that awaits him, a freedom that he will explore, as he 
says, by finding his own language, since the language of the Nazis as well as the 
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Aesthetics and Zeitgeist  
 
“Das erworbene Wissen über die mordende Diktatur ist eins, meine Erinnerung ist ein 
anderes.”431 In Ein springender Brunnen, Walser puts this statement from the Munich 
speech into effect. Nazi crimes and Nazi genocide are widely bracketed from the 
depiction of the protagonist’s adolescent years. Walser presents the reader with an 
elegantly and powerfully written coming-of-age story of a boy growing up in the 
beautiful scenery of Lake Constance. The war, death, “Auschwitz”, or “das 
Schreckliche”, as Walser refers to the Holocaust, are present in the background but are 
clearly not the main focus of the book. 
 This conscious neglect of historical context turned the novel into a controversial 
subject among its critics, with many defending Walser’s approach.432 Some, however, 
were bothered by the novel’s provocative gesture. Andreas Isenschmid, for example, 
literary critic for the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, ended his presentation of the novel in the 
TV-show Das literarische Quartett with the following summary:   
Das Heikelste an der ganzen Sache […] ist natürlich dies, dass das eine 
Kindheitsgeschichte im deutschen Faschismus ist, in der das Wort ‘Auschwitz’ 
nicht vorkommt, das Wort ‘Dachau’ vielleicht dreimal vorkommt, aber der 
Schrecken des Faschismus, wie wir ihn kennen, eigentlich beinahe ausgeblendet 
ist. Es gibt einige wenige Szenen, wo Antisemitismus stattfindet. Es gibt natürlich 
einen spürbaren Druck der nationalsozialistischen Formierung im Dorf, aber hier 
wird eine Jugend geschildert, in der jemand in einem ganz engen Wissensradius 
gelebt hat. Und Martin Walser hat sich dazu entschieden, diese Jugend, ich sage 
mal, mit Scheuklappen zu schildern. Ganz bewusst hat er das Wissen, das im 
Buch dargestellt wird, reduziert auf das Wissen, das er damals gehabt hat, und das 
ist kläglich wenig. Und er weigert sich sozusagen, hinzutun so etwas wie 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung, geradezu auch nur Scham zu zeigen über die 
damalige Zeit. Das ist wahrscheinlich das Provokative in diesem Buch.433  
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Walser responded directly to Isenschmid’s criticism in his acceptance speech for the 
prestigious Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels he was awarded in 1998. He made 
fun of Isenschmid for not recognizing one of the most basic techniques of literature, the 
point-of-view narration:  
Ein smarter Intellektueller hißt im Fernsehen in seinem Gesicht einen Ernst, der in 
diesem Gesicht wirkt wie eine Fremdsprache, wenn er der Welt als schweres 
Versagen des Autors mitteilt, daß in des Autors Buch Auschwitz nicht vorkomme. 
Nie etwas gehört vom Urgesetz des Erzählens: der Perspektivität. Aber selbst 
wenn, Zeitgeist geht vor Ästhetik.” 434  
 
Walser thus argues that Auschwitz does not appear in his novel due to the narrative form 
he chose. Why the drama? the author seems to ask. This is literature, he claims, a domain 
that should be guided by aesthetic principles not by political demands by the zeitgeist.  
But of course, the childlike innocence displayed in the novel and the minor role the 
Holocaust plays in the text were not simply aesthetic choices on the part of the author. 
This becomes particularly clear from the inter-text emerging from the novel and the 
Friedenspreis speech, which I will consider later. But even the prologues to the three 
sections of the novel reveal that Walser takes a distinct position on how the Nazi past 
should be remembered in present-day Germany. The prologues turn this literary work 
into a political podium.   
 The prologue to the first part of Ein springender Brunnen argues that our 
collective memory is a matter of public interest and that this public memory is subject to 
change and can be shaped and molded. Individual memory, however, cannot be changed 
ad libitum and ought to be a private matter. Walser phrases this in more poetic terms:  
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In der Vergangenheit, die wir alle zusammen haben, kann man herumgehen wie in 
einem Museum. Die eigene Vergangenheit ist nicht begehbar. Wir haben von ihr 
nur das, was sie von selbst preisgibt. Auch wenn sie dann nicht deutlicher wird als 
ein Traum.435  
 
Remembering the past is thus imagined as something that occurs “von selbst” rather than 
something that can be actively pursued. Similar to a dream, our past offers itself to us and 
we are merely its passive recipients. While we risk that the past might remain just as 
vague as a dream, we need to refrain from interpreting and trying to derive meaning from 
it. Only then, the past can maintain its authenticity:  
Träume zerstören wir auch, wenn wir sie nach ihrer Bedeutung fragen. Der ins 
Licht einer anderen Sprache gezogene Traum verrät nur noch, was wir ihn fragen. 
Wie der Gefolterte sagt er alles, was wir wollen, nichts von sich. So die 
Vergangenheit.436  
 
Walser thus seems to want to recreate the past with no interest other than the desire to let 
the images speak for themselves. Since it is through the child’s perspective that the past is 
supposed to reveal itself, the adult voice speaking to the reader in the prologue—
unidentified but recognizable as the author’s voice as I will show later—retreats to a 
passive position as soon as the point-of-view narrative begins. He wants to ‘receive’ the 
past without interfering with it: “Man nimmt entgegen. Bleibt bereit.”437  
 The second prologue justifies this narrative approach from another angle. Here, 
Walser preemptively responds to the critique that a representation of the Holocaust is 
missing from his novel. This prologue lines up the three situations during Johann’s 
adolescence in which the boy heard the word ‘Dachau.’438 These memories are presented 
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without a comment. But they are juxtaposed with the ten-year-old’s memories of his 
recently deceased father, his favorite music, his way of taking medicine on a piece of 
bread and the one time he slapped Johann in the face. Walser suggests that for the ten-
year-old Johann, “Dachau” experiences carried the same weight as the experience of 
taking medicine on a piece of bread. Experiences become memories only after the fact, 
and memories are qualified in their historical or biographical weight only in hindsight. 
“Solange etwas ist, ist es nicht das, was es gewesen sein wird”, Walser had written at the 
very beginning of the novel, and he repeats here “Solange man es [das Vergangene] noch 
vor Augen hat, schaut man nicht hin.”439  
 Apart from the fact that the rhetoric of “nicht hinschauen” becomes important in 
Walser’s Friedenspreis speech, as I will explain later, it also evokes the question of the 
role of the bystander. The child and teenager who did not see the Nazi oppression before 
his eyes may not to be blamed for his ignorance. But how does the person remembering 
the past evaluate this ignorance? How does he feel about the recognition that for the child 
and teenager he word “Dachau” was merely a random word and that he did not 
understand its political, or rather criminal, implications? In the prologue, the narrrator 
says vaguely: “Im Objekt solcher Heimsuchung kann der Verdacht entstehen, das 
Vergangene dränge sich nur auf, daß man unter seiner Unwiederbringlichkeit leide.”440 It 
could be suspected that the person haunted by the past might suffer from it, more 
precisely from the fact that it might be irretrievable. Nothing can be done to change it. 
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But the suffering remains only a possibility, a suspicion. Walser ultimately shrug his 
shoulders at the irretrievability of life experiences. He says:  
Woher hätte man wissen können, was das, was passierte, dem Gedächtnis wert 
ist? Man kann nicht leben und gleichzeitig etwas darüber wissen. Welche Warze 
war denn höher, erhabener, die links neben der Nase im Gesicht von Helmers 
Hermine oder die auf der Oberlippe der Zollbeamtenfrau und stellvertretenden 
NS-Frauenschaftsführerin Heym?441 
 
Perhaps, this is the most explicit comment on the consequences of the narrative through 
the eyes of the child: For Johann, the name of the concentration camp “Dachau” meant as 
little or as much as the warts on the noses of the women of the village. The provocative 
matching of the politically and historically charged term “Dachau” with something 
utterly banal such as warts illustrates that for the sake of authenticity, Walser accepts the 
uniformity of these experiences—even or precisely when it comes to memories of the 
Third Reich.  
 In the third prologue, he comes back to the idea of authenticity presented in the 
first prologue, surprisingly undercutting what he had claimed there, namely that the 
person remembering the past remains passive in the memory process. Here, he concedes 
that one always approaches the past with a certain motivation. The past, he argues, is 
always a product of the present:  
Vergangenheit ist in der Gegenwart auf eine Weise enthalten, daß sie nicht aus ihr 
gewonnen werden kann, wie man einen Stoff, der in einem anderen Stoff 
enthalten ist, durch ein kluges Verfahren herausziehen kann, und man hätte ihn 
dann als solchen. Die Vergangenheit als solche gibt es nicht. Es gibt sie nur als 
etwas, das in der Gegenwart enthalten ist, ausschlaggebend oder unterdrückt, 
dann als Unterdrückte ausschlaggebend.442  
 
We may wish to view the past in complete separation from the present and to distill the 
past by clearing out all the parts that were added later on. But it is simply not possible to 
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consider the past without the present. The narrator wishes to conserve his memory 
exactly as it was but he realizes at the same time that even this very intention is rooted in 
the present. The third prologue ends with the wish that the past may reveal itself to us, as 
it was the idea in the first prologue. This wish, however, is now formulated in the 
subjunctive and receives a dream-like quality:   
Der Vergangenheit eine Anwesenheit wünschen, über die wir nicht Herr sind. 
Nachträglich sind keine Eroberungen zu machen. Wunschdenkens Ziel: Ein 
interesseloses Interesse an der Vergangenheit. Daß sie uns entgegenkäme wie von 
selbst.443  
 
Ultimately, Walser thus addresses the futility of trying to maintain a past “under glass.” 
The narrator admits that the more he attempts to revisit the past in its complete 
authenticity, the more he is guided by a certain intention, “ein Motiv, das mich gerade 
jetzt heißt, die Vergangenheit aufzusuchen.”444 Thus, Walser directly points us to the 
question of what his motif is. He gives the answer ex negativum when he he critically 
speaks about those who have developed an exclusively negative perspective toward their 
past. The most important passage of the third prologue reads:     
Manche haben gelernt, ihre Vergangenheit abzulehnen. […] Ich habe einige Male 
zugeschaut, wie Leute aus ihrer Vergangenheit förmlich herausgeschlüpft sind, 
um der Gegenwart eine günstigere Vergangenheit anbieten zu könen. Die 
Vergangenheit als Rolle. […]  
In Wirklichkeit wird der Umgang mit der Vergangenheit von Jahrzehnt zu 
Jahrzehnt strenger normiert. Je normierter dieser Umgang, umso mehr ist, was als 
Vergangenheit gezeigt wird, Produkt der Gegenwart. […] Eine komplett 
erschlossene, durchleuchtete gereinigte, genehmigte, total gegenwartsgeeignete 
Vergangenheit. Ethisch, politisch durchkorrigiert. Vorexerziert von unseren 
Gescheitesten, Einwandfreisten, den Besten. Was auch immer unsere 
Vergangenheit gewesen ist, wir haben uns von allem befreit, was in ihr so war, 
wie wir es jetzt nicht mehr möchten.445 
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He criticizes those intellectuals—the “Gescheitesten”, “Einwandfreisten” and “Besten”—
who have presented their biographies in a politically correct and ethically corrected way. 
This distanced view “people” develop toward their past is presented as role-playing and 
even lying here. The memory of the past, Walser suggests, should not be instrumentalized 
for present interests. Walser concedes: even if he wishes that the past could be 
represented without the interference of present interests, and even if he gives this novel 
the illusion of an authentic replica of his childhood and adolescence, there is a present 
motif guiding him. And his motif is precisely this: to represent the wish that this 
unobtrusive, innocent memory of a childhood and adolescence during the Third Reich 
were possible.  
 Thus, whereas Ein springender Brunnen appears at first glance as a poetic and 
apolitical rendering of Walser’s childhood, the political framework becomes evident in 
the prologues. As vague as Walser remains in his language, speaking broadly of the 
“past” and the “present, my reading strongly suggests that he refers to the memory of the 
Nazi past and the present discourse about it in the late 1990s. I argue that Walser writes 
his memoir against this discourse that he considers normative in that he thinks it is too 
occupied with the Holocaust and forces German intellectuals of his generation to relate to 
their childhood and youth to this part of the history between 1933 and 1945 only.  
 Clearly then, the narrative form of Ein springender Brunnen conveys a 
provocative political message. Walser attacks this discourse by representing his 
childhood nostalgia in Ein springender Brunnen. The narrative device of the childhood 
narrator and the idea of childhood innocence are used purposefully to underscore his 





But I take issue in particular with a passage in the novel, in which Walser presents his 
own memory in competition to the memory of the Holocaust.  
The German-Jewish encounter  
It would be wrong to say, as Andreas Isenschmidt did, that the Nazi terror is excluded 
from Walser’s text. Although the child narrator himself is not capable of relating the 
repression in Wasserburg to the greater political framework, let alone to critically 
evaluate it, the text does occasionally point at Nazi discrimination and persecution, and it 
is not least the reader’s political and historical knowledge that lends these instances an 
almost eerie presence in Johann’s story.  
 This is the case, for example, in the episode about the clown in the second part of 
the book. During his visit to the circus, the ten-year-old Johann does not understand that 
the clown takes a great risk by mocking Hitler’s so-called “Anschluss” of Austria in 
1938. The reader, however, knows the likely consequences of such openly critical 
remarks about Hitler. He sees the subsequent violence against the clown immediately in 
the context of Nazi oppression, while for Johann the event is incomprehensible, even if it 
is significant because it results in the circus leaving the village. While Johann worries 
about being separated from his teenage love Anita, the circus director’s daughter, the 
violence against the clown leaves a different imprint on the reader’s mind. It foreshadows 
the political development following the annexation of Austria in 1938: the increasing 
violence against critics of the regime, the anti-Jewish pogroms of the 
“Reichskristallnacht” in the same year, and the beginning of the war a year later. 





background, and Johann’s apolitical and unreflected perception of the rise of National 
Socialism in the village requires the reader to fill in the gaps.  
 But the reader’s role changes in the third part of the novel. In the first and second 
part where Johann is five and ten respectively, his young age functions as an indicator for 
the reader not to accept the account of the young boy entirely at face value. But in the 
third part, Johann is eighteen and no longer a child. Necessarily, I would argue, the 
reader’s critical distance to the protagonist diminishes. The narrative constellation also 
changes because we are looking at the historical turning point of 1945. By setting the 
third part of the novel in 1945, Walser inevitably raises the question of how Johann’s 
perspective changes after he learns that the Nazi regime was, in fact, a murderous 
dictatorship. In his Munich speech, Walser juxtaposed his childhood experiences and the 
knowledge “über die mordende Diktatur,” that he later gained. The reader wonders: did 
the eighteen-year-old Johann/Martin not learn of the Europe-wide persecution, 
deportation and killing of Jews that also took place in Wasserburg?  
 Walser addresses this issue in a key scene towards the end of the novel. The scene 
is set after the war. Johann has returned to Wasserburg and has re-enrolled into his high 
school program in the nearby city Lindau in order to complete his Abitur. One day, 
during his daily bike ride to school, he runs into Wolfgang Landsmann who struggles 
with a flat tire. Wolfgang, the reader remembers from an episode told earlier in the novel, 
was excluded from the Jungvolk because his mother was Jewish. Johann and Wolfgang 
were ten at the time, and the earlier episode also involved a bike. The Jungvolk Führer 
Edi Fürst had pushed Wolfgang’s new bike down a hill to humiliate the boy. At the sight 





to repair the flat tire. Being reminded of this act of discrimination, Johann is insecure as 
to how to react:   
Johann spürte, daß es ihm ganz und gar gegen den Strich gegangen wäre, wenn 
Wolfgang jetzt von Edi Fürst angefangen hätte, von dem Appell damals. Er hätte 
doch überhaupt nicht gewußt, was er hätte sagen sollen. Sagen können. Und 
selber davon anfangen, das war unvorstellbar. Wenn Wolfgang davon anfangen 
würde, müßte Johann reagieren. Wie, wußte er nicht. Also, auf jeden Fall, alle 
Aufmerksamkeit aufs Fahrradflicken.446 
 
This encounter is emblematic of the Hitler Youth generation’s “awakening” at the end of 
the war, their recognition that the political system in which they grew up was a regime of 
repression and mass murder. Johann’s insecurity toward Wolfgang—How should he deal 
with the memory of the bicycle incident? Should he openly talk about it? Does he have to 
evaluate it now?—emphasizes their difficult situation in 1945. How to deal with the 
knowledge that for the surviving victims of the Nazi regime the last 12 years will be 
remembered as the most horrific and fearsome period in their lives and not as the time of 
a happily lived childhood? Understandably, Johann is overwhelmed by this confrontation 
and does not want the other boy to address the issue. But while he focuses on repairing 
Wolfgang’s tire, Wolfgang wants to talk:  
Wolfgang war noch nicht fertig mit dem, was er Johann offenbar erzählen will. 
[…] Wie wenig Johann weiß. Das wundert Wolfgang am meisten. Seine Mutter, 
Jüdin, lebte doch mit seinem Vater, dem Dr. Landmann, in privilegierter 
Mischehe. Der Vater, trotz seines Namens, kein Jude. […] Wolfgangs Mutter 
andauernd in der Angst, abgeholt zu werden. […] Dann weißt du auch nicht, sagte 
er, daß Rudolf Heß 1934 Frau Haensel besucht hat? Nein, weiß Johann nicht. Er 
weiß nicht, daß Frau Haensel Jüdin ist. Wolfgang wunderte sich.447  
 
Johann is faced with a different “side of the story,” another account of the past several 
years: Wolfgang’s mother feared deportation every day because the village teacher 
threatened to report her to the Gestapo. Frau Hänsel, an old customer of his parents, is 
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Jewish. Johann’s reaction is crucial: He wants to fend off this knowledge, as he thinks it 
is too burdening:  
Johann wehrte sich gegen die Angst, in der Frau Landsmann gelebt hatte. 
Wolfgang hatte ihm leid getan, als Edi Fürst ihm das Fahrrad den Rain 
hinuntergeworfen hatte. Er hatte Wolfgang dann vergessen und vergessen, daß er 
ihn vergessen gehabt hatte. Warum hat er nicht gesagt, daß er dieses Rad kennt? 
Er hätte doch zeigen können, daß er dieses Rad kennt. Dann hätte Wolfgang 
gewußt, was Johann damit sagen wollte! Warum hatte er das nicht gesagt? Die 
Angst, in der Frau Landsmann gelebt hat, engt ihn ein. Er will mit dieser Angst 
nichts zu tun haben.448  
 
Johann’s initial insecurity soon turns into a more aggressive rejection. He does not want 
to be bothered with Wolfgang’s perspective and becomes defensive. How could he have 
known? Wolfgang, he thinks, has no right to accuse him of not having known:   
Er hatte gespürt, daß Wolfgang, was er ihm erzählt hatte, erzählt hatte, weil 
Johann das wissen müsse. Vielleicht meinte Wolfgang, daß Johann ein Vorwurf 
zu machen sei, weil er all das nicht gewußt hatte. Johann wehrte sich gegen 
diesen vermuteten Vorwurf. Woher hätte er denn wissen sollen, daß Frau Haensel 
Jüdin ist? Er wollte von sich nichts verlangen lassen. Was er empfand, wollte er 
selber empfinden. Niemand sollte ihm eine Empfindung abverlangen, die er nicht 
selber hatte. Er wollte leben, nicht Angst haben. Frau Landsmann würde ihn mit 
ihrer Angst anstecken, das spürte er. Er mußte sich wegdenken von ihrer Angst. 
Eine Angst gebiert die nächste. Nichts so sicher wie das. Er hatte Angst, Frau 
Landsmann zu begegnen. Seit er wußte, in welcher Angst sie gelebt hatte, wußte 
er nicht mehr, wie er ihr begegnen mußte . Wie grüßen, wie hin- oder 
wegschauen? Mehr ausdrücken, als er in dem Augenblick gerade empfand? Er 
wollte nicht gezwungen sein. Zu nichts und von niemandem. […] Johann wollte 
nie mehr unterworfen sein, weder einer Macht noch einer Angst. Niemand sollte 
einen Anspruch an ihn haben. Am liebsten wäre er so frei gewesen, wie noch nie 
jemand gewesen war.449  
 
Since we still follow the point of view of the eighteen-year-old without being offered a 
commentary, this passage is ambiguous: Is this a critical portrayal of the protagonist’s 
refusal to have empathy for the Jewish experience of the Third Reich? Does Walser 
depict a moment in early post-war history here when the prototypical German response to 
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the Holocaust was to push the Nazi crimes far away? Might this passage even be, as 
Tillmann Moser claims, a poetic transfiguration of the Mitscherlichs’ famous thesis of 
Germany’s inability to mourn?450  
 It is unlikely that Walser wants the reader to take a critical stance toward Johann 
in this passage because in a speech given in 1998, the year Ein springender Brunnen was 
published, Walser expressed a strikingly similar view to the one his eighteen year-old 
alter ego expresses in the passage above. The way Johann rejects the victims’ memory in 
the novel very clearly reflects the way Walser rejects Holocaust memory in the speech he 
gave at the award ceremony for the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels. 
 
The Friedenspreis speech 
The Friedenspreis speech presents, at its core, a critique of Germany’s memory discourse 
of the 1990. According to Walser, the memory of the Holocaust has become a mere 
“Drohroutine“ in the German media,  “jederzeit einsetzbares Einschüchterungsmittel oder 
Moralkeule.”451 His reaction to this supposed instrumentalization of the Holocaust is to 
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look away from images of concentration camps,452 and he also feels a strong resistance to 
having to deal with this memory:  
Kein ernstzunehmender Mensch leugnet Auschwitz; kein noch 
zureichnungsfähiger Mensch deutelt an der Grauenhaftigkeit von Auschwitz 
herum; wenn mir aber jeden Tag in den Medien diese Vergangenheit vorgehalten 
wird, merke ich, daß sich in mir etwas gegen diese Dauerrepräsentation unserer 
Schande wehrt. Anstatt dankbar zu sein für die unaufhörliche Präsentation unserer 
Schande, fange ich an wegzuschauen. Ich möchte verstehen, warum in diesem 
Jahrzehnt die Vergangenheit präsentiert wird wie nie zuvor. Wenn ich merke, daß 
sich in mir etwas dagegen wehrt, versuche ich, die Vorhaltung unserer Schande 
auf Motive hin abzuhören, und bin fast froh, wenn ich glaube, entdecken zu 
können, daß öfter nicht mehr das Gedenken, das Nichtvergessendürfen das Motiv 
ist, sondern die Instrumentalisierung unserer Schande zu gegenwärtigen 
Zwecken.453 
 
Walser’s argument against what he considers a publicly reinforced memory of the 
Holocaust for the wrong reasons is that every individual should decide for him- or herself 
how to remember the Nazi period. He stresses the importance of the privacy of one’s 
moral conscience. He gets to the conclusion:  
Mit seinem Gewissen ist jeder allein. Öffentliche Gewissensakte sind deshalb in 
der Gefahr, symbolisch zu werden. Und nichts ist dem Gewissen fremder, als 
Symbolik, wie gut sie auch gemeint sei. [...] Es kann keiner von einem verlangen, 
was er gern hätte, der aber nicht geben will.454  
 
Much has been written about these and other controversial passages of the speech, which 
became the subject of one of the most heated memory controversies in post-war 
Germany, in its impact topped perhaps only by the Historikerstreit in the eighties. The 
controversy, later called the “Walser-Bubis Debatte”, was triggered by Ignaz Bubis, who 
as a Holocaust survivor and head of the Zentralrat der Deutschen Juden criticized Walser 
for ultimately propagating that Germany move on from his Nazi history, and he called the 
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speech “geistige Brandstiftung.”455 The innumerable Feuilleton commentaries, the letters 
both Walser and Bubis received as well as a documentation of the meeting of the two 
men have been published in a volume that counts no less than 679 pages. Since I will 
present a more in-depth discussion of the controversy in the following chapter, I will 
narrow my focus here and only highlight the evident connection between the speech and 
the novel.456     
 That there is such a connection becomes clear from the fact that Walser uses 
almost the exact same phrasing in the speech as in the scene in the novel where he 
describes the encounter between Johann and Wolfgang. In the novel he writes: 
Johann wehrte sich gegen diesen vermuteten Vorwurf. […] Er wollte von sich 
nichts verlangen lassen. Was er empfand, wollte er selber empfinden. Niemand 
sollte ihm eine Empfindung abverlangen, die er nicht selber hatte.457  
 
By comparison, in the speech he says:  
[W]enn mir […] jeden Tag in den Medien diese Vergangenheit vorgehalten wird, 
merke ich, daß sich in mir etwas gegen diese Dauerrepräsentation unserer 
Schande wehrt. [...] Mit seinem Gewissen ist jeder allein. [...] Es kann keiner von 
einem verlangen, was er gern hätte, der aber nicht geben will.458 
 
Johann’s refusal to deal with the Jewish experience of the years between 1939 and 1945 
in combination with his insistence on individual memory hence strikes me as analogous 
to Walser’s resistance towards the public memory of the Holocaust and his insistence on 
a private instead of a public conscience. The similarity in both wording and content 
demonstrates that Johann, at least in the last part of the book, functions as Walser’s 
mouthpiece. The author seems to be threatened by an omnipresent discourse that focuses 
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456 To my knowledge, only Amir Eshel has linked Johann’s reaction in the encounter with Wolfgang with 
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primarily on the victims’ fate. His critique against the leftist discourse, already voiced in 
“Händedruck mit Gespenstern” and “Über Deutschland reden,” is brought to an extreme 
here. His unwillingness to play the part he thinks he is expected to play within this 
discourse—to present an “ethically corrected” memory of his childhood that cuts off the 
beauty and tenderness he might feel—tips over into angry denial and defense. We can 
conclude that if Johann displays this attitude at the end of the novel it merely reproduces 
the author’s own conviction.  
Safety zone literature 
An important part of Walser’s critique of the memory discourse of the 1990s is his claim 
about the subjection of aesthetics to politics. He dedicates large portions of his 
Friedenspreis speech to the argument that writers ought not be treated as 
“Gewissenswarte der Nation.“ They should carry responsibility only for themselves, not 
for the public. He refers to Goethe and Thomas Mann as authors who, from today’s 
perspective, did not have the “politically correct” (and that for Walser means not a leftist) 
position in the political discourse—Goethe with his visit to the anti-revolutionary camp in 
France and his retreat to aestheticism during the French Revolution, and Thomas Mann 
with his anti-democratic writings of 1918—but were nevertheless acknowledged for their 
literary accomplishments. Those who read Buddenbrooks or Zauberberg, Walser argues, 
did not notice Mann’s “krassen Meinungswechsel” but recognized “den wirklichen 
Thomas Mann,” the writer Thomas Mann.459 Walser continues:   
Das möchte man den Meinungssoldaten entgegenhalten, wenn sie mit 
vorgehaltener Moralpistole, den Schriftsteller in den Meinungsdienst nötigen. Sie 
haben es immerhin so weit gebracht, daß Schriftsteller nicht mehr gelesen werden 
müssen sondern nur noch interviewt. Daß die so zustande kommenden 
                                                





Platzanweisungen in den Büchern dieser Schriftsteller entweder nicht verizifierbar 
oder kraß widerlegt werden, ist dem Meinungs-und Gesinnungswart eher egal, 
weil das Sprachwerk für ihn nicht verwertbar ist.460  
  
To summarize Walser’s position: In his depiction, the media (“Meinungssoldaten”) force 
the writer into the role of a commentator of political and moral issues without taking his 
literature into consideration. It is in his literature, however, that the morality of an author, 
his “actual” feelings and character, becomes most visible. Since the media does not 
bother with the author’s aesthetic work and is only interested in a political categorization 
(“Platzanweisungen”) based on his non-literary works (“Texten, in denen er politisch-
moralisch recht haben mußte”,), they do not notice that this categorization cannot be 
verified or is proved wrong in his books. Walser describes the problem a nutshell in 2002 
in Der Spiegel: “Ästhetik gilt nichts, nur die politische Korrektheitsforderung gilt, und 
das erlebe ich als ungeheure Bevormundung.”461 And his  response to Isenschmidt’s 
criticism that the Holocaust is missing from his novel: “Nie etwas gehört vom Urgesetz 
des Erzählens: der Perspektivität. Aber selbst wenn, Zeitgeist geht vor Ästhetik.”462 
Hence, I suggest that we read the following statement about Thomas Mann also as a 
statement about Walser:   
Wie er wirklich dachte und empfand, seine Moralität also, teilt sich in seinen 
Romanen und Erzählungen unwillkürlich und vertrauenswürdiger mit als in den 
Texten, in denen er politisch-moralisch recht haben mußte. Oder gar das Gefühl 
hätte, er müsse sich rechtfertigen.463  
 
In fact, I would argue, it is in Ein springender Brunnen, the literary counterpart to the 
Friedenspreis speech, that Walser dares to express his political opinions most 
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nicht befehlen,” 162.  
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expressively. The vagueness of the literary language allows him to express controversial 
views he thinks he could otherwise not communicate publicly   
Walser even makes this idea explicit in the novel. In the final scene, Johann is 
wondering if he should tell his girlfriend about a precarious dream he had about her, a 
dream about which he feels shame. Instead of talking to her he considers writing about 
the dream:  
Was er nicht sagen konnte, schreiben? Den Traum aufschreiben, dann Lena den 
aufgeschrieben Traum lesen lassen? Eine Art Hoffnung, daß er durch das 
Aufschreiben den Traum beruhigen könnte. Oder daß die Beschämungskraft des 
Traums nachließe. Er mußte den Traum aufschreiben. Er mußte sich wehren. 
 Den Traum aufschreiben, das kam ihm vor, wie etwas, was man nicht tun 
darf. Aber er tat’s. Er mußte es tun. Sich einfach der Sprache anvertrauen.464  
 
We can read this passage as a double entendre: “Den Traum aufschreiben”, here used in a 
literal sense, was the goal formulated at the beginning of the book, where the past was 
compared to a dream.465 Writing the dream thus becomes a metaphor for the entire 
project, Walser’s autobiography.  
 As such, this passage names several reasons why at the age of seventy-one Walser 
finally dealt with his childhood during the Third Reich.The first is his wish for calm 
(“den Traum beruhigen”), which we can read as the wish to work through a trauma, 
either the trauma of having been brought up with Nazi ideologies, or in Anne Fuchs’ 
interpretation the trauma of losing father and brother.466 The second reason is the desire 
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commented on is the way the idyllic atmosphere of Ein springender Brunnen is fundamentally undercut by 
the traumatic experience of loss: the protagonist Johann loses his beloved father and later his much admired 
brother who signs up for the Wehrmacht shortly before the war’s end and becomes canon fodder on the 





“daß die Beschämungskraft des Traums nachließe.” The dilemma of feeling innocent yet 
somehow involved in the Nazi period—the dilemma of the Hitler Youth generation—
obviously still wakes a feeling shame for the author. But the third reason reveals the 
strong sense of resistance that he feels when dealing with this childhood memories. 
Johann wants to write down the dream because: “Er mußte sich wehren.”467 From my 
perspective this motivation is the strongest: The name of the family’s pub, Restauration, 
accurately describes the motto of this novel: Walser wants to restore his childhood and 
with it, the village of Wasserburg with its dialect, its solidarity and its close-knit 
community468. A nostalgic depiction of the Nazi years? Walser predicts that such a 
project will raise suspicions: “Den Traum aufschreiben, das kam ihm vor, wie etwas, was 
man nicht tun darf. Aber er tat’s. Er mußte es tun.”469  
 A concluding assessment of Walser’s autobiography and its narrative set-up must 
take into account all three motivations the author names in this passage: trauma, shame, 
and protest. The question that this text raises for me is whether Walser’s protest is 
necessary. The novel was celebrated in the feuilleton, and only a few scholars have made 
                                                                                                                                            
up during the Nazi period, he too has the inalienable right to record a painful loss as just that: a wound that 
has not healed.” Anne Fuchs, “Towards an Ethics of Remembering: The Walser-Bubis Debate and the 
Other of Discourse,” The German Quarterly 75.3 (Summer 2002): 235-46, 243-44.  
467 See last block quote. Walser, Ein springender Brunnen, 404.  
468 The conservative and almost nostalgic approach to the past becomes clear also in the afterword to the 
novel, in which Walser speaks about a number of dialect words that have disappeared ever since his 
childhood. For Reinhart Baumgart, the sense of community celebrated in Walser’s childhood novel changes 
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Kosmos untergehen in Diktatur und Krieg.” See Reinhard Baumgart, “Sich selbst und allen unbequem. Der 
Weg des Martin Walser als ‘geistiger Brandstifter,’” in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 389-94, 
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the effort of discussing the moral implications of a depiction of the Nazi era through the 
perspective of a child.. At least parts of Walser’s novel show that such a narrative 
constellation can be revealing and productive. The child figure with its different 
perspective on the world can subvert our common views of the Nazi period and 
illuminate aspects that were not visible before. A literary work is not a history book, after 
all. As readers we never expect to be offered a complete historical account. The child 
narrative in Ein springender Brunnen only becomes problematic when Walser sets up his 
own experience of the Nazi era in competition with the memory of the Holocaust. It is 
problematic when the German-Jewish encounter that Walser stages in the third part 
seems to sanctify a lack of sympathy for the fate of the Jewish victims because Johann’s 
“Angst” is greater than his sensitivity for Wolfgang’s experiences. Why does Walser 
present his nostalgia for “ein Dorf, das es nicht mehr gibt”470 in a mode of protest? 
Perhaps my perspective results from a shift in the memory discourse. But I wonder 
whether there were as many restrictions in the memory discourse as Walser assumed 
there would be. Had the debates about Germans as victims not at least brought the 
recognition that the memory of the victims and the memory of the perpetrators are not 
mutually exclusive? From today’s perspective, one cannot help but to see Walser tilting 
at windmills in his attempt to make this beautiful poetic text a provocative piece of 
political writing.  
 
 
                                                





3. Innocence and Guilt in Günter Grass’ Beim Häuten der Zwiebel 
The scandal 
Günter Grass’ autobiographical novel Beim Häuten der Zwiebel became a famous and 
much discussed text even before its publication. On August 11 2006, the Deutsche 
Presseagentur sent out the following report:  
Hamburg (dpa) – Der Literaturnobelpreisträger Günter Grass war nach eigenen 
Worten im Zweiten Weltkrieg Mitglied der Waffen-SS. Darüber berichtet der 
Schriftsteller erstmals in seiner im September erscheinenden Autobiografie. Er sei 
kurz vor Kriegsende zur Waffen-SS einberufen worden. In einem Gespräch mit 
der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (Samstagsausgabe) bestätigte er diesen 
Sachverhalt.471  
 
Indeed, in the interview with the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung printed one day later, 
Grass confirmed that he had decided to include in his soon-to-be-published 
autobiography what he had long kept a secret: He had always claimed that he had spent 
the last months of the war as a Flakhelfer, like many young men his age. Now, he 
admitted that at the age of seventeen he had served as a drafted member of the Waffen-
SS.  
 The confession caused a great uproar and occupied large parts of the German 
media for weeks. Every public figure, whether literary critic, politician, historian or 
writer, seemed eager to comment on Grass’ revelation. While some acknowledged his 
courage in finally telling the true version of his biography, the majority of critics harshly 
bemoaned the belatedness of his confession. Some even demanded, to no avail, that the 
author’s most prestigious award, the Nobel Prize for literature, be revoked. With all this 
publicity, Grass’s publisher, the Steidl Verlag, decided to publish the novel Beim Häuten 
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der Zwiebel two weeks before its intended publication date. And when the book appeared 
in the bookstores on August 15th in 2006, it was in such great demand that the publishing 
house immediately ordered the printing of a second edition, which was delivered only a 
few days later. By September 1st, the date Grass’ autobiography was originally to be 
published, the book had already been number one on the bestseller lists, and the debate 
was still in full swing.472 
 However, those readers who expected Beim Häuten der Zwiebel to reveal 
spectacular details about Grass’ time in the SS, perhaps even a possible implication in 
Nazi crimes, must have been disappointed. Two chapters dealing with this period of the 
author’s life take up only a small portion of the book—about a fifth of the roughly 500-
page autobiography—and Grass stresses that he never fired a single shot in combat. The 
biographical facts explaining how he wound up in the SS can be summarized in less than 
a paragraph: What emerges is the story of an ordinary young German, who in the midst 
of puberty, was eager to drop out of school and leave his petty-bourgeois background 
behind in order to fight for the Führer. As a fifteen-year-old, Grass initially volunteered 
only for the submarine fleet of the Wehrmacht. When he received his conscription order 
about two years later (shortly before his seventeenth birthday), it was not for the navy and 
not even for the Wehrmacht. He was ordered to serve as a  Panzerschütze in the tank 
division Jörg von Frundsberg, part of the Waffen-SS, where he remained until being 
wounded on April 20th in 1945, shortly before Germany’s surrender.473  
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 In her essay “‘Ehrlich, du lügst wie gedruckt’: Günter Grass’s Autobiographical 
Confession and the Changing Territory of Germany’s Memory Culture”, Anne Fuchs 
divides Beim Häuten der Zwiebel into three different parts: The first deals with Grass’ 
adolescent experience of Nazi Germany from 1939 until 1945; the second, modelled on 
Grimmelshausen’s Simplicissimus, portrays Grass’ “vagabond-like existence in search of 
food, women and entertainment“474 in the immediate post-war period; and the third 
focuses on the decade from 1949 until 1959, tracing Grass’ development as a sculptor in 
Düsseldorf and his early beginnings as a writer. Fuchs points out that each part is written 
in a different mode: while the last part reads like a cultural history of Germany in the 
fifties and the narrative in the second part mimics the style of a picaresque novel, the first 
part is presented as a “confessional account of Grass’s youthful errors.”475 
 It is worth noticing that Grass dedicates the larger part of his autobiography to the 
depiction of the years between the end of the war roughly until the publication of his first 
novel Die Blechtrommel in 1959. This depiction underpins my earlier argument that 
intellectuals of the Hitler Youth generation were widely absent from the cultural debates 
of the forties and fifties. Grass gives a vivid and—I believe—representative account of 
how he struggled with rather practical matters of life during this time period. Barely an 
adult in 1945, he had to find a way to make a living and to continue his education—and 
was also busy exploring the other sex. He speaks of his “three hungers”: the actual 
hunger during the months immediately following the war, the second hunger, an 
insatiable hunger for sexual relations, and a little later a third type, his hunger for art.476    
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 Since this chapter focuses on the representation of childhood and youth in Hitler 
Youth autobiographies, I will not deal with Grass’s depiction of the post-war years, but 
instead discuss only the first part of Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, that part of his 
autobiography which deals with the author’s adolescence from 1939 until 1945. In my 
discussion of this first part, I will not focus on the SS-episode itself but rather ask in 
general how Grass approaches his younger self and whether he excuses his joining the 
Waffen-SS with his young age. It will become clear that although from the very 
beginning Grass puts great efforts into depicting his fascination with the Nazi movement 
and his membership in the Waffen-SS precisely not as youthful follies, he nevertheless 
uses narrative strategies which continually undercut this stance. The reader faces a 
constant back-and-forth between the evocation and the denial of childhood innocence.  
Oskar and Günter   
Perhaps the most curious aspect about Grass’ childhood autobiography is that he does not 
actually write about his childhood proper. As opposed to both Walser and Wolf, both of 
whom include the pre-war years before Hitler’s rise to power, Beim Häuten der Zwiebel 
begins in 1939 with the beginning of the war, when Grass is already twelve. Grass 
implies on the first pages of Beim Häuten der Zwiebel that he has already treated his 
childhood, including this earlier period, in his very first novel Die Blechtrommel, 
published in 1959. Why then, he asks in an important passage, did he have to write 
another book on his childhood and adolescence?  
Warum überhaupt soll Kindheit und deren so unverrückbar datiertes Ende erinnert 
werden, wenn alles, was mir ab den ersten und seit den zweiten Zähnen 
widerfuhr, längst samt Schulbeginn, Murmelspiel und verschorften Knien, den 
frühsten Beichtgeheimnissen und der späteren Glaubenspein zu Zettelkram 
wurde, der seitdem einer Person anhängt, die, kaum zu Papier gebracht, nicht 





Hand hatte und sich dank ihrer Blechtrommel einen Namen machte, der fortan 
zitierbar zwischen Buchdeckeln existierte und in weißnichtwieviel Sprachen 
unsterblich sein will?477  
 
Why does Oskar Matzerath, the “Person” to which Grass alludes in this passage, not 
suffice as a representative of the author’s Danzig childhood, if Grass has already 
incorporated “alles, was mir ab den ersten und seit den zweiten Zähnen widerfuhr” in this 
literary figure? He gives the answer himself. Because he omitted a part of his biography 
in this early novel that he must now, after all these years, include after all:  
Weil dies und auch das nachgetragen werden muß. Weil vorlaut auffallend etwas 
fehlen könnte. Weil wer wann in den Brunnen gefallen ist: meine erst danach 
überdeckelten Löcher, mein nicht zu bremsendes Wachstum, mein Sprachverkehr 
mit verlorenen Gegenständen. Und auch dieser Grund sei genannt: weil ich das 
letzte Wort haben will.478  
 
Grass wants to have the last word. Whether we read this as a self-ironic statement that 
characterizes the always outspoken author, or an expression of the wish to confess before 
his death, Grass explains at the beginning of the book that Oskar, while in some ways 
representing his childhood, was only in part an autobiographical figure. 
 Like the character Zweifel in Grass’s Tagebuch einer Schnecke, Oskar thus 
becomes visible as another “retrospektive Wunschfigur” of the author, to borrow 
Sebald’s term again.479 Not only because he does not become a member of the Waffen-
SS but mainly because Grass depicts him as someone who does not have to deal with a 
childhood during the Nazi era and the difficult moral implications about guilt and 
innocence that follow from it. For Oskar is not really a child. He is lucid, reflexive and 
crafty from the moment of his birth, as he himself tells us:  
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Ich gehörte zu den hellhörigen Säuglingen, deren geistige Entwicklung schon bei 
der Geburt abgeschlossen ist und sich fortan nur noch bestätigen muß. So 
unbeeinflußbar ich als Embryo nur auf mich gehört und mich im Fruchtwasser 
spiegelnd geachtet hatte, so kritisch lauchste ich den ersten spontanen 
Äußerungen der Eltern unter den Glühbirnen. Mein Ohr war hellwach. Wenn es 
auch klein, geknickt, verklebt und allenfalls niedlich zu benennen war, bewahrte 
es dennoch jede jener für mich fortan so wichtigen, weil als erste Eindrücke 
gebotenen Parolen. Noch mehr: Was ich mit dem Ohr einfing, bewertete ich 
sogleich mit winzigstem Hirn und beschloß, nachdem ich alles Gehörte genug 
bedacht hatte, dieses und jenes zu tun, anderes gewiß zu lassen.480  
 
Only a few seconds after his birth, Grass thus presents Oskar as a critical observer, who 
cannot only perceive his environment but also evaluate it. He is able to reflect upon what 
he hears and sees, and well capable, “dieses und jenes zu tun, anderes gewiß zu lassen.”  
 Oskar soon understands that his childlike appearance puts him in an advantageous 
position, as the adults around him constantly underestimate his critical faculties. He 
decides to remain in the position of a child by refusing to grow. At the age of three, he 
makes the decision “einen Punkt zu machen, so zu verbleiben […]; ich blieb der 
Dreijährige, der Gnom, der Däumling, […] um Unterscheidungen wie großer und kleiner 
Katechismus enthoben zu sein, um nicht als einszweiundsiebzig großer, sogenannter 
Erwachsener einem Mann, der sich […] mein Vater nannte, ausgeliefert und [s]einem 
Geschäft verpflichtet zu sein.”481 Thus, Oskar recognizes that by remaining a child, he 
can avoid responsibility.  
 Grass himself could not. While Oskar, the author’s fantasy-fictional alter ego, 
refused to grow up and to grow into the Nazi society, Grass emphasizes in Beim Häuten 
der Zwiebel that his own process of growing up was “kaum zu bremsen:” “Ich aber 
wuchs und wuchs,”482 he writes. “Schon mit sechzehn, als ich zum Arbeitsdienst kam, 
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galt ich als ausgewachsen. Oder maß ich erst dann endgültig einen Meter und 
zweiundsiebzig Zentimeter, als ich Soldat wurde und nur mit Glück oder aus Zufall das 
Kriegsende überlebte?“483 The actual Günter Grass, the author emphasizes here, grew up 
and, not having Oskar’s critical capacities, became part of the Nazi’s institutions, the 
Hitler Youth, the Arbeitsdienst, the Wehrmacht, and the Waffen- SS. But does he depict 
this development as the result of being a naïve and young child?   
The end of childhood innocence 
 
In his review of Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, Andreas Huyssen writes that “Grass comes 
down hard and unsentimentally on his inability as a young man to read the signs of the 
times.”484 Indeed, Sigrid Weigel’s critique that the Hitler Youth generation presents itself 
as innocent witnesses of the Nazi past, while true for Walser, does not seem to be 
justified in Grass’ case. Nothing becomes clearer in this book than Grass’s willingness 
not to use his childhood in an exculpatory way.  
 Already in the first two paragraphs of the novel, Grass emphasizes that he is 
tempted to write evasively about himself in the third-person and represent himself as a 
little boy sitting on his mother’s lap. However, that he will not do so, becomes clear in his 
statement that the beginning of the war meant the end of childhood innocence: 
Ob heute oder vor Jahren, lockend bleibt die Versuchung, sich in dritter Person zu 
verkappen: Als er annähernd zwölf zählte, doch immer noch liebend gern auf 
Mutters Schoß saß, begann und endete etwas. Aber läßt sich, was anfing, was 
auslief, so genau auf den Punkt bringen? Was mich betrifft, schon.  
Auf engem Raum wurde meine Kindheit beendet, als dort, wo ich aufwuchs, an 
verschiedenen Stellen zeitgleich der Krieg ausbrach. […] [M]it ehernen Worten 
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[from the radio] wurde in einer Parterrewohnung, die Teil eines dreistöckigen 
Mietshauses im Langfuhrer Labesweg war, das Ende meiner Kinderjahre 
ausgerufen.485 
 
However, he admits that he used his status as a child to play dumb when Nazi repression 
and violence increased around him. He did not ask questions when his Polish uncle was 
shot by the Germans during the invasion of Poland, nor when his classmate Heinrich 
disappeared after Heinrich’s anti-fascist father had been arrested by the Gestapo and his 
mother had committed suicide. Would he have been more aware of the Nazi regime’s 
oppressive nature if his father had, like Wolfgang Heinrich’s father, been opposed to it 
instead of joining the Nazi party early on? Grass brushes off these apologetic thoughts:  
Hätten wir damals… Wären wir damals…  
 Aber ich habe nicht, bin nicht. Der Onkel war weg, der Schulfreund blieb 
weg. Doch überdeutlich ist jener Junge, dem ich auf der Spur zu bleiben habe, 
dort aufzufinden, wo Ungeheuerliches geschah: knapp ein Jahr vor Kriegsbeginn. 
Gewalt, hell ausgeleuchtet bei Tageslicht.  
 Als bald nach meinem elften Geburtstag in Danzig die Synagogen 
brannten und Schaufenster in Scherben fielen, war ich zwar untätig, doch als 
neugieriger Zuschauer dabei [...]486 
 
Trying to reconstruct what he felt when he watched SA men set the Danzig synagogues 
on fire during the so-called “Reichskristallnacht“ in November 1938, Grass writes he was 
probably slightly surprised, perhaps even excited, but certainly oblivious to the injustice 
that happened before his eyes. He writes: “So beflissen ich im Laub meiner Erinnerungen 
stochere, nichts findet sich, das mir günstig wäre. Offenbar haben keine Zweifel meine 
Kinderjahre getrübt. Vielmehr machte ich, leicht zu gewinnen, bei allem mit, was der 
Alltag, der sich aufgeregt aufregend als ‚Neue Zeit’ ausgab, zu bieten hatte.”487  
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 Grass thus portrays himself as the classic bystander, whose failure to recognize 
and then to act upon discrimination, persecution and violence constitutes his moral guilt. 
He emphasizes that he never denounced anyone, neither the neighbor who told jokes 
about Göring, nor the history teacher who expressed his doubts about the propagated 
“Endsieg”. But when Monsignore Stachnik, a priest who taught Latin at his high school, 
disappeared and there were rumours that he was brought to the Stutthof concentration 
camp, he once more remained a silent observer, uncritical enough not to inquire further 
into the matter.488  
 During his training for his military service as a Flakhelfer, he displayed the same 
attitude towards another fifteen-year-old boy in his unit. This boy, probably a member of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, refused to hold or even touch a weapon, always using the same 
explanation: “Wir tun so was nicht.” The boy, soon called “Wirtunsowasnicht”, kept up 
his resistence and eventually disappeared. The young Grass felt 
wenn nicht froh, dann erleichtert seitdem der Junge verschwunden war. Der 
Anflug von Zweifel an allem, was sich als Glaube felsenfest gab, flaute ab. Und 
die Windstille in meinem Kopf wird wohl keinem Gedanken erlaubt haben, flügge 
zu werden. Nur Stumpfsinn machte sich in ihm breit.489  
 
Even though the young Grass suspected that “Wirtunsowasnicht” was brought to 
Stutthof, he did not doubt the legitimacy of this action.  
 Grass shakes his head about the obliviousness of his younger self, also with 
regard to his recruitment for the Waffen-SS. He cannot remember his exact reaction to 
receiving the conscription order. But he speculates that he must have felt excited to join 
the SS, the Führer’s elite soldiers, who—such was their image—were ordered to help out 
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the Wehrmacht in particularly dangerous combat situations and were comprised of 
volunteers from several European countries in order to collectively save “das Abendland 
vor der bolschewistischen Flut.”490  
In the chapter “Wie ich das Fürchten gelernt habe”, Grass describes the short time 
period he spent in his Waffen-SS division: In one of the very few contacts with ‘the 
enemy’, he soils his pants out of fear.  Shortly before the end of the war, the eighteen-
year-old Grass is injured. Shortly after the end of the war, he runs away from his division 
as the others are taken prisoners. He trades his SS uniform for a Wehrmacht one, winds 
up first in a field hospital to have his injury treated and later in an American POW camp.  
Grass emphasizes that he was never involved in any war crimes, that he did not 
even know about their existence, that he never used his weapon other than for training 
purposes, and that he was part of the SS-division only for a few months. “Also Ausreden 
genug”491 he states. But he continues:  
Und doch habe ich mich über Jahrzehnte hinweg geweigert, mir das Wort und den 
Doppelbuchstaben einzugestehen. Was ich mit dem dummen Stolz meiner jungen 
Jahre hingenommen hatte, wollte ich mir nach dem Krieg aus nachwachsender 
Scham verschweigen. Doch die Last blieb, und niemand konnte sie erleichtern.  
 Zwar war während der Ausbildung zum Panzerschützen, die mich den 
Herbst und Winter lang abstumpfte, nichts von jenen Kriegsverbrechen zu hören, 
die später ans Licht kamen, aber behauptete Unwissenheit konnte meine Einsicht, 
einem System eingefügt gewesen zu sein, das die Vernichtung von Millionen 
Menschen geplant, organisiert und vollzogen hatte, nicht verschleiern. Selbst 
wenn mir tätige Mitschuld auszureden war, blieb ein bis heute nicht abgetragener 
Rest, der allzu häufig Mitverantwortung genannt wird. Damit zu leben ist für die 
restlichen Jahre gewiß.492 
 
Despite the fact that he did not carry any “tätige Mitschuld” and came to the SS as an 
oblivious and naive seventeen-year-old not understanding the political situation, Grass 
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says that he has always felt great responsibility for having been part of a system that 
organized and executed the Holocaust.   
 But it seems as though he blames himself even more for the conformist behavior 
towards the persecution that took place right in front of his eyes. As Anne Fuchs has 
pointed out, the episodes about the killing of his Polish uncle, the disappearance of 
Wolfgang Heinrich’s father, his witnessing the “Reichskristallnacht” and especially the 
episodes about Monsignore Stachnik and Wirtunsowasnicht “exemplify the idea of 
resistance to the system, demonstrating that alternative non-conformist behavior would 
have been possible.”493 
With this admission of guilt, Grass explicitly distinguishes himself from other members 
of his generation, who use their age or their obliviousness to free themselves from any 
involvement with the Nazi period. He dissociates himself from those—those like Walser, 
one could add—he ironically calls “Minderbelastete,”494 who after the war simply 
presented themselves as clueless and indoctrinated victims of the Nazi regime:  
Ihnen war außer Pflichterfüllung nichts nachzuweisen. In Chorstärke sangen sie 
‘Kein schöner Land in dieser Zeit…’ Und als Verführte und Verblendete reihten 
sie mildernde Umstände, stellten sich ahnungslos und sprachen einander ein 
Höchstmaß an Unwissenheit zu.495 
 
He admits that he sometimes feels tempted to use the same defense strategies, most 
importantly he would like to use the excuse that he did not learn about the enormity of 
Nazi crimes until after the war.  But his moral guilt, he stresses once more, consists in the 
fact that he experienced the deportation of people he knew first-hand, but nevertheless, 
“trotz überprüfbarer Fassadenrisse, zunehmender Flüsterparolen und des überall, nun 
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auch in Frankreich rückgängigen Frontverlaufs,” his belief in the Führer remained 
entirely “unbeschadet.”496 The mea culpa of a member of the Hitler Youth could not be 
more unsparing than in the following:  
[D]as Belasten, Einstufen und Abstempeln kann ich selber besorgen. Ich war ja 
als Hitlerjunge ein Jungnazi. Gläubig bis zum Schluß. Nicht gerade fanatisch 
vorneweg, aber mit reflexhaften unverrücktem Blick auf die Fahne, von der es 
hieß, sie sei ‚mehr als der Tod’, blieb ich in Reih und Glied, geübt im 
Gleichschritt. Kein Zweifel kränkte den Glauben, nichts Subversives, etwa die 
heimliche Weitergabe von Flugblättern, kann mich entlasten. Kein Göringwitz 
machte mich verdächtig. Vielmehr sah ich das Vaterland bedroht, weil von 
Feinden umringt. [...]  Meine Kritik richtete sich allenfalls gegen lokale 
Parteibonzen, sogenannte Goldfasane, die sich feige vorm Dienst an der Front 
drückten, uns nach Aufmärschen vor Tribünen mit öden Reden langweilten und 
dabei ständig den heiligen Namen des Führers mißbrauchten, an den wir glaubten, 
nein, an den ich aus ungetrübter Fraglosigkeit so lange glaube, bis alles [...] in 
Scherben fiel. [...] 
 So sehe ich mich im Rückspiegel. [...] Um den Jungen und also mich zu 
entlassen, kann nicht einmal gesagt werden: Man hat uns verführt! Nein, wir 
haben uns, ich habe mich verführen lassen.497  
 
Nothing, Grass argues, can exonerate him from his naive belief in Hitler and his 
opportunist behavior. He unequivocally stresses that he was not lured into his belief in 
National Socialism—which would be an obvious apologetic argument—but that he let 
himself be lured and thus played an active part in this process.  
Peeling the onion 
Already from this brief presentation of the text it becomes clear that Grass’s main focal 
point is not, like in Walser’s case, the depiction of a childhood and youth during the Nazi 
era, but rather the display of the author’s self-criticism today. Whereas Walser creates the 
illusion of reconstructing the past in the greatest immediacy possible seemingly without 
the interference of the author, Grass makes his present view of his adolescence the center 
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of his autobiography. The metaphor of the onion epitomizes this emphasis on the process 
of remembering. Actively involved in the process of regarding his past, the author peels 
layer after layer of the onion, and every new layer faces him with new and more oblique 
memories that he needs to decipher:  
Wenn ihr mit Fragen zugesetzt wird, gleicht die Erinnerung einer Zwiebel, die 
gehäutet sein möchte, damit freigelegt werden kann, was Buchstab nach Buchstab 
ablesbar steht: selten eindeutig, oft in Spiegelschrift oder sonstwie verrätselt. 
Unter der ersten, noch trocken knisternden Haut findet sich die nächste, die, kaum 
gelöst, feucht eine feuchte dritte freigibt, unter der die vierte, fünfte, warten und 
flüstern. Und jede weitere schwitzt zu lange gemiedene Wörter aus, auch 
schnörkelige Zeichen, als habe sich ein Geheimniskrämer von jung an, als die 
Zwiebel noch keimte, verschlüsseln wollen.498  
 
Grass describes the task of deciphering the onion’s “text” as difficult. His memories, he 
implies, are unreliable and ambiguous, and not everything in his autobiography must be 
taken for the truth. “Dichtung and Wahrheit”, Grass emphasizes, go hand in hand in this 
text:  
Schon wird Ehrgeiz geweckt: dieses Gekrakel soll entziffert, jener Code geknackt 
werden. Schon ist widerlegt, was jeweils auf Wahrheit bestehen will, denn oft gibt 
die Lüge oder deren kleine Schwester, die Schummelei, den haltbarsten Teil der 
Erinnerung ab; niedergeschrieben klingt sie glaubhaft und prahlt mit Einzelheiten, 
die als fotogenau zu gelten haben […].  
 Die Zwiebel hat viele Häute. Es gibt sie in Mehrzahl. Kaum gehäutet, 
erneuert sie sich. Gehackt treibt sie Tränen. Erst beim Häuten spricht sie wahr. 
Was vor und nach dem Ende meiner Kindheit geschah, klopft mit Tatsachen an 
und verlief schlimmer als gewollt, will mal so, mal so erzählt werden und verführt 
zu Lügengeschichten.499 
 
But while Grass indicates here that the memories of his adolescence might not be 
accurate in every instance and that his autobiography might even contain some 
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“Lügengeschichten”,500 he emphasizes that the process of remembering is a truthful 
enterprise. Only during the act of peeling, “Beim Häuten der Zwiebel”, does the onion 
speak the truth.  
 The text thus redirects the reader’s attention from the events during Grass’ 
adolescence to the way in which the autobiographer approaches this past in the present. 
The reader who peels the onion with Grass and follows him on his way through the 
multiple layers of his memory, from the dry and cracked older skins outside of the onion 
to the younger, moister and tear-inducing skins on the inside, can experience the true and 
authentic Grass.501 
Self-accusation and self-exoneration 
 
While Beim Häuten der Zwiebel certainly foregrounds Grass’ emphatic self-accusation, a 
number of textual strategies nonetheless work in the author’s defense. The absolute 
rejection of the idea of childhood innocence, for example, is counterbalanced by several 
references reminding the reader that Grass was, in fact, ‘only a child’: The onion, at one 
point, whispers to Grass: “du bist doch fein raus, warst nur ein dummer Junge, hast nichts 
Schlimmes getan.”502 His belief in Adolf Hitler, he writes at another point, “fiel 
kinderleicht.”503 And he calls his trip from Danzig to Dresden, where he joined the 
Waffen-SS division Jörg von Frundsberg “Kinderlandverschickung.” 504 Even if he 
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ultimately contradicts the onion, even if the use of the word “kinderleicht” is clearly 
ironic and even if he writes that of course his “zweite Reise in den Westen wäre nur aus 
zynischer Perspektive als Kinderlandverschickung zu verstehen gewesen,”505 these 
passages serve as reminders of his young age.  
 That his intended self-accusation is accompanied by a desire for self-exoneration 
becomes very clear in two crucial passages, in which Grass stages encounters between 
himself as autobiographer and his teenage self. While he acknowledges that his young 
age cannot exonerate him from all responsibility, he writes that he cannot retire to a 
position either, from which he interrogates and judges his younger self as though he felt 
no sympathy for the boy he used to be at all. This conflicted relationship to his youth is 
epitomized in the following, in which each Grass persona represents a different attitude 
towards the past; the elderly Grass judges wihout mercy, while the young one finds 
excuses: 
Sobald ich mir den Jungen von einst, der ich als Dreizehnjähriger gewesen bin, 
herbeizitiere, ihn streng ins Verhör nehme und die Verlockung spüre, ihn zu 
richten, womöglich wie einen Fremden, dessen Nöte mich kaltlassen, 
abzuurteilen, sehe ich einen mittelgroßen Bengel in kurzen Hosen und 
Kniestrümpfen, der ständig grimassiert. Er weicht mir aus, will nicht beurteilt, 
verurteilt werden. Er flüchtet auf Mutters Schoß. Er ruft: ,Ich war doch ein Kind 
nur, nur ein Kind... 506  
 
The second passage depicts the autobiographer’s inner conflict even more clearly. Grass 
writes that he feels shame and disgrace towards his uncritical and naive belief in the 
Nazis. But at the same time he emphasizes that he can only express these feelings in 
retrospect (“im Nachholverfahren”), since as a the twelve-year-old he was not aware of 
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any wrongdoings. Grass admits that he thus probably overtaxes his younger self when he 
interrogates him about the past:  
Also schreibe ich über die Schande und die ihr nachhinkende Scham. Selten 
genutzte Wörter, gesetzt im Nachholverfahren, derweil mein mal nachsichtiger, 
dann wieder strenger Blick auf einen Jungen gerichtet bleibt, der kniefreie Hosen 
trägt, allem, was sich verborgen hält, hinterdreinschnüffelt und dennoch versäumt 
hat, „warum“ zu sagen. 
 Und während der Zwölfjährige noch peinlich befragt und dabei gewiß von 
mir überfordert wird, wäge ich in immer schneller schwindender Gegenwart jeden 
Treppenabsatz, atme hörbar, höre mich husten und lebe so heiter es geht auf den 
Tod zu.507 
 
His view of his former self, he writes in this programmatic passage, will thus be lenient 
and critical at the same time (“mal nachsichtiger, dann wieder strenger”).  
 What becomes most apparent from the juxtaposition of the young boy in shorts 
and the almost eighty-year-old author, who is out of breath, coughs, feels physically weak 
and is approaching death, is the great distance Grass feels towards his youth. This 
distance is a major theme throughout the book, apparent for example in the many 
questions in the text, which do not only point at the autobiographer’s porous memory but 
also signal his estrangement with his own thoughts and feeling, especially during the 
National Socialist period.508  
 Grass presents this distance as yet another possible form of exoneration. This is 
why in the programmatic opening paragraph of the book, along with rejecting the idea of 
childhood innocence, he pleads to resist the temptation to write about himself in the third 
person and hence to distance himself from his past. At a later point, he reiterates this idea 
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that the third-person narrative would be a way to speak more abstractly about his Nazi 
youth and to avoid personalisation of and identification with it:   
Weil aber so viele geschwiegen haben, bleibt die Versuchung groß, ganz und gar 
vom eigenen Versagen abzusehen, ersatzweise die allgemeine Schuld einzuklagen 
oder nur uneigentlich in dritter Person von sich zu sprechen: Er war, hat, sagte, er 
schwieg...509 
 
Grass explicitly rejects the idea of speaking about himself “nur uneigentlich in dritter 
Person” (as he has done for decades, one could add, in his fictional works). However, just 
as he alludes to his young age several times in the text despite the various affirmations 
that childhood is not an excuse, does not absolve him, for innocence, there is a distinct 
marker in the text with which Grass constantly distances himself from his youth: a 
continuous shift from a first-person to a third-person narrative. 
 In the chapters about the time period between 1939 and 1945, Grass often refers 
to himself as “jener Junge, der anscheinend ich war,”510 “der Sohn,”511 “der Junge meines 
Namens,”512 “jener Junge, dem ich auf der Spur zu bleiben habe,”513 “der grimassierende 
Junge,”514 “der maßlose Junge, der als Entwurf meiner selbst weiter zu entdecken ist,”515 
“der Junge mit der vorstehenden Unterlippe,”516 “mein uniformiertes Selbst,”517 or simply 
as the twelve-year-old, the thirteen-year old, the fourteen-year-old, etc. Ostensibly more 
comfortable identifying with his younger self later on, Grass uses these self-depicting 
phrases less frequently in the chapters set after the war and writes almost entirely from 
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the first-person-perspective.518 A certain sense of estrangement, however, remains. At 
some point mid-way through the book he stresses that despite having more and more 
practice in using the “I”, as he calls it, his former “I” remains foreign to him:  
Sobald ich, wie mittlerweile geübt, über alle Bedenken hinweg Ich sage, also 
meinen Zustand vor rund sechzig Jahren nachzuzeichnen versuche, ist mir mein 
damaliges Ich zwar nicht ganz und gar fremd, doch abhanden gekommen und 
entrückt wie ein entfernter Verwandter.519 
 
This passage as well as the various self-descriptive phrases in the third person dissociate 
the elderly author from the Hitlerjunge, Flakhelfer and member of the SS Günter Grass. 
Self-accusation as strategy? 
Thus, although Grass stresses that he does not want to exonerate himself by emphasizing 
how young he was, he continually hints at his young age. And although he assures us that 
he does not want to relate to his younger self from the safe distance of a third-person 
perspective, he switches back and forth between first and third person in the first part of 
his novel. So, Grass’s confessional narrative ultimately becomes visible, in Anne Fuchs’ 
words, as “a dialectical process in which each act of self-accusation triggers moments of 
self-exoneration.”520 This dialectical back and forth between self-accusation and self-
exoneration represents the author’s relationship to his Nazi childhood probably in the 
most accurate terms, and in my view the book would have gained moral credibility if 
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Grass had emphasized the exonerating aspects critically even more. As it is, he clearly 
foregrounds self-criticism and non-exculpation, a mode which appears slightly thick-
layered especially considering that he uses the emphatic self-accusation to shield himself 
from criticism.  
 In the debate following the book’s publication, this was precisely his position. 
When critics asked why in his long career as a writer and public intellectual, Grass had 
always criticized Germany’s superficial reckoning with the Nazi past but never talked 
about his own entanglement, he always evasively pointed to the book as though to say: 
the conflicted relationship with my past, my self-criticism and self-awareness, it’s all in 
there. In a television interview with Ulrich Wickert for the ARD-show “Tagesthemen”, 
for example, the interviewer confronted Grass with the criticism of Charlotte Knobloch, 
at the time president of the “Zentralrat der deutschen Juden”. Knobloch had said that 
Grass’ confession to have been in the Waffen-SS demonstrates the absurdity of his earlier 
speeches about Germany’s insufficient dealings with the past. Grass replied:  
[I]ch [kann] nur darauf hoffen, dass Frau Knobloch die Zeit findet, mein Buch zu 
lesen, denn innerhalb des Zeitraums, den ich schildere—meine jungen Jahre—
spielt das [his membership in the Waffen-SS] zwar eine Rolle, aber die weit 
kritischeren Fragen stelle ich mir in einem ganz anderen Zusammenhang. Dass 
ich zum Beispiel als Jungvolk-Hitlerjunge zu bestimmten Situationen im engeren 
Kreis, auch zum Beispiel im Familienkreis, nicht Fragen gestellt habe, nicht die 
richtigen Fragen gestellt habe.521 
 
About the fact that he kept his SS-past a secret over several decades, he said further:  
 
Ich hab das ja in meinem Buch—auch dieses Schweigen von mir—zum Thema 
gemacht. Deswegen kann ich eigentlich in der jetzigen Situation nur darauf 
hinweisen. Das Buch wird jetzt ausgeliefert und die Leser können sich selber ein 
Bild machen. Ich bin ja diesem Thema nicht ausgewichen im Buch. So, wie es in 
der Presse dargestellt worden ist, durch eine Vorabmeldung in der FAZ, sieht es 
                                                





so aus, als hätte ich der FAZ ein Geständnis gemacht; das ist nicht der Fall, es ist 
Inhalt meines Buches.522 
 
But Knobloch had wanted an explanation not so much for the lack of political insight of 
the Hitlerjunge Grass nor for his volunteering for the Wehrmacht or his joining the 
Waffen-SS. She asked for an explanation for his long silence. Although Grass claims in 
the interview that Beim Häuten der Zwiebel offers clarification with regard to this aspect, 
it actually widely avoids this subject mentioning only briefly the shame that the author 
says had hindered him from “speaking the truth.”523 Especially when pointing his finger 
at other members of his generation—who in his eyes look back onto their Nazi pasts less 
critically than he does—the constant demonstration of his willingness to criticize himself 
seems slightly forced. Not only would Grass’ confession have been more convincing 
without this indirect self-appraisal and the emphasis on the onion-peeler’s exemplary 
self-criticism, but a truly self-critical autobiography, one could argue, would have 
included a satisfying answer to the question why Grass waited so long to confess his 
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Shortly after Günter Grass revealed his membership in the Waffen-SS in Beim Häuten der 
Zwiebel, Martin Walser was quoted in the Stuttgarter Zeitung:  
Der Mündigste aller Zeitgenossen kann sechzig Jahre lang nicht miteilen, dass er 
ohne eigenes Zutun in die Waffen-SS geraten ist. Das wirft ein vernichtendes 
Licht auf unser Bewältigungsklima mit seinem normierten Denk- und 
Sprachgebrauch. [...] Grass hat durch die souveräne Platzierung seiner Mitteilung 
diesem aufpasserischem Moral-Klima eine Lektion erteilt.524 
 
Grass’s confession: a provocative gesture made in order to challenge Germany’s 
supposedly normative and narrow-minded memory culture? This is a misreading of Beim 
Häuten der Zwiebel that speaks volumes about Walser’s own position vis-à-vis German 
memory discourse. While Walser’s book clearly seeks to provoke, Grass’ is instead a 
work of compliance, a work that subscribes to the tenets of that discourse, a book written 
in an attempt to redeem the author after decades of hiding his past. Blaming Grass’ 
silence on the restrictions of a memory discourse that would not have permitted the 
revelation of his Waffen-SS past sooner is simplistic, especially since—as several critics 
have noted—the Bitburg affair in 1985 would have been an ideally powerful moment for 
such a confession. Whatever the consequences for his reputation, such a move would 
have underscored the author’s advocacy of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in a truly 
meaningful—and less compromising—way.525 
 Despite Walser’s attempts to ally himself with Grass in 2006, their childhood 
autobiographies could not be more different. Beim Häuten der Zwiebel represents exactly 
what Walser in his own memoir had criticized as “[e]ine komplett erschlossene, 
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durchleuchtete gereinigte, genehmigte, total gegenwartsgeeignete Vergangenheit. 
Ethisch, politisch durchkorrigiert.”526  Grass knew that he had to take responsibility, to 
“own,” his sin in order to maintain his status as a public intellectual; he knew that he had 
to plea guilty from the beginning, and to unequivocally reject any apologetic tendencies. 
As Grass writes, “das Belasten, Einstufen und Abstempeln kann ich selber besorgen.”527 
Walser, on the other hand, belongs to those whom criticized by Grass for playing the 
apologetic roles of “Verführte und Verblendete,”528  those who claim they did not know 
about Nazi crimes. Thus, while Grass wanted to prove himself guilty to take the wind out 
of his critics’ sails, Walser wanted to prove himself innocent in order to take a stand 
against the discourse on German guilt that he understood as dominating the memory 
culture of the nineties.  
What these two post-reunification texts have in common, however, is their 
treatment of the subject of childhood innocence within a discourse no longer focused on 
German guilt as a whole, but instead on the status of the author/intellectual himself. Both 
authors were aware of the delicate nature of their respective books, were aware that these 
texts would put them in the spotlight due to their prominent roles in post-war German 
memory discourse. And we see Walser address this delicacy in his attempts to separate 
private and public memory, both at the beginning of his novel as well as in his 
Friedenspreis speech. Of course, such a separation is wishful thinking: Grass’ and 
Walser’s memories of the Nazi era, as much as they might be part of their private, 
individual biographies, can never remain a private affair. As members of the Hitler Youth 
generation and the last witnesses of the Third Reich on the perpetrators’ side, Grass and 
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Walser were and are aware of the representative function their childhood memories 
would inevitably carry, and they both seem to have incorporated these public 
expectations into the construction of their childhood narratives.  
 Christa Wolf’s Kindheitsmuster (1976), written at an earlier and very different 
time, presents a different case. The memory of the Third Reich had not yet become 
omnipresent in literature and television, especially not in East Germany where the GDR’s 
culture of anti-fascism made any account of this time period that did not involve heroic 
socialist resistance taboo. Therefore, the sheer fact that Wolf wrote a text about her own 
involvement in the fascist regime, her adoption of anti-Semitic stereotypes, her 
willingness to ignore from discrimination, and her eagerness to climb the ladder in the 
hierarchical system of the Bund Deutscher Mädel, must be considered courageous. 
However, it is still true that Wolf only vaguely alludes to the parallels between the Nazi 
and GDR regimes. When she describes her active participation in the BDM and her pride 
in becoming a group leader despite her recognition of the mistreatment suffered by one of 
her members, the girl Gerda, it would thus likely be an overstatement to consider this a 
self-reflexive depiction of her role in the GDR. One wishes the novel contained more 
passages in which Wolf had critically depicted not only her role in the Nazi system but 
also in the GDR. And Wolf clearly wished this too—as she noted much later in her 2010 
novel Stadt der Engel: “Um wie vieles leichter war es doch, dachte ich, über die 
Verführungen einer Kindheit Rechenschaft zu geben als über die Verfehlungen der 
späteren Jahre.”529  
 Nevertheless, Wolf has undoubtedly written the most personal, most intimate and 
most self-reflexive of all three of these childhood texts, precisely because she explicitly 
                                                





writes it as a representative of her generation and not—like Grass and Walser—in order 
to establish or maintain her individual role in the public sphere. Like Walser in Ein 
springender Brunnen, Wolf represents her childhood with poetic immediacy and a sense 
of childlike innocence; like Grass in Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, she also depicts her 
narrator’s conflicted feelings towards the younger self. She, however, adds a third 
narrative missing from the other two novels, adding a second level of self-observation 
and of critical distance by incorporating her narrator’s writing process. Ultimately, it is 
the inclusion of this narrative that turns Wolf’s text into the most exceptional and most 
insightful examination of a Nazi childhood. 
Do the three writers of the Hitler Youth generation simply exploit their childhood 
representations for the purpose of exculpation? This would be a crude exaggeration, since 
while none of the texts reject the role of the innocent witness, none of them use it in order 
to reject historical responsibility. Even in the case of Walser’s novel—which at first 
glance might give this impression—the author’s insistence on an entirely innocent child 
narrator was not so much (or simply) about self-exculpation but rather a critique of the 
memory discourse of the nineties. Reading these texts as simply exculpatory, as many 
have done, seems to me to miss one of their most important aspects, and to miss an 
important critical opportunity afforded by them: a consideration of how the 
autobiographical texts of this generation played a part not just in adding to the 
understanding of the Nazi past, but also in shaping the memory discourse that developed 
in post-war Germany. Rather than reading them as authors seeking to use childhood 





lesser extent Wolf) as authors involved in a complex discursive sphere, and consider how 
the perspective of childhood innocence plays into that sphere. 
I began this chapter with the observation that the representation of childhood 
innocence in Imre Kertész’s Fatelessness, his novel about Auschwitz, would not be 
possible in a depiction of World War II from the perpetrators’ side. And as I have shown, 
while the three texts under examination here do explore this idea of a childlike innocence, 
they do not employ it without—at least partially—subverting it. In 2010, however, 
Rowohlt published a paperback memoir with the title Ich war Hitlers letztes Aufgebot. 
Meine Erlebnisse als SS-Kindersoldat, which tells the story of Günter Lucks’ 
adolescence. Recruited by the SS in 1944 at the age of 16, the same year Grass 
volunteered for the Waffen-SS, Luchs was sent into combat, captured by the Russians, 
and spent several years in their POW camps. The neologism “SS-Kindersoldat”—used 
almost nonchalatanly in the book’s title—describes with a certain accuracy the 
idiosyncratic historical role of the Hitler Youth generation: it evokes innocence as well as 
guilt, violence being done to the child as well as violence committed by it, the child as a 
victim and perpetrator. Not surprisingly, we find Grass’ recommendation on the back: 
“Der Text hat mich berührt. Ich hoffe, dass mit Hilfe solch anschaulicher Beschreibungen 
Nachgeborene Gelegenheit haben, aus den Erfahrungen früherer Generationen zu 
lernen.”530 While the almost insoluble tension of the term “SS-Kindersoldat” is startling, 
the fact that this might be the first publication to use the term “child soldier” in the 
context of World War II and the Holocaust, definitely reflects a shift in German memory 
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discourse—the ideas of innocence and guilt by association or participation no longer 





Manchmal habe ich gedacht, wenn eine gute Fee vorbeikäme, und ich hätte drei Wünsche 
frei—oder nur einen!—dann hätte ich gewünscht, noch einmal unbekannt sein zu dürfen. 
Die Ansprüche an mich kamen so massiv, daß ich in einem ständigen Schuldgefühl lebte, 










On October 2nd, 1990, one day before Germany celebrated its official political reunion, 
Frank Schirrmacher, editor and co-publisher of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
called the phenomenon of the Hitler Youth generation’s enduring dominance of the 
German literary scene since the 1960s “ein in der europäischen Literaturgeschichte 
einzigartiger Sonderfall.”531 Addressing the seemingly everlasting presence of this elderly 
league of writers, he wrote:  
Fast kein neues Gesicht ist hinzugekommen. Fast alle sind sie noch da. Und die 
jüngeren Autoren sind nicht da wie sie. Es hat sich so gut wie nichts verändert. 
Die hier schon seit dreißig Jahren versammelt sind, bestimmen […] das 
literarische Leben des Landes bis heute. Es fällt nicht leicht, eine andere Epoche 
zu finden, die so lange bei sich selber aushielt. 532 
 
Schirrmacher argued that after the historical caesura of 1945, it became the self-assigned 
task of West German literature “zu bessern, zu belehren und zu erziehen, [...] ein 
demokratisches Bewußtsein zu beweisen,” in sum, to create a founding myth for the new 
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nation, a feasible national identity, that turned out to be, “das läßt sich nach dem Ende der 
Teilung feststellen, [...] die Identität einer einzigen Generation.”533  
 However, Schirrmacher predicted that in the wake of Germany’s reunification, 
this generation, with its particular relation to World War II and the Holocaust, would 
finally be forced to retire. The fall of the Berlin Wall would involve the emergence of a 
new generation of writers and a literature liberated from national and moral-political 
demands. 
 Surprisingly enough, Ulrich Greiner, a journalist for Die Zeit, a weekly newspaper 
traditionally to the left of the F.A.Z., supported Schirrmacher’s critique of left-liberal 
writers. In the 1990 debate on Christa Wolf, later called “deutsch-deutscher 
Literaturstreit,” Greiner coined a highly controversial term, describing the predominant 
aesthetic model of Wolf’s literature—and of post-1945 German literature in general—as 
“Gesinnungsästhetik.” That is, a type of aesthetics primarily concerned with 
“außerliterarischen Themen […], mit dem Kampf gegen Restauration, Faschismus, 
Klerikalismus, Stalinismus etcetera.”534 Greiner argued, “Die Gesinnungsästhetik ist das 
gemeinsame Dritte der glücklicherweise zu Ende gegangenen Literaturen von BRD und 
DDR.”535  
 Similarly, the conservative thinker and editor of Der Merkur Karl-Heinz Bohrer 
declared in 1990, not without relief, that the model of the German littérature engagée 
was outdated. In an essay programmatically entitled “Die Ästhetik am Ausgang ihrer 
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Unmündigkeit,” Bohrer traces the long history of the German alliance between aesthetics 
and politics since the 18th century.536 He invokes both Kant and Hegel in order to 
emphasize that German literature stands at the threshold of a great liberation nothing 
short of the Enlightenment: the “Selbstbefreiung (of art) von theologisch-metaphysischer, 
schließlich ideologisch-geschichtsphilosophischer Bevormundung.”537 Like Schirrmacher 
and Greiner, Bohrer thus announced the end of a literary epoch. Finally, with the political 
change in 1990, the realm of aesthetics would be liberated from the socio-political and 
historical demands marking the country’s rebuilding after 1945. A discourse had ended.  
 Bohrer, however, revised this assertion sixteen years later in the wake of the 
Günter Grass debate around the author’s Waffen-SS membership .In his 2006 essay “Das 
eigentliche Fiasko des politischen Moralismus,”538 he conceded that the idea of a German 
littérature engagée had not ended with the historical caesura of 1990. He wrote: “Es 
zeigte sich […], dass wir aus dem Zeitalter der Moralpolitik nur zögerlich auszutreten 
beginnen.”539 Indeed, the pronouncements of the death of this generation of writers and 
their moral-political discourse were premature. The emancipation from the Hitler Youth 
generation took longer than Bohrer, Greiner, and Schirrmacher predicted. These writers 
continued to publish and to dominate the post-reunification public discourse. And yet, the 
Christa-Wolf-debate in 1990 was the first in a series of debates in which the biographies 
and the moral integrity of writers of this generation came to be increasingly questioned. 
The Wolf debate in 1990 and the media-scandal around Grass’s Waffen-SS membership 
in 2006, I argue, mark the general boundaries of the period, during which the process of 
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detachment from the Hitler Youth generation took place. Wolf’s Stasi collaboration, the 
antisemitism reproach raised against Walser, and Grass’s Waffen-SS past knocked the 
authors off their pedestals and, as a consequence, questioned the aesthetics they 
embodied—an aesthetics imbued with the morality and biography of the author.  
 In this chapter, I trace the development of Germany’s separation from a 
generation of authors who, through their biographies, had long represented the ability of 
postwar Germany to transcend the Nazi past. I will further examine a question the 
feuilleton critics widely overlooked: what the authors themselves had to say about this 
development. Since the controversies focused almost exclusively on the writers’s 
political role, the critics failed to notice the authors’s self-awareness in the very texts that 
triggered the debates. I will show that Wolf, Walser, and Grass themselves commented 
on the cultural-political change after 1989/90, as it concerned their public role.  
 This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I consider the debates about Christa 
Wolf’s political attitude towards the GDR, the so-called Deutsch-Deutscher 
Literaturstreit of 1990–91, triggered by a critique of Wolf’s novel Was bleibt 
(1979/1990) as well as the discussions that followed the revelation of her Stasi affiliation 
in 1993. I reveal that in Was bleibt , Wolf depicted her difficulties in relinquishing her 
role as a public advocate of the socialist utopia, a role I claim she only abandoned in her 
most recent novel, Stadt der Engel (2010). Second, I focus on the controversies 
surrounding Walser’s 1998 Friedenspreis speech, known as the “Walser-Bubis-Debatte,” 
and his allegedly anti-Semitic novel Tod eines Kritikers (2002). I argue that both of these 
texts were planned disturbances of the memory discourse, with which Walser sought to 





urgency of Holocaust memory. Consciously toying with the subject of memory in his 
texts, he did precisely the opposite. Finally, I turn to the scandal of Grass’s membership 
in the Waffen-SS, which he revealed in his autobiographical novel Beim Häuten der 
Zwiebel (2006). I argue that, in contrast to Walser, Grass’s novel reveals an undiminished 
desire to remain the moral-political conscience of the nation even after his biographical 
revelations. 
 My analysis shows that the most obvious commonality between the three sets of 
debates was the writers’s role as placeholders. Clearly, Wolf, Walser, and Grass did not 
present the only controversial subjects. At stake were Germany’s unification, German-
Jewish relations, and the necessity of a generational change. Rather perceptively, Thomas 
Anz entitled his edited volume on the Christa Wolf debate Es geht nicht um Christa Wolf 
540. This could be said, respectively, for each author in each debate.  
 
1. Täterakte-Opferakte—Christa Wolf and the Stasi in Was bleibt (1990) 
and Stadt der Engel (2010) 
 
Christa Wolf, Stasi informant 
In January 1993, Christa Wolf published an article in the Berliner Zeitung, a local Berlin 
newspaper, where she declared that during a visit at the so-called Gauck-Behörde where 
the documents of the GDR’s Secret Police have been administered since 1990, she found 
forty-two folders with documents confirming that the Stasi had observed her and her 
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family between 1968 and 1980.541 But besides these “Opferakten,” the files that showed 
Wolf as a victim of the Stasi, she was also confronted—as she says in the article, much to 
her own surprise—with one small folder belonging to the “Täterakten,” those files with 
information about the people who had worked for the Stasi. The evidence was 
indisputable: Wolf had been an informant for the Geheime Staatspolizei, a so-called 
“Informeller Mitarbeiter” (IM), between 1959 and 1962.542 
 The “perpetrator” file, published with the author’s agreement shortly after she had 
revealed her “discovery” in 1993, shows that the cooperation of IM Margarete (Wolf’s 
middle name and code name for her Stasi activities) with the Stasi had indeed always 
been informal, as she never signed any documents, and her cooperation had always been 
“only” as an informant. Wolf was, for example, never assigned active observations, and 
while the “Täterakte” reveals that she wrote a small number of evaluations on the 
political attitude of other writers or artists in the GDR, it also makes clear that these 
reports never contained any incriminating information. Rather, Wolf praised the political 
loyalty or literary talent of her Genossen.543 The Stasi itself marked the mere 
“informatorischen Charakter” of these reports, and after Wolf moved from Halle to 
Potsdam in 1962, the organization apparently lost interest in cooperating with her. In a 
final report written three years after the end of Wolf’s IM activities, a certain 
Oberleutnant Roscher emphasized Wolf’s “überbetonte Vorsicht und größere 
Zurückhaltung, die auf einer gewissen intellektuellen Ängstlichkeit basieren.” Comrade 
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Wolf seemed to be supportive of the SED party, “jedoch scheint ihr Verhältnis zur Partei 
mehr intellektuell-verstandesmäßig und weniger klassemäßig zu sein.”544 Roscher 
reported that Wolf had declined to meet with Stasi officials after moving to Halle. In 
1962, the “Täterakte” on Wolf was closed and put into the archives. It contained, in a 
single folder, roughly seventy pages regarding her activities as an IM. The “Opferakte” 
on Christa Wolf, which was opened in 1968, contains forty-two folders and thousands of 
pages that document the surveillance of Wolf and her husband between 1965 and 1980.545  
Stasi debate (1993) 
Finding an IM file with her name on it came as a shock to Christa Wolf. In “Auskunft,” 
the revelatory article in Berliner Zeitung, where she publicized this information, she 
wrote that she simply did not remember this episode of her life. The only memory she 
claimed to have was of a visit by two Stasi officials in 1959 who tried to obtain 
information about a West German author who had criticized the GDR regime. She 
remembered agreeing to another meeting with the Stasi because she felt intimidated. All 
the rest, her activities as Informeller Mitarbeiter were completely absent from her 
memory.546  
 The personal attacks against Wolf were fierce. The headline on the front page of 
Bild was full of malice, reading: “Unsere berühmteste Schriftstellerin Christa Wolf: Ich 
war IM… aber ich wußte es nicht.”547 The magazine Der Spiegel had supposedly been 
able to buy a copy of the IM file illegally, although the file was not yet available to the 
public. With this evidence, they felt legitimized to speak of Wolf as “überaus angepaßte 
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Opportunistin.”548 The magazine characterized her cooperation with the Ministerium für 
Staatssicherheit as “eifrige Dienstbarkeit bei der Stasi,”549 and categorized her presentation 
of the IM episode in the Berliner Zeitung article as downplaying the facts.550 Despite the 
accusatory tone and the many generalizations typical of the entire debate, the authors of 
the Spiegel article attempt to separate the biographical information on the person Christa 
Wolf from the written work of the author: “Es bleibt von Christa Wolf ein international 
beachtetes literarisches Werk. Bücher wie ‘Kassandra’ (1983) oder ‘Störfall’ (1987) 
haben nie einen Zweifel daran gelassen, daß hier keine Apologetin des DDR-Staates und 
schon gar nicht, wie immer behauptet, eine ‘Staatsdichterin’ schrieb.”551 This moral 
failure, according to Der Spiegel, did  not diminish Wolf’s continuously critical attitude 
expressed in her literary work since the 1960s. 
 This attitude was an exception. Friedrich J. Raddatz in Die Zeit, for example, 
barely distinguishes between Wolf’s literature and her biography. In his article “Von der 
Beschädigung der Literatur durch ihre Urheber: Bemerkungen zu Heiner Müller und 
Christa Wolf,” he claims that both Christa Wolf and Heiner Müller have discredited their 
work with their dishonorable political behavior:552 “Mir scheint, beide haben nicht nur 
ihrer Biographie geschadet; sie haben ihr Werk beschädigt.”553 Furthermore, Raddatz  
argues that this damage  the authors have done to their work represents a betrayal of their 
audience: “Sie haben uns verraten: nicht im Sinne von ‘angezeigt’, sondern in einem viel 
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tieferen Sinne.”554 Personally, the critic and former GDR citizen says, he feels greatly, 
almost paralyzingly, disappointed.555 The article ends with the demand that Wolf and 
Müller explain their behavior in order to rehabilitate their work and ease the 
disappointment and sadness of their audience: “Halten Sie der Würde ihres Werkes die 
Treue. Erklären Sie. Nehmen Sie mir und Ihren Lesern die Traurigkeit.”556 
 In the eyes of politician Antje Vollmer, the lack of distinction between Wolf’s 
work and her life and the highly emotional reaction that this article by Raddatz displays 
were paradigmatic of the attitude with which GDR writers were regarded in the West. 
She describes this problem as “Distanzlosigkeit” and refers to it as “klebrige Haß-
Liebe,”557 the reason, according to her, why this debate about the GDR was so passionate 
and highly charged.558 Vollmer harshly criticizes the German feuilleton’s sensationalism 
and the media’s incapacity to distinguish between author and work: “[D]a der 
Jagdinstinkt groß ist, werden für den Augenblick beide beschädigt, die Frau und ihr 
Werk.”559  
 Literary critic Volker Hage, however, argues in his Spiegel article that this lack of 
distinction comes as no surprise, considering that Wolf’s work has always been strongly 
inspired by her personal biography; the reader is facing a literary work “das mit dem 
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Leben der Autorin stark verquickt ist.”560 Having continually fostered interest in her 
biography, he suggests, Wolf had to expect this great interest in her personal life and, by 
consequence, also in her failure. Hage thinks Wolf cannot be seen as a victim of a media 
campaign, as Vollmer, for example, suggests, because:  
Christa Wolf ist nun einmal nicht allein Schriftstellerin und Privatperson, sie ist 
auch öffentliche Figur. Das Interesse des Publikums an ihrem Lebenslauf kann ihr 
niemand ersparen. Sie hat—als Autorin—auch ihren Nutzen daraus gezogen. [...] 
 Es ist also nicht Sensationsgier oder Voyeurismus, was zu 
Nachforschungen Anlaß gibt, sondern das Interesse an einem wesentlichen 
Mosaikstein im Leben dieser bedeutenden Autorin, und nicht nur das: auch in der 
Literaturgeschichte und der deutschen Geschichte überhaupt.”561  
 
He considers the public’s demand to know more about Wolf’s brief cooperation with the 
Stasi not only understandable but also legitimate, considering her role as a public and a 
representative figure.  
 Hage is right in pointing out that Wolf contributed to becoming the public figure 
she is by making her personal biography, and particularly her very personal relationship 
with the GDR, an integral part of her writing ever since her novel Nachdenken über 
Christa T (1968). Considering her public role, he seems to argue, she should not have 
been surprised about the great interest in her life. The problem with this argument, 
however, is that Wolf’s literature was precisely neglected in most discussions of her 
biography. The writer’s moral integrity was measured largely independently from the 
corpus of her work and merely on the basis of her political biography.  
 This problem had been even more obvious in the debate surrounding Wolf’s Was 
bleibt in 1990–91. The critics’ stunning blind spot for the novella at the center of the 
debate reveals the extent to which the controversy was focused on Wolf as a public 
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persona. The feuilletons failed to notice that Wolf, the writer, had already commented on 
the very same subject they were so heatedly discussing—her relationship with the GDR 
and her moral integrity as a public intellectual—in Was bleibt. In the following, I will 
recapitulate the main events of the 1990 debate before presenting my reading of Was 
bleibt. At the center of this part of my chapter on Christa Wolf, however, stands my 
discussion of Wolf’s novel Stadt der Engel, published one year before she passed away in 
2011. While during the twenty years between 1990 and 2010, the discourse on the Hitler 
Youth generation changed—public interest in the writers’ representative function 
diminished—Wolf continued to hold on to the idea that her biography represented GDR 
history until her last novel. The autobiographical text focuses on the question of how she 
could repress her Stasi past. She wants to present a clear explanation in order to complete 
the story of the East-German state. But as I will show, the text does not give a 
satisfactory answer. Like Wolf’s life and the political utopia in which she believed, the 
novel leaves us with contradictions. 
What remains—The “Was bleibt” debate in 1990 
Whereas in the Stasi debate in 1993, Wolf’s writing was questioned on the grounds of her 
biography, the earlier debate in 1990–91 questioned her biography on the grounds of a 
literary work. The object of dispute was the short novella Was bleibt, published one year 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In this text, Wolf describes in just ninety-two 
pages one day in the life of a female author in East Berlin in 1979, who is being observed 
by the Stasi. The notion of being under surveillance accompanies the narrator’s every 
action, from the most banal private ones like making coffee to significant public ones like 





parked in front of her building cause her, the text depicts her strong resistance toward 
acknowledging the oppressive sides of the GDR regime. At almost any costs, she wants 
to maintain the utopian ideal on which this state was founded. Wolf demonstrates how 
the narrator’s convictions begin to crumble—and how, nonetheless, she cannot release 
her attachment to the socialist idea.  
 The publication of this short text was followed by a heated debate carried out in 
all national dailies and weeklies for over a year, a debate that shook the intellectual scene 
of the newly re-united Germany to its core. The “Christa-Wolf-Debatte” became what 
was later called “Der Deutsch-Deutsche Literaturstreit,” a debate no longer only 
involving the East German writer but a broad reassessment of post-1945 literature in both 
East and West Germany.562 Obviously, Wolf served as a catalyst for a cultural debate that 
was needed one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall, but how did the slim novella Was 
bleibt become the trigger?  
 Ulrich Greiner’s article “Mangel an Feingefühl,” published June 1, 1990 in Die 
Zeit, served as the starting point of the debate. In this article, Greiner attacked Wolf by 
calling the publication of this book hypocritical. He pointed out that through the figure of 
the narrator,563 the author had presented herself as a victim of the same regime she had 
actually always supported. With unrestrained sarcasm, he writes:  
Das ist ja ein Ding: Die Staatsdichterin der DDR soll vom Staatssicherheitsdienst 
der DDR überwacht worden sein? Christa Wolf, die Nationalpreisträgerin, die 
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prominenteste Autorin ihres Landes, SED-Mitglied bis zum letzten Augenblick, 
ein Opfer der Stasi?564  
 
Wolf’s failure and her lack of integrity were most apparent, according to Greiner, in the 
fact that Wolf withheld its publication until after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The novella 
ends with the juxtaposition of two dates in the last line suggesting its genesis both in 
“Juni/Juli 1979” and “November 1989.”565  In his eyes, the two dates represent on the one 
hand the moment Wolf began to write about the surveillance when it occurred in 1979 
and on the other the time when she finally dared to take the manuscript out of the drawer. 
That is, the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, when it was politically safe and no longer 
presented a personal risk for her to publish this text. Greiner calls this belated publication 
embarrassing:  
[D]er 9. November ist doch mindestens in dieser Hinsicht eine historische 
Wasserscheide. Davor wäre die Publikation dieses Textes eine Sensation 
gewesen, die sicherlich das Ende der Staatsdichterin Christa Wolf und vermutlich 
ihre Emigration zur Folge gehabt hätte. Danach ist die Veröffentlichung nur noch 
peinlich.566  
 
By not publishing the text earlier, Greiner argues, Wolf decided to retain the comfortable 
position of being the GDR’s “Staatsdichterin,” and thereby missed the opportunity to 
become a courageous critic of the regime. “Daß Christa Wolf diesen Text in der 
Schublade behielt, ist ihr gutes Recht,”567 Greiner concedes this point, half-heartedly 
pointing out that as a West German citizen he might not be in a position to judge. 
Nevertheless, in his eyes Wolf is to blame for having been dishonest with herself and her 
own history. He claims that the belated publication expressed “einen Mangel an 
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Feingefühl gegenüber denen, deren Leben der SED-Staat zerstört hat.”568 While others 
were forced to flee because they were overt in their criticism, Greiner suggests, Wolf had 
been able to stay because she remained vague. That she attempted to correct this behavior 
in retrospect with a text representing her as a victim of the GDR regime was outrageous.  
 Frank Schirrmacher published a similarly accusatory article on Wolf in the F.A.Z. 
one day after Greiner’s article appeared. Like Greiner, Schirrmacher harshly criticizes the 
late publication of Was bleibt and considers it a missed opportunity: “Dieses Buch, das 
eine Verfolgungsangst schildert, hätte vor zehn, ja vor fünf Jahren der Staatssicherheit 
wohl Schaden zufügen können. Jetzt ist es bedeutungslos, anachronistisch und hat Züge 
des Lächerlichen.”569  Schirrmacher makes it very clear that Wolf does not interest him 
from an aesthetic viewpoint: “Christa Wolf interessiert nicht als künstlerischer Fall,” he 
says bluntly, and he speaks of her reputation as a writer as “weit überschätzt.”570 
Schirrmacher thus dismisses Wolf as an artist, and instead openly attacks her on a moral 
basis. He speaks with contempt of her willingness to believe in the political system of 
socialism without ever losing “jene Mischung von Illusionsbereitschaft, Wunschdenken 
und bigotter Zustimmung, die es fraglich erscheinen läßt, ob Christa Wolf überhaupt 
jemals begriffen hat, daß sie in einem totalitären System lebte.”571 He blames her for 
having downplayed the totalitarian character of the GDR and sarcastically mocks her 
alleged naiveté, stating that she does not seem to have ever understood “daß die 
                                                
568 Ibid., 70.  
569 Frank Schirrmacher, “Dem Druck des härteren, strengeren Lebens standhalten. Auch eine Studie über 
den autoritären Charakter: Christa Wolfs Aufsätze, Reden und ihre jüngste Erzählung Was bleibt,” 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 2, 1990, in Anz, Es geht nicht um Christa Wolf, 77–89, 87.  
570 Schirrmacher, “Dem Druck,” 77.  





sozialistische Unterdrückung nicht mit einem gruppentherapeutischen 
Selbsterfahrungszirkel bekämpft werden kann.”572  
 He then continues his analysis by turning Wolf’s moral failure into an exemplary 
case. He reads “die beunruhigende und in vielem exemplarische Biographie dieser 
Schriftstellerin”573 as a study of the authoritarian German character. Wolf becomes a 
representative of intellectuals in both the GDR and the Third Reich: “der versagende 
Intellektuelle im Angesicht totalitärer Herrschaft,“574 blindly following state authorities at 
the loss of intellectual integrity. He writes: “Angesichts ihrer Biographie stellt sich ein 
zweites Mal in der Geschichte dieses Jahrhunderts die Frage, wie blind Denken und Tat, 
Literatur und Welt füreinander sein könnten.”575 And further: “[I]n Wahrheit war das 
Verhältnis des Intellektuellen zum SED-Staat in vielem eine fast tragikomische 
Wiederholung der Fehler von einst, und jene ‘Strukturen’, von denen man in aller 
Unklarheit so gerne sprach, lebten hier vor aller Augen greifbar fort.”576 He clarifies that 
the GDR regime lacked the criminal energy of the murderous Nazi regime but maintains 
that the parallels in the behavior of intellectuals in both regimes are obvious: history has 
repeated itself in that the writers again have proven not to be courageous enough to stand 
up to the totalitarian regime. Again, the intellectuals have failed.  
 Schirrmacher embeds his statements about Wolf’s allegedly authoritarian 
character and opportunism into what Andreas Huyssen has mockingly called the “psycho-
historisch aufgeputztes Generations-Argument.”577 In order to explain why Wolf was 
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unable to see herself being corrupted by the totalitarian regime, Schirrmacher espouses an 
idea that Wolf herself has expressed many times, namely that it was the catastrophic 
experience of the Third Reich that made her believe in the experiment of socialism with 
its founding myth of anti-fascism and its goal to become the better Germany. The wish 
for acceptance by the older generation of socialist heroes and father figures, and the hope 
to redeem her first moral failure, her guilt about her Hitler Youth past, lead her to slip 
into her second moral failure: her belief in the socialist utopia represented by the GDR. 
Huyssen has pointed out that it is “[v]öllig unzulässig” to denigrate Wolf “als 
Gallionsfigur eines Totalitarismus mit Vaterkomplex.”578 He writes: “Schirrmacher 
scheint vergessen zu haben, daß es Wolf war, die die Kontinuitäten im Leben unter dem 
Faschismus und in der DDR in ‘Nachdenken über Christa T.’ und in ‘Kindheitsmuster’ 
thematisierte, und zwar gegen große Widerstände in der DDR.”579 Perhaps even more 
objectionable than the neglect of those core works is that Schirrmacher’s generational 
argument is in fact, knowingly or unknowingly, “borrowed” from Wolf herself. To 
present Christa Wolf as a case study of the authoritarian character—embodying a lack of 
independence and responsibility among intellectuals that was prevalent in Hitler’s 
Germany and supposedly continued into the GDR—is almost ironic considering the 
project of Wolf’s novel Kindheitsmuster (1976). This novel turns precisely around  the 
self-critical quest for patterns that have remained dominant in the generation that grew up 
under Hitler, such as a deep belief in authorities.  
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 Schirrmacher does acknowledge the importance of the category of “generation” 
for Wolf but presents it as proof of his own argument:  
Scham, Schuld, Wiedergutmachung—diesen Imperativ und die Einsicht in die 
Konsequenz der ungeheuren Verbrechen scheint in Ost und West jene Generation 
am tiefsten verinnerlicht zu haben, die das Dritte Reich noch als Jugendliche 
erlebt hat. Das Schlüsselwort, mit dem Christa Wolf immer wieder politische 
Sachverhalte interpretiert, heißt denn auch ‚Generation’. Es hat in allen ihren 
Essays und all ihren Romanen und Erzählungen eine zentrale Bedeutung [...].580 
 
Schirrmacher brushes off Wolf’s generational reflections as simplistic. He does not even 
entirely ignore that Wolf presents her own political trajectory and that of generation at 
times in a highly self-critical way. He simply dismisses these moments of self-
recognition as “folgenlos” and hidden underneath Wolf’s allegedly wishy-washy 
language:  
Auch in den Momenten der Selbsterkenntnis verhüllt ihre [i.e., Wolf’s] Sprache 
wieder alles, was das Gewissen freigibt: jene Mischung aus Selbstlosigkeit und 
folgenloser Selbstbezichtigung, die noch im Schuldbekenntnis die 
Märtyrerhaltung sucht und mit der die gleiche Generation auch in der 
Bundesrepublik vierzig Jahre lang den Widerstand gegen Hitler nachholte.581  
 
Wolf’s self-criticism loses credibility, from his perspective, because it is merely an 
attempt at redemption, especially if it occurs only in the realm of aesthetics. “Vor der 
Gewissensnot in die diffusen Räume des Unsagbaren flüchten, das war [...] schon die 
Übung der vom Nationalsozialismus belasteten Intellektuellen der Nachkriegszeit-
Wiederholungszwang der Geschichte,”582 he writes, alluding to the so-called Innere 
Emigration during the Nazi period. Was bleibt, for him, seems to be yet another text 
representing the moral failure of German writers of the 20th century, too weak to address 
political oppression.  
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Personal, political, and aesthetic crisis—A reading of “Was bleibt” 
Schirrmacher’s interpretation of Wolf’s Was bleibt conflicts with my own close reading 
of the text. I argue that Wolf does not avoid a critical stance. Rather, her criticism is 
directed not exclusively at the GDR, but at her own attitude towards the socialist state. To 
argue that Wolf hides self-criticism behind her poetic language is possible only if one 
overlooks the text’s frame—its beginning and end, in which Wolf explains in a highly 
self-critical way why her language lacks the sharpness and directness that both 
Schirrmacher and Greiner demand of her. The entire text is framed by the narrator’s 
doubt, expressed in the first and last paragraph, about whether she will ever be able to 
find this type of language. The text begins with an encouragement not to postpone the 
project of writing about the Stasi surveillance:  
Nur keine Angst. In jener anderen Sprache, die ich im Ohr, noch nicht auf der 
Zunge habe, werde ich eines Tages auch darüber reden. Heute, das wußte ich, 
wäre es noch zu früh. Aber würde ich spüren, wenn es an der Zeit ist? Würde ich 
meine Sprache je finden? Einmal würde ich alt sein. Und wie würde ich mich 
dieser Tage dann erinnern? Der Schreck zog etwas in mir zusammen, das sich bei 
Freude ausdehnt. Wann war ich zuletzt froh gewesen? Das wollte ich jetzt nicht 
wissen. Wissen wollte ich—es war ein Morgen im März, kühl, grau, auch nicht 
mehr allzu früh—, wie ich in zehn, zwanzig Jahren an diesen noch frischen, noch 
nicht abgelebten Tag zurückdenken würde.583 
 
Besides evoking an atmosphere of anxiety (“Angst”) and sadness (“Wann war ich zuletzt 
froh gewesen?”), which sets the tone of this text right from the start, this passage also 
contains the admission of a failure: the narrator hopes that some day she will be able to 
talk “about that” (“darüber”) in a different kind of language, but she has doubts about 
when and even if this will happen (“Würde ich meine Sprache je finden?”). For now, she 
concedes that this use of a new language presents an impossibility (“Heute, das wußte 
ich, wäre es noch zu früh”).  
                                                





 The narrator is not yet able to talk about the blatant gap between the original idea 
socialism represented and the GDR reality. This becomes manifest in a passage where 
she speaks about the headrests in her observers’ car. She has learned not to confuse those 
inanimate objects with the heads of the observers:  
Köpfe sind ungleichmäßig geformt, beweglich, Kopfstützen gleichförmig, 
abgerundet, steil—ein gewaltiger Unterschied, den ich irgendwann einmal 
genauer beschreiben könnte, in meiner neuen Sprache, die härter sein würde als 
die, in der ich immer noch denken mußte. Wie hartnäckig die Stimme die 
Tonhöhe hält, auf die sie sich einmal eingependelt hat, und welche Anstrengung 
es kostet, auch nur Nuancen zu ändern. Von den Wörtern gar nicht zu reden, 
dachte ich, während ich anfing, mich zu duschen—den Wörtern, die, sich 
beflissen überstürzend, hervorquellen, wenn ich den Mund aufmache, 
angeschwollen von Überzeugungen, Vorurteilen, Eitelkeit, Zorn, Enttäuschung 
und Selbstmitleid.584 
 
Someday, she says, she will be able to describe the discrepancy between the ideal 
appearance, “gleichförmig, abgerundet, steil,” and the reality of things, “ungleichmäßig 
geformt, beweglich.” To describe this drastic difference between the utopian ideal and its 
ugly manifestation, seeing the heads of those men ordered to sit in front of her house to 
keep her under surveillance, she will need to find a different register, a different pitch—a 
task that presents enormous difficulties for her since she emphasizes the effort this 
change requires: “Wie hartnäckig die Stimme die Tonhöhe hält, auf die sie sich einmal 
eingependelt hat, und welche Anstrengung es kostet, auch nur Nuancen zu ändern.” To 
find a vocabulary for her new language seems even harder to her. She will have to 
overcome a flood of emotions in order to speak differently about the GDR regime, 
“Überzeugungen, Vorurteile […], Eitelkeit, Zorn, Enttäuschung und Selbstmitleid.”585  
 Thus the narrator finds herself at a turning point. She is becoming disillusioned 
with the GDR regime, and this disillusionment, she feels, affects her writing. She 
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recognizes that, with the realization of the oppressive sides of the regime, her aesthetic 
approach will also have to change. This recognition triggers a veritable “Sprachkrise.” 
The language she used to speak is already in a state of crisis, as becomes visible in the 
following passage:  
Aber zu welchem Zweck saßen drei junge Herren viele Stunden lang beharrlich in 
einem weißen Wartburg direkt gegenüber unserem Fenster.  
 Fragezeichen. Die Zeichensetzung in Zukunft gefälligst ernster nehmen, 
sagte ich mir. Überhaupt: sich mehr an die harmlosen Übereinkünfte halten. Das 
ging doch, früher. Als hinter den Sätzen mehr Ausrufezeichen als Fragezeichen 
standen? Aber mit simplen Selbstbezichtigungen würde ich diesmal nicht 
davonkommen. Ich setzte Wasser auf. Das mea culpa überlassen wir mal den 
Katholiken. Wie auch das pater noster. Lossprechungen sind nicht in Sicht.586  
 
The conventions of punctuation, “die harmlosen Übereinkünfte” of language, which here 
stand in for political convictions as well, have become fragile. Where there used to be 
exclamation marks, there are now question marks. “Lossprechungen,” easy ways out of 
the crisis, are not on the horizon.  
  Later in the text, the beginning passage is reiterated. Don’t be afraid, the narrator 
says to herself again, there will be a new language. It has already begun to grow inside of 
her:  
Keine Angst. Meine andere Sprache, dachte ich, weiter darauf aus, mich zu 
täuschen, während ich das Geschirr in das Spülbecken stellte, mein Bett machte, 
ins vordere Zimmer zurückging und endlich am Schreibtisch saß—meine andere 
Sprache, die in mir zu wachsen begonnen hatte, zu ihrer vollen Ausbildung aber 
noch nicht gekommen war, würde gelassen das Sichtbare dem Unsichbaren 
opfern, würde aufhören, die Gegenstände durch ihr Aussehen zu beschreiben—
tomatenrote, weiße Autos, lieber Himmel!—und würde, mehr und mehr, das 
unsichtbare Wesentliche aufscheinen lassen. Zupackend würde diese Sprache 
sein, soviel glaubte ich immerhin zu ahnen, schonend und liebevoll. Niemandem 
würde sie weh tun als mir selbst. Mir dämmerte, warum ich über diese Zettel, 
über einzelne Sätze nicht hinauskam. Ich gab vor, ihnen nachzuhängen. In 
Wirklichkeit dachte ich nichts.587 
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One day, she will be able to overcome the simple realism of describing objects by their 
outer appearance. The new language will “das unsichtbare Wesentliche aufscheinen 
lassen”; it will not just convey the color of the surveillance car in front of the narrator’s 
house but also address its political significance. This language will get to the bottom of 
things without being accusatory; she herself will be the only person to whom this new 
language will cause pain. But as in the opening paragraph, this hope for a new language 
is expressed in the subjunctive, and the narrator even acknowledges that her talk about a 
new language serves the purpose of self-deception. With the talk of the “other” language, 
she is “weiter darauf aus, mich zu täuschen.” For the moment, the thoughts of a more 
critical and more concrete way of writing about the GDR are not all-absorbing: “Ich gab 
vor, ihnen nachzuhängen. In Wirklichkeit dachte ich nichts.”  
 Again, the text displays the narrator’s failure. While she is able to analyze the 
problem her inability to express the corruption of the idea she once believed in), to see 
the challenge (finding a new mode of expression that allows for doubt and criticism), and 
to imagine a solution for the future (the new language with which she will be able to 
express criticism firmly and openly), she also makes it clear that for now, she is stuck 
hoping for a different, more critical aesthetic. Thus, I read the beginning of Was bleibt, 
the framework for this novella about Wolf being under Stasi observation, not as a 
representation of victimhood but as a self-critical assessment of a process of 
disillusionment that started with the recognition of her own surveillance.  
 The day Wolf describes in Was bleibt marks the beginning of a process of 
disillusionment. It starts with a change in perception that makes her recognize the terror 





genauer, mit meinem gesamten Wahrnehmungsapparat. [...] Was ist mit uns, hörte ich 
mich denken, mehrmals hintereinander, sonst fehlten mir die Worte, sie fehlen mir bis 
heute.”588 What about us, the people who believed in this system? It is significant that 
Wolf is publishing this text in 1990 claiming that she still has not found the words to 
comment on this loss of political orientation in a meaningful way: “sie fehlen mir bis 
heute.” It is a strong statement that Wolf publishes this text displaying her aesthetic and 
political paralysis around 1979 in 1989 at the moment of the GDR’s total collapse, 
because it shows that she is at the same point she was ten years before. She is still 
searching for a way of translating the drastic political change into a new aesthetic form. 
This text mirrors her helplessness in facing, both personally and aesthetically, the 
breakdown of the utopian idea that had accompanied her throughout her life. 
 This reading invalidates Greiner’s reproaches concerning Wolf’s language and the 
date of publication. In the article initiating the long-lasting Christa Wolf debate, Greiner 
had criticized what he calls the “Christa-Wolf-Sound, diese flaue Unverbindlichkeits-
Melodie in der apart formulierten Sprache, [...] diese für Christa Wolf typische 
Unschärfe-Relation zwischen der wirklichen Welt, die als ferne Ahnung 
herüberschimmert, und der poetischen Welt ihrer Texte.”589 Only vaguely, he states, does 
Wolf describe the problems in the GDR instead of calling institutions or places by their 
names: “Der vorliegende Text vermeidet jede Konkretion. Weder von Stasi ist die Rede 
noch von Berlin. Terror findet statt. Aber kein Ort, nirgends.”590 But whereas Greiner 
reads the text’s lack of concreteness as well as its late publication date as a sign of Wolf’s 
avoidance and cowardice, I argue that this is precisely what Wolf displays in Was bleibt: 
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her inability to be concrete in her criticism of the GDR. She herself recognizes as a 
failure that she is not able to adequately depict what is wrong with the state she lives in. 
The book is framed by the admission that there is still no new, free language, not even in 
1989. Ironically, Greiner is then only repeating the idea Wolf had already addressed in 
her book. Because of her inability to address the real problems of the GDR regime, he 
turns her into a representative of the moral failure of the left, after she had depicted 
herself in this role.  
 The juxtaposition of Wolf’s generation with the younger generation of GDR 
citizens and writers in Was bleibt can be seen as further evidence for this reading. In an 
encounter with a young female writer of the same generation as the narrator’s daughter, 
the narrator recognized that this younger generation does not share her deep personal 
intertwinement with GDR history and is much freer and more courageous in its political 
criticism. The young writer comes to her apartment for advice. It turns out that the young 
woman had been involved in political activities as a university student, which ultimately 
led to her being expelled from her studies: “sie es war, die man damals vom Studium 
ausgeschlossen hatte, da sie nicht zu den Erpreßbaren gehörte.”591 Ultimately, she was 
even put in prison. The narrator feels strongly that this confinement, the result and 
embodiment of the younger woman’s willingness to risk her personal freedom in order to 
speak up against the regime, separates the two: “‘Gefängnis’ war das Wort, das unsere 
Verwandtschaft in Frage stellte. Es ließ sich nichts dazu sagen, nichts fragen.”592  
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 Although the young woman’s writing is excellent, the narrator advises her not to 
publish any of it. While she admires the younger colleague for her courage, she feels that 
she risks too much with her regime-critical writing:  
Ich dachte: Es ist soweit. Die Jungen schreiben es auf. Das Mädchen erzählte von 
seinem harten Leben, jetzt wollte es sein innerstes Wesen hervorkehren, aber 
wohin sollte das führen, ich mußte es zügeln, ich konnte nicht dulden, daß es in 
diesem zutraulichen Zustand auf die Straße trat, ich mußte es fragen, wie es im 
Gefängnis war, mußte mir anhören, die Kälte sei das schlimmste gewesen. [...] Ich 
mußte jetzt, falls es möglich war, diesem Mädchen Angst einjagen. Mußte ihm 
sagen, die größten Talente seien in deutschen Gefängnissen vermodert, 
dutzendweis, und es sei nicht wahr, daß ein Talent der Kälte und der Demütigung 
und der Zermürbung besser widerstehe als ein Nichttalent. Und daß noch in zehn 
Jahren Menschen Sätze würden lesen wollen, wie sie sie schrieb. Und daß sie, 
bitte, nicht in jedes offene Messer laufen sollte.593  
 
Here we arrive at an exceedingly important passage of the text. Considering that Wolf 
herself waited until 1989 to publish Was bleibt, it is significant that she recommends the 
young writer to leave her manuscript in the drawer because in ten years’ time the 
situation might look different. Had the critics discovered this interesting twist of the text, 
they would have probably read it as a justification of Wolf’s alleged opportunism: not 
only did she herself lack the courage to publish a critical text, but she portrays it as 
juvenility. But the encounter with the younger writer triggers crucial moments of self-
doubt in the narrator that Wolf equally portrays in the text. Comparing herself to the 
young woman, the narrator realizes that her own inability to write about the regime’s 
terror stems from a hesitation to let go of the socialist ideal: “Das Mädchen fragte nicht 
krämerisch: Was bleibt. Es fragte auch nicht danach, woran es sich erinnern würde, wenn 
es einst alt wäre.”594 
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 Later, when she is confronted with the open criticism of a few younger GDR 
citizens at the reading she gives in an East Berlin theater, she says: “Was taten diese 
Leute. Sie brachten sich in Gefahr. Aber mit welchem Recht hielt ich sie für dümmer als 
mich? Mit welchem Recht nahm ich mir heraus, sie vor sich selbst zu schützen?”595 This 
juxtaposition of the narrator’s fear with the younger generation’s courage turns Was 
bleibt into a self-critical autobiographical text. Later at night, the narrator’s daughter calls 
because she had heard about an incident at the reading. She says at the end of the phone 
conversation: “Was ich noch sagen wollte: Sie haben ja recht, dir zu mißtrauen.” The 
narrator responds: “Das fange ich gerade zu begreifen an.”596 The novella pinpoints this 
moment—the moment the narrator realizes that she is slowly but surely moving to the 
side of the critics of the regime. The curtailment of civic freedom in the GDR has 
increased so much that she can no longer look away. Was bleibt depicts the narrator’s 
melancholic position of trying to come to terms with this conflict and her vain struggle to 
find a new language to write about it.  
Light and free?—Christa Wolf in the City of Angels 
Almost exactly twenty years after Germany’s reunification and the publication of Was 
bleibt, Wolf’s autobiographical novel Stadt der Engel oder The Overcoat of Dr. Freud 
(2010) appeared in German bookstores. Stadt der Engel covers the academic year 1992–
1993, when Wolf was a fellow of the Getty Center in Los Angeles, while the Stasi debate 
was in full swing in Germany. The novel portrays the American experience of the 
protagonist, clearly identifiable as Christa Wolf, her emotional reactions to the attacks 
against her in the German press, and, most importantly, her attempts at understanding 
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how she could simply forget about the part of her biography that involved her affiliation 
with the Stasi.  
 Wolf’s fans and critics had awaited this novel with great anticipation. In the 
Berliner Zeitung article, in which she had confessed to having a Stasi file,she had 
announced a plan to write about her personal relationship with the GDR one day “in 
größerem Zusammenhang.”597 From my perspective, the novel fulfills that promise—
however, not in the sense many readers expected, who were counting on a clear-cut 
explanation of Wolf’s cooperation with the Stasi and her long silence about it. Wolf does 
not give an explanation that goes beyond the memory loss she had claimed earlier. But 
she provides something else. In the last paragraph of Was bleibt, the narrator expresses 
with some hope: “Eines Tages, dachte ich, werde ich sprechen können, ganz leicht und 
frei.”598 This day, I believe, arrives with the publication of Stadt der Engel. Wolf depicts 
her liberation from the firm grip of socialism, a liberation that also has aesthetic 
consequences.  
 It is a strange setting: the East German author Christa Wolf in L.A., transplanted 
to the easy-going West Coast of the United States, her recently dissolved country 
appearing in the distance as a vague memory. This setting, however, creates a particular 
atmosphere that demands a shift in perspective, both in the narrator as well as in the 
reader. How important L.A. is for the understanding of the novel can not only be seen 
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from the title but also from the novel’s epigraph, taken from Walter Benjamin’s 
Ausgraben und Erinnern:  
So müssen wahrhafte Erinnerungen  
viel weniger berichtend verfahren 
als genau den Ort bezeichnen,  
an dem der Forscher ihrer habhaft wurde.599  
 
Thus we are told from the beginning why the City of Angels is of great importance: It is 
the place where Wolf is confronted with her memories of the GDR, or more precisely her 
attempts to remember what led to her cooperation with the Stasi. We will be given 
“wahrhafte Erinnerungen,” the epigraph suggests, and they will be expressed not in the 
form of a report (“berichtend”), but indirectly in this narrative of Wolf’s visit to 
California.   
 Wolf stays at the Getty Center as a writer in residence, but while she secretly 
pursues another project—the search for an old Jewish friend of her friend Emma, both of 
them communists from the first hour—she goes to the Center every day and writes 
“Tagesprotokolle” of her experiences in L.A. Increasingly, these daily reports turn into 
“Überlegungen, die mit den Tagesnotizen scheinbar nichts zu tun hatten,”600 and she 
writes down memories of her life in the GDR and reflections on her relationship to the 
socialist state. These reflections stand out typographically from the rest of the text, as 
they are written in capital letters. As such Wolf gives the illusion that we are dealing with 
the same notes she had scribbled down on a daily basis in 1993 at the Getty Center. She 
simply collected them and inserted them into her novel.  
 One of these notes, placed towards the beginning of the text, I consider 
particularly important for the character of the entire novel. It reads: “VOM ENDE HER 
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ERZÄHLEN.”601 This indicates the perspective of hindsight, both politically as well as 
biographically, from which Wolf tells her story. On the one hand, the word “end” refers 
to the end of the GDR. The socialist state as a political entity “ended” with Germany’s 
reunification in 1990. More importantly, however, Wolf’s approach “vom Ende her” 
alludes to her own biography. As Jörg Magenau, Wolf’s biographer, has pointed out, it is 
not a coincidence that the novel ends with a trip to Death Valley and the fantasy, rather 
untypical for Christa Wolf, of flying over the vast landscape with an angel.602 Wolf 
evidently considers this autobiographical text the last one she will write in her lifetime. 
One has to read the following note with both the political and the personal layers of 
meaning in mind:  
WIE VOM ENDE HER ALLES SICH AUFKLÄRT. WIE MAN, WENN MAN 
MITTEN DRIN STECKT, DURCH KEINE ANSTRENGUNG DAS MUSTER 
ERKENNEN KANN. DAS UNTER DEN ERSCHEINUNGEN ARBEITET. 
WEIL DER BLINDE FLECK DAS ZENTRUM DER EINSICHT UND DER 
ERKENNTNIS ÜBERDECKT.603  
 
Whereas in Was bleibt, Wolf presents herself as too entangled with the ideas behind the 
corrupted political system to gain a critical perspective, she suggests that this text 
contains the insights of a woman of eighty-one years who has seen the GDR collapse 
more than twenty years earlier—a perspective from which things obviously look 
different.  
 The temporal and geographical distance allows her to revisit her strong belief in 
the socialist utopia and also to eventually tackle the most difficult part of her past: the 
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602 Magenau writes that in “Die Reise endet nicht zufällig im ‘Death Valley’, wo sie in eine Traumvision 
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cooperation with the Stasi that she had repressed for so long and re-discovered less than a 
year before. She wants to find out both what had made her amenable to being an 
informant for the Stasi and, perhaps even more importantly, how she could forget this 
episode of her life. “MEINER EIGENEN FREMDHEIT NACHZUGEHEN,” she writes 
“hatte ich lange vermieden, bis jetzt.”604 Her plan is now: “NOCH EINMAL DAS 
UNTERSTE NACH OBEN KEHREN.”605 The image with which she tries to capture the 
difficulty of this inquiry becomes the overcoat of Dr. Freud, used throughout the novel.  
 The coat had once belonged to an architect, Bob Rice, who had received it from 
the wife of Richard Neutra, to whom the coat had been given by Freud himself. With 
Freud’s overcoat he would be able to make it through any difficulty in life, Rice thought. 
When it was stolen, Rice simultaneously felt a great loss and the conviction that he would 
make do without its protection. The ambiguity of the loss of the coat—was it a loss or a 
blessing in disguise?—draws Wolf, again and again, to this image. When she tells her 
American friend Sally about the unexpected Stasi files, Wolf says: “The overcoat of Dr. 
Freud [...]. Ich wünschte, er könnte mich schützen.” Sally replies: “Im Gegenteil [...]. Er 
ist doch dazu da, dir deinen Selbstschutz wegzuziehen,”606 implying that the 
psychoanalytic technique Freud represents is supposed to bring back repressed fears and 
conflicts into consciousness. Wolf explains the coat metaphor most clearly to her 
Feldenkrais therapist, like her Chinese accupuncture therapist one of many Californian 
characters the East-German author encounters: “The overcoat of Dr. Freud […]. Der 
Mantel, weißt du, der dich wärmt, aber auch verbirgt, und den man von innen nach außen 
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wenden muß. Damit das Innere sichtbar wird.”607 This image expresses the two-fold 
process she must follow: in order to stop the concealment, she needs to get to the bottom 
of her repressed memory about her Stasi past (“MEINER EIGENEN FREMDHEIT 
NACHGEHEN,”608 as she calls it), while simultaneously protecting herself from what 
this process will stir up. The process of unveiling, not coincidentally, begins on the 
evening she first hears about Dr. Freud’s overcoat from Bob Rice.  
 In the novel, this is the moment in which Wolf decides that she needs to speak 
publicly about her Stasi “Täterakte”: 
Alles in mir sträubte sich dagegen, aber es ließ sich nicht mehr aufschieben, damit 
an die Öffentlichkeit zu gehen, ich fing an, eine Art Bericht zu schreiben, so 
wahrhaftig wie möglich, den ich an eine Zeitung in Berlin faxte.609 
 
The wish for a protective shield becomes urgent when, shortly after the publication of the 
article in Berliner Zeitung, the Stasi affair reaches its peak in the German media. In Stadt 
der Engel, Wolf reveals how she suffered during this time. The night after her husband 
faxes her some of articles containing harsh personal attacks against her, she has suicidal 
thoughts: 
Ich fragte mich ernsthaft, was ich machen sollte. Wie ich die Nacht überstehen 
sollte. [...] Ich legte mich ins Bett und suchte angestrengt nach Beweisen, die ich 
für eine Verteidigung hätte brauchen können. Ich fand keine. Keinen Zipfel des 
overcoat des Dr. Freud konnte ich ergreifen. Ich spürte, daß ich in einen Strudel 
geriet, und begriff, daß ich in der Gefahr war. Der Grund des Strudels, an dem ich 
nicht mehr da wäre, kam mir sehr verlockend vor, als das einzig Mögliche. Ich 
überlegte, wie ich es machen könnte, das lenkte mich etwas ab.610 
 
Wolf is ultimately able to free herself from the maelstrom, but the nagging self-
interrogation does not stop. If she only searches long and hard enough, if she turns herself 
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inside out, she hopes to eventually find a convincing way of explaining what happened in 
1959 when she began to cooperate with the Stasi, and how she could forget about it. She 
realizes the implausibility of the only explanation she has to offer: “Wie hatte ich das 
vergessen können? Ich wußte ja, daß man mir das nicht glauben konnte, man warf es mir 
sogar als mein eigentliches Vergehen vor.”611 Was it really possible that she could have 
simply forgotten she was an IM? She talks to a friend, a psychotherapist, from Zurich: 
Ich rief den Freund in Zürich an: Sie als Psychologe müssen es wissen: Kann man 
es vergessen? Daß sie mir einen Decknamen gegeben haben? Daß ich einen 
Bericht geschrieben habe? Er ließ sich nicht aus der Ruhe bringen. Na und? sagte 
er. Was weiter? Im übrigen: Man kann alles vergessen. Man muß sogar. Kennen 
Sie nicht den Satz von Freud: Ohne Vergessen könnten wir nicht leben? – 
Verdrängen! sagte ich. Und er: Nicht unbedingt. Man vergißt auch, was man nicht 
so wichtig findet. – Aber das kann es doch bei mir in diesem Fall nicht gewesen 
sein. – Wer weiß. Wie lange ist das denn her. – Dreiunddreißig Jahre. – Ach du 
lieber Himmel. Und woher wollen Sie dann heute wissen, was Ihnen damals 
wichtig war? – Das will ich rauskriegen. – Und wie? – Ich steig noch mal runter 
in diesen Schacht.612   
 
She might have repressed the 1959 encounters with the Stasi, says the psychotherapist, or 
simply forgotten them because they were not that important. Wolf finds this explanation 
as unsatisfying as many of her critics. In one of her notes, she writes: “MANCHMAL 
DENKE ICH, ICH MÜSSTE MICH NUR AUF DIE RICHTIGE WEISE 
ANSTRENGEN, DANN WÜRDEN DIE RICHTIGEN, DIE RETTENDEN SÄTZE 
ZUM VORSCHEIN KOMMEN.”613 There must be a good way to defend herself, to find 
the right language to do it. She only has to try harder.  
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 Jörg Magenau, in his review of the novel for the taz, focuses on this introspection 
and expresses his tiredness with Wolf’s “tendenziell unendliche Selbstbefragung.”614 
Critically, he asks:  
Müsste Christa Wolf nach ihrem Stasi-Gedächtnis-Debakel nicht ihre Methode 
ändern? [...] Sie setzt die alte Methode der selbstquälerischen Erinnerungsarbeit 
fort, als wäre nichts gewesen.615  
 
I disagree with Magenau’s reading. In my view, Stadt der Engel represents a turning 
point in Wolf’s writing precisely because she gives up the torturing self-interrogation. It 
is hard to pinpoint a precise moment in the novel at which Wolf finally abandons the 
search for a justification and the self-inspection that went along with it. But there are 
moments of recognition throughout the novel that point in this direction, such as when 
she wonders about the right behavior in her situation but ultimately acknowledges: 
“ODER VERFALLE ICH WIEDER IN DEN FEHLER, NACH DEN ANSPRÜCHEN 
ANDERER ZU FRAGEN.”616 An encounter with a young (West) German journalist who 
has come to California to interview her also shows her that it might ultimately be futile to 
hope for understanding at all.617 Faced with the journalist’s ignorance—she is entirely 
clueless and uninformed with regard to Wolf’s literary work—Wolf feels that whatever 
explanation she gives will be misunderstood. At another point, she notices that she 
mainly pursues an internal self-interrogation out of an external sense of duty to the 
public:  
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MIR IST KLARGEWORDEN, DASS ICH MICH ALS EXEMPEL NEHME, 
ALSO VON MIR ABSEHE, INDEM ICH MICH GANZ AUF MICH ZU 
KONZENTRIEREN SCHEINE. EINE MERKWÜRDIGE GEGENLÄUFIGE 
BEWEGUNG.618  
 
These moments of recognition, I argue, lead to the novel’s strange ending and can explain 
the lack of a satisfying explanation for Wolf’s Stasi past. If one assembles all the 
passages relating to this episode in her life, the reader is offered the following narrative: 
in her naive admiration for the GDR state, Wolf did not see any reason to question the 
necessity of the Geheime Staatspolizei. She willfully cooperated, writing a few reports. 
Then she simply forgot this episode of her life, because it just did not have great 
significance for her at the time.  
 The fact that Christa Wolf abides by this simplest, banal, and definitely least 
believable explanation of her Stasi past, and that she accepts that there is no great secret 
to discover, no solution, no possibility to be a role model in this situation, takes on a 
much greater significance at this point in the text. She will not need the protective shield 
of Freud’s coat nor will she have to turn it inside out in an act of self-revelation. All she 
needs to do—after all, this is new-agey California—is learn the art of letting go, which 
she accomplishes at the end.  
Flight with an angel? The ending of “Stadt der Engel” 
This acceptance of her double moral failure—her Stasi past and its repression—
transforms her. She isolates herself from her friends and falls ill with a high fever. The 
fever seems to be reason for the appearance of Angelina, the angel, who in reality is her 
African American cleaning lady. “OB SIE, DER ENGEL, EIN TEIL MEINER 
                                                





GENESUNG SEI,”619 Wolf wants to know. Clearly, the answer is yes. She experiences a 
great change during her last weeks in the U.S. She arrives at a “Wendepunkt [...], 
Wochen, in denen ich das Gefühl hatte, in einer immer brüchiger werdenden Wirklichkeit 
zu leben.”620 On a trip to Arizona with new friends, she visits a Hopi reservation, and 
faced with the history of this people, she realizes her country’s and her own 
insignificance in the great scope of things. The trip becomes “EINE REISE AUF DIE 
ANDERE SEITE DER WIRKLICHKEIT,”621 and angel Angelina remains her steady 
companion. 
 The healing process taking place during this trip to the other side of reality 
involves giving up the torturing habit of self-questioning: “Angelina ließ mich wissen, 
daß man nicht alles erklären müsse.”622 Wolf meditates on the necessity of living with 
unsolvable conflicts; she learns “DASS KEINE UNSERER UNAUSWEICHLICHEN 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN RICHTIG IST. DASS WIR KEINE WAHL ZWISCHEN 
FALSCH UND RICHTIG HABEN.”623 This recognition goes hand in hand with a 
remarkable shift in tone, a freer and lighter, almost humorous language that allows for 
conversations with angels and other magical elements such as the flight over Death 
Valley Wolf undertakes with Angelina at the very end of the novel. From the perspective 
of death, “vom Ende her,” Wolf ultimately recognizes that nothing ever comes to a 
perfect completion:  
Ich wußte, daß es ein Abschied war. Eine Arbeit ist getan, Angelina, aber warum 
bleibt das Gefühl der Vollendung aus? Ein Wort trieb mir zu, das ich seit Wochen 
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unbewußt gesucht hatte: Vorläufig. Eine vorläufige Arbeit ist zu einem 
vorläufigen Schluß gekommen. Angelina lachte: Aber ist es so nicht immer?624  
 
To let go—this seems to be the life lesson Wolf learns at the end of her stay in California. 
From her new vantage point, the suffering that the socialist experiment called GDR has 
caused in her life seems in vain:  
Das kleine Land, aus dem ich kam, [...] [s]tand über ihm nicht von Anfang an das 
Menetekel des Untergangs: ins Nichts mit ihm? Wäre es möglich, daß ich um 
einen banalen Irrtum so sollte gelitten haben?625  
 
It appears as though this is the moment she leaves behind the idea of her country, indeed 
the entire belief system that accompanied her ever since she emerged from World War II 
as a young woman, one of Hitler’s admirers. How can she make do without her identity 
as a socialist writer? How is starting from scratch possible at her advanced age? 
Angelina, the angel, has the last word, and so the novel ends with a reference to life’s 
(and the text’s) uncertainty and circularity:  
Müßte ich jetzt nicht eine große Schleife fliegen? Sagte ich. Zurück auf Anfang? 
Mach doch, sagte sie ungerührt. Und Jahre Arbeit? Einfach wegwerfen? Das 
Alter, Angelina, das Alter verbietet es.  
Angelina hatte zum Alter kein Verhältnis. Sie hatte alle Zeit der Welt. Sie wollte 
ihren Leichtsinn auf mich übertragen. Sie wollte daß ich diesen Flug genoß. [...] 
Wohin sind wir unterwegs? Das weiß ich nicht.  
 
With this final, almost absurd and certainly unusual image—a Superman-like flight of an 
Ossi with an African American angel—Wolf shows her readers that she has found a new 
way to approach her past. Surprisingly, it is not the dialectic language of questioning and 
self-questioning, of rational explanations and getting to the bottom of things we are used 
to from Wolf’s texts. It seems that “Leichtsinn”—the levity Angelina wanted to transfer 
onto her, as the last quote suggests—has indeed crept into Christa Wolf’s writing, in the 
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truest sense of the word. Towards the end of her life, Wolf accepts the loss of the socialist 
utopia and the great ideological disorientation it brings (“Wohin sind wir unterwegs? Das 
weiß ich nicht.”). She even seems to enjoy it. Will people believe her when she says that 
she has simply forgotten about her Stasi affiliation in her youth? Stadt der Engel presents 
a liberation from this very question. Wolf said once in an interview that if a fairy came 
and granted her three wishes, or even one, she would wish that she had never become 
famous, because the burden of responsibility she felt toward the public was often too 
much to bear.626 With the figure of Angelina, Wolf has created an American version of 
this fairy, but with Stadt der Engel she herself makes this wish come true.  
Reception of “Stadt der Engel” 
Wolf’s 1990 novella Was bleibt displays the writer’s difficulty abandoning the socialist 
utopia, so integral of her post-war biography and constitutive of her identity as a writer. 
Even after the collapse of the GDR regime, she emphasizes in this novel, she has not yet 
found a language that would be critical of the socialist experiment. In Stadt der Engel, 
she still has not found this critical language. However, seventeen years after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, she finally realizes that while the public discourse about writers of the 
Hitler Youth generation had changed, she herself continued to hold on to the idea of 
exemplifying the political development of the GDR. The failure of the state and her own 
failure became one. But with the surrealist ending of Stadt der Engel, Wolf’s true 
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“Alterswerk” and the last novel before her death she puts an end to a search for a new 
language. In an act of liberation, she imagines the end of her life in an unusual language, 
in an untypical setting, as far away as she could possibly be from embodying GDR 
history. But how did the critics react to this conscious counterpoint to Wolf’s previous 
writing? How did they evaluate Wolf’s treatment of her Stasi past, which the writer 
herself had called unsatisfying?  
 Considering that Wolf was read as a symbol of German history both in 1990 and 
1993, it is astonishing that there was not even a hint of such a representative reading in 
the initial reviews of Stadt der Engel. While the text vividly represents Wolf’s own 
psychological quest to get to the bottom of her Stasi repression, the critics seem to be 
preoccupied mostly with aesthetic questions. Joachim Güntner, for example, writing for 
Neue Zücher Zeitung, focuses on the genre question—is this a novel or a travelogue?—
and complains about the many side characters, who appear “flat” to him, especially 
compared to Wolf’s other novels.627 Arno Widmann’s review for the Frankfurter 
Rundschau, is similarly concerned with the genre of the text. He protests that Wolf 
should have made the text more obviously autobiographical by including more concrete 
dates.628  
 Jens Jessen, journalist for Die Zeit, provides the subtlest reading of the novel. His 
review was the only one offering an explanation of the strange twist at the end of Stadt 
der Engel. Like me, he interprets Stadt der Engel as Wolf’s disassociation from a certain 
                                                
627 Joachim Güntner, “Weich abgefederte Selbstbefragung. Stadt der Engel oder The Overcoat of Dr. 
Freud. Christa Wolfs kalifornisches Räsonnement,” Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 22, 2010, 
http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/kultur/buchrezensionen/weich_abgefederte_selbstbefragung_1.6201888.ht
ml.  
628 Arno Widmann, “Christa Wolf’s Stadt Der Engel. Wahrheit und Wahn,” Frankfurter Rundschau, June 





self-image: her “hochgehaltenes, literarisch hochgezüchtetes Selbstbild als Inbegriff 
moralischer Sensibilität.”629 He does not spare Wolf the charge of “Larmoyanz und 
Selbstgerechtigkeit,” but ultimately understands that “die Selbstgerechtigkeit, die Anfälle 
von Weinerlichkeit und Selbstmitleid werden nur zur Vorbereitung einer ganz anderen 
Pointe inszeniert”630: all self-involvement is staged in order to be left behind. His reading 
of the novel thus ends on a positive note. Wolf, in his eyes, is preparing herself for the 
end of her life and has never been more humble.  
 Overall, the reviews clearly lack the judgmental tone with which Wolf’s moral-
political failures were commented on before. The emotional investment palpable in the 
reviews of Was bleibt is missing. The accusations and the assessment of guilt that formed 
the foundation of the 2003 Stasi debate seem to no longer be of interest to  critics in 
2010. Instead, they reveal a willingness to discuss the text primarily for its aesthetic 
merits or failures. Apparently, the discussion of whether Wolf belongs to the shelf of 
German history on the side of the “Täterakten” or on the side of the “Opferakten” had 
petered out long before the author herself, with some belatedness, gave up on playing a 
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Es gab in seiner Rede überspitzte Formulierungen. Ein Dichter darf so etwas. 
            —Gerhard Schröder 
  
2. Literature and Morality— 
The Walser Debates of 1998 and 2002 
 
The moral cudgel—Walser speaking at St. Paul’s Church  
Martin Walser’s speech “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” parts of 
which have been previously discussed, becomes relevant once again in the context of this 
chapter. I have argued that Walser’s insistance on presenting his childhood memories in 
Ein springender Brunnen from the ahistorical and apolitical perspective of the child 
matches his demand for an individualization of memory in the Friedenspreis speech. I 
have already mentioned the particularly provocative passages of the speech: Walser 
argued that the Holocaust was being instrumentalized, that it had become mere 
“Drohroutine, […] jederzeit einsetzbares Einschüchterungsmittel oder Moralkeule.”631 
He spoke of an “Instrumentalisierung unserer Schande zu gegenwärtigen Zwecken,”632 
and a “Routine des Beschuldigens” in the German media, called the Holocaust memorial 
in Berlin “einen fußballfeldgroßen Alptraum,” and he confessed that he had developed a 
strong resistance against this type of “Dauerrepräsentation unserer Schande.”633 “Mit 
seinem Gewissen ist jeder allein,”634 Walser claimed insisting on individuality in matters 
of memory, which in his eyes ought not to be imposed by the government or the media.  
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 What remains to be considered is the furious debate that arose shortly after 
Walser’s speech. This controversy as well as the debate that followed the publication of 
Walser’s novel Tod eines Kritikers (2002) four years later will be the focus of this next 
part of my chapter.  
 In its emotional and intellectual vigor, the Walser-Bubis debate, which arguably 
became the most important memory controversy of the 1990s, is comparable only to the 
famous Historikerstreit of 1987. It began with a public statement by Ignatz Bubis, 
president of the Zentralrat der Deutschen Juden in Deutschland at the time. Bubis had 
already expressed his dislike of Walser’s speech by remaining seated in the St. Paul’s 
Church while the majority of the audience gave Walser a standing ovation. Two days 
later, on October 11, he was quoted in the FAZ putting Walser in close ideological 
proximity to politicians of the extreme right: “Leute wie der DVU-Vorsitzende Gerhard 
Frey and Ex-Republikaner Chef Franz Schönhuber sagen es auch nicht anders. Das ist 
geistige Brandstiftung.”635 On November 9, the anniversary of the Kristallnacht, his 
accusations became more concrete. In a commemorative speech at a synagogue in Berlin, 
he referred to Walser’s speech as “[d]en neuesten Versuch, Geschichte zu verdrängen 
beziehungsweise die Erinnerung auszulöschen.”636 Walser, in turn, defended his stance 
with the argument that many Germans felt the same way. At the university of Duisburg 
on November 28, he stressed that in the roughly six weeks since the Friedenspreis speech 
he had received over one thousand letters, in which German citizens expressed “daß sie 
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einer Rede zustimmen, in der öffentlich gesagt wurde, was jeder bisher nur gedacht oder 
gefühlt hatte.”637 
 The outrage both over Walser’s speech and Bubis’ response did not abate for at 
least four months. Until the beginning of the following January, when contributions 
became more irregular, there were articles and letters-to-the-editor in the papers every 
single day, either commenting on Walser’s speech or Bubis’ reaction, or discussing the 
German memory discourse in general. Every German intellectual of distinction seems to 
have contributed to the exchange.  The volume assembling articles and letters 
encompasses 679 densely printed pages.  
The Walser-Bubis debate in its historical and political context 
Three characteristic features can explain the intensity of the debate. The first one is the 
political and historical context of the 1990s. As Schirrmacher put it, the time of Walser’s 
speech at St. Paul’s Church presented an “Augenblick, da das Land die Hauptstadt 
wechselt und das Jahrhundert hinter sich läßt.”638 The 1990s in Germany represented a 
decade of great historical and political change, beginning with Germany’s reunification in 
1990, a consequence of which was the move of the country’s capital from provincial 
Bonn to the historical city of Berlin in 1998. Furthermore, the era of Helmut Kohl had 
just ended. One month before the Friedenspreis speech, in September 1998, a new 
                                                
637 Martin Walser, “Wovon zeugt die Schande, wenn nicht von Verbrechen. Das Gewissen ist die innere 
Einsamkeit mit sich: Ein Zwischenruf,” FAZ, November 28, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-
Debatte, 252-260.   
638 Frank Schirrmacher, “Ein Gespräch. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,” FAZ, December 14, 1998, in 
Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 436-438, 437. With these words, Schirrmacher introduces a 
meeting of Walser and Bubis, who were invited by the FAZ to talk to each other in person when two 
months after Walser’s speech the controversial discussions still had not calmed down. For a transcription of 
the conversation between Walser and Bubis, with the presence of Salomon Korn and Frank Schirrmacher, 
see Ignatz Bubis, Salomon Korn, Frank Schirrmacher, and Martin Walser, “Wir brauchen eine neue 






parliament was elected: for the first time in eighteen years the German chancellor was no 
longer Helmut Kohl, and a coalition of the social-democratic and the Green Party (“Die 
Grünen”) took over, with Gerhard Schröder as the chancellor and Joschka Fischer as the 
foreign minister.639 These obvious political changes entailed shifts in less conspicuous 
realms. German national identity needed to be redefined, and how closely this reflection 
on nationhood and identity was intertwined with the memory of the past becomes 
palpable from the various memory debates of the 1990s such as the Wehrmacht debate, 
the Goldhagen controversy, the fights over compensatory claims made by Holocaust 
survivors, the debates about Germans as victims of World War II, and the debate about 
the Holocaust memorial that Walser mentions in his speech.640 In the cultural sphere, a 
number of national and international movies (with Steven Spielberg’s 1993 film 
Schindler’s List being the most popular) and television productions (consider for example 
Guido Knopp’s popular documentaries) addressing the subject of the Holocaust and 
World War II further demonstrate that the 1990s were a decade of an international 
“memory boom”—with Germany, due to its historical role, always at the center.641 
Considering the omnipresence of the memory subject, it is not surprising that almost 
everyone seemed to have an opinion about Walser’s memory speech. Obviously, there 
was great need for an open dialogue about memory. Walser had hit the nation’s nerve not 
least because of the politico-historical timing of his speech.  
                                                
639 Kohl was Germany’s Chancellor from 1982 to 1998.    
640 For information on these debates, see Lexikon der 
“Vergangenheitsbewältigung,” eds. Torben Fischer, and Mathias N. Lorenz (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 
2009). More specifically, see entries on “Wehrmachtsausstellung” (288-289), “Holocaust-Mahnmal in 
Berlin” (290-292), “Goldhagen-Debatte” (295), as well as the section on “Deutsche Opfernarrative” (340 
356).  
641 See for example James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, (Yale: 
Yale University Press), and Andreas Huyssen, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. 





 The second characteristic feature that contributed to the heatedness of the debate 
concerns the protagonists’s biographies. Both Walser and Bubis were born in 1927, but in 
the debate they occupied different roles with regard to the history of the Third Reich, 
Bubis belonging to the side of the Jewish victims, Walser to the side of the German 
perpetrators. As Schirrmacher put it: “zwei Gleichaltrige, aufgewachsen auf den zwei 
Seiten der Jahrhunderterfahrung.”642 Thus, while it was repeatedly said that the debate 
enabled a new form of Jewish-German dialogue,643 Karl Heinz Bohrer was correct when 
he pointed out that this controversy was “ein im Grunde nicht lösbaren Streit zwischen 
emotionell sich verletzt Fühlenden einer noch betroffenen Generation.”644 What 
distinguished this debate from previous ones, Bohrer argued, was “daß die meisten 
Teilnehmer nicht eigentlich wie Intellektuelle sprachen oder vorrangig in Kompetenz 
über eine Sache Sprechende waren, sondern buchstäblich Betroffene.”645 
 Klaus von Dohnanyi’s role in the controversy exemplifies Bohrer’s thesis. The 
participants had high emotional stakes in the debate due to their biographical attachment 
to the Nazi period. Von Dohnanyi had tried to mediate between Bubis and Walser in his 
role as someone who, coming from a family with members of the resistance movement, 
stood between perpetrators and victims.646 He suggested in his defense of Walser in Die 
Zeit that this position enabled him to see why one party could not understand the other, or 
                                                
642 Frank Schirrmacher, Ein Gespräch, Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 438.  
643 See for example Rafael Seligmann, “Endlich streiten wir uns. Walser contra Bubis: Der deutsch-
jüdische Dialog befreit sich aus dem Angstghetto,” Die Welt, November 21, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die 
Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 198-200.  
644 Karl Heinz Bohrer, ”Schuldkultur oder Schamkultur und der Verlust an historischem Gedächtnis,” NZZ, 
December 12, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 420-431, here 423-24. 
645 Ibid., 421.  
646 Klaus von Dohnanyi, former mayor of Hamburg and a famous figure in Germany’s political scene, is 
the son of Hans von Dohnanyi and Christine Bonhoeffer. His father was arrested by the Gestapo because of 
his active resistance against the Nazis and killed in the concentration camp of Sachsenhausen shortly before 
the end of the War in 1945. His uncle Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Lutheran theologian and pastor, was also an 
active opponent of Nazism and equally involved in the German resistance movement. Arrested in 1943, he 





rather why Bubis could not understand Walser: “weil […] für Ignatz Bubis niemals auch 
nur ein Nebenton von persönlichem Vorwurf zu spüren sein kann. Bubis ist Jude, für ihn 
als Deutschen beginnt die Verantwortung erst nach dem Holocaust.”647 Walser’s speech, 
however, was read by von Dohnanyi as “die Klage eines persönlich unschuldigen 
Deutschen, der sich in der historischen Haft weiß, in einer Schande für die Verbrechen 
vorangegangener Generationen, die er nicht begangen hat, für die er sich aber doch 
verantwortlich fühlen muss.”648 Ironically, while von Dohnanyi from his supposedly 
neutral stance seemed to argue for communication across the stark historical divide 
between perpetrators and victims, he achieved quite the opposite. The positions hardened 
after he proceeded to ask whether Bubis had ever wondered how the Jewish citizens of 
Germany would feel today if ‘only’ the disabled, the homosexuals and the Roma had 
been deported to the camps and the Jews had been excluded from Nazi persecution.649 
Bubis responded almost immediately, calling this question “bösartig.”650 Von Dohnanyi, 
deeply upset, felt misquoted and misunderstood—and soon the exchange became a back-
and-forth of unproductive accusations and expressions of hurt sensitivities.651 Jens Jessen 
                                                
647 Klaus von Dohnanyi, “Eine Friedensrede. Martin Walsers notwendige Klage,” FAZ, November 14, 
1998, 146-150, 148.  
648 Ibid., 150.  
649 Dohnanyi writes: “Ich selbst formuliere deswegen, trotz meiner Familiengeschichte, immer ganz 
bewußt: Wir Deutsche haben das gemacht. Ignatz Bubis muß als Jude ein anderes Bewußtsein haben. Für 
ihn haben die Deutschen das getan. Allerdings müßten sich natürlich auch die jüdischen Bürger in 
Deutschland fragen, ob sie sich so sehr viel tapferer als die meisten anderen Deutschand verhalten hätten, 
wenn nach 1933 ‘nur’ die Behinderten, die Homosexuellen oder die Roma in die Vernichtungslager 
geschleppt worden wären. Ein jeder sollte versuchen, diese Frage für sich selbst ehrlich zu beantworten.” 
Ibid., 148.   
650 Ibid., 148.  
651 Klaus Dohnanyi wrote in an open letter to Bubis: “Ich finde, als Vorsitzender des Zentralrates der 
Deutschen Juden könnten Sie mit Ihren nicht-jüdischen Landsleuten etwas behutsamer umgehen; wir sind 
nämlich alle verletzbar. (“Klaus von Dohnanyi antwortet Ignatz Bubis. Wir sind alle verletzbar,” FAZ, 
November 11, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 164.) Bubis, in turn, understanding the 
pronoun “wir” in last sentece as referring exclusively to the non-Jewish Germans, suggested in his response 
that von Dohnanyi and Walser could likewise treat their fellow Jewish citizens with more caution “denn 
auch wir sind verletzbar. Ist Ihnen das schon einmal in den Sinn gekommen?” (”Ignatz Bubis antwortet 





evaluated the situation intelligently several years later when he wrote about Bubis, 
Dohnanyi, and Walser: “In diesem historisch durchaus emblematischen Dreieck von 
überlebendem Opfer, Nachfahr des Widerstands und national verzweifeltem Dichter 
bewegte sich nun die Debatte von Verletzung zu Verletzung, ohne den geringsten 
Erkenntniswert als eben den der Verletzbarkeit […].”652 The debate within the debate 
thus verifies Bohrer’s point very clearly: these participants do not speak with the rational 
voice and emotional distance of intellectuals but as representatives of the same complex 
generation with, however, distinct historical roles that seemed to make of a dialogue a 
topic so closely related to their personal biographies difficult if not impossible.  
 The third reason for the fervor and length of the debate was Walser’s nebulous 
phrasing. The speech was full of vague formulations and allusions, and to a large extent, 
the Walser-Bubis debate can simply be seen as “Interpretationsstreit,”653 in which the 
greatest ambiguity concerned the question Klaus Harpprecht asked in Die Zeit: “Wen 
meint Martin Walser?”654 Like many other, Harpprecht wondered why Walser did not 
clarify against whom his critique of the instrumentalization of Holocaust memory was 
directed. It was this vagueness, he argued, that gave way to suspicions about underlying 
                                                                                                                                            
Bubis-Debatte, 174-175, 175.)  Von Dohnanyi then clarified in yet another retort, deeply aggrieved, that he 
had of course meant all German citizens with his remark that everyone is vulnerable and—finally—asked 
Bubis to continue this dialogue in person. (“Klaus von Dohnanyi antwortet Ignatz Bubis. Wer das Wir 
zerbricht,” FAZ, November 20, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 186).  
652 Jens Jessen, ”Der Dichter und sein Bärenführer. Der Fall Martin Walser ist auch ein Fall Frank 
Schirrmacher: Wozu die ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’ einen Tabubrecher braucht,” Die Zeit, June 6, 
2002, http://www.zeit.de/2002/24/Der_Dichter_und_sein_Baerenfuehrer. 
653 Rafael Seligmann, “Endlich streiten wir uns. Walser contra Bubis: Der deutsch-jüdische Dialog befreit 
sich aus dem Angstghetto,’’Die Welt, November 21, 1998, in in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 
198-200, 198.   






anti-Semitism.655 Salomon Korn criticized Walser’s “nebulösen 
Instrumentalisierungsvorwurf” in a similar way:  
Er hätte zumindest Roß und Reiter nennen müssen, um nicht den fatalen Eindruck 
zu erwecken, es seien wieder einmal ‘die üblichen Verdächtigen’ gemeint, zum 
Beispiel der Zentralrat der deutschen Juden in Deutschland, der World Jewish 
Congress oder gar das ‘internationale Judentum’—oder waren es vielleicht doch 
Grass, Reich-Ranicki, Habermas und andere?”656  
 
And Marcel Reich-Ranicki, while considering the content of the speech rather harmless, 
identified Walser’s rhetoric of ambiguity as its actual problem:   
Ich sehe in seiner Rede keinen einzigen wirklich empörenden Gedanken. Aber es 
wimmelt in ihr von unklaren und vagen Darlegungen und Formulierungen, die 
mißverstanden werden können und von denen manche—das war doch 
vorauszusehen—mißverstanden werden müssen.657  
 
Why would Walser not avoid any ambiguity that could bring him close to positions of the 
extreme right? He refused to distance himself from these “false” readings of his speech. 
If his vagueness had been unintentional and he had felt that the entire debate was based 
on misunderstandings, would it not have been easy for a writer to explain his position? 
“Ein klärendes Wort, wäre das so schwierig gewesen, ein klärendes Wort?,” Salomon 
                                                
655 Harpprecht writes: “Durch die Wolkigkeit der Anklage spannt er das Netz des Verdachts viel weiter: 
Wer steckt zuletzt hinter der ‘Drohroutine’? Wer droht wem? Drohen New Yorker Anwälte, die von der 
Deutschen Bank Aufklärung über Arisiserungsgewinne und von der Allianz Auskunft über unterschlagene 
Versicherungen fordern? Droht der Jüdische Weltkongreß? Israel?” He concludes: “Das Problem der 
Frankfurter Rede Walsers ist nicht ihre Kühnheit, sondern die Feigheit generalisierender Verdächtigung.’” 
Ibid., 52 and 53.  
656 Salomon Korn, “Es ist Zeit. Die andere Seite des Walser-Bubis-Streits,” FAZ , December 1, 1998, in 
Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 304-307, 305-306. In the same vein, Wolfram Schütte found 
fault with Walser’s “Kritik, die semantisch in die Nähe politisch rechter Verschwörungstheorien landete.” 
Wolfram Schütte, “Lawinenkunde. Folgekosten einer ‘literarischen’ Friedensrede,” Frankfurter Rundschau 
November 25, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 220-223, 222. And Friedrich 
Schorlemmer expressed a similar concern in a letter to Bubis that Walser “begibt […] sich in den 
Dunstkreis rechter Zweideutigkeit und schwankt mit Heidegger ins Ungefähre.” Friedrich Schorlemmer, 
“Brief an Ignatz Bubis: Walsers trostloses Ungefähr. Einwände zu Martin Walsers Friedenspreisrede am 
11.10.98 in der Frankfurter Paulskirche,” October 20, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 
73-75, 74. 
657 Marcel Reich-Ranicki, “Das Beste, was wir sein können. Walser, Bubis, Dohnanyi und der 





Korn asked Walser. But Walser did not want to clarify. In fact, he made it a point not to 
do so.  
No need to clarify?  
During the conversation with Bubis and Schirrmacher at the offices of the FAZ, Bubis 
kept reminding Walser of his important role in German memory politics. Bubis argued 
that Walser has always been known for his moral integrity, especially when it came to the 
memory of the Holocaust—after all, it was Walser who had written the famous essay 
“Unser Auschwitz” in 1965, reminding the Germans of their historical responsibility.658 
Bubis appealed to Walser’s role as representative figure in the memory discourse when 
he says: “Man erlebt jetzt eine Entlastung, man kann jetzt sagen, man habe jemanden, auf 
den man sich berufen kann, auf Martin Walser, einen unverdächtigen Mann.”659 Salomon 
Korn further explicated this point: “Es geht darum, daß sich viele Menschen aus dieser 
Verantwortung nun verabschieden, weil sie sagen können, daß Martin Walser es ihnen 
vorgemacht hat.”660 This representative role, however, was precisely what Walser wanted 
to cast off. Fritz Göttler commented in Süddeutsche Zeitung:  
Es war einmal, ein paar Jahr nur ist das her, da hat man sich nicht mehr retten 
können vor lauter Walser-Auftritten und -Äußerungen. Grass war gerade etwas 
abgetaucht, Walser gefordert als moralische Instanz. Gerade das will er nun als 
Friedenspreisträger nicht [mehr] sein.661   
 
                                                
658 Walser wrote the essay “Unser Auschwitz” in 1965 during the time of the Auschwitz trials. He accused 
the German public of delegating the responsibility for the Nazi crimes conveniently to “the Nazis,” the 
small group of men being put on trial, while the widespread support of the entire nation was being 
forgotten. See Martin Walser, “Unser Auschwitz”, in Martin Walser, Ansichten, Einsichten, 158-172.  
659 Ignatz Bubis, Salomon Korn, Frank Schirrmacher, Martin Walser, “Wir brauchen eine neue Sprache für 
die Erinnerung. Ein Gespräch,” FAZ, December 14, 1998, in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 
438-465. 457. 
660 Ibid., 457.  
661 Fritz Göttler, ”Der Frieden und sein Preis. Rede oder Widerrede: Was spricht, wenn Walser spricht?,” 





Clearly, Walser rejects the role as “moralische Instanz” when in the conversation with 
Bubis he points out that he spoke as a private person and carried no responsibility for 
other people’s understanding of his speech: “Ich habe nur gesagt, wie es mir geht. Und 
darin haben andere gesehen, wie es ihnen geht.”662 If these ‘other people’ misunderstood 
his literary language, he made clear in the following statement, it was not his fault:  
Es ist nicht leicht, in einem politischen Raum mit einer persönlichen 
Schriftsteller-Sprache zu sprechen. Ich will mir aber keine Sekunde lang meinen 
Sprachgebrauch durch den Raum vorschreiben lassen, in den ich spreche.663 
 
Thus, by depicting himself as an author who had merely expressed his personal opinion, 
Walser rejects the moral-political responsibility that, one could argue, was expected of 
him since he spoke not only from a political podium at St. Paul’s Church, but also as a 
representative of the Hitler Youth generation. The historical moment was well chosen: At 
the peak of the memory boom of the 1990s, at a moment when Germany sought to 
redefine its political identity, the atmosphere was already charged. The vagueness of the 
Friedenspreis speech and the impression it evoked that Walser had shifted towards the 
right, I argue, were fully intentional, as was the controversy that evolved in the political 
climate of 1998. With this text, Walser distances himself more clearly than ever before 
from the left-liberal consensus among authors of his generation. He re-defines his role as 
a public intellectual by staging himself as an author as opposed to a political 
commentator.  
Borchmeyer and Bogdal on Martin Walser and the public sphere 
Before I examine the Friedenspreis speech with regard to Walser’s self-understanding as 
a public intellectual, I will briefly discuss readings of the speech by two scholars, both of 
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whom have argued that is is the result of a broadly consistent position in Walser’s work 
dating to the late 1970s: Dieter Borchmeyer’s  short 2001 monograph Martin Walser und 
die Öffentlichkeit, and Klaus-Michael Bogdal’s  essay “’Nach Gott haben wir nichts 
Wichtigeres mehr gehabt als die Öffentlichkeit’. Selbstinzenierungen eines deutschen 
Schriftstellers.”664 While Borchmeyer and Bogdal agree that the speech mostly reiterates 
previously formulated ideas, their evaluation of Walser could not be more contrary. 
While Borchmeyer seeks to rehabilitate the author by showing that the critics simply 
misunderstood the speech, Bogdal reads the Friedenspreis speech as Walser’s latest piece 
of “Selbstinszenierung.”   
 Borchmeyer argues that Walser never intended to marginalize Holocaust memory. 
He considers this reading of the speech the result of a “Fehlrezeption.”665 Walser’s 
critique, he claims, was not directed at the memory discourse per se, but at a public 
discourse, in which rules about political directness impede the open exchange of political 
opinions—a point Walser had made since the end of the 1970s. Borchmeyer uses 
Walser’s Auschwitz essays from the 1960s and 1970s666 as evidence that his 
Friedenspreis speech cannot have been aimed at normalization and forgetting. The 
numerous interpretations of the speech, he claims, constructed a “second speech,” which 
existed only in the minds of the critics and falsely rendered the true intentions of the first 
one. “Walsers Rede [hat] geradezu das Gegenteil dessen erreicht […], was sie 
                                                
664 Dieter Borchmeyer, Martin Walser und die Öffentlichkeit. Von einem neuerdings erhobenen 
unvornehmen Ton im Umgang mit einem Schriftsteller, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2001). Klaus-
Michael Bogdal, “Nach Gott haben wir nichts Wichtigeres mehr gehabt als die 
Öffentlichkeit:Selbstinszenierungen eines deutschen Schriftstellers”, in Martin Walser (Text + Kritik), ed. 
Heinz-Ludwig Arnold (Munich: Edition Text + Kritik, 2000), 19-43. 
665 Borchmeyer, Martin Walser und die Öffentlichkeit, 53. 
666 See Walser’s two Auschwitz essays. Martin Walser, “Unser Auschwitz” (1965), and “Auschwitz und 
kein Ende” (1979), in Martin Walser, Ansichten, Einsichten. Aufsätze zur Zeitgeschichte, vol IX of Werke 
in zwölf Bänden, eds. Helmuth Kiesel and Frank Barsch (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997), 158-172, 





anstrebte,”667 Borchmeyer argues in the last essay of his book. It could have generated a 
“Bereicherung der Diskussion um die Erinnerung an den nationalsozialistischen 
Judenmord, ihrer Befreiung von Schablonen und erkenntnishemmenden Tabus.”668 The 
result, however, was a missed opportunity for a dialogue about public memory, for which 
he does not blame Walser but rather his critics.669 Borchmeyer’s own agenda is visible 
when he laments the lack of true literary scholarship during the Walser-Bubis debate. He 
speaks of a tendentious “Enthüllungsgermanistik,” “übler Nachrede,” and “predigthaften 
pathetischen Tiraden […], die an die Stelle philologischer Argumentation treten.”670 Had 
the critics read the speech more carefully, he suggests, they would have understood that 
Walser was merely trying to free the public discourse of normative restrictions.  
 Certainly, Borchmeyer correctly points out that the Walser-Bubis debate 
represents a missed opportunity, especially for a German-Jewish debate about unhelpful 
taboos in the memory discourse. However, his interpretation of the debate as the mere 
result of a misunderstanding serves to underestimate and make a victim of a writer who 
in my own opinion clearly aimed at provocation rather than “gemeinsames Erinnern,”671 
as Borchmeyer would have wanted him to do. Klaus-Michael Bogdal’s reading strikes 
me as more convincing.  
 Bogdal claims that Walser’s speech ought to be seen within the context of an 
intentional “Selbstinzenierung.” He emphasizes: “Walser gehört zu jenen Autoren, die 
                                                
667 Borchmeyer, Martin Walser und die Öffentlichkeit, 54.  
668 Ibid., 53.  
669 Borchmeyer’s reading, from the beginning, is set out to defend the author. The only criticism directed at 
Walser appears in Borchmeyer’s last sentence, where he suggests that Walser could have stressed more 
strongly in his speech what he had said afterwards in the conversation with Bubis: that the collective 
memory can exist alongside the individual memory. If Walser had emphasized this idea more in his speech, 
Borchmeyer admits, he could have avoided “manche Verletzung der heillosen Debatte.” Ibid., 57.  
670 Ibid., 50-51.  





Werk und (öffentliche) Person funktional verknüpft haben und ihre Selbstinzenierungen 
und –stilisierungen dem Wandel des Schriftstellerbildes nach 1945 flexibel anzupassen 
wussten.”672 Bogdal posits that since the late 1970s Walser has increasingly distanced 
himself from the type of left-liberal intellectual that intellectuals like Grass represented. 
He writes: “Es wäre […] verfehlt, die Frankfurter Rede […] primär als 
Meinungsäußerung eines engagierten Intellektuellen (des Grass-Types) einzuordnen.”673 
For a long time, Walser had been trying to escape the role of the left-liberal intellectual 
“durch den Wechsel von den traditionellen Themen linksintellektueller Schriftsteller zu 
‘großen’ Themen wie Nation, Heimat, Gewissen und Sprache. Mit dem Wechsel soll 
auch die Wahrnehmung der literarischen Werke aus dem linksintellektuellen Kontext 
gelöst und eine gewisse Dignität und Seriosität (Spätstil) erlangt werden.”674 Bogdal 
points out that these topics are framed in the Friedenspreis speech “in bewusster 
Differenz zum moralisch-politischen Redetypus und dessen Sprache.”675 I strongly agree 
with this reading, although I would emphasize that Walser did not simply position 
himself in opposition to the left-liberal intelligentsia in general but to intellectuals of his 
own generation. At the end of the nineties, Walser begins to strongly reject the moral-
political role in society that came with his generation’s particular historical position. In 
the following, I will read the Friedenspreis speech as an expression of this feeling and thus 
highlight a hitherto neglected aspect in this much-discussed text.  
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The Friedenspreis speech: a critical reading  
The refusal of a societal role connected to his generational identity becomes apparent in 
the way Walser frames his speech. He begins by speaking about his feelings upon the 
news that he was awarded the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchhandels. It bothered 
him, he says, that he was expected to give a “critical” speech:  
Darüber, daß von ihm natürlich eine kritische Rede erwartet werde, konnte der 
Ausgesuchte sich nicht […] freuen. Klar, von ihm wurde die Sonntagsrede 
erwartet. Die kritische Predigt. […] Der Ausgesuchte kam sich eingeengt vor, 
festgelegt.676 
 
The passage following this statement, which due to its vagueness never appears in any of 
the critical readings of the speech, seems to concern the choice of topic of his 
“Sonntagsrede.” With bitter irony, Walser declares that talking about “Schönes” at St. Paul’s 
Church  would have been out of the question. He was expected to deliver a critical speech 
on a subject of societal relevance, a so-called “Gewissensthema.” He says: “In jeder 
Epoche gibt es Themen, Probleme, die unbestreitbar die Gewissensthemen der Epoche 
sind. Oder dazu gemacht werden.”677 This sentence sheds light on one of many 
inconsistencies in the speech, namely why Walser addresses a topic at the beginning that 
is seemingly unrelated to the rest: his plea to pardon Rainer Rupp, a GDR spy who had 
been, in Walser’s view unjustly, sentenced to twelve years in prison. By unexpectedly 
addressing this subject, in fact, by addressing the Bundespräsident in person to ask for 
Rupp’s release , Walser posits what he considers worthy of his public interference. He 
seems to suggest that Holocaust memory, by contrast, has been made into such a 
                                                
676 Walser, “Erfahrungen beim Verfassen einer Sonntagsrede,” in Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 
7-17, 7.  





“Gewissensthema” in the 1990s, a topic every public intellectual thinks he has to address. 
He, however, refuses to play along.  
 This set-up allows Walser to distinguish himself from those intellectuals and 
writers who do talk about memory—in Walser’s eyes too much. It was suspected that 
Walser meant Habermas and Handke when he referred to  “ein wirklich bedeutender 
Denker” and “[e]in wirklich ebenso bedeutender Dichter,” for both writers had argued 
that the most urgent problem of the 1990s was the increased popularity of Neo-Nazis 
within German society.678 Walser fends off this idea by suggesting that it is unrealistic to 
assume that all political and societal forces in Germany,  “Regierung, Staatsapparat, 
Parteienführung und die braven Leute am Nebentisch” are “‘moralisch-politisch’ 
verwahrlost.”679 Walser considers the assumptions about the terror from the right as 
exaggerated as Grass’s controversial position in the reunification debate: “Jemand findet 
die Art, wie wir die Folgen der deutschen Teilung überwinden wollen, nicht gut und sagt, 
so ermöglichen wir ein neues Auschwitz.”680 He summarizes:  
                                                
678 The respective passage reads: “Ein wirklich bedeutender Denker formulierte im Jahr 92: ‘Erst die 
Reaktionen auf den rechten Terror -die aus der politischen Mitte der Bevölkerung und die von oben: aus 
der Regierung, dem Staatsapparat und der Führung der Parteien - machen das ganze Ausmaß der 
moralisch-politischen Verwahrlosung sichtbar.’ Ein ebenso bedeutender Dichter ein paar Jahre davor: 
‘Gehen Sie in irgendein Restaurant in Salzburg. Auf den ersten Blick haben Sie den Eindruck: lauter brave 
Leute. Hören Sie Ihren Tischnachbarn aber zu, entdecken Sie, daß sie nur von Ausrottung und 
Gaskammern träumen.’ Addiert man, was der Denker und der Dichter - beide wirklich gleich seriös - 
aussagen, dann sind Regierung, Staatsapparat, Parteienführung und die braven Leute am Nebentisch 
"moralisch-politisch" verwahrlost. Meine erste Reaktion, wenn ich Jahr für Jahr solche in beliebiger Zahl 
zitierbaren Aussagen von ganz und gar seriösen Geistes- und Sprachgrößen lese, ist: Warum bietet sich mir 
das nicht so dar? Was fehlt meiner Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit? Oder liegt es an meinem zu leicht 
einzuschläfernden Gewissen? Das ist klar, diese beiden Geistes- und Sprachgrößen sind auch 
Gewissensgrößen.” See Walser, “Sonntagsrede,” 10.   
679 Ibid., 10.  
680 Ibid., 12. This statement refers to Grass’s controversial stance towards Germany’s reunification: the 
author had feared that the reunion of the two German states would foster a sense of normalization about 





Ich werde andauernd Zeuge des moralisch-politischen Auftritts dieses oder jenes 
schätzenswerten Intellektuellen und habe selber schon, von unangenehmen 
Aktualitäten provoziert, derartige Auftritte nicht vermeiden können.681  
 
It becomes clear that the target of his criticism is precisely this “use” of the intellectual in 
the moral-political realm, when he asks the rhetorical question:  
Wäre die Öffentlichkeit ärmer oder gewissensverrohter, wenn Dichter und Denker 
nicht als Gewissenswarte der Nation aufträten?   
 
He continues with a critique of the media. Writers like him are often forced into the role 
of public speakers by the media, which are increasingly less interested in these writers’s 
literary texts. He speaks of journalists as “Meinungssoldaten” who  
mit vorgehaltener Moralpistole, den Schrifststeller in den Meinungsdienst 
nötigen. Sie haben es immerhin so weit gebracht, daß Schriftsteller nicht mehr 
gelesen werden müssen, sondern nur noch interviewt. Daß die so 
zustandekommenden Platzanweisungen in den Büchern dieser Schriftsteller 
entweder nicht verifizierbar oder kraß widerlegt werden, ist dem Meinungs-und 
Gewissenswart eher egal, weil das Sprachwerk für ihn nicht verwertbar ist.682 
 
Interviews, in which writers function as political commentators, have replaced a serious 
appreciation for literature, Walser claims here. A writer’s morality, he argues later in his 
speech, cannot be based on categorizations such as left or right—“Platzanweisungen,” as 
Walser calls them. Instead, a writer’s morality becomes apparent in his or her aesthetics. 
 So far, one could summarize Walser’s position as a writer’s plea to reverse the 
politicization of German literature. But Walser proceeds by provocatively speaking about 
the instrumentalization of Holocaust memory in a manner that comes dangerously close 
to right-wing positions.683 Considering that both those commentators of the speech who 
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683 For evidence that his speech became a celebrated piece of writing for the political right in Germany at 
the time, see eds., Endlich ein normales Volk? Vom rechten Verständnis der Friedenspreisrede Martin 
Walsers - Eine Dokumentation, eds. Martin Dietzsch, Siegfried Jäger, and Alfred Schobert (Duisburg: 





came to Walser’s defense and those who attacked the writer widely agreed about the 
ambiguity of his language, there is one passage in Walser’s speech that I consider highly 
problematic. In it, he admits that his way of protesting against the widespread 
mobilization of German writers as preachers and political commentators is to withdraw 
into the aesthetic realm in order to make use of the ambiguity of literary language:  
[W]enn ich ahne, daß es gegen meine Empfindung wäre, mich ein weiteres Mal 
dieser Predigerersatzfunktion zu fügen, dann liefere ich mich der Sprache aus, 
überlasse ihr die Zügel, egal, wohin sie mich führe. Letzteres stimmt natürlich 
nicht. Ich falle ihr in die Zügel, wenn ich fürchten muß, sie gehe zu weit, sie 
verrate zuviel von mir, sie enthülle meine Unvorherzeigbarkeit zu sehr. Da 
mobilisiere ich furcht- und bedachtsam sprachliche Verbergungsroutinen jeder 
Art.684 
 
Only when he feels that he reveals too much of his “unrepresentable” opinions, only 
when it reveals too much of himself, the freedom of language needs to be restricted. 
Thus, Walser clearly admits that his speech was purposefully ambiguous.  
 I am not going as far as arguing that Walser hides his right-wing opinions behind 
this ambiguity. Yet, the criticism voiced by Bubis and others is legitimate: Walser 
provided the extreme right with fresh arguments for their cause. He was fully aware of 
the delicacy of the subject he was addressing, and played with his authority within the 
memory discourse deliberately and, as I would add, recklessly. On the other hand, it is no 
coincidence that Walser does not just simply distance himself from the concept of 
littérature engage. It is no coincidence that he does not simply address his tiredness with 
the German “obsession” with memory. His speech must be read as the performance piece 
of a member of the Hitler Youth generation. Even though Walser never makes the 
generational background explicit, the fact that his celebration of an aesthetics free of 
political demands is connected with the topic of memory politics illustrates that he is not 
                                                





simply talking about aesthetics and politics in general but the interconnectedness of 
aesthetics, politics and generational identity. Walser, like Bubis and von Dohnanyi, 
speaks from his position as Zeitzeuge of the Nazi era with the background of a very 
specific biographical experience. The point of his performance is to demonstrate that he 
would no longer obey any demands connected to his biographical attachment to the Nazi 
period.685 How far he would go with his demonstration will become clear in my 
presentation of Walser’s next big coup, the 2002 publication of Tod eines Kritikers.  
“Tod eines Kritikers” 
In the spring of 2002, Frank Schirrmacher of the FAZ—a great admirer of Martin Walser 
who had given the encomium when Walser was awarded the Friedenspreis—was part of 
a small group of people who were allowed to read the proofs of Walser’s new novel, Tod 
eines Kritikers. Like many of his texts, this novel, announced as “skandalöses Buch” 
earlier that year,686 was supposed to be serialized in the FAZ before its official 
publication. But unexpectedly, on May 29, Schirrmacher published an open letter 
directed at Walser in which he proclaimed that the FAZ had decided against serializing 
Tod eines Kritikers. “Ihr Roman ist eine Exekution. Eine Abrechnung […] mit Marcel 
                                                
685 It should be pointed out that Walser repeatedly used the very moral-political authority he rejected in his 
speech when during the Bubis debate he depicted himself as the spokesperson of the German Volk. He 
suggested that many people felt the same way as he did about the exaggerative German duty of 
commemoration. Otherwise, he would not have received standing ovations at St. Paul’s Church as well as 
over a thousand letters from citizens who expressed their support. This way, he reassumed the authoritative 
role he wanted to fend off. 
 As far as I can see, the only person who has publicly pointed out this inconsistency in Walser’s 
position was Richard von Weizsäcker, who said: “Walser hat als Privatperson eine, wie er es nannte, 
Sonntagsrede gehalten, freilich als Friedenspreisträger in der Frankfurter Paulskirche auf dem geistig-
moralischen Podest der Nation. […] Er sprach mit einer Autorität, um die es ihm ging und für die er sich 
später auf den stehenden Beifall des Auditoriums berief.” Richard von Weizsäcker, “Der Streit wird 
gefährlich. Mußte Walser provozieren?” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeiung, November 20, 1998, in 
Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte, 187-188, 187. 
686 This is how Walser described the novel in February 2002 to the boulevard magazine Bunte. Quoted 
after: Martin Walser and Volker Hage, “‘Der Autor ist der Verlierer.’ Der Schrifsteller Martin Walser über 





Reich-Ranicki,” he wrote, calling Walser’s book “ein Dokument des Hasses” and “nichts 
anderes als eine Mordphantasie;” Walser worked, he argued, with a “Repertoire 
antisemitischer Klischees,” from which one could not simply look away.687 Undoubtedly, 
Schirrmacher stated, the protagonist in Walser’s novel was a caricature of Germany’s 
most influential and most famous literary critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki, who had also been 
head of the FAZ feuilleton from 1973-1988. It was tasteless, Schirrmacher argued, that 
Walser had evoked the death of Reich-Ranicki, a Polish Jew who had survived the 
Warsaw Ghetto and had escaped, against all odds, the Nazi murder of European Jewry. 
Schirrmacher writes: “Verstehen Sie, daß wir keinen Roman drucken werden, der damit 
spielt, daß dieser Mord fiktiv nachgeholt wird?”688  
 Schirrmacher correctly says that the novel plays with the murder of the figure 
representing Reich-Ranicki, who is called Andre Ehrl-König in Walser’s text.689 A 
murder does not actually take place. The plot begins with the disappearance of the star 
critic from a party at the house of the publisher Ludwim Pilgrim. The police cannot find 
his body but evidence suggests that he was murdered. Since Ehrl-König had just 
excoriated the new novel by Hans Lach in his TV show Sprechstunde (modeled after 
Reich-Ranicki’s ZDF-show Das literarische Quartett), Lach is considered the prime 
                                                
687 Frank Schirrmacher, “Der neue Roman von Martin Walser: Kein Vorabdruck in der FAZ. Frank 
Schirrmachers offener Brief an Martin Walser,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 June 2002, No. 122, 
49. 
688 Ibid.  
689 The name Ehrl-König is a reference to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s famous ballad Der Erlkönig. In 
the poem, Erlkönig is a figure of death accompanying the lyrical “I” on horse back on the way to seek help 
for his dying child. The last stanza describes how the ride through the windy night was in vain. The erl-king 
is holding the dead child in his arms (“in seinen Armen das Kind war tot”). Jan-Philipp Reemtsma points 
out that “Erlkönig” was the nickname of Willy Andre König, a critic figure in Walser’s 1993 novel Ohne 
einander. It was suggested in this earlier novel, that the character was called “Erlkönig” because of the line 
from Goethe’s poem “in seinen Armen das Kind war tot,” meaning: just like Erlkönig in Goethe’s poem, 
the figure of the critic in both novels brings death over his subject. Reemtsma goes further on to argue that 
Walser alludes to another line in Goethe’s poem: “Erlkönig hat mir ein Leids getan.” Reemtsma reads this 






murder suspect. He is arrested, not only because of his motive but also because he 
allegedly threatened the critic by uttering a variation of Hitler’s infamous quote about the 
attack of Poland in 1939: “ab 0.00 Uhr wird zurückgeschlagen.”690 The narrator, another 
author called Michael Landolf, begins a private investigation of the case in order to prove 
Lach’s innocence. He interviews friends and foes of the critic—writers, publishers, 
editors, journalists and professors, essentially the entire German literary scene—all of 
whom seem to have an opinion on Ehrl-König but none of whom bring Landolf forward 
in his investigation. At the end of the novel, Walser presents the reader with a twist: Lach 
and Landolf, he unveils, are one and the same person, and Ehrl-König reappears after a 
weekend with his mistress. The famous critic had staged his own murder.  
Controversial readings of the novel 
Walser’s novel is not only a satire but also a roman-à-clef. Besides Marcel Reich-
Ranicki, several other prominent figures of the German Literaturbetrieb are recognizable 
in Walser’s representation of this scene: Jürgen Habermas, Joachim Kaiser, Walter und 
Inge Jens, Siegfried Unseld, and Ulla Berkewicz, to name only the most prominent ones. 
The uproar that followed Schirrmacher’s open letter was not about this aspect of the 
novel but about Tod eines Kritikers as supposedly anti-Semitic—as was the general 
understanding of Schirrmacher’s reproach.691 Reich-Ranicki was sent a copy of the 
manuscript and soon commented that he found the entire matter “wirklich 
                                                
690 Martin Walser, Tod eines Kritikers (Berlin: Ullstein-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 2003).  
691 Schirrmacher stressed in an interview with Der Spiegel that he did not call the novel an anti-Semitic 
book but rather critiqued Walser’s irresponsible use of anti-Semitic cliches: “Dass ich behauptet habe, wie 
mir unterstellt wird, es sei schlechthin ein antisemitisches Machwerk, ist falsch. Ich sprach vom Spiel mit 
dem Repertoire antisemitischer Klischees, etwa was die notorische ‘Herabsetzungslust’ des Kritikers 
angeht.” See Frank Schirrmacher, interview with Wolfgang von Höbel and Mathias Schreiber, “‘Ich war so 
angewidert.’ FAZ-Mitherausgeber Frank Schirrmacher über seine Ablehnung des Walser-Textes.” Der 





ungeheuerlich.” He condemned the book not only because of Walser’s “antisemitischen 
Ausbruch, der ja wirklich offenkundig ist” but also because of the text’s poor literary 
quality. He called it “miserable Literatur” and added: “So schlecht hat Walser noch nicht 
geschrieben.”692 Walser on the other hand seemed aghast about Schirrmacher’s 
accusations, as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported having spoken to the author on the 
telephone the day after the letter appeared in FAZ. He stressed that it was simply not true 
that the novel was about the alleged murder of a Jew. The novel’s only topic was “die 
Machtausübung im Kulturbetrieb zur Zeit des Fernsehens.”693 He would repeat this 
sentence with slight variations regularly during the weeks that followed. In an interview 
with Der Spiegel, he said emphatically:  
Niemals, wirklich niemals, hätte ich gedacht, dass es auf diese Weise abgelehnt 
wird, mit dem Vorwurf des Antisemitismus. Wenn ich auch nur einen Satz in 
dieser Richtung hätte wittern können, dann hätte ich ihn rausgestrichen! Warum 
sollte ich das Buch damit belasten, wo es mir um etwas ganz anderes ging: um die 
Machtausübung im Kulturbetrieb.694 
 
Was Tod eines Kritikers, as Walser stresses here, merely a satirical text about the German 
cultural scene without the intentional use of anti-Semitic stereotypes? This was the 
question critics had to deal with as soon as the novel was published.695  
 Schirrmacher had claimed that the repertoire of anti-Semitic cliches was “nicht 
übersehbar.”696 The list of evidential material included the threat made against Ehrl-
                                                
692 All quotes found in “Unter Anklage. Antisemitismus-Vorwürfe gegen Martin Walser”, NZZ- Online, 
May 30, 2002, http://www.nzz.ch/2002/05/30/fe/article86V0D.html. 
693 Ibid.  
694 Walser, “Der Autor ist der Verlierer,” 186.  
695 A sideline of the debate, which was also called the Walser-Schirrmacher-debate, was also concerned 
with the fact that Schirrmacher had lanced a public attack of a novel that had not even been published yet. 
In several articles, mainly in Süddeutsche Zeitung but also in Die Zeit, this step was understood as a great 
journalistic faux pas, because no one but a very small circle of people at FAZ and the Suhrkamp 
publishing house were able to read the text in order to examine whether or not the reproaches were 
justified. As a consequence, Suhrkamp had to publish the novel weeks before the intended publication 
date. It appeared on June 26, 2002. For a critique of Schirrmacher, see for example Jessen, “Der Dichter 





König at the party, a modification of the Hitler phrase “Seit 5 Uhr 45 wird jetzt 
zurückgeschossen,” the fact that the Jewish critic had a thick accent Schirrmacher found 
reminiscent of the Yiddish language, and that he was portrayed as suffering from a 
veritable “Messiaskomplex.”697 The book was about the murder not of a critic but of a 
Jew, he concluded, the Jewish critic being Marcel Reich-Ranicki. Most outrageous in 
Schirrmacher’s eyes was a sentence uttered by Ehrl-König’s wife who commented on her 
husband’s disappearance saying that it did not “suit him to be murdered.” Considering 
that Reich-Ranicki was the only one in his family who survived the Holocaust, 
Schirrmacher considered this sentence “der das Getötetwerden oder Überleben zu einer 
Charaktereigenschaft macht”698 appalling.  
 There were critics who agreed with Schirrmacher’s judgment and critics who 
argued against it. Among the former was the director of the Hamburger Institut für 
Sozialforschung, Jan Philipp Reemtsa, who added several more points to Schirrmacher’s 
list: the critic’s lecherous but ultimately impotent sexuality, his illegitimate lust for 
power, his cosmopolitanism while his origin is not completely clear, and a scene in 
alluding to a Jewish conspiracy when in his TV show the critic promotes Jewish literature 
(a book by Philip Roth) while belittling German literature (the book by Hans Lach). The 
novel portrayed, Reemtsma summarized, “[die] Zerstörung der deutschen Literatur durch 
den mächtigen jüdischen Schädling.”699 His explanation: Martin Walser had been 
continually hurt by Reich-Ranicki and over time had become so enraged that this rage 
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697 Ibid.  
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ultimately led “zum antisemitischen Affektsturm.”700 Walser’s fictional murder fantasy 
about Reich-Ranicki displayed a social brutality, “die das Werk, in dem das geschieht, 
von vornherein disqualifiziert, es mag ansonsten beschaffen sein, wie es will.”701 In other 
words, for Reemtsma the moral-political content of the novel, in his eyes unacceptable, 
undermined the novel’s aesthetic value entirely. In the concluding sentence Reemtsma 
heightens Schirrmacher’s evaluation stating firmly that Martin Walser had written an 
anti-Semitic novel.702  
 Ruth Klüger responded to Walser’s novel in the Frankfurter Rundschau on June 
26 on a more personal level. In an open letter to Martin Walser, she wrote: “Als eine 
Jüdin, die sich beruflich mit deutscher Literatur befasst und sich mit Dir und Deiner 
Familie befreundet glaubt, fühle ich mich von Deiner Darstellung eines Kritikers als 
jüdisches Scheusal betroffen, gekränkt, beleidigt.”703 Klüger does not accept the satirical 
nature of Tod eines Kritikers as an excuse:  
Der Satiriker wählt, was ihm bedeutend erscheint. Verantwortlich ist er dann 
allerdings für die Bedeutung. Und wenn er einen widerlichen Kritiker als Juden 
zeichnet, dann darf man wohl fragen, ob er damit so etwas wie die zerstörende 
Macht der Juden im deutschen zeitgenössischen Geistesleben meint.704     
 
Understanding Tod eines Kritikers as a satire, a comedy, or a farce does not solve the 
problem, Klüger argues. She points out that comedies and bad jokes have always been 
“besonders beliebte Vehikel der Verhöhnung.”705 The reappearance of the critic and the 
recognition that there was no murder at all do not take away Walser’s blame for her. She 
writes: “Lieber Martin, vor dem Hintergrund der deutschen Geschichte, die sich nun 
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701 Ibid.  
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703 Ruth Klüger, “ ‘Siehe doch, Deutschland!’ Martin Walsers Tod eines Kritikers,” Frankfurter 
Rundschau, June 27, 2002, http://www.lyrikwelt.de/rezensionen/todeineskritikers-r.htm. 
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einmal nicht ausklammern lässt, ist die komische Wiederkehr des nur scheinbar 
ermordeten Juden noch schlimmer als ein handfester Krimi mit Leiche gewesen wäre.”706 
For Klüger, Günter Grass’ last novel Im Krebsgang, which depicts a murder actually 
committed by a Jew, serves as a counter-example to Walser’s book. She characterizes 
Grass’ representation as “weder anti- noch philosemitisch, sie ist vorurteilsfrei und daher 
nicht zu beanstanden.”707 Walser himself had described his novel as a discourse on power 
and on winners and losers in the cultural scene. But this discourse on power, she argues, 
does not only concern writers and critics, “sondern stellvertretend ist auch das Vaterland, 
das einstens besiegte, das sich noch immer schämt, miteinbezogen, mitgedacht.”708 At the 
end of her letter, Klüger asks Walser directly: “Wo bleibt hier die Moral?”709   
 Dieter Borchmeyer and Helmuth Kiesel seek to eliminate this type of personal or 
moral approach in their 2003 book Der Ernstfall. In the preface to this collection of 
essays on the debate surrounding Tod eines Kritikers, they categorically describe the 
“Literaturkritik” of the German Feuilleton as incompetent of the “Genauigkeit 
philologischer Lektüre,”710 at which their volume aims.711 Almost triumphantly they state 
that none of the contributors to their volume had come to the conclusion that 
Schirrmacher’s accusations were justified even in the slightest.”712 Feuilleton critics, they 
claim, have altogether overlooked the finesse of Walser’s literary technique and misread 
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708 Ibid.  
709 Ibid.   
710 Dieter Borchmeyer, and Helmuth Kiesel, “Vorwort,” in Der Ernstfall, eds. Dieter Borchmeyer and 
Helmuth Kiesel, (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2003), 7-24, 22.  
711 Ibid., 22.  
712 The respective passage reads: “Keiner der beteiligten Autoren gelangt zu der Ansicht, daß der offene 
Brief Schirrmachers und die nachfolgende Polemik der FAZ und anderer ihr in diesem Punkt nahestehender 
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und die publizistische Moral, den jene Vorverurteilung Walsers darstellte.” Borchmeyer and Kiesel, Der 





the novel as anti-Semitic as a result. Thus, Walser did not write an anti-Semitic novel but 
rather a revealing portray of a literary scene dominated by the media. By the very 
definition of the text’s genre, plot and characters were exaggerated and provocative. The 
fact that Walser even depicts the Feuilleton’s eagerness to highlight anti-Semitism as the 
motive of the alleged murder of the Jewish critic—a sideline of the plot—Walser’s has 
proven his prognostic talent: “Dieser Roman setzte sich im vergangenen Jahr aufgrund 
des um ihn entfachten Skandals in der Wirklichkeit fort.”713  
 Without giving Walser as much credit as Borchmeyer and Kiesel do, Bill Niven 
comes to a similar conclusion in an insightful and less tendentious article. He offers a 
sober analysis of the novel by considering arguments for and against an anti-Semitic 
reading. Ultimately, he argues, “any reading of Tod eines Kritikers as anti-Semitic […] 
can only be sustained by failing to acknowledge the manner in which the novel is 
constructed, indeed by failing to acknowledge its status as literature.”714 Niven claims 
that almost every negative statement on the Jewish critic is not directly uttered by a 
character but mediated through other people or the press. He summarizes: “The novel 
thus highlights the problematic nature of a notion such as authenticity in a world in which 
reality is mediated—not least through the media themselves.”715 Moreover, Niven argues, 
it ought not to be underestimated that “Walser’s novel satirizes the self-importance of its 
characters.”716 If the characters utter their negative opinions about the critic, Niven 
claims, their reliability is simultaneously undermined by the critical way in which Walser 
depicts them. Thus, he writes, “’[t]he novel is not about a Jew, but about the anti-Semitic 
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construction of a Jew in the minds of the resentful.”717 Hence, Niven reads Tod eines 
Kritikers as an experiment in post-modern writing—one of poor quality, he makes sure to 
add—the overall purpose of which it is to exhibit the constructedness of reality. This 
constructedness “is designed to highlight the fact that the ‘Literaturbetrieb’ […] is 
dominated by self-interested rumors and projections.”718 Thus, “[t]o equate Walser’s 
attitude with those of his characters […] is to overlook the essential point that the 
ironization of the heart of the novel strongly invites the reader to distance himself or 
herself from their views. A novel whose characters make anti-Semitic remarks is not 
necessarily an anti-Semitic novel.”719  
 On the question of anti-Semitism, I tend to agree with Bill Niven: there are 
“aspects of the novel” which could arguably support Schirrmacher’s anti-Semitic reading 
of it,720 and attributes with which Walser describes the Jewish critic—for example his 
sexual predilection for young girls721 or his insatiable hunger for power—that, as Niven 
carefully formulates, “make of Ehrl-König a construction not dissimilar to National 
Socialist anti-Semitic projections.”722 But ultimately, it is hard to prove that Walser 
actually used anti-Semitic clichés, let alone that Walser is an anti-Semite, and even a 
detailed discussion of this subject would presumably not lead to a definite answer. There 
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719 Ibid., 310.  
720 Niven writes: “Ehrl-König is portrayed variously by the characters in the novel as an amalgam of 
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721 “Am liebsten waren ihm natürlich Mädelchen, aber wenn’s keine gab, nahm er auch Mädels. Frauen 
findet er langweilig. Unzumutbar. Besonders deutsche.” Walser, Tod eines Kritikers, 111  





can, however, be no doubt that he played with anti-Semitic clichés very consciously, and 
this is highly relevant for the context of this chapter.  
“Tod eines Kritikers” and the discourse on the Hitler Youth generation   
Notwithstanding its provocative and tasteless aspects and poor literary quality, Tod eines 
Kritikers presents a compelling text when read  as a reaction—or rather, an over-
reaction—to the very phenomenon I want to highlight in this chapter: the blurring of 
moral–political and aesthetic matters in post-War German literature that becomes 
particularly evident in the reception of writers of the Hitler Youth generation. Like the 
Friedenspreis speech, the novel criticizes a feuilleton culture, in which authors are judged 
within the rules of a political and not a literary discourse. Both Reemtsma’s dismissal of 
the novel based on the argument that it is anti-Semitic as well as Klüger’s question “wo 
bleibt die Moral?” represent precisely this type of privileging of moral-political before 
aesthetic criteria. An even more apt example of the alleged infiltration of the literary 
discourse by demands based on memory, history, and biography is the article by Ruth 
Klüger, who expresses her hurt feelings as Walser’s friend and as a Jew. Post-war 
German literature, Walser seems to suggest, has been superseded by a discourse in which 
biographical-generational parameters play a more important role than aesthetic ones. 
More precisely, Walser is bothered by the fact that he is still considered to be writer who 
belongs, at least in some ways, to the perpetrator collective.  
 In order to demonstrate that literature ought to be a realm independent of such 
historical-biographical matters, Tod eines Kritikers inverts the historical roles of 
perpetrator and victim. He shows how the German author Hans Lach becomes the victim 





interview: “durch sein Verschwinden und Wiederauftauchen besiegt er (the Jewish critic) 
noch einmal den Autor. Der Autor ist der Dumme, der ist der Verlierer. Der Kritiker 
kehrt ins Scheinwerferlicht zurück.”723 Lach becomes the victim on several levels: First 
because his book is badly reviewed on Ehrl-König’s show, second because he becomes 
the main suspect in the murder case while being completely innocent, and third—and this 
bears the greatest significance—because the media immediately frame the murder in a 
German-Jewish context:  
Das Thema war jetzt, daß Hans Lach einen Juden getötet hatte. […] Hans Lach 
hatte seine Tat in der Tatnacht in der PILGRIM-Villa in einem an Hitler 
erinnernden Jargon angekündigt. Ab heute nacht Null Uhr wird zurückgeschlagen. 
Diesen Hans Lach-Satz konnte man jetzt jeden Tag überall lesen und abends aus 
allen Kanälen hören.724  
 
The anti-Semitism debate that follows is depicted as a farce. The majority of feuilleton 
critics in Walser’s novel believe “daß in Deutschland die Ermordung eines Juden doch 
wohl ein Faktum ganz anderer Art sei als in jedem anderen Land der Welt.725 Hans 
Lach’s book Der Wunsch, Verbrecher zu sein, seen as evidence for his wish to murder 
the critic, becomes “das am meisten zitierte Buch des späteren Winters.” And the writer 
Landolf says at one point in the novel: “Um die Schuld oder Unschuld eines 
Schriftstellers zu beweisen, braucht man doch keine Indizien, die Bücher genügen.”726 
Only one journalist critically notes that this approach to the murder of a critic whose 
Jewish identity is not even confirmed is indicative of the “Geisteszustand der deutschen 
Gesinnungspresse.”727 The term “Gesinnungspresse —“Gesinnungspresse war sofort ein 
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Wort, ohne das keiner mehr auskam”728— alludes to the Christa-Wolf-debate in the early 
nineties when Ulrich Greiner described Wolf’s work as part of a widespread 
“Gesinnungsästhetik.” In Walser’s depiction, not the authors are obsessed with historical 
and political questions but the media. Hans Lach’s novel Der Wunsch, Verbrecher zu sein 
is taken to prove the writer’s “guilt”, just as it was the case in the reception of Ein 
springender Brunnen, and now again with Tod eines Kritikers itself.  
 Due to the level of self-reflexivity manifest in the novel, it is difficult to see it as 
anything else but a calculated provocation. In a commentary on the Walser-debate in 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Martin Meyer pointed at the boundaries he believed Walser had 
overstepped: “Wie weit darf ein intelligenter Autor gehen, um immer noch damit rechnen 
zu können, dass sein Text als ‘reine’ und ästhetisch geschützte Literatur wahrgenommen 
wird?” And he claimed: “[D]iese Frage hat sich Walser offenbar kaum gestellt.”729 But 
Walser obviously  asked himself this question and took it very seriously. It is precisely 
this idea of moral restraints in the aesthetic realm that he attacked. I argue that he 
consciously played with the theme of anti-Semitism, “das heikelste aller Themen,”730as 
Greiner has called it. Hence, it is hard to take Walser seriously when he claims that he 
would have never published the book, or anything for that matter, if he had had only the 
slightest hunch that one could consider the text anti-Semitic.731  Rather, one has to 
assume that Walser provoked the entire debate in order to be able to point to the 
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literariness of his book and to the critics’ misreading of his book as anti-Semitic. “Das ist 
doch reine Satire!”732  he regularlysaid.  
 With his statements that the novel was not about a Jew but about a critic, and that 
he wanted to broadly address the widespread “Machtausübung im Kulturbetrieb,”733 
Walser simply plays at  naïveté in order to outrage his critics. Clearly, it played a crucial 
role that he depicted a Jewish critic, considering the importance of the German-Jewish 
context for the novel. Walser has always seen his relationship with Reich-Ranicki in a 
historical-biographical context, and even more precisely, in a perpetrator-victim context. 
This becomes evident in an interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, given shortly before the 
1998 Friedenspreis speech. Walser said:  
In unserem Verhältnis ist er der Täter, und ich bin das Opfer. […] Jeder Autor, 
den er so behandelt, könnte zu ihm sagen: Herr Reich-Ranicki, in unserem 
Verhältnis bin ich der Jude.734  
 
Thus, years before the publication of Tod eines Kritikers, Walser had already formulated 
the inversion of the perpetrator and the victim role that would become the topic of the 
novel. Hence, I find Bill Niven’s non-historicizing reading of the novel as a post-modern 
experiment ultimately unconvincing. It falls short of addressing this historical-
biographical anchor that—while Walser claims to want to move away from it—becomes 
palpable everywhere in the text.  
On Walser’s diagnosis 
How accurate was Walser’s diagnosis? Was the media in 2002 still only occupied with 
historical and political questions entirely unrelated to the literary work itself? If we 
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examine the controversy about his own book and compare it to the 1990 debate around 
Christa Wolf’s Was bleibt, we can see that the moral-political authority of the Hitler 
Youth generation had begun to dwindle. Already in 1998, in an open letter to Walser 
published in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Klaus-Michael Bogdal and Michael Brocke had 
criticized the author for his complaint that the media supposedly forced authors into the 
role of political commentators and moral guides. They argued that the general public was 
less and less interested in writers’ opinions about moral-political affairs, which in their 
eyes rendered Walser’s protest pointless:  
Wenn Sie […] wahrzunehmen meinen, daß ‘Meinungssoldaten’ sie ‘mit 
vorgehaltener Moralpistole… in den Meinungsdienst’ nötigen, mag das Ihrer 
Profession und Ihrer früheren öffentlichen Rolle geschuldet sein, seit dem 
deutsch-deutschen Literaturstreit nach der Vereinigung ist es doch eher so, 
daß eine breite Öffentlichkeit nur noch in sehr geringem Maße an dem interessiert 
ist, was Schriftsteller zur politischen Moral zu sagen haben.735 
 
Obviously this is not entirely true, since the upheaval Walser successfully caused with his 
provocations in 1998 and 2001 confirms that there was still interest in what this author 
had to say. It is striking, however, that the majority of critics who participated in the 
debates were either of Walser’s generation or part of the generation of 1968. It is 
probably safe to say that the younger generations considered this discourse outdated and 
its vehemence incomprehensible.  
 But even among the older generations, Walser’s moral-political provocations 
were not taken seriously by everyone anymore. One can find a recurring argument in the 
reception of Tod eines Kritikers, which indicates a changed perception of the author in 
the public realm. While most critics categorically rejected the novel both for its literary 
and its moral-political qualities, several argued that Tod eines Kritikers should be 
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considered a piece of literary writing separate from its political content. Hellmuth 
Karasek, for example, agreed with Schirrmacher that the book presented a document full 
of hatred, but stated in his review with Tagesspiegel: “Ein Werk des Hasses, das müsste 
noch kein Fehler sein.”736 He highlights the well-written satirical passages and carefully 
distinguishes them from the passages, which reveal “bedenkenlos antisemitische […] 
Klischees.”737 Martin Meyer, in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, similarly makes an effort to 
consider the literary quality separately from the morally problematic parts. “Tod eines 
Kritikers,” he writes, “ist ein haarsträubend schlechter Roman—und das noch vor allen 
möglichen ideologischen Implikationen.”738  
 Particularly interesting is Fritz J. Raddatz’s article “Das Treffen im Seichten,” 
published in Die Zeit.739 Raddatz, who had condemned Christa Wolf for her Stasi 
affiliation in 1993, arguing that it had damaged her work irreversibly, now brushes away 
moral arguments.740 He writes: “Literatur darf alles: Mordphantasien schäumen lassen, 
Hinrichtungen herbeibeten, kalte Rache üben an unserer Welt—auch an einem jüdischen 
Fernsehrichter. Wenn es denn Literatur ist.”741 In a strange way, then, Walser achieved 
what he had demanded in his Friedenspreis speech: some critics agreed that there ought 
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to be no moral restrictions. Raddatz, however, still considers Walser’s book a complete 
and utter failure—only that he does so based on literary, not on moral-political criteria.  
 The attempts to separate aesthetics and politics in the 2002 debate about Tod eines 
Kritikers can be read as a sign that authors of the Hitler Youth generation were being 
perceived in a new way. They continued to be in the limelight but were perceived less as 
political figures than as writers. The discourse on the Hitler Youth generation had begun 






Um wie vieles leichter war es doch, dachte ich, über die Verführungen einer Kindheit 
Rechenschaft zu geben als über die Verfehlungen der späteren Jahre. 
—Christa Wolf, Stadt der Engel, 2010   
 
 
3. Fall of a Hero—Günter Grass’ Beim Häuten der Zwiebel  
The confession  
In 2006, Günter Grass revealed a detail that hitherto had been omitted from his official 
biography. On August 11 it made the national news: the news shows of both ARD and 
ZDF, the two biggest German television channels, announced that Grass had not just 
served in the Nazi system as a Hitlerjunge and Flakhelfer but also as a member of the 
Waffen-SS. In an interview with the FAZ on August 12 about his forthcoming 
autobiography, Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, Grass confirmed that his book would treat his 
brief membership in the Waffen-SS.742 Reportedly, he volunteered unsuccessfully for the 
submarine fleet at the age of 15, was then conscripted into the Reich Labour Service 
(Reichsarbeitsdienst), and ultimately called up for the Waffen-SS, into the 
“Panzerdivision Frundsberg,” shortly before his 17th birthday in October 1944. He then 
stayed with this division, surviving a few combat situations without firing a single shot 
until the “Panzerdivision Frundsberg” surrendered to U.S. forces in April 1945.743  
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 Grass in the Waffen-SS—what did this mean for Germany? After the 2006 World 
Cup, hosted by Germany, the media had a new topic. After the first wave of the Grass 
scandal had hit the German public, the comedian Harald Schmidt satirically summarized 
the reactions to Grass’ revelation in his column for the magazine Focus: “Literarisch 
bleibt er für mich ein Großer, aber moralisch würde ich nicht mal mehr eine 
Blechtrommel von ihm kaufen!”744 This is a fairly accurate summary of the general 
opinions voiced in the debate. The public outrage about Grass did not arise from the fact 
that he had been a member of the Waffen-SS at age seventeen—indeed, his young age 
was widely accepted as an excuse for his ideological aberration. The criticism was 
primarily directed at the fact that Grass had kept silent about it afterwards during his 
almost fifty-year writing career. A number of critics put forward the so-called Bitburg 
affair, in which Grass had vehemently protested the symbolic gesture planned on the 
occasion of US-President Reagan’s visit to Germany on the 40th anniversary of V-Day: 
Kohl had suggested that both political leaders should lay a wreath at the Bitburg cemetery 
where not only German Wehrmacht soldiers were buried but, as it turned out, also several 
members of the Waffen-SS.745 There seemed to be a general agreement that if there ever 
was a “right” moment for Grass to reveal his own membership in the SS, it would have 
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been in the context of Bitburg.746 Thus Grass’ silence during the Bitburg affair was 
considered the peak of his hypocrisy.747 
The debate 
The debate about Günter Grass’ moral credibility that followed his Waffen-SS revelation 
displays in the clearest terms the representative function Grass had occupied in the 
cultural sphere of the post-war era. What Christa Wolf was for East Germany, Grass was 
for the West: a role model par excellence. His fall from grace, then, was accordingly 
severe. The day of the first announcement on TV, August 11, the news show Heute-
Journal had still introduced Grass with the sentences: “Günter Grass ist eine moralische 
Instanz in Deutschland. Sein Wort zählt, und das nicht nur in der Literatur.”748 Soon, 
however, the headline of any news report on Grass’s belated confession could essentially 
have been: “Ende einer moralischen Instanz.”749 As the general secretary of the German 
PEN Wilfried F. Schoeller wrote, “die moralischen Verdikte fielen verheerend aus, als 
ginge es bei diesem Verschweigen einer jugendlichen Torheit um Landesverat.”750 
Indeed, Grass’s national importance became most obvious at the moment when its end 
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was announced. Even Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel commented on the affair, 
saying, “ich hätte mir gewünscht, wir wären über seine Biografie von Anfang an in 
vollem Umfang informiert gewesen.”751 This comment is striking not only because 
Germany’s highest governing official felt provoked to give a public comment at all. It is 
also the use of the pronoun “wir,” with which Merkel implied that Grass had disrespected 
his obligations to the Germans, the national collective he and she were representing. 
More polemically, Der Spiegel wrote, “Grass gab sich als moralischer 
Aufsichtsratvorsitzender der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” and with equal gloating, and 
arguably also with accuracy, Henryk M. Broder called Grass “de[n] Prototyp des guten 
Deutschen, den man überall vorzeigen konnte, weil er auch sein Land mit Kritik nicht 
verschonte, die intellektuelle Quersumme aus Thomas Mann, Frantz Fanon und 
Popeye.”752  
 Even in his failure critics saw him as representative figure. As in the case of 
Christa Wolf’s Stasi affiliation, the author’s weakness was considered symbolic of the 
country he was representing. Ina Hartwig, critic at Frankfurter Rundschau, wrote: “Grass 
hat jetzt einen Coup gelandet, gerade weil er sich in seiner moralischen 
Unvollkommenheit zeigt.”753 With his long silence about his past, Frank Schirrmacher 
wrote, Grass epitomized Germany’s difficulties with Vergangenheitsbewältigung, the 
same resistance to face the past that Grass had tirelessly denounced. The sociologist 
Heinz Bude, who was the first to do research about the Flakhelfergeneration in the 
1980s, similarly said that Grass’s withholding turned him into an “echten Repräsentanten 
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der Bundesrepublik.”754 He spoke of Grass’s “historische Glaubwürdigkeit” and called 
him “ein würdiger Nobelpreisträger aus Deutschland.”755 According to Thomas Steinfeld, 
feuilleton editor of Süddeutsche Zeitung, what had become clear by the end of the first 
week of the scandal—that “Grass ist Deutschland”—would be confirmed after people 
read his book: “Grass war Deutschland.” 756  
Grass was Germany  
The shift from the present to the past tense—from “Grass ist Deutschland” to “Grass war 
Deutschland”— indicates both the writer’s enormous significance for German society as 
well as the loss of his moral authority marked by his disclosure. In her article “‘Ehrlich, 
du lügst wie gedruckt’: Günter Grass’ Autobiographical Confession and the Changing 
Territory of Germany’s Memory Culture,” Anne Fuchs claims that this loss of authority 
concerns Grass’s entire generation. “The controversy over Grass’ hypocrisy,” she writes, 
“seems to mark the end of the Hitler Youth generation’s intellectual prominence.”757 The 
Grass debate, argues Fuchs, served “as an opportunity to dismantle the political and 
intellectual authority of the so-called Hitler Youth generation, which had dominated post-
war affairs for more than forty years.”758 Fuchs sees indicators of this change in the 
vehemence of the attacks against Grass “as an icon of the post-war German intellectual 
scene.”759 She uses the cover of the August 2006 issue of Der Spiegel as an example, 
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which portrays Grass as Oskar Matzerath, the famous protagonist of the Blechtrommel, 
drumming on an SS-helmet. According to Fuchs, the title “Der Blechtrommler,” the word 
“Blech” being highlighted, suggested “that Grass’ belated confession turned his many 
interventions in Germany’s post-war politics into a heap of rubbish.”760 Furthermore, she 
observed that younger generations of Germans had grown tired of the very heatedness 
with which the Grass case was discussed:  
[I]nterventions by a range of younger writers and commentators gave expression 
to a deep-seated sense of tiredness with this type of German memory contest that 
continues to make the National Socialist past a prime concern of the present at the 
expense of other more contemporary and pressing issues.761   
 
Since Anne Fuchs makes this point in passing, she does not provide much evidence for 
her claim. Perhaps one could consider the satirical takes on the Grass debate, such as 
commentaries by Henryk M. Broder and Harald Schmidt, both born after the war, as a 
sign of the exhaustion Fuchs observes. Schmidt writes that the general German sentiment 
towards Grass should be “Schade eigentlich. Denn über die Jahre war GG ein Fels im 
Watt. Ob für Willy oder gegen Verdrängung—GG sagte uns (oft ungefragt), wo’s 
langgeht. Auch die Filme waren Spitze.”762 This satirically portrays what the general 
public (rather superficially) connected with Grass: his engagement for Willy Brandt and 
against the repression of the Nazi as well as Schlöndorff’s film version of die 
Blechtrommel, arguably better known than Grass’ novel. Fuchs is right in pointing out 
that this type of analysis bears a new tone in that it indicates amused indifference rather 
than outrage. Casually, Schmidt recommends saying good-bye to the great writer: Tant 
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pis, it was nice while it lasted, we’ve always liked his movies. Fuchs explains the 
phenomenon as such:  
The awareness that the last generation of witnesses is now passing away has 
produced a new transgenerational dialogue which abandons the accusatory tone of 
earlier inner-familial engagements with the National Socialist past, 
paradigmatically voiced in the so-called ‘Väterliteratur’, popular during the 1970s 
and 1980s in Germany.”763  
 
Fuchs’s claim about a new, less accusatory and less emotional tone in the perception of 
the Hitler Youth generation is convincing but difficult to prove. Most articles written by 
journalists and public intellectuals of various generations naturally take issue with Grass’ 
hypocrisy. There are, however, two striking phenomena that become evident in the 2006 
Grass debate in comparison with the preceding controversies around Wolf and Walser.  
Generational awareness 
The first phenomenon is that, in Fuchs’s words, “the Grass debate brought the issue of 
generation in contemporary German identity debates to the fore.”764 Compared to the 
controversies surrounding Wolf and Walser, the debate over Günter Grass exhibits a 
much greater awareness of the role Grass and his generation played in post-war Germany. 
The symbolic significance of the Hitler Youth generation seems to be finally noticed by 
the feuilleton community, paradoxically at a moment when it had already waned. With 
much greater analytical distance than in the previous debates, several critics even 
redirected the critical gaze from the author to society itself. In an article in Frankfurter 
Rundschau, for example, Harry Nutt writes:  
Wenn an der These, dass Grass eine Art moralischen Selbstmord begangen habe, 
etwas dran ist, dann stellt sich gesellschaftspolitisch die Frage, was für ein Leben 
man so einer Vorbild-Instanz von außen zuschreibt. Die moralische Eitelkeit der 
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Person korrespondiert nur allzu gut mit dem Bedürfnis nach einfachen 
Identifikationsangeboten. Als widerspruchsfreie Leitfigur, der eine 
stellvertretende Unschuld beanspruchen kann, ist der Typus des Intellektuellen 
jedoch schon vor längerer Zeit gestorben.765  
 
Grass’s reign over post-war society, Nutt states, cannot merely be blamed on the author’s 
vanity, which Nutt condemns earlier in the article. His authority was also based on a 
societal desire for authority figures, with which one could easily identify. The Hitler 
Youth generation represented the better Germany, the left-liberal antipodes to the Nazi 
period, from which they seemed to have emerged as the only Germans seemingly 
untainted—or at least that is what people wanted to believe. The problem, a columnist for 
the Badische Zeitung writes, was the Germans’s “Sehnsucht nach der unverfälschten 
moralischen Instanz,” and “[de]r in Ost und West schier unerschütterliche Glaube an die 
moralisch-ethische Kraft des Schriftstellers.”766 
 In an insightful article for Der Tagesspiegel, Peter von Becker points to the 
particular role Grass and his generation have played for the post-war memory discourse:  
Aus der Generation Grass sind ja einige alte, große Autoren und Gelehrte noch 
spät von ihrer einst ziemlich unvermeidlichen Hitler-Jugend eingeholt worden. 
Männer wie Walter Jens und Peter Wapnewski. Doch das alles passiert wohl zum 
letzten Mal. Die Zäsur steht an, denn die Täter, Opfer und Mitläufer, die 
Zeitzeugen, sie sterben aus. Damit setzt eine Historisierung des Erinnerns ein, 
auch die distanzierende Musealisierung. Schon jetzt ist beispielsweise das 
Holocaust-Mahnmal in Berlins Mitte für die Jungen eine lockere Begehungs- und 
Begegnungsstätte. Begegnung mit Vergangenheit – und Zukunft. Ein Hauch, eine 
frische Zugluft war auch die Fußball-WM. Statt des hässlichen zeigte sie der Welt 
den hübschen, heiteren Deutschen. Den jungen Deutschen.767 
 
Von Becker predicts that with the last witnesses of the Nazi period vanishing—from the 
public scene and, given their age, also in general—there will be room for a generational 
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change that was long overdue. This will mark a caesura in post-war German history: a 
historicization of memory will begin, as soon as there will no longer be members of the 
Hitler Youth generation who are still biographically attached to Hitler’s Germany. 
Whereas Grass will remain popular as the writer of Die Blechtrommel, he will certainly 
lose his moral authority over Germany—which in von Becker’s eyes presents a positive 
development:  
Grass hat mit der ‚Blechtrommel’ oder den ‚Hundejahren’  Weltliteratur 
geschrieben. Das bleibt, für immer. Nur das moralische Denkmal ist gestürzt. Das 
hat auch etwas Gutes. Denk mal selber! Ohne praeceptor Germaniae. 
 Denn jetzt kommt eine andere Zeit. Keine Wertewende. Aber was wir in 
dieser letzten Woche erlebt haben, ist in Deutschland 60 Jahre nach dem Krieg 
und anderthalb Jahrzehnte nach der jüngsten Diktatur der Anfang einer 
übervaterlosen Gesellschaft. Das schafft Spielraum, öffnet einen neuen Freiraum. 
Auch wenn da noch ein Leerraum gähnt.768 
 
The disassociation from Grass and other members of the Hitler Youth generation, von 
Becker argues, will mark the beginning of a new time period: “der Anfang einer 
übervaterlosen Gesellschaft,”769 in which people will no longer be able to rely on the 
guidance of these societal role models who seemed to guarantee the correct moral and 
political opinion. The notion of sapere aude implicit in von Becker’s argument indicates 
the significance he assigns to this historical change.  
  
Disassociation of aesthetics and politics 
The second phenomenon, new to the 2006 Grass debate, is the astonishingly strict 
separation of Grass’s aesthetic and his political work. It seemed almost  as if Günter 
Grass were two distinct people:: an author and a public intellectual. The discussions on 
the repercussions of Grass’s revelation for his place in society and the reviews of the 
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book were almost entirely dissociated from one another.770 The criticism mostly 
concerned the public persona Günter Grass, while his autobiographical novel emerged 
from the “Papierberg der Entrüstung,” Schoeller writes, “bislang relativ unbeschadet.”771 
The distinction between Grass the author and Grass the authority figure became explicit 
in many commentaries by other public figures. Former Bundespräsident Richard von 
Weizsäcker was quoted with the sentence: “An der Kraft seiner Literatur und seinen 
prägenden Leistungen für das deutsch-polnische Verhältnis nach dem barbarischen Krieg 
ändert das nichts!”772 The Peruvian writer and Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa argued 
that the scandal would soon be forgotten, while Grass’s writing, especially his novel Die 
Blechtrommel, would last. “Berührt das, was geschehen ist, das literarische Werk von 
Günter Grass? Überhaupt nicht,”773 he stated decidedly. Michel Friedmann, former vice 
president of the Zentralrat der deutschen Juden, said in an interview: “Günter Grass 
gehört zu den genialen Dichtern, seine politischen Äußerungen sind teilweise 
nachvollziehbar, teilweise strittig. Darum geht es ja nicht. Um was es geht, ist der Homo 
politicus, der sich zurecht in die politisch-moralisch-historische Debatte einbrachte.”774 
Critic Joachim Kaiser, asked in an interview with Focus what remained of Grass as a 
public authority figure, responded: “Ungebrochenes Vertrauen in seine genialisch-
poetische Kraft, sanftes Achselzucken, wenn er als Zeitkritiker fundamentalistisch in 
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Wallung gerät.”775 Swiss literary scholar Peter von Matt was asked by the magazine 
Weltwoche: “Schädigt das Schuldgeständnis Grass’ literarisches Werk und seine Rolle als 
moralische Instanz der Nachkriegszeit, oder ist sein Ruhm als Nobelpreisträger so groß, 
dass er die Affäre unbeschädigt überstehenwird?” He answered succinctly: “Mit der 
moralischen Instanz ist es jetzt Essig. ‘Die Blechtrommel’ aber bleibt ein herrlicher 
Roman.”776 Margarete Mitscherlich, co-author of Die Unfähigkeit zu trauern (1967),777 
was asked by the magazine Cicero whether she agrees with those critics demanding that 
Grass return the Nobel Prize he had been awarded in 1999. She said: “Aber nein. Er hat 
diesen Preis nicht seiner Gesinnung wegen bekommen, sondern wegen seines Werks.”778  
 Most journalists likewise praised Grass’s literary accomplishments while stating 
more critically that his moral credibility had seriously suffered. The distinction between 
Grass’s moral credibility and his qualities as a writer almost became a presupposition, as 
the following quotes demonstrate:   
Als öffentliche Autorität ist Günter Grass unwiderruflich beschädigt. Sein Werk 
harrt indes einer womöglich spannenden Relektüre.779  
 
[M]an [muss] die öffentliche Person, den weltanschaulichen und politischen 
Kommentator Grass von dem Dichter und seinem Werk unterscheiden: Wie so 
oft, ist das Werk hier deutlich klüger als die öffentliche Stimme des Autors. 780 
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Das Werk steht unbeschädigt, es verliert nicht ein Jota von seinem literarischen 
Wert, es zeigt sich resistent gegen die öffentlichen Anwürfe. Zur Diskussion steht 
nicht der Literat, sondern die öffentliche Person.781  
 
What had appeared in outlines of the controversy surrounding Walser’s Tod eines 
Kritikers becomes most obvious in the 2006 Grass debate: writers of the Hitler Youth 
generation were released from their public role.  
 The significance of this development cannot be overestimated. Consider the 
debates surrounding Christa Wolf during the nineties in comparison, in which Wolf’s 
alleged moral-political failure was consistently understood as devaluing her work. 
Whereas there seems to have been a general agreement in 1993 that Wolf’s image as a 
writer was hurt by her Stasi affiliation, journalists in 2006 simply rejected the idea that 
Grass’s hypocritical silence about the Waffen-SS past could affect the high estimation of 
his writing. Thus, I would correct Fuchs’s claim that the Grass controversy marked “the 
end of the Hitler Youth generation’s intellectual prominence.”782 It was their authority as 
political commentators that had come to an end. Their prominence as writers remains 
unbroken, as the success of recent publications by all three writers, Grass, Wolf, and 
Walser suggests.783 The true change, which became visible first with the last Walser 
debate in 2002, lies in the reestablishment of boundaries between the biography of the 
authors and their literary work.   
Bad conscience of the nation—a reading of “Beim Häuten der Zwiebel”  
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In the first part of this chapter, I argue that Christa Wolf, in her most recent 
autobiographical novel Stadt der Engel, lets go of the responsibility she felt toward the 
public. In her novel, she liberates herself from the representative role she had long 
embraced but always perceived as a burden. Martin Walser, by contrast, had done so long 
before, and his controversial texts from 1998 and 2002 depict an almost cynical act of 
game-playing with this role: he subverts the morality that was expected of him by 
breaking the most delicate taboos present in German memory discourse. What then does 
Grass’s autobiographical novel Beim Häuten der Zwiebel reveal about the author’s 
position regarding his public role?  
 It seems fairly clear, not only from the autobiographical novel itself but also from 
the FAZ interview in which the author talks for the first time publicly about his Waffen-
SS past, that as opposed to Wolf and Walser, Grass clung to his role as Germany’s 
“national conscience.” He continued to write as a representative of the Hitler Youth 
generation, personal and collective memory intertwined. As Anne Fuchs has pointed out, 
the autobiography is   “[w]ritten in a highly self-conscious manner, the book does not 
begin with Grass’s birth and early childhood memories but rather with the outbreak of the 
Second World War on 1 September 1939, which for Grass marks the abrupt end of his 
childhood; and it ends with the publication of Die Blechtrommel in 1959.”784 This time 
frame alone indicates that Grass does not present his readers with a typical autobiography 
spanning his entire life to the present. Rather, he paints a portrait of the artist as a young 
man that ends with the publication of the work that has brought about Grass’s national 
and international fame. Beim Häuten der Zwiebel depicts the years before Die 
Blechtrommel, the formative years for the career that would follow. These biographical 
                                                





experiences, Grass seems to say, motivated him to become who he is, not as a private 
person but as a public intellectual. This is why Grass continually connects biographical 
experiences during the war and the immediate post-war years with his oeuvre. As Richard 
Schade writes in his essay “Layers of Meaning, War, Art: Grass’s Beim Häuten der 
Zwiebel”:   
Throughout the memoir the reader is reminded of titles written during the years 
well after the purview of the autobiography (1939-1945). The text functions as a 
kind of bibliography, as a literary biography of sorts, reminding the reader that the 
young man who came of age in Beim Häuten der Zwiebel went on to produce 
texts relevant to the events of his entire life.785 
 
One could reformulate this last sentence in reverse order: Grass reminds his readers of the 
fact that the productivity of his later career was fueled by these years as an adolescent 
during the Nazi years and a young adult in the fifties. Similarly to Christa Wolf, for 
whom the war and early post-war years were decisive in terms of her life-long 
engagement with the socialist idea, Grass had always depicted his witnessing of the Nazi 
era and his subsequent coming to awareness after 1945 as the engine that drove his 
writing and his advocacy of Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the Federal Republic.  
 Considering the Waffen-SS revelation, it is somewhat surprising that Grass still 
presents himself as an authority in the memory discourse after the publication of Beim 
Häuten der Zwiebel.  The status as witness without guilt, to which Weigel assigns the 
authority of the Hitler Youth generation, 786 while by and large historically accurate due 
to their young age, becomes at least questionable in Grass’s case. He was, in his own 
words, part of a system “das die Vernichtung von Millionen Menschen geplant, 
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organisiert und vollzogen hatte”787 “Selbst wenn mir tätige Mitschuld auszureden war,” 
he writes in Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, “blieb ein bis heute nicht abgetragener Rest, der 
allzu geläufig Mitverantwortung genannt wird.”788 The twist that enables Grass to speak 
about the Nazi period with an authoritative voice, still as a spokesperson of a “Generation 
[…], die mit kindlichem Aneignungseifer die Nazi-Ideologie übernahm, die in den letzten 
Kriegsmonaten zum Verheizen bestimmt war, die sich durch die Nachkriegszeit hungerte 
und eine Schubumkehr unserer politischen Kultur zustande brachte,”789 as Wilfried 
Schoeller put it, is part of his ostentatious rhetoric of self-accusation.  
 Andreas Huyssen, in his review of Grass’ autobiography for The Nation, 
describes that after an initial sense of betrayal he was surprised to discover the harshness 
with which Grass tackled the ideological aberrations during his adolescence:  
Grass comes down hard and unsentimentally on his inability as a young man to 
read the signs of the times—the nonconformist fellow student who one day 
disappeared from the classroom; the Catholic teacher who ended up in a nearby 
concentration camp; his mother’s hints about the persecution of the Jews. 
Indoctrinated as he was, he saw and looked away. Günter Grass’s éducation 
politique was slow in taking shape, and his memoir acknowledges it.790  
 
Indeed, the self-accusatory tone in the part where Grass writes about his adolescence is 
disarming and appears genuine. Nevertheless, the manner in which he presents his guilt 
appears exaggerated and almost seems exculpatory, as I have demonstrated in the 
previous chapter. He makes a point of depicting Grass the memoirist as the harshest critic 
of Grass the teenager: 
[D]as Belasten, Einstufen und Abstempeln kann ich selber besorgen. Ich war ja 
als Hitlerjunge ein Jungnazi. Gläubig bis zum Schluß. Nicht gerade fanatisch 
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vorneweg, aber mit reflexhaften unverrücktem Blick auf die Fahne, von der es 
hieß, sie sei ‚mehr als der Tod’, blieb ich in Reih und Glied, geübt im 
Gleichschritt. Kein Zweifel kränkte den Glauben, nichts Subversives, etwa die 
heimliche Weitergabe von Flugblättern, kann mich entlasten. Kein Göringwitz 
machte mich verdächtig. Vielmehr sah ich das Vaterland bedroht, weil von 
Feinden umringt. [...]  Um den Jungen und also mich zu entlassen, kann nicht 
einmal gesagt werden: Man hat uns verführt! Nein, wir haben uns, ich habe mich 
verführen lassen.791  
 
His willingness to judge himself harshly is juxtaposed with the teenager’s appearances. 
Teenage Grass regularly “comes to life” in order to remind the memoirist as well as the 
reader to see the historical situation from his perspective:  
Sobald ich mir den Jungen von einst, der ich als Dreizehnjähriger gewesen bin, 
herbeizitiere, ihn streng ins Verhör nehme und die Verlockung spüre, ihn zu 
richten, womöglich wie einen Fremden, dessen Nöte mich kaltlassen, 
abzuurteilen, sehe ich einen mittelgroßen Bengel in kurzen Hosen und 
Kniestrümpfen, der ständig grimassiert. Er weicht mir aus, will nicht beurteilt, 
verurteilt werden. Er flüchtet auf Mutters Schoß. Er ruft: ‚Ich war doch ein Kind 
nur, nur ein Kind...’ 
 Ich versuche, ihn zu beruhigen, und bitte ihn, mit beim Häuten der 
Zwiebel zu helfen, aber er verweigert Auskünfte, will sich nicht als mein frühes 
Selbstbild ausbeuten lassen. Er spricht mir das Recht ab, ihn, wie er sagt, 
‚fertigzumachen’, und zwar ‚von oben herab’.792  
 
Both the self-accusation as well as the offer of an apology that becomes manifest in these 
last two passages serve the purpose of exonerating Grass from the blame of having been 
in the Waffen-SS, while simultaneously portraying the author as a highly self-critical and 
thus exemplary memoirist.  
 I agree with Ulrich Greiner’s subtle critique of this skillful yet exaggerated self-
criticism when he writes: “Selbst die eindrucksvoll herausgearbeitete 
Selbstzerknirschung, die man in den Memoiren von Grass nachlesen kann, entbehrt nicht 
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eines gewissen Sündenstolzes.”793 Jens Jessen more explicitly condemned the “Spektakel 
der Selbstanklage” that Grass,794in his view, staged in his interview with the FAZ: the 
caption of his article in Die Zeit reads, “Die öffentliche Selbstrechtfertigung des großen 
Schriftstellers ist so unnötig wie ärgerlich.”795 To call Grass’s confession an entirely 
staged “Aufschrei einer gequälten Seele in maximaler Lautstärke,” as Jessen does, is too 
harsh a judgment, and I do not support Jessen’s suggestion that the interview was a 
marketing trick to sell his book. My main criticism is directed at the imbalance between 
Grass’ ostentatious self-accusation with regard to his adolescent aberrations and the 
comparatively meager commentary on the belatedness, with which he confessed the 
important historical detail that he was a member of the Waffen-SS. Considering that most 
critics did not even bother to discuss the moral issue of his joining the SS at seventeen and 
that his moral failure was rather seen to be his long-term silence, that the author, in his 
attempt to tame his critics, participated in a discourse about guilt and innocence that had 
long become outdated. One could say that he simply addressed the wrong issue.  
 The debate in 2006 would have been an appropriate moment for Grass either to 
reflect whether his long silence was caused by restrictions inherent of the post-war 
discourse or to simply withdraw from public discourse. Instead, he displays a strong 
desire to remain the advocate of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, as though nothing had 
changed since the 1960, as the following statement shows that Grass made on television 
in 2006:  
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Und was sagen Sie denen, die von Ihnen als moralischer Instanz nun enttäuscht 
sind? 
—Ja, ich muss mit dieser Kritik leben, ich will das alles auch nicht zurückweisen, 
aber wenn ich das so zur Kenntnis nehme, werd ich an meinen politischen 
Beurteilungen und meinen Einschätzungen nichts zurücknehmen. […] Das sind 
Einschätzungen, die ich auch aufgrund meiner Erfahrungen gemacht habe. Ich 
gehöre zu dieser gebrannten Generation und habe daraus sehr früh dann nach und 
noch mit dem Wachsen meiner politischen Einsichten und Kenntnisse meine 
Konsequenzen daraus gezogen.796  
 
Since he cannot relinquish his responsibilities as a spokesperson of society, he seems to 
posit here, he will simply have to “endure” the personal criticism. My analysis of the 
Grass debate has shown that by 2006 the writers had been deprived of the authority they 
once had as moral-political figures in the political discourse. It seems that Grass, 
however, refused to recognize this change. 
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During the Christa Wolf debate in 1990–91, Ulrich Greiner described the merging of 
aesthetics, biography, and memory politics in post-war German literature as 
“Gesinnungsästhetik,” and Wolf as the most prominent representative of this conception:  
In der Gesinnungsästhetik, und ihr herausragendes Beispiel bleibt Christa Wolf, 
sind Werk und Person und Moral untrennbar. Der Text ist der moralische 
Selbstentwurf des Autors. Und der Autor ist identisch mit seiner moralischen 
Absicht.797  
 
While Greiner uses the term “Gesinnungsästhetik” critically and applies to post-war 
German literature as a whole, I want to suggest at the end of this chapter to turn it into an 
unironical, analytical category and to use it exclusively for writers of the Hitler Youth 
generation. No other generation in the post-war era made both their writing and their 
politics so dependent on a morality intrinsically linked to the Nazi era. “Gesinnung,” a 
term with moral and political implications that is perhaps best translated as “morality,” is 
a crucial category for understanding the work of Grass, Walser and Wolf, and in order to 
understand their “Gesinnung” one needs to take into account how their Hitler Youth 
biographies shaped their development as writers during the post-war era. Their historical 
position between the perpetrator and the first post-war generation, an ambiguous place 
between innocence and guilt, made the public reflection on their upbringing both in 
literary and political terms necessary. “Werk und Person und Moral”798 were intrisically 
connected for them.  
 In this chapter, I have traced the disintegration of this triad by focusing on the 
literature and the reception of Grass, Walser, and Wolf in the twenty years following 
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Germany’s re-unification. When the memory discourse changed after 1990 the writers’s 
representative role as the generation of witnesses became increasingly less important, 
while simultaneously the critics acknowledged this role for the first time. My goal has not 
been only to outline the development in the reception of Wolf, Walser, and Grass, but 
also to unveil that these authors themselves reflected upon the dismantling of their 
authority in the public sphere. It should now be apparent that they did so in different 
ways:  
 It seems that Christa Wolf’s belief in socialism was so closely connected with her 
pre-war biographical and so constitutive of her post-war identity as a writer and public 
persona that she was unable to admit the failure of the socialist German experiment even 
after the collapse of the GDR. I have shown, however, that the critics overlooked the self-
reflective qualities of the 1990 text Was bleibt. In many ways, the participants of the 
debate merely repeated what Wolf had already stressed in the text herself, namely that, 
despite the Stasi surveillance she endured during the seventies, and despite the obvious 
failure of the East-German state, she unsuccessfully searched for a new language that 
would enable her to regard the socialist experiment in more critical terms. I have 
illustrated that in this disclosure of her weakness, Wolf offers a generational explanation. 
While the younger writer in Was bleibt takes a critical stance and expresses the 
oppressive tendencies of the regime without fear, Wolf’s alter ego, is unable to do so 
because the state presents such an important part of her personal history. Only twenty 
years after Germany’s reunification in her novel Stadt der Engel, Wolf finally distances 
herself from her socialist past—along with a type of biographical writing typical for the 





counterpoint to her previous writing and an act of liberation. The novel does not reveal a 
new language critical of the GDR. Neither does it address Wolf’s Stasi affiliation in the 
sixties in a sufficient way. But after a long period of self-introspection, in which the 
author withdrew more and more from the public sphere, she releases herself from the 
self-assigned moral and political responsibilities in Stadt der Engel. She died one year 
later in December 2011.  
 Walser, one could argue, was the most perceptive of the three authors. Since the 
late 1970s he had rejected the idea of being part of a generation representing what from 
his perspective was a guilt-ridden memory of the Nazi period. When memory became an 
important topic again during the 1990s he used his popularity in order to subvert the role 
he knew was expected of him as a former Hitler Youth. Instead of emphasizing the 
importance of ritualized Holocaust memory, he expresses his utter annoyance with it. 
Both with his Friedenspreis speech (1998) and with his novel Tod eines Kritikers (2002) 
he sought to provoke. Supposedly speaking as a private person who “just said what 
everyone thinks,” he demanded the normalization of Germany’s memory discourse in his 
Frankfurt speech, and he thereby distinctly opposed Grass and other intellectuals of the 
Hitler Youth generation. A few years later, he performed the role of a writer who “just 
wrote a satire about the literary scene,” while consciously playing with the most 
explosive issue in German public discourse to the present day in order to make the point 
that literature ought to be free from moral claims—even with regard to anti-Semitism. 
Though it was precisely Walser’s goal to reject moral-political responsibilities derived 
from his generational background, his stark protest underlines the significance of this 





 Grass, by comparison, displays an unimpaired desire to maintain his role as 
Germany’s moral and political spokesperson, even after his Waffen-SS confession in 
2006. Unlike Wolf whose commitments were shaken up by the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
and unlike Walser, who had long given up such a position, Grass’s self-reflective writing 
never concerned his post-war persona but was always limited to his role during the war 
and shortly thereafter. In Beim Häuten der Zwiebel, he offers the same approach to his 
biography as during his entire career, the sole exception being his slightly more 
ostentatious self-accusation, which I have read as an attempt to buffer the impact of 
criticism he expected after the Waffen-SS revelation. The feuilleton, however, was not 
nearly as interested in Grass’s guilt during the Nazi as in his post-war dishonesty—a 
topic Grass failed to address.   
 The analyses in this last chapter show that there are two reasons for the Hitler 
Youth generation’s long-lasting influence in the public sphere. On the one hand, the 
writers themselves displayed a strong sense of commitment to building a new and better 
Germany. Their moral-political mission was shaped by their coming of age in Nazi-
Germany and the recognition that they had blindly followed a murderous regime. From 
the beginning of their careers, Grass, Walser and Wolf hence saw themselves as political 
writers, their engagement in the public sphere driven by their generational experience. On 
the other hand, their enduring intellectual prominence in the public sphere equally 
resulted from a strong desire for clear-cut role models in Germany’s post-war society, 
both in the East and West. After the moral and political disaster of the Third Reich, the 
need for iconic figures who represented the successful transition from Nazi enthusiasm to 





implicated than the perpetrator generation, was the first generation able to fill this need. 
Thus, for a long time, the two Germanies were willing to grant the writers as much 
authority as they wanted to have in the public sphere. 
 After 1990, however, the parameters changed. Although the detachment from the 
Hitler Youth generation took almost twenty years, much longer than predicted, the 
generational change ultimately did happen—not only because of Germany’s different 
political landscape and the country’s increased distance to World War II but also because 
Wolf’s affiliations with the Stasi, Walser’s memory provocations, and Grass’s Waffen-SS 
past damaged the moral credibility of these writers. Greiner, Schirrmacher, and Bohrer, 
however, quoted in the introduction to this chapter, were only partly right in their 
prognosis that this generation of writers would resign. Interestingly, it seems that while 
the Hitler Youth generation was relieved of its political responsibility, the high esteem of 
its contributions in the aesthetic realm remains unbroken. They left the stage as political 
commentators during the twenty years after Germany’s reunification. But they are—or 








In the four chapters of this dissertation, I sought to illuminate the childhood bonds 
between Günter Grass, Martin Walser, and Christa Wolf, as a result of their shared 
generational experiences of the Nazi era. I argued that Gruppe 47— often used as a 
synonym for the “first generation of post-war writers”—the label under which the works 
of Grass and Walser are usually subsumed along with those of writers such as Alfred 
Andersch and Hans-Werner Richter, does not capture the particularity of either the 
politics or the literature of these two writers of the Hitler Youth generation. Instead, I 
contended that their intense, biographically motivated engagement with German politics, 
perhaps surprisingly demonstrates a much stronger affinity with the works of the East 
German writer Christa Wolf.  
 In fact, Grass and Wolf appear as the western and eastern sides of the same coin, 
so to speak: they came to embody the memory of the Nazi past by speaking to and about 
their generation, the children of Hitler, on both sides of the Berlin Wall. They became the 
representatives of the work of Vergangenheitsbewaltigung, vanguards in understanding 
and working through the past—their past, the childhood and adolescence of a generation 
that grew up under Hitler, and subsequently became the subject of many of their books. 
But while he shared in the public recognition of Grass and Wolf, and all three were seen 
to symbolize Germany’s political development after 1945, the departure from Nazi 
ideologies and the fight for democratic values, I argued that Walser himself never fully 
endorsed the political discourse represented by his generation, which was primarily a 
memory discourse focusing on Germany’s historical guilt. His conservative politics since 





nostalgia for a German Heimat separated him from Wolf and Grass. As a result of his 
right-wing political leanings, Walser—unlike the two others—did not write about his 
upbringing during the Third Reich until the end of the nineties, when he used his 
childhood memoir Ein springender Brunnen, as well as a series of other texts, as a means 
not so much to work through the past, but to protest against the public role he believed 
the mainstream left-wing memory discourse had forced on him and his generation.  
I argued that, at least to some extent, Walser’s provocative agitations of the 
discourse surrounding his generation and their relationship to the Nazi past became a 
kind of tilting at windmills. After 1990, this discourse had already begun to change, as as 
a result of changes in Germany’s self-understanding following reunification, and as the 
feuilletons developed an increasingly critical position towards the three authors and their 
generation in a number of heated public debates. I claimed that while the three writers 
remained respected figures within the literary realm, over the course of the nineties they 
increasingly lost their authority in the political sphere.  
At the end of my analysis it is worth asking how the authors see themselves in the 
cultural-political realm today. While Grass and Walser have never really connected over 
their shared childhood experience, the two writers have recently begun to bond over a 
common enemy: the media, or, to use the more nuanced German term, the 
“Öffentlichkeit”. In 2007, in an interview with Die Zeit on the occasion of their 80th 
birthdays, both men speak in terms of a victimhood that had not been heard before, 
revealing the extent to which they both felt they had been demoted by the media and thus 
deprived of the respect and recognition they think they deserve for their life’s work. 





Friedenspreis speech and his own Waffen SS revelations, Grass for example said that 
“Im Ausland schüttelt man den Kopf darüber, wie man mit uns beiden hierzulande 
umgeht.”799 Referring to the negative reviews of his reunification novel Ein weites Feld 
(1995), he added: “Dieser Mangel an Respekt unseren Leistungen gegenüber, den finde 
ich entsetzlich.”800 Walser’s strong aversion to the media could not have been more 
obvious in the interview, as he continually attacks the journalists Iris Radisch and 
Christoph Siemes, and expresses his fatigue about the alleged stupidity of their 
questions—“Jetzt brauche ich Zigarillos!” as he laments, “Das kann ich nur noch als 
Raucher bestehen.”801 Even without actually being criticized by the journalists, Walser 
preemptively suggests that the media is to blame—though it is not made entirely clear 
what they are to blame for: “Dieses Gespräch muss auch ein Gespräch sein über das 
Medium Öffentlichkeit, das ihr verwaltet und mit dem wir 40 Jahre lang zu tun haben. 
[…] Die Vierte Gewalt dürfte sich ruhig auch einmal selbst kritisieren.”802  
 In her article on the symbolic character of generational memory, Sigrid Weigel 
claims that these authors sought to create and disseminate an apologetic discourse of 
avoidance with regard to the legacy of the Third Reich. In contrast, I believe that I have 
shown that none of the three authors examined in my dissertation used the idea of 
childhood innocence to evade historical responsibility in such a simple manner. Rather, 
the sense of victimhood seems to have emerged with old age—and not with regard to 
their childhood biographies but to their legacy as cultural figures during the post-war era. 
                                                
799 Günter Grass and Martin Walser, “Wer ein Jahr jünger ist, hat keine Ahnung. Ein Zeit-Gespräch 









It’s worth noting, however, that only the two male authors began to represent themselves 
publicly as artistis mistreated by the public. In contrast, Christa Wolf withdrew from the 
political arena after reunification and tried to come to terms with the end of the socialist 
dream in private. Her last statement made before she died was not public and political but 
aesthetic, as I argued in in my reading of the strange ending of her novel Stadt der Engel, 
where I see her releasing herself from the responsibility of explaining her politics, and 
her errors, to the German public. 
 Walser and Grass’ new discourse of victimization, however, proved to have a 
long reach, affecting the memory about Wolf even after her death. While Grass’ eulogy 
for Wolf began by praising her accomplishments, it ended with bitter accusations against 
the media, who in Grass’ view, had badly mistreated the East German author during the 
debate surrounding her novella Was bleibt. Why, Grass asked, had none of those who 
attacked Wolf during that time apologized for carrying on a smear campaign against the 
author based on “Verleumdungen, verfälschte Zitate, Rufmord”?803 Up until her death, he 
claimed, Wolf’s critics had revealed a shocking lack of precisely that trait of character 
she herself embodied: “Mut zum Selbstzweifel.”804 But nobody is listening to Grass 
anymore, it seems, even when he attempts to hold on to his role as a societal 
spokesperson for the state of the German nation. When Beim Häuten der Zwiebel was 
published in Israel in 2011, he falsely claimed in an interview with Ha’aretz that six 
million German soldiers had been killed in the Soviet Union—the actual number being 
                                                
803 Grass, “Was bleibt. Trauerrede,” Berliner Zeitung, December 14, 2011, http://www.berliner-
zeitung.de/kultur/abschied-von-christa-wolf-was-bleibt--trauerrede-von-guenter-
grass,10809150,11302844.html.  





around one million.805 While one might expect a reaction of outrage on the part of the 
German “Öffentlichkeit”, it was a sign of Grass’ declining status that no such widespread 
outrage occurred. In touching on the idea of German suffering in World War II, which 
was already long regarded as passé, Grass enacted his own irrelevance. Of the few critical 
articles in the German feuilleton that even commented on the event, a few reacted with 
cynicism,806 but by and large, it seems that the critics merely sighed and moved on to 
more pressing, more relevant topics. Sometimes, one critic remarked, it would be better if 








                                                
805 His precise words were these: “Of eight million German soldiers who were captured by the Russians, 
perhaps two million survived and all the rest were liquidated. There were about 14 million refugees in 
Germany; half the country went directly from Nazi tyranny to communist tyranny. I am not saying this to 
diminish the gravity of the crime against the Jews, but the Holocaust was not the only crime. We bear 
responsibility for the Nazis’ crimes. But the crimes inflicted serious disasters on the Germans and thus they 
became victims.” Tom Segev, “The German who needed a fig leaf,” Ha’aretz, 26 August 
<http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/magazine/the-german-who-needed-a-fig-leaf-1.380883>. In reality, 
between 700,000 and 1.1 million Germans had died in captivity, mostly from hunger. For an account of this 
latest Grass affair and useful historical background, see Peter Jahn, “Wie Günter Grass den Weltkrieg 
verrechnet,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 1, 2011, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/kultur/relativierung-
von-kriegsgraeulen-wie-guenter-grass-den-weltkrieg-und-dessen-folgen-verrechnet-1.1137420. 
806 See, for example, Ulrich Gutmair, “Holocaust-Mathe mit Günter Grass. Lasst uns alle Opfer sein,” taz, 
September 1, 2011, http://www.taz.de/!77313/.  
807 See the last sentence in Gerrit Bartels: “’Auch Deutsche unter Opfern. Porträt Günter Grass, 
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